Latest / Supreme Cases from 1803-2018 / 26 - Supreme Cases from 1803-2018 by United States Supreme Court
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Section twenty six of a collection of Supreme Court opinions
- 0:04Speaker 1: by the United States Supreme Court. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:08Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:11Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Recording
- 0:17Speaker 1: by Colin McMahon Roe v. Wade, four to ten US
- 0:21Speaker 1: one thirteen, Decided January twenty second, nineteen seventy three, Part two.
- 0:26Speaker 1: Please note this is a reading of the opinion of
- 0:29Speaker 1: the Court only. This reading does not include the syllabus
- 0:33Speaker 1: or any concurring or dissenting opinions. For ease of listening,
- 0:37Speaker 1: this reading omits legal citations found within the text of
- 0:40Speaker 1: the Court's opinion end of quote. Except for periodic condemnation
- 0:46Speaker 1: of the criminal abortionist. No further formal AMA action took
- 0:50Speaker 1: place until nineteen sixty seven. In that year, the Committee
- 0:54Speaker 1: on Human Reproduction urged the adoption of a stated policy
- 0:58Speaker 1: of opposition to inducetable except when there is quote documented
- 1:03Speaker 1: medical evidence end of quote of a threat to the
- 1:06Speaker 1: health or life of the mother, or that the child
- 1:09Speaker 1: quote may be born with incapacitating physical deformity or mental
- 1:13Speaker 1: deficiency end of quote, or that a pregnancy. Quote resulting
- 1:18Speaker 1: from legally established, statutory or forcible rape or incest may
- 1:23Speaker 1: constitute a threat to the mental or physical health of
- 1:25Speaker 1: the patient. End of quote. Two other physicians quote chosen
- 1:30Speaker 1: because of their recognized professional competence, have examined the patient
- 1:34Speaker 1: and have concurred in writing. End of quote, and the
- 1:38Speaker 1: procedure quote is performed in a hospital accredited by the
- 1:41Speaker 1: Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. End of quote. The
- 1:46Speaker 1: providing of medical information by physicians to state legislatures in
- 1:50Speaker 1: their consideration of legislation regarding therapeutic abortion was quote to
- 1:55Speaker 1: be considered consistent with the principles of ethics of the
- 1:59Speaker 1: American Medicals Association. End of quote. This recommendation was adopted
- 2:03Speaker 1: by the House of Delegates in nineteen seventy after the
- 2:07Speaker 1: introduction of a variety of proposed resolutions and of a
- 2:11Speaker 1: report from its Board of Trustees. A reference committee noted
- 2:15Speaker 1: quote polarization of the medical profession on this controversial issue.
- 2:19Speaker 1: End of quote, division among those who had testified, a
- 2:23Speaker 1: difference of opinion among AMA councils and committees. Quote. The
- 2:27Speaker 1: remarkable shift in testimony end of quote in six months
- 2:31Speaker 1: felt to be influenced quote by the rapid changes in
- 2:35Speaker 1: state laws and by the judicial decisions which tend to
- 2:38Speaker 1: make abortion more freely available end of quote, and a
- 2:42Speaker 1: feeling quote that this trend will continue end of quote.
- 2:45Speaker 1: On June twenty fifth, nineteen seventy, the House of Delegates
- 2:48Speaker 1: adopted preambles and most of the resolutions proposed by the
- 2:52Speaker 1: Reference Committee. The preambles emphasized quote the best interests of
- 2:57Speaker 1: the patient, sound clinical judgment, and informed patient consent end
- 3:02Speaker 1: of quote, in contrast to quote mere acquiescence to the
- 3:05Speaker 1: patient's demand end of quote. The resolutions asserted that abortion
- 3:10Speaker 1: is a medical procedure that should be performed by a
- 3:13Speaker 1: licensed physician in an accredited hospital only after consultation with
- 3:17Speaker 1: two other physicians and in conformity with state law, and
- 3:21Speaker 1: that no party to the procedure should be required to
- 3:24Speaker 1: violate personally held moral principles footnote quote. Whereas abortion, like
- 3:29Speaker 1: any other medical procedure, should not be performed when contrary
- 3:33Speaker 1: to the best interests of the patient, since good medical
- 3:36Speaker 1: practice requires due consideration for the patient's welfare and not
- 3:41Speaker 1: mere acquiescence to the patient's demand. And whereas the standards
- 3:45Speaker 1: of sound clinical judgment, which, together with informed patient consent,
- 3:50Speaker 1: should be determinative according to the merits of each individual case. Therefore,
- 3:56Speaker 1: be it resolved that abortion is a medical procedure and
- 3:59Speaker 1: should be performed formed only by a duly licensed physician
- 4:02Speaker 1: and surgeon in an accredited hospital, acting only after consultation
- 4:07Speaker 1: with two other physicians, chosen because of their professional competency
- 4:11Speaker 1: and in conformance with standards of good medical practice and
- 4:15Speaker 1: the Medical Practice Act of his state. And be it
- 4:18Speaker 1: further resolved that no physician or other professional personnel shall
- 4:23Speaker 1: be compelled to perform any act which violates his good
- 4:26Speaker 1: medical judgment. Neither physician, hospital, nor hospital personnel shall be
- 4:31Speaker 1: required to perform any act violative of personally held moral principles.
- 4:36Speaker 1: In these circumstances, good medical practice requires only that the
- 4:40Speaker 1: physician or other professional personnel withdrawal from the case, so
- 4:45Speaker 1: long as the withdrawal is consistent with good medical practice.
- 4:48Speaker 1: End of Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates, two
- 4:52Speaker 1: twenty June nineteen seventy end of footnote. The AMA Judicial
- 4:57Speaker 1: Council rendered a complimentary opinion. Footnote. The principles of medical
- 5:02Speaker 1: ethics of the AMA do not prohibit a physician from
- 5:05Speaker 1: performing an abortion that is performed in accordance with good
- 5:09Speaker 1: medical practice and under circumstances that do not violate the
- 5:13Speaker 1: laws of the community in which he practices. In the
- 5:16Speaker 1: matter of abortions, as of any other medical procedure, the
- 5:20Speaker 1: Judicial Council becomes involved whenever there is alleged violation of
- 5:24Speaker 1: the principles of medical ethics as established by the House
- 5:27Speaker 1: of Delegates end of footnote seven the position of the
- 5:32Speaker 1: American Public Health Association. In October nineteen seventy, the Executive
- 5:37Speaker 1: Board of the APHA adopted standards for abortion services. These
- 5:42Speaker 1: were five in number. A rapid and simple abortion referral
- 5:46Speaker 1: must be readily available through state and local public health departments,
- 5:50Speaker 1: medical societies, or other non profit organizations. B. An important
- 5:56Speaker 1: function of counseling should be to simplify and expedite the
- 5:59Speaker 1: provision of abortion services. It should not delay the obtaining
- 6:03Speaker 1: of these services. C Psychiatric consultation should not be mandatory,
- 6:09Speaker 1: as in the case of other specialized medical services. Psychiatric
- 6:13Speaker 1: consultation should be sought for definite indications and not on
- 6:16Speaker 1: a routine basis. D A wide range of individuals from
- 6:21Speaker 1: appropriately trained, sympathetic volunteers to highly skilled physicians may qualify
- 6:26Speaker 1: as abortion counselors. E. Contraception and or sterilization should be
- 6:32Speaker 1: discussed with each abortion patient. Among factors pertinent to life
- 6:36Speaker 1: and health risks associated with abortion were three that quote
- 6:40Speaker 1: are recognized as important end of quote. A the skill
- 6:44Speaker 1: of the physician, b the environment in which the abortion
- 6:47Speaker 1: is performed, and above all, C the duration of pregnancy
- 6:51Speaker 1: as determined by uterine size and confirmed by menstrual history.
- 6:55Speaker 1: It was said that quote a well equipped hospital end
- 6:59Speaker 1: of quote offers more protection quote to cope with unforeseen
- 7:02Speaker 1: difficulties than an office or clinic without such resources. The
- 7:07Speaker 1: factor of gestational age is of overriding importance end of quote. Thus,
- 7:12Speaker 1: it was recommended that abortions in the second trimester and
- 7:15Speaker 1: early abortions in the presence of existing medical complications be
- 7:20Speaker 1: performed in hospitals as inpatient procedures for pregnancies in the
- 7:24Speaker 1: first trimester. Abortion in the hospital, with or without overnight
- 7:28Speaker 1: stay quote is probably the safest practice end of quote.
- 7:32Speaker 1: An abortion in an extramural facility, however, is an acceptable
- 7:37Speaker 1: alternative quote, provided arrangements exist in advance to admit patients
- 7:41Speaker 1: promptly if unforeseen complications develop end of quote. Standards for
- 7:46Speaker 1: an abortion facility were listed. It was said that at present,
- 7:50Speaker 1: abortions should be performed by physicians or osteopaths who are
- 7:54Speaker 1: licensed to practice and who have quote adequate training end
- 7:58Speaker 1: of quote eight the position of the American Bar Association.
- 8:03Speaker 1: At its meeting in February nineteen seventy two, the ABA
- 8:06Speaker 1: House of Delegates approved with seventeen opposing votes, the Uniform
- 8:10Speaker 1: Abortion Act that had been drafted and approved the preceding
- 8:14Speaker 1: August by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
- 8:18Speaker 1: We set forth the Act in full in the margin
- 8:21Speaker 1: footnote Uniform Abortion Act. Section one. Abortion defined when authorized.
- 8:27Speaker 1: A abortion means the termination of human pregnancy with an intention
- 8:32Speaker 1: other than to produce a live birth or to remove
- 8:35Speaker 1: a dead fetus. B. An abortion may be performed in
- 8:38Speaker 1: this state only if it is performed one by a
- 8:41Speaker 1: physician licensed to practice medicine or osteopathy in this state,
- 8:46Speaker 1: or by a physician practicing medicine or osteopathy in the
- 8:49Speaker 1: employ of the Government of the United States or of
- 8:52Speaker 1: this state, and the abortion is performed in the physician's
- 8:56Speaker 1: office or in a medical clinic, or in a hospital
- 8:59Speaker 1: approved by the Department of Health or operated by the
- 9:02Speaker 1: United States, this State, or any department, agency, or political
- 9:06Speaker 1: subdivision of either, or by a female upon herself with
- 9:10Speaker 1: the advice of the physician, and two within twenty weeks
- 9:14Speaker 1: after the commencement of the pregnancy, or after twenty weeks
- 9:18Speaker 1: only if the physician has reasonable cause to believe. One
- 9:21Speaker 1: that there is a substantial risk the continuance of the
- 9:24Speaker 1: pregnancy would endanger the life of the mother or would
- 9:27Speaker 1: gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother.
- 9:31Speaker 1: Two that the child would be born with grave physical
- 9:34Speaker 1: or mental defect, or three that the pregnancy resulted from
- 9:38Speaker 1: rape or incest or illicit intercourse with a girl under
- 9:41Speaker 1: the age of sixteen years. Section two penalty. Any person
- 9:46Speaker 1: who performs or procures an abortion other than authorized by
- 9:49Speaker 1: this Act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof,
- 9:53Speaker 1: may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one
- 9:55Speaker 1: thousand dollars or to imprisonment in the state penitentiary reading
- 10:00Speaker 1: five years, or both. Section three. Uniformity of interpretation. This
- 10:05Speaker 1: Act shall be construed to effectuate its general purpose to
- 10:08Speaker 1: make uniform the law with respect to the subject of
- 10:12Speaker 1: this Act among those states which enact it. Section four
- 10:16Speaker 1: short title. This Act may be cited as the Uniform
- 10:19Speaker 1: Abortion Act. Section five severability. If any provision of this
- 10:25Speaker 1: Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
- 10:28Speaker 1: is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions
- 10:32Speaker 1: or applications of this Act, which can be given effect
- 10:35Speaker 1: without the invalid provision or application. And to this end,
- 10:40Speaker 1: the provisions of this Act are severable. Section six repeal.
- 10:45Speaker 1: The following acts and parts of acts are repealed one
- 10:49Speaker 1: two three. Section seven Time of taking effect. This Act
- 10:54Speaker 1: shall take effect blank. End of footnote. The opinion of
- 10:59Speaker 1: the Court Conference has appended an enlightening prefatory note. Footnote.
- 11:04Speaker 1: This Act is based largely upon the New York Abortion Act,
- 11:07Speaker 1: following a review of the more recent laws on abortion
- 11:10Speaker 1: in several states and upon recognition of a more liberal
- 11:13Speaker 1: trend in laws on this subject. Recognition was given also
- 11:17Speaker 1: to the several decisions in state and federal courts which
- 11:21Speaker 1: show a further trend toward liberalization of abortion laws, especially
- 11:25Speaker 1: during the first trimester of pregnancy. Recognizing that a number
- 11:29Speaker 1: of problems appeared in New York, a shorter time period
- 11:32Speaker 1: for quote unlimited end of quote abortions was advisable. The
- 11:37Speaker 1: time period was bracketed to permit the various states to
- 11:40Speaker 1: insert a figure more in keeping with the different conditions
- 11:43Speaker 1: that might exist among the states. Likewise, the language limiting
- 11:47Speaker 1: the place or places in which abortions may be performed
- 11:51Speaker 1: was also bracketed to account for different conditions among the states.
- 11:55Speaker 1: In addition, limitations on abortions after the initial quote unlimited
- 12:00Speaker 1: end of quote period were placed in brackets so that
- 12:03Speaker 1: individual states may adopt all or any of these reasons
- 12:07Speaker 1: or place further restrictions upon abortions after the initial period.
- 12:11Speaker 1: This Act does not contain any provision relating to medical
- 12:14Speaker 1: review committees or prohibitions against sanctions imposed upon medical personnel
- 12:19Speaker 1: refusing to participate in abortions because of religious or other
- 12:23Speaker 1: similar reasons, or the like. Such provisions, while related, do
- 12:27Speaker 1: not directly pertain to when, where, or by whom abortions
- 12:31Speaker 1: may be performed. However, the Act is not drafted to
- 12:34Speaker 1: exclude such a provision by a state wishing to enact
- 12:37Speaker 1: the same end a footnote seven. Three reasons have been
- 12:42Speaker 1: advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws
- 12:46Speaker 1: in the nineteenth century, and to justify their continued existence.
- 12:52Speaker 1: It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the
- 12:54Speaker 1: product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however,
- 13:01Speaker 1: does not advance this justification in the present case, and
- 13:04Speaker 1: it appears that no court or commentator has taken the
- 13:07Speaker 1: argument seriously. The appellans ANEMICI contend moreover that this is
- 13:13Speaker 1: not a proper state purpose at all, and suggests that
- 13:16Speaker 1: if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in protecting it,
- 13:20Speaker 1: since the law fails to distinguish between married and unwed mothers.
- 13:24Speaker 1: A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure.
- 13:28Speaker 1: When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure
- 13:32Speaker 1: was a hazardous one for the woman. This was particularly
- 13:35Speaker 1: true prior to the development of antisepsis. Antiseptic techniques, of course,
- 13:40Speaker 1: were based on discoveries by Lister Pesterer and others first
- 13:44Speaker 1: announced in eighteen sixty seven, but were not generally accepted
- 13:48Speaker 1: and employed until about the turn of the century. Abortion
- 13:51Speaker 1: mortality was high even after nineteen hundred, and perhaps until
- 13:55Speaker 1: as late as the development of antibiotics in the nineteen forties,
- 13:59Speaker 1: standard modern techniques such as dilation and curetage were not
- 14:04Speaker 1: nearly so safe as they are today. Thus, it has
- 14:07Speaker 1: been argued that a state's real concern in enacting a
- 14:10Speaker 1: criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman, that is,
- 14:13Speaker 1: to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed
- 14:16Speaker 1: her life in serious jeopardy. Modern medical techniques have altered
- 14:20Speaker 1: this situation. Appellants and Varius Amici refer to medical data
- 14:25Speaker 1: indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to
- 14:29Speaker 1: the end of the first trimester, although not without its risk,
- 14:33Speaker 1: is now relatively safe. Mortality rates for women undergoing early
- 14:37Speaker 1: abortions where the procedure is legal, appear to be as
- 14:40Speaker 1: low as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth. Consequently,
- 14:45Speaker 1: any interest of the state in protecting the woman from
- 14:47Speaker 1: an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally
- 14:51Speaker 1: dangerous for her to forego it, has largely disappeared. Of course,
- 14:56Speaker 1: important state interests in the areas of health and medical
- 14:59Speaker 1: standards do remain. This state has a legitimate interest in
- 15:03Speaker 1: seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure,
- 15:07Speaker 1: is performed under circumstances that ensure maximum safety for the patient.
- 15:12Speaker 1: This interest obviously extends at least to the performing physician
- 15:16Speaker 1: and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability
- 15:20Speaker 1: of aftercare, and to adequate provision for any complication or
- 15:23Speaker 1: emergency that might arise. The prevalence of high mortality rates
- 15:27Speaker 1: at illegal quote abortion mills end of quote strengthens, rather
- 15:32Speaker 1: than weakens, the state's interest in regulating the conditions under
- 15:35Speaker 1: which abortions are performed. Moreover, the risk to the woman
- 15:40Speaker 1: increases as her pregnancy continues. Thus, the state retains a
- 15:44Speaker 1: definite interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety
- 15:48Speaker 1: when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.
- 15:51Speaker 1: The third reason is the state's interest. Some phrase it
- 15:55Speaker 1: in terms of duty in protecting prenatal life. Some of
- 15:59Speaker 1: the argument or this justification rests on the theory that
- 16:02Speaker 1: a new human life is present from the moment of conception.
- 16:06Speaker 1: The state's interest and general obligation to protect life then extends,
- 16:10Speaker 1: It is argued to prenatal life only when the life
- 16:13Speaker 1: of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against
- 16:17Speaker 1: the life she carries within her. Should the interest of
- 16:20Speaker 1: the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a
- 16:24Speaker 1: legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or
- 16:27Speaker 1: fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins a
- 16:30Speaker 1: conception or at some other point prior to life birth.
- 16:34Speaker 1: In assessing the state's interest, recognition may be given to
- 16:37Speaker 1: the less rigid claim that as long as at least
- 16:40Speaker 1: potential life is involved, the state may assert interests beyond
- 16:44Speaker 1: the protection of the pregnant woman alone. Parties challenging state
- 16:48Speaker 1: abortion laws have sharply disputed in some courts the contention
- 16:52Speaker 1: that a purpose of these laws when enacted was to
- 16:55Speaker 1: protect prenatal life, Pointing to the absence of legislative history
- 16:59Speaker 1: to support them contention, They claimed that most state laws
- 17:02Speaker 1: were designed solely to protect the woman. Because medical advances
- 17:06Speaker 1: have lessened this concern, at least with respect to abortion
- 17:10Speaker 1: and early pregnancy, they argue that with respect to such abortions,
- 17:14Speaker 1: the laws can no longer be justified by any state interest.
- 17:18Speaker 1: There is some scholarly support for this view of original purpose.
- 17:22Speaker 1: The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws
- 17:25Speaker 1: in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did focus
- 17:29Speaker 1: on the state's interest in protecting the woman's health rather
- 17:32Speaker 1: than in preserving the embryo and fetus. Proponents of this
- 17:36Speaker 1: view point out that in many states, including Texas, by
- 17:40Speaker 1: statute or judicial interpretation, the pregnant woman herself could not
- 17:44Speaker 1: be prosecuted for self abortion or for cooperating in an
- 17:48Speaker 1: abortion performed upon her by another. They claim that adoption
- 17:52Speaker 1: of the quickening distinction, through received common law and state
- 17:56Speaker 1: statutes taxitly recognizes the greater health hazards inherent in late
- 18:01Speaker 1: abortion and impliedly repudiates the theory that life begins at conception.
- 18:06Speaker 1: It is with these interests and the eight to be
- 18:08Speaker 1: attached to them, that this case is concerned. Eight. The
- 18:13Speaker 1: Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy in
- 18:17Speaker 1: a line of decisions. However, going back, perhaps as far
- 18:20Speaker 1: as Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Botsford, the Court is
- 18:24Speaker 1: recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee
- 18:28Speaker 1: of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under
- 18:32Speaker 1: the Constitution in varying contexts. The Court or individual justices
- 18:37Speaker 1: have indeed found at least the roots of that right
- 18:41Speaker 1: in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
- 18:44Speaker 1: in the p numbers of the Bill of Rights, in
- 18:47Speaker 1: the Ninth Amendment or in the concept of liberty guaranteed
- 18:50Speaker 1: by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. These decisions
- 18:54Speaker 1: make it clear that only personal rights that can be
- 18:56Speaker 1: deemed quote fundamental end of quote or quote implicit in
- 19:01Speaker 1: the concept of ordered liberty end of quote are included
- 19:04Speaker 1: in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it
- 19:08Speaker 1: clear that the right has some extension to activities relating
- 19:11Speaker 1: to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.
- 19:18Speaker 1: This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
- 19:20Speaker 1: Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
- 19:25Speaker 1: action as we feel it is, or as the district
- 19:28Speaker 1: court determined in the Ninth Amendments, reservation of rights to
- 19:32Speaker 1: the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
- 19:35Speaker 1: whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that
- 19:39Speaker 1: the state would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying
- 19:42Speaker 1: this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically
- 19:47Speaker 1: diagnosable even in early pregnancy, may be involved. Maternity or
- 19:51Speaker 1: additional offspring may force upon the woman a distressful life,
- 19:55Speaker 1: and future psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
- 19:59Speaker 1: health may be taxed by childcare. There is also the
- 20:02Speaker 1: distress for all concerns associated with the unwanted child, and
- 20:07Speaker 1: there is the problem of bringing a child into a
- 20:09Speaker 1: family already unable psychologically and otherwise to care for it.
- 20:13Speaker 1: In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties
- 20:17Speaker 1: and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All
- 20:21Speaker 1: these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily
- 20:25Speaker 1: will consider in consultation. On the basis of elements such
- 20:29Speaker 1: as these, Appellant and some amici argue that the woman's
- 20:33Speaker 1: right is absolute, and that she is entitled to terminate
- 20:36Speaker 1: her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for
- 20:40Speaker 1: whatever reason she alone chooses. With this, we do not agree.
- 20:44Speaker 1: Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at
- 20:48Speaker 1: all in regulating the abortion decision or no interest strong
- 20:52Speaker 1: enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination
- 20:56Speaker 1: are unpersuasive. The Court's decisions recognize a right of privacy
- 21:01Speaker 1: also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by
- 21:05Speaker 1: that right is appropriate. As noted above, a state may
- 21:09Speaker 1: properly assert important interests in safeguarding health in maintaining medical
- 21:14Speaker 1: standards and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy,
- 21:19Speaker 1: these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of
- 21:24Speaker 1: the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right
- 21:28Speaker 1: involved therefore cannot be said to be absolute. In fact,
- 21:32Speaker 1: it is not clear to us that the claim asserted
- 21:34Speaker 1: by some amchi that one has an unlimited right to
- 21:37Speaker 1: do with one's body as one pleases bears a close
- 21:40Speaker 1: relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the
- 21:44Speaker 1: Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited
- 21:48Speaker 1: right of this kind in the past. We therefore conclude
- 21:52Speaker 1: that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,
- 21:55Speaker 1: but that this right is not unqualified and must be
- 21:58Speaker 1: considered against I courtant's state interests in regulation. We note
- 22:03Speaker 1: that those federal and state courts that have recently considered
- 22:06Speaker 1: abortion law challenges have reached the same conclusion. A majority,
- 22:10Speaker 1: in addition to the district court in the present case,
- 22:13Speaker 1: have held state laws unconstitutional, at least in part because
- 22:18Speaker 1: of vagueness or because of overbreadth and abridgment of rights.
- 22:22Speaker 1: Others have sustained state statutes, Although the results are divided.
- 22:27Speaker 1: Most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy,
- 22:30Speaker 1: however based, is brought enough to cover the abortion decision,
- 22:33Speaker 1: that the right nonetheless is not absolute and is subject
- 22:37Speaker 1: to some limitations, and that at some point the state
- 22:40Speaker 1: interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal
- 22:44Speaker 1: life become dominant. We agree with this approach. Where certain
- 22:49Speaker 1: quote fundamental rights and are involved, the court has held
- 22:53Speaker 1: that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by
- 22:57Speaker 1: a quote compelling state interest end of quote, and that
- 23:01Speaker 1: legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
- 23:05Speaker 1: legitimate state interests at stake. In the recent abortion cases
- 23:10Speaker 1: cited above, courts have recognized these principles. Those striking down
- 23:15Speaker 1: state laws have generally scrutinized the state's interests in protecting
- 23:19Speaker 1: health and potential life, and have concluded that neither interest
- 23:23Speaker 1: justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a physician
- 23:27Speaker 1: and his pregnant patient might decide that she should have
- 23:29Speaker 1: an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining
- 23:33Speaker 1: state laws have held that the state's determinations to protect
- 23:37Speaker 1: health or prenatal life are dominant and constitutionally justifiable. Nine
- 23:43Speaker 1: the District Court held that the appelle failed to meet
- 23:46Speaker 1: his burden of demonstrating that the Texas statutes infringement upon
- 23:50Speaker 1: rose rights was necessary to support a compelling state interest,
- 23:55Speaker 1: and that although the appelle presented quote several compelling justifications
- 23:59Speaker 1: for state presence in the area of abortions end of quote,
- 24:03Speaker 1: the statutes outstripped these justifications and swept quote far beyond
- 24:08Speaker 1: any areas of compelling state interest end of quote. Appellant
- 24:13Speaker 1: and apelle both contest that holding Appellant, as has been indicated,
- 24:17Speaker 1: claims an absolute right that bars any state imposition of
- 24:21Speaker 1: criminal penalties in the area. Appelli argues that the state's
- 24:24Speaker 1: determination to recognize and protect prenatal life from and after
- 24:28Speaker 1: conception constitutes a compelling state interest. As noted above, we
- 24:33Speaker 1: do not agree fully with either formulation A. The appelle
- 24:38Speaker 1: and certain amici argue that the fetus is a quote
- 24:41Speaker 1: person end of quote, within the language and meaning of
- 24:44Speaker 1: the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at
- 24:48Speaker 1: length and in detail the well known facts of fetal development.
- 24:51Speaker 1: If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case,
- 24:55Speaker 1: of course collapses, for the fetus's right to life would
- 24:59Speaker 1: then be guaranteed mead specifically by the Amendment. The appellant
- 25:03Speaker 1: conceded as much on reargument. On the other hand, the
- 25:06Speaker 1: appelle conceded on reargument that no case could be cited
- 25:10Speaker 1: that holds that a fetus is a person within the
- 25:13Speaker 1: meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution does not define
- 25:17Speaker 1: person in so many words. Section one of the Fourteenth
- 25:20Speaker 1: Amendment contains three references to person. The first, in defining citizens,
- 25:26Speaker 1: speaks of quote persons born or naturalized in the United
- 25:29Speaker 1: States end of quote. The word also appears both in
- 25:33Speaker 1: the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause.
- 25:37Speaker 1: Person is used in other places in the Constitution, in
- 25:40Speaker 1: the listing of qualifications for representatives and senators in the
- 25:44Speaker 1: Apportionment clause footnote, we are not aware that in the
- 25:49Speaker 1: taking of any census under this clause, a fetus has
- 25:51Speaker 1: ever been counted end of foot in the Migration and
- 25:55Speaker 1: Importation Provision, in the Emolument Clause, in the Elector's Provision,
- 26:00Speaker 1: in the Provision outlining qualifications for the Office of President,
- 26:05Speaker 1: in the Extradition Provisions, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause,
- 26:09Speaker 1: and in the fifth, twelfth and twenty second Amendments, as
- 26:13Speaker 1: well as in sections two and three of the fourteenth Amendment.
- 26:17Speaker 1: But in nearly all these instances, the use of the
- 26:19Speaker 1: word is such that it has application only post natally.
- 26:24Speaker 1: None indicates with any assurance that it has any possible
- 26:27Speaker 1: prenatal application. Footnote. When Texas urges that a fetus is
- 26:33Speaker 1: entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection as a person, it faces
- 26:36Speaker 1: a dilemma. Neither in Texas nor in any other state
- 26:40Speaker 1: are all abortions prohibited. Despite broad prescription, an exception always exists.
- 26:46Speaker 1: The exception contained in Article eleven ninety six for an
- 26:49Speaker 1: abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose
- 26:53Speaker 1: of saving the life of the mother is typical. But
- 26:56Speaker 1: if the fetus is a person who is not to
- 26:58Speaker 1: be deprived of life with that due process of law,
- 27:01Speaker 1: and if the mother's condition is the sole determinant, does
- 27:05Speaker 1: not the Texas exception appear to be out of line
- 27:07Speaker 1: with the Amendment's command. There are other inconsistencies between Fourteenth
- 27:12Speaker 1: Amendment status and the typical abortion statute. It has already
- 27:16Speaker 1: been pointed out that in Texas, the woman is not
- 27:20Speaker 1: a principle or an accomplice with respect to an abortion
- 27:23Speaker 1: upon her. If the fetus is a person, why is
- 27:26Speaker 1: the woman not a principle or an accomplice. Further, the
- 27:30Speaker 1: penalty for criminal abortion specified by Article eleven ninety five
- 27:34Speaker 1: is significantly less than the maximum penalty for murder prescribed
- 27:39Speaker 1: by Article twelve fifty seven of the Texas Penal Code.
- 27:43Speaker 1: If the fetus is a person, may the penalties be different?
- 27:46Speaker 1: And a footnote. All this, together with our observation supra
- 27:51Speaker 1: that throughout the major portion of the nineteenth century, prevailing
- 27:55Speaker 1: legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today,
- 27:58Speaker 1: persuades us that the word person as used in the
- 28:01Speaker 1: fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn footnote. Cf. The
- 28:06Speaker 1: Wisconsin abortion statute defining quote unborn child end of quote
- 28:11Speaker 1: to mean quote a human being from the time of
- 28:14Speaker 1: conception until it is born alive end of quote, and
- 28:17Speaker 1: the new Connecticut statute declaring it to be the public
- 28:20Speaker 1: policy of the state and the legislative intent quote to
- 28:24Speaker 1: protect and preserve human life from the moment of conception
- 28:27Speaker 1: end of quote, end of footnote. This is in accord
- 28:31Speaker 1: with the results reached in those few cases where the
- 28:34Speaker 1: issue has been squarely presented Indeed, our decision in United
- 28:38Speaker 1: States VI Viwage inferentially is to the same effect, For
- 28:42Speaker 1: we there would not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorable
- 28:46Speaker 1: to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was
- 28:51Speaker 1: the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. This conclusion, however,
- 28:57Speaker 1: does not of itself fully answer the contentions by Texas,
- 29:01Speaker 1: and we pass on to other considerations. B. The pregnant
- 29:05Speaker 1: woman cannot be isolated in her privacy she carries an
- 29:09Speaker 1: embryo and later a fetus, if one accepts the medical
- 29:12Speaker 1: definitions of the developing young in the human uterus. The
- 29:16Speaker 1: situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy or bedroom
- 29:20Speaker 1: possession of obscene material, or marriage or procreation or education,
- 29:25Speaker 1: with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley Loving Skinner, and Pierce
- 29:30Speaker 1: and Meyer were respectively concerned. As we have intimated above,
- 29:35Speaker 1: it is reasonable and appropriate for a state to decide
- 29:38Speaker 1: that at some point in time another interest, that of
- 29:42Speaker 1: health of the mother or that of potential human life,
- 29:45Speaker 1: becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no longer sole,
- 29:50Speaker 1: and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.
- 29:54Speaker 1: Texas urges that, apart from the fourteenth Amendment, life begins
- 29:58Speaker 1: at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that therefore
- 30:02Speaker 1: the state has a compelling interest in protecting that life
- 30:06Speaker 1: from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult
- 30:10Speaker 1: question of when life begins when those trained in the
- 30:13Speaker 1: respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to
- 30:18Speaker 1: arrive at any consensus. The judiciary, at this point in
- 30:21Speaker 1: the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position
- 30:24Speaker 1: to speculate as to the answer. It should be sufficient
- 30:28Speaker 1: to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this
- 30:31Speaker 1: most sensitive and difficult question. There's always been strong support
- 30:36Speaker 1: for the view that life does not begin until live birth.
- 30:39Speaker 1: This was the belief of the Stoics. It appears to
- 30:42Speaker 1: be the predominant, though not the unanimous attitude of the
- 30:45Speaker 1: Jewish faith. It may be taken to represent also the
- 30:49Speaker 1: position of a large segment of the Protestant community, in
- 30:52Speaker 1: so far as that can be ascertained. Organized groups that
- 30:56Speaker 1: have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have
- 30:59Speaker 1: generally regardard abortion as a matter for the conscience of
- 31:02Speaker 1: the individual and her family. As we have noted, the
- 31:05Speaker 1: common law found greater significance in quickening. Physicians and their
- 31:09Speaker 1: scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest, and
- 31:13Speaker 1: have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth,
- 31:18Speaker 1: or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes
- 31:21Speaker 1: quote viable end of quote that is potentially able to
- 31:25Speaker 1: live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability
- 31:29Speaker 1: is usually placed at about seven months twenty eight weeks,
- 31:33Speaker 1: but may occur earlier, even at twenty four weeks. The
- 31:37Speaker 1: Aristotelian theory of quote mediate animation end of quote that
- 31:42Speaker 1: held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe,
- 31:45Speaker 1: continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the nineteenth century,
- 31:50Speaker 1: despite opposition to this quote insulment end of quote theory
- 31:54Speaker 1: from those in the Church who would recognize the existence
- 31:57Speaker 1: of life from the moment of conception. The latter is now,
- 32:01Speaker 1: of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church. As
- 32:04Speaker 1: one brief amicist discloses, this is a view strongly held
- 32:08Speaker 1: by many non Catholics as well, and by many physicians.
- 32:12Speaker 1: Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are posed However,
- 32:17Speaker 1: by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception
- 32:22Speaker 1: is a process over time rather than an event, and
- 32:25Speaker 1: by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the morning
- 32:29Speaker 1: after pill, implementation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial wounds.
- 32:36Speaker 1: In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been
- 32:39Speaker 1: reluctant to endorse any theory that life as we recognize
- 32:42Speaker 1: it begins before live birth, or to accord legal rights
- 32:46Speaker 1: to the unborn, except in narrowly defined situations and except
- 32:50Speaker 1: when the rights are contingent upon life birth. For example,
- 32:54Speaker 1: the traditional role of torte law denied recovery for prenatal
- 32:57Speaker 1: injuries even though the child was born alive. That role
- 33:00Speaker 1: has been changed in almost every jurisdiction. In most states,
- 33:04Speaker 1: recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus
- 33:07Speaker 1: was viable or at least quick when the injuries were sustained,
- 33:11Speaker 1: though few courts have squarely so held. In a recent
- 33:15Speaker 1: development generally opposed by the commentators, some states permit the
- 33:19Speaker 1: parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for
- 33:22Speaker 1: wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Such an action, however,
- 33:26Speaker 1: would appear to be one to vindicate the parent's interest,
- 33:30Speaker 1: and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus
- 33:33Speaker 1: at most represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn
- 33:38Speaker 1: children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by
- 33:41Speaker 1: way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have
- 33:45Speaker 1: been represented by guardians adletum. Perfection of the interests involved, again,
- 33:50Speaker 1: has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the
- 33:54Speaker 1: unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons
- 33:57Speaker 1: in the whole sense. Ten. In view of all this,
- 34:01Speaker 1: we do not agree that by adopting one theory of life,
- 34:04Speaker 1: Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that
- 34:07Speaker 1: are at stake. We repeat, however, that the state does
- 34:11Speaker 1: have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting
- 34:15Speaker 1: the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a
- 34:17Speaker 1: resident of the state or a non resident who seeks
- 34:20Speaker 1: medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still
- 34:24Speaker 1: another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
- 34:28Speaker 1: human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows
- 34:33Speaker 1: in substantiality as the woman approaches term, and at a
- 34:37Speaker 1: point during pregnancy, each becomes quote compelling end of quote
- 34:42Speaker 1: with respect to the state's important and legitimate interest in
- 34:45Speaker 1: the health of the mother. The quote compelling end of
- 34:48Speaker 1: quote point in light of present medical knowledge, is at
- 34:52Speaker 1: approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so
- 34:56Speaker 1: because of the now established medical fact referred to above
- 35:00Speaker 1: that until the end of the first trimester, mortality in
- 35:03Speaker 1: abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It
- 35:07Speaker 1: follows that from and after this point a state may
- 35:11Speaker 1: regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation
- 35:15Speaker 1: reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.
- 35:19Speaker 1: Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements
- 35:23Speaker 1: as to the qualifications of the person who is to
- 35:26Speaker 1: perform the abortion, as to the licensure of that person,
- 35:30Speaker 1: as to the facility in which the procedure is to
- 35:33Speaker 1: be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital
- 35:36Speaker 1: or may be a clinic or some other place of
- 35:38Speaker 1: less than hospital status, as to the licensing of the facility,
- 35:42Speaker 1: and the like. This means, on the other hand, that
- 35:45Speaker 1: for the period of pregnancy prior to this compelling point,
- 35:49Speaker 1: the attending physician, in consultation with his patient is free
- 35:53Speaker 1: to determine, without regulation by the state, that in his
- 35:56Speaker 1: medical judgment the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that
- 36:00Speaker 1: decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an
- 36:04Speaker 1: abortion free of interference by the state. With respect to
- 36:08Speaker 1: the state's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
- 36:12Speaker 1: compelling point is at viability. This is so because the
- 36:16Speaker 1: fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
- 36:20Speaker 1: the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after
- 36:24Speaker 1: viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the
- 36:29Speaker 1: state is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it
- 36:33Speaker 1: may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period,
- 36:37Speaker 1: except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
- 36:40Speaker 1: health of the mother. Measured against these standards, Article eleven
- 36:44Speaker 1: ninety six of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal
- 36:47Speaker 1: abortions to those quote procured or attempted by medical advice
- 36:52Speaker 1: for the purpose of saving the life of the mother
- 36:54Speaker 1: and of quote, sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no
- 36:58Speaker 1: distinction between abortions per formed early in pregnancy and those
- 37:01Speaker 1: performed later, and it limits to a single reason saving
- 37:05Speaker 1: the mother's life the legal justification for the procedure. The
- 37:10Speaker 1: statute therefore cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.
- 37:15Speaker 1: This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the
- 37:18Speaker 1: additional challenge to the Texas statute asserted on grounds of
- 37:22Speaker 1: vagueness eleven. To summarize and to repeat one, A state
- 37:29Speaker 1: criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that accepts
- 37:33Speaker 1: from criminality only a life saving procedure on behalf of
- 37:36Speaker 1: the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage, and without recognition
- 37:40Speaker 1: of the other interests involved, is violative of the due
- 37:44Speaker 1: process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A. For the stage
- 37:48Speaker 1: prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
- 37:51Speaker 1: abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
- 37:54Speaker 1: medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. B. For
- 37:59Speaker 1: the stage which subsequent to approximately the end of the
- 38:02Speaker 1: first trimester, this state, in promoting its interest in the
- 38:06Speaker 1: health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the
- 38:09Speaker 1: abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
- 38:14Speaker 1: See for the stage subsequent to viability. This state, in
- 38:18Speaker 1: promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may,
- 38:22Speaker 1: if it chooses, regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where
- 38:26Speaker 1: it is necessary in appropriate medical judgment. For the preservation
- 38:30Speaker 1: of the life or health of the mother. Two, This
- 38:34Speaker 1: state may define the term physician as it has been
- 38:36Speaker 1: employed in the preceding paragraphs of this Part eleven of
- 38:40Speaker 1: this opinion, to mean only a physician currently licensed by
- 38:43Speaker 1: the state, and may proscribe any abortion by a person
- 38:47Speaker 1: who is not a physician, as so defined in do v. Bolton.
- 38:51Speaker 1: Procedural requirements contained in one of the modern abortion statutes
- 38:55Speaker 1: are considered. That opinion and this one, of course, are
- 38:59Speaker 1: to be read together. OOTE. Neither in this opinion nor
- 39:03Speaker 1: in Dovie Bolton do we discuss the father's rights, if
- 39:06Speaker 1: any exist in the constitutional context in the abortion decision.
- 39:11Speaker 1: No paternal right has been asserted in either of the cases,
- 39:14Speaker 1: and the Texas and Georgia's statutes, on their face take
- 39:18Speaker 1: no cognizance of the father. We are aware that some
- 39:21Speaker 1: statutes recognize the father under certain circumstances. North Carolina, for example,
- 39:27Speaker 1: requires written permission for the abortion from the husband when
- 39:30Speaker 1: the woman is a married miner, that is, when she
- 39:33Speaker 1: is less than eighteen years of age. If the woman
- 39:36Speaker 1: is an unmarried miner, written permission from the parents is required.
- 39:40Speaker 1: We need not now decide whether provisions of this kind
- 39:43Speaker 1: are constitutional. End of footnote. This holding we feel is
- 39:47Speaker 1: consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests involved,
- 39:51Speaker 1: with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history,
- 39:55Speaker 1: with the lenity of the common law, and with the
- 39:58Speaker 1: demands of the profound pri problems of the present day.
- 40:01Speaker 1: The decision leaves the state free to place increasing restrictions
- 40:05Speaker 1: on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long
- 40:08Speaker 1: as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests.
- 40:13Speaker 1: The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer
- 40:16Speaker 1: medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the
- 40:20Speaker 1: points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.
- 40:26Speaker 1: Up to those points, the abortion decision, in all its
- 40:29Speaker 1: aspects is inherently and primarily a medical decision, and basic
- 40:34Speaker 1: responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an
- 40:37Speaker 1: individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical judgment,
- 40:43Speaker 1: the usual remedies judicial and intra professional are available. Twelve.
- 40:49Speaker 1: Our conclusion that Article eleven ninety six is unconstitutional means,
- 40:53Speaker 1: of course, that the Texas Abortion Statutes as a unit
- 40:56Speaker 1: must fall The exception of Article eleven ninety six cannot
- 41:00Speaker 1: be struck down separately, For then the state will be
- 41:03Speaker 1: left with a statute prescribing all abortion procedures, no matter
- 41:07Speaker 1: how medically urgent the case. Although the District Court granted
- 41:12Speaker 1: appellant Row declaratory relief, it stopped short of issuing an
- 41:16Speaker 1: injunction against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The Court has
- 41:20Speaker 1: recognized that different considerations enter into a federal court's decision
- 41:25Speaker 1: as to declaratory relief on the one hand, an injunctive
- 41:28Speaker 1: relief on the other. We are not dealing with a
- 41:31Speaker 1: statute that, on its face appears to abridge free expression,
- 41:34Speaker 1: an area of particular concern under Dombrowski and refined in
- 41:38Speaker 1: Younger v. Harris. We find it unnecessary to decide whether
- 41:43Speaker 1: the District Court aired in withholding injunctive relief. For we
- 41:46Speaker 1: assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to
- 41:51Speaker 1: this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that
- 41:55Speaker 1: state are unconstitutional. The judgment of the District Court as
- 41:59Speaker 1: to intervene ter Halford is reversed, and doctor Halford's complaint
- 42:03Speaker 1: in intervention is dismissed. In all other respects, the judgment
- 42:07Speaker 1: of the District Court is affirmed costs are allowed. To
- 42:10Speaker 1: the appellate, it is so ordered. End of Section twenty six.
- 42:16Speaker 1: Recording by Colleen McMahon