Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / A hospital's FOI spreadsheet carried staff health records for 33 months
Transcript
- 0:03Good morning, and welcome to Decrypted.
- 0:05I'm Belinder. It's Monday, the ninth of November, twenty twenty-six, and this is the morning edition.
- 0:11A hospital's F O I spreadsheet carried staff health records for 33 months.
- 0:17No hacker, no malware and no zero-day, a flaw attackers use before a fix exists, were involved in one recent
- 0:26N H S data incident. A spreadsheet answering a Freedom of Information request went onto the public website of
- 0:33Royal Cornwall Hospitals N H S Trust in February 2023.
- 0:38It stayed there for 33 months, carrying health and sickness records for thousands of staff.
- 0:44The trust's independent review reached its board on 5 November.
- 0:47So, what exactly was exposed?
- 0:51The trust said at the time that the file held sickness absence records for current and former employees, covering
- 0:57April 2020 to May 2023. No patient or financial data was affected.
- 1:03The review, as reported by The British Eye, puts the number of workers at 8,003, of whom 7,715 were trust employees.
- 1:13The I C O, the Information Commissioner's Office, the UK's data regulator, has since closed its case after the
- 1:19trust implemented the recommendations.
- 1:22How did the records stay hidden inside a harmless-looking file?
- 1:26Picture a filing cabinet with a tidy summary pinned to the front.
- 1:30The sheet that staff saw looked harmless.
- 1:32But Excel pivot tables, the feature that lets a summary be re-cut in different ways, keep the underlying rows
- 1:39inside the file so the cabinet can be reopened.
- 1:42The review reported that the confidential records were still reachable through the workbook's pivot tables.
- 1:47A member of the public found them in November 2025.
- 1:51What the defender could see was thin.
- 1:54Website logs covered only the previous 12 months and showed 340 accesses.
- 1:59Investigators could not say how many were people and how many were web crawlers.
- 2:04So the trust could not say who had read what.
- 2:07Where did the process go wrong?
- 2:09It leaned on memory. The request went to the e-Rostering team, not the People Information Unit that knew the
- 2:16data. Staff were told to convert spreadsheets to P D F before publishing, and did not.
- 2:21An officer either did not run Excel's Document Inspector or did not act on what it found.
- 2:27The approval step asked whether the answer met the request, and assumed somebody had already checked the contents.
- 2:33Everyone trusted someone else to have checked.
- 2:36So what's the design lesson, and what does it cost?
- 2:40Every safeguard here depended on a person remembering.
- 2:44Secure by Design asks for the opposite: a publishing route that cannot carry hidden data, however rushed the
- 2:50day. That means a default output of flat C S V or P D F generated from the data owner's system, a named approver
- 2:58from the team that holds the data, and logs kept long enough to answer "who saw it".
- 3:03None of that is expensive.
- 3:05The trust has since required password protection for workbooks and senior information governance sign-off for
- 3:11spreadsheets, though the review noted the C S V rule is not yet in the formal procedure.
- 3:16Compare that with the bill for not doing it.
- 3:19A helpline meant to run for two weeks ran for 11.
- 3:22It was staffed by clinical governance colleagues given a day's notice and a script about 30 minutes before opening.
- 3:28Some call handlers had their own data in the file.
- 3:32As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 3:35That was Decrypted, with me, Belinder.
- 3:40The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:43Thanks for listening. Stay patched, and stay sceptical.