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Operation Desert Storm: How Airpower Weakened Iraq’s Army · Military History Uncovered

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: Early on January 17, 1991, the coalition campaign to expel
• 0:04
  Speaker 1: Iraqi forces from Kuwait entered its combat phase. Cruise missiles
• 0:09
  Speaker 1: and coalition aircraft moved against targets in Iraq. Air defense sites,
• 0:13
  Speaker 1: communication systems, military facilities, airfields, and command targets were among
• 0:18
  Speaker 1: the objectives. The opening attacks were only the beginning of
• 0:22
  Speaker 1: a sustained operation that would last 43 days, from January
• 0:25
  Speaker 1: 17 through February 28. The scale of the undertaking reflected
• 0:31
  Speaker 1: the scale of the crisis. In August 1990, Iraq invaded
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  Speaker 1: and occupied neighboring Kuwait. The occupation brought Iraqi forces close
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  Speaker 1: to Saudi Arabia, threatened important regional oil supplies, and placed
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  Speaker 1: Kuwait's substantial reserves under Iraqi control. The invasion drew a
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  Speaker 1: broad international response. The United Nations demanded that Iraq withdraw.
• 0:54
  Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United States, European allies, and other
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  Speaker 1: states assembled a coalition with the immediate task of defending
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  Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia and the eventual mission of liberating Kuwait. The
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  Speaker 1: first stage was called Operation Desert Shield. Troops, armored vehicles, aircraft, ships, ammunition, fuel,
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  Speaker 1: medical facilities, engineers, and communications equipment moved into the region.
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  Speaker 1: It was an immense logistical effort. Combat power had to
• 1:22
  Speaker 1: be transported across oceans and then kept supplied in a
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  Speaker 1: desert theater far from the industrial bases that sustained it.
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  Speaker 1: Airfields had to handle unfamiliar aircraft. Maintenance organizations had to
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  Speaker 1: work in heat, dust, and crowded operating areas. Fuel had
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  Speaker 1: to reach both aircraft on the ground and aircraft already
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  Speaker 1: in the air. The coalition's military challenge was not simply
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  Speaker 1: to destroy equipment. Iraq possessed a large army, extensive defensive
• 1:50
  Speaker 1: positions in Kuwait, an air force, radar networks, surface-to-air missiles, artillery, armor,
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  Speaker 1: and command facilities. Iraqi forces had also emerged from a
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  Speaker 1: long war with Iran. Coalition planners expected prepared defenses, minefields, trenches,
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  Speaker 1: and the possibility of a costly assault if Iraqi ground
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  Speaker 1: forces remained intact and coordinated. The coalition therefore designed an
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  Speaker 1: air operation that would pursue several connected aims. It would
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  Speaker 1: seek control of the air. It would suppress or circumvent
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  Speaker 1: Iraqi air defenses. It would attack selected national-level command, communications,
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  Speaker 1: and military infrastructure targets. It would strike airfields and elements
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  Speaker 1: of the Iraqi Air Force. It would also apply continuing
• 2:35
  Speaker 1: pressure against Iraqi forces in Kuwait, their artillery, armored vehicles,
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  Speaker 1: supply sites, transport routes, and field positions. This was not
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  Speaker 1: a simple sequence in which one task ended before another began.
• 2:48
  Speaker 1: targets had different military characteristics. A fixed facility in Baghdad
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  Speaker 1: could be studied using imagery and assigned an aim point
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  Speaker 1: in advance. A runway could be attacked repeatedly but might
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  Speaker 1: also be repaired. A fielded formation in Kuwait occupied a
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  Speaker 1: wider area and required a different weapons mix. A mobile
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  Speaker 1: missile launcher could move, hide, or be mistaken for something
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  Speaker 1: else before aircraft arrived. The campaign required many types of aircraft, munitions,
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  Speaker 1: intelligence systems, and planning staffs operating at the same time.
• 3:20
  Speaker 1: General Norman Schwarzkopf commanded coalition forces in the theater. Lieutenant
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  Speaker 1: General Chuck Horner directed coalition air operations. Air University's account
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  Speaker 1: of Horner's later legacy emphasizes the latitude he had to
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  Speaker 1: organize the air effort under Schwarzkopf's overall command. That command
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  Speaker 1: relationship mattered because the air campaign was not an isolated contest.
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  Speaker 1: It was part of a theater strategy whose stated political
• 3:46
  Speaker 1: and military objective was the liberation of Kuwait. Before the
• 3:50
  Speaker 1: first attacks, coalition staffs had to turn broad objectives into
• 3:54
  Speaker 1: daily flight plans. Strike aircraft needed routes, timing, fuel, weapons,
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  Speaker 1: tanker support, identification procedures, rescue arrangements, intelligence updates, and coordination
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  Speaker 1: with aircraft from different services and countries. Tankers were indispensable.
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  Speaker 1: Many combat aircraft could not travel to distant targets, conduct
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  Speaker 1: their missions, and return without aerial refueling. Surveillance aircraft watched
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  Speaker 1: the air picture. Reconnaissance systems gathered imagery. Electronic warfare aircraft
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  Speaker 1: supported attacks on defended airspace. Cargo aircraft continued bringing people
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  Speaker 1: and material into the theater. The opening night displayed that
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  Speaker 1: integrated design. Cruise missiles struck selected targets. Aircraft attacked Iraqi
• 4:37
  Speaker 1: air defense systems and radar-related sites. Electronic warfare and other
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  Speaker 1: forms of support helped coalition aircraft penetrate defended airspace. F-117,
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  Speaker 1: a stealth aircraft, were assigned to certain heavily defended fixed targets.
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  Speaker 1: Other aircraft struck airfields, communications facilities, and military command targets.
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  Speaker 1: The point was not merely to produce dramatic images over Baghdad.
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  Speaker 1: It was to begin reducing Iraq's ability to observe, communicate, coordinate,
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  Speaker 1: and respond. The F-117 became one of the conflict's most
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  Speaker 1: recognizable symbols. Its low observable design reduced the likelihood of
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  Speaker 1: radar detection and made it useful on some missions against
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  Speaker 1: defended fixed targets. The aircraft's public prominence encouraged a broader
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  Speaker 1: belief that stealth had transformed every aspect of air warfare.
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  Speaker 1: The evidence is more specific. A Government Accountability Office review
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  Speaker 1: concluded that stealth was one option among many used during
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  Speaker 1: Desert Storm and that its value varied according to the
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  Speaker 1: target and mission type. The GAO also cautioned against broad
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  Speaker 1: claims based on comparisons of conventional and stealth aircraft support requirements.
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  Speaker 1: It described some such comparisons as essentially anecdotal and noted
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  Speaker 1: that conventional strike packages were reduced as the air defense
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  Speaker 1: threat changed. Stealth could reduce detection and support requirements on
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  Speaker 1: some missions, especially early against certain defended targets. but that
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  Speaker 1: did not make it a replacement for conventional aircraft or
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  Speaker 1: the many supporting systems required by a large campaign. The
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  Speaker 1: F-117 had clear operating limitations. According to the GAO, it
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  Speaker 1: was not designed to search for mobile targets, cover large
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  Speaker 1: area targets requiring dozens of bombs, or conduct the daylight
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  Speaker 1: attacks planners might assign to other aircraft. The review reported
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  Speaker 1: an F-117 bomb hit rate between 55 and 80 percent
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  Speaker 1: and a weapon release rate of 75 percent. Those figures
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  Speaker 1: complicate the popular image of an infallible aircraft. They also
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  Speaker 1: show why planners used a broad mix of capabilities rather
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  Speaker 1: than relying on one platform. Precision weapons attracted similarly intense attention.
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  Speaker 1: Video of laser-guided bombs striking selected buildings became a defining
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  Speaker 1: image of the war. The footage demonstrated that a weapon
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  Speaker 1: could be guided toward a particular aim point with striking accuracy.
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  Speaker 1: Yet those images were never a complete representation of the
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  Speaker 1: air campaign. Precision-guided munitions were important. especially against particular fixed targets.
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  Speaker 1: But many coalition aircraft also employed unguided bombs. Weather, smoke,
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  Speaker 1: target identification, weapon reliability, and the practical difficulty of confirming
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  Speaker 1: results all limited what any weapon could accomplish. The most
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  Speaker 1: demanding part of the process often came after an attack.
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  Speaker 1: A target struck by a bomb was not automatically eliminated
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  Speaker 1: as a military problem. Analysts had to determine whether a
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  Speaker 1: facility had been destroyed, damaged, abandoned, repaired, or misidentified. A
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  Speaker 1: damaged runway might be restored. A command facility might have
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  Speaker 1: alternate communications. A vehicle detected in imagery might be a decoy.
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  Speaker 1: A bridge attack could disrupt movement without fully severing a route.
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  Speaker 1: Military planners had to make new decisions while working with
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  Speaker 1: incomplete information. This cycle of intelligence, targeting, strike planning, mission reports, reconnaissance,
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  Speaker 1: and reassessment ran throughout the campaign. It was a human
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  Speaker 1: system as much as a technological one. Pilots flew missions
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  Speaker 1: in hostile airspace, maintenance crews prepared aircraft for subsequent sorties,
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  Speaker 1: tanker crews kept formations moving, imagery analysts evaluated damage, and
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  Speaker 1: planning staffs rebuilt the next day's target lists. The effectiveness
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  Speaker 1: of the campaign rested on whether this chain could operate
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  Speaker 1: faster and more consistently than Iraq could adapt. Iraq's air
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  Speaker 1: defense network presented an immediate problem. Radar systems, surface-to-air missiles, guns,
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  Speaker 1: command links, and interceptor aircraft could impose losses on attacking aircraft.
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  Speaker 1: Coalition planners sought to reduce that danger through route planning,
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  Speaker 1: electronic warfare, anti-radiation weapons, repeated strikes, and attacks that forced
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  Speaker 1: Iraqi operators into difficult choices. Activating radar could improve Iraqi
• 8:59
  Speaker 1: awareness while also revealing the system's position. Remaining silent might
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  Speaker 1: preserve a site but reduce the ability to detect incoming aircraft.
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  Speaker 1: Coalition aircraft still operated at risk. Iraqi defenses did not
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  Speaker 1: simply vanish after the first night and coalition losses occurred
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  Speaker 1: during the war. But the coalition gradually gained the operational
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  Speaker 1: initiative in the air. Iraq's air force failed to mount
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  Speaker 1: sustained resistance. Some Iraqi aircraft were destroyed, while others were
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  Speaker 1: removed from the immediate contest, including aircraft flown to Iran.
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  Speaker 1: The precise explanation differed by aircraft and circumstance, but the
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  Speaker 1: operational result was that coalition aircraft could continue attacking targets
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  Speaker 1: across Iraq and Kuwait with far less aerial interference than
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  Speaker 1: planners had feared. Control of the air made other missions possible.
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  Speaker 1: It allowed reconnaissance aircraft to collect information, tankers to sustain
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  Speaker 1: long-range operations, strike aircraft to return repeatedly to designated targets, areas,
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  Speaker 1: and ground forces to prepare for their eventual offensive under
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  Speaker 1: strong air cover. It also gave coalition planners more freedom
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  Speaker 1: to choose when and where to direct pressure. Iraq still
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  Speaker 1: possessed troops, weapons, and defensive positions, but its ability to
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  Speaker 1: employ them as a fully coordinated military system was increasingly contested.
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  Speaker 1: In Iraq itself, the coalition attacked elements of national command
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  Speaker 1: and control, military communications, airfields, intelligence-related facilities, and selected logistical
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  Speaker 1: and industrial targets. The intended military effect was to complicate
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  Speaker 1: Iraqi decision-making and reduce the reliability of links between senior
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  Speaker 1: authorities and forces in the field. Public accounts often describe
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  Speaker 1: this as the rapid paralysis of Iraqi leadership. That phrase
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  Speaker 1: should be treated as an assessment rather than a precise measurement.
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  Speaker 1: Communications and command systems can be disrupted in uneven ways,
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  Speaker 1: and the surviving record does not permit every operational effect
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  Speaker 1: to be measured with certainty. What can be said with
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  Speaker 1: confidence is that coalition planners treated command and communications as
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  Speaker 1: central targets from the beginning. The approach reflected an understanding
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  Speaker 1: that armies depend on more than weapons. They require orders, reports, transport,
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  Speaker 1: supply arrangements, air defense coordination, and the ability to understand
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  Speaker 1: what is happening beyond the immediate position of an individual unit.
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  Speaker 1: Repeated attacks on those systems could degrade military effectiveness even
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  Speaker 1: when every individual facility was not destroyed. The forces occupying
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  Speaker 1: Kuwait faced a different kind of pressure. Iraqi units had trenches, minefields,
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  Speaker 1: artillery positions, armored vehicles, and defensive belts. A direct assault
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  Speaker 1: through prepared positions could be costly. Coalition air attacks were
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  Speaker 1: intended to impose attrition and uncertainty before ground forces moved.
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  Speaker 1: Aircraft struck artillery, armor, ammunition areas, transportation infrastructure, supply locations,
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  Speaker 1: and formations in the Kuwaiti theater. For soldiers living in
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  Speaker 1: exposed positions, the campaign was experienced not as a single
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  Speaker 1: decisive event, but as weeks of recurring danger. Aircraft could
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  Speaker 1: appear overhead at unpredictable times. Vehicles and supply activity risked detection. Repairs, movement,
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  Speaker 1: and redeployment could become hazardous. The cumulative effect on a
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  Speaker 1: unit depended on many variables. The weapons used, the accuracy
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  Speaker 1: of intelligence, the state of local defenses, weather, morale, supplies,
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  Speaker 1: and the unit's own ability to disperse or adapt. Assertions
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  Speaker 1: that every Iraqi formation was cut off or unable to
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  Speaker 1: resupply go beyond what the supplied record can prove. The
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  Speaker 1: better supported conclusion is that the coalition made Iraqi military
• 12:46
  Speaker 1: movement and sustainment more difficult across the theater. The campaign
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  Speaker 1: also served the coalition's wider operational design. Iraqi commanders expected
• 12:56
  Speaker 1: pressure from Saudi Arabia toward Kuwait. Coalition activity in the
• 13:00
  Speaker 1: eastern sector helped maintain that expectation. The eventual ground plan
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  Speaker 1: included a wide western maneuver by armored forces, moving into
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  Speaker 1: Iraq and then turning east against Iraqi formations. The air
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  Speaker 1: operation did not dictate the outcome on its own, but
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  Speaker 1: its attacks across Iraq and Kuwait helped create a battlefield
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  Speaker 1: in which Iraqi commanders had less reliable information and fewer
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  Speaker 1: safe options for shifting forces. The campaign's most persistent targeting
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  Speaker 1: challenge involved Iraq's Scud missiles. Iraq launched Scuds toward Israel
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  Speaker 1: and Saudi Arabia. These attacks carried political significance as well
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  Speaker 1: as military significance. An Iraqi effort to draw Israel directly
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  Speaker 1: into the conflict could have placed strain on a coalition
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  Speaker 1: that included Arab states. Coalition leaders worked to prevent that outcome,
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  Speaker 1: and Israel did not enter the war. Finding mobile Scud
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  Speaker 1: launchers was exceptionally difficult. A fixed facility can be located, mapped, revisited,
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  Speaker 1: and attacked at known coordinates. A mobile launcher can move
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  Speaker 1: after firing, use concealment, disperse in a large area, or
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  Speaker 1: be represented by decoys. The National Security Archives' collection of
• 14:14
  Speaker 1: Desert Storm records includes material on Scuds and on the
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  Speaker 1: problem of measuring the counter-Scud effort. Its summary notes that
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  Speaker 1: later lessons emphasized the difficulty of targeting ballistic missiles that
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  Speaker 1: were mobile and time-sensitive. Coalition aircraft flew missions against suspected
• 14:31
  Speaker 1: Scud-related targets, but later assessments questioned how many actual mobile
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  Speaker 1: launchers were destroyed. The central historical lesson is not that
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  Speaker 1: the campaign ignored the problem or that every reported target
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  Speaker 1: was a launcher. It is that locating, identifying, and striking
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  Speaker 1: a mobile target within a short window is fundamentally harder
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  Speaker 1: than attacking a fixed target with known coordinates. Desert Storm
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  Speaker 1: made that challenge visible to a global audience, and subsequent
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  Speaker 1: military planning continued to wrestle with it. The air war
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  Speaker 1: also had costs beyond the immediate military contest. Coalition aircraft
• 15:06
  Speaker 1: were lost in combat and accidents. Aircrew members were killed, captured,
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  Speaker 1: or listed as missing. Iraqi infrastructure was damaged, and Iraqi
• 15:15
  Speaker 1: civilians were killed during the campaign. Totals differ among sources,
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  Speaker 1: as do judgments about particular target decisions and the strategic
• 15:23
  Speaker 1: value of attacks on infrastructure. The campaign's operational accomplishments do
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  Speaker 1: not remove those questions from the historical record. By late February,
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  Speaker 1: the coalition held a major advantage. Iraqi air defenses had
• 15:35
  Speaker 1: been heavily challenged. The Iraqi Air Force no longer posed
• 15:38
  Speaker 1: a sustained operational obstacle. Iraqi forces in Kuwait had endured
• 15:43
  Speaker 1: prolonged attack, and their military system faced pressure on its communications, logistics, transport,
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  Speaker 1: and field formations. But Iraqi troops still held territory. Some
• 15:55
  Speaker 1: units retained weapons, positions, and the capacity to fight. Terrain
• 16:00
  Speaker 1: could not be liberated by airstrikes alone. On February 24,
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  Speaker 1: coalition ground forces began the offensive that would decide control
• 16:08
  Speaker 1: of Kuwait. Marines and Arab coalition forces moved into Kuwait.
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  Speaker 1: United States and allied armored formations carried out the wide
• 16:17
  Speaker 1: western maneuver into Iraq before turning east. The operation moved
• 16:22
  Speaker 1: far more quickly than a direct assault against fully effective
• 16:25
  Speaker 1: defenses might have done. Coalition advantages in training, mobility, communications,
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  Speaker 1: combined arms coordination, and air support all contributed to that result.
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  Speaker 1: The ground campaign lasted roughly 100 hours. Iraqi units surrendered, withdrew,
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  Speaker 1: or were defeated. Kuwait City was liberated. On February 28,
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  Speaker 1: President George H.W. Bush announced a ceasefire. Iraq's occupation of
• 16:53
  Speaker 1: Kuwait had ended, fulfilling the coalition's immediate war aim. The
• 16:57
  Speaker 1: historical significance of Desert Storm lies in the relationship between
• 17:02
  Speaker 1: the air and ground phases. The air campaign did not
• 17:05
  Speaker 1: eliminate the need to seize territory, breach obstacles, defeat units
• 17:09
  Speaker 1: on the ground, and physically remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
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  Speaker 1: Those tasks required ground forces. Yet the air operation had
• 17:18
  Speaker 1: altered the military environment in which the ground offensive began.
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  Speaker 1: It had secured broad freedom of action in the air,
• 17:25
  Speaker 1: imposed pressure on Iraqi military systems, and weakened the defensive
• 17:29
  Speaker 1: posture confronting coalition troops. It also reshaped military debate. The
• 17:34
  Speaker 1: campaign encouraged investment in stealth, precision weapons, surveillance, electronic warfare,
• 17:39
  Speaker 1: air-to-air refueling, and integrated command systems. At the same time,
• 17:44
  Speaker 1: the record offered cautions. Stealth was valuable, but mission-dependent. Laser-guided
• 17:49
  Speaker 1: weapons were influential but not universal solutions. Mobile targets remained
• 17:54
  Speaker 1: difficult to find. Battle damage assessment could remain uncertain even
• 17:58
  Speaker 1: after apparently successful attacks. Technical superiority did not remove the
• 18:03
  Speaker 1: need for judgment, intelligence, logistics, and ground maneuver. The Coalition's
• 18:07
  Speaker 1: accomplishment was the integration of those elements. Thousands of aircraft
• 18:11
  Speaker 1: and personnel from multiple services and nations had to function
• 18:14
  Speaker 1: within one theater campaign. Intelligence personnel identified and reassessed targets.
• 18:20
  Speaker 1: Tanker crews extended the range of strike aircraft. Electronic warfare
• 18:24
  Speaker 1: crews helped address air defense threats. Fighters helped secure the skies.
• 18:28
  Speaker 1: Stealth aircraft struck selected targets. Bombers and other strike aircraft
• 18:32
  Speaker 1: attacked infrastructure and fielded forces. Reconnaissance systems attempted to determine
• 18:38
  Speaker 1: what had actually happened. Desert Storm therefore remains more than
• 18:42
  Speaker 1: a story of a single aircraft, a single weapon, or
• 18:45
  Speaker 1: a spectacular opening night. It was a sustained coalition operation
• 18:49
  Speaker 1: in which planning, logistics, command relationships, intelligence, and repeated daily
• 18:55
  Speaker 1: execution mattered as much as individual platforms. The air campaign
• 19:00
  Speaker 1: weakened Iraq's capacity to defend its occupation of Kuwait. The
• 19:04
  Speaker 1: ground offensive then converted that advantage into the liberation of
• 19:07
  Speaker 1: the country. The war's end was decisive in Kuwait, but
• 19:11
  Speaker 1: incomplete in the wider region. Saddam Hussein remained in power.
• 19:17
  Speaker 1: Iraq's state was not occupied or overthrown in 1991. The
• 19:21
  Speaker 1: Gulf remained subject to military and political tension for years afterward.
• 19:26
  Speaker 1: Even so, Operation Desert Storm established a lasting benchmark. Air
• 19:31
  Speaker 1: power could impose major operational effects when linked to a
• 19:34
  Speaker 1: coherent coalition strategy, but the political purpose of the war
• 19:38
  Speaker 1: was achieved only through the combined action of forces in
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  Speaker 1: the air and on the ground. This is Military History Uncovered.
• 19:46
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