Latest / The Vault: The Epstein Files / The OIG Report Into Jeffrey Epstein's Death: Conclusions And Recommendations (Chapter 7) (Part 5)

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The OIG Report Into Jeffrey Epstein's Death: Conclusions And Recommendations (Chapter 7) (Part 5) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
• 0:05
  In this episode, we're going to pick up where we
• 0:07
  left off with the OIG report into the circumstances surrounding
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  the death of Jeffrey Epstein. In our last episode, we
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  were talking about how the mcc new York staff had
• 0:20
  allowed Jeffrey Epstein to place an unmonitored telephone call on
• 0:24
  August ninth, So we're going to pick up right where
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  we left off at Part D. Mcc new York staff
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  failed to conduct and document cell searches and eliminate safety
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  hazards in epstein cell on August ninth, leaving Epstein with
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  excessive linens in his cell. The OIG's Investigation and Review
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  determined that mcc new York staff assigned to the Shoe
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  on August ninth, twenty nineteen, failed to conduct and document
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  searches of Epstein's cell in the shoe. BOP policy requires
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  BOP staff routine and irregularly search the housing units mcc
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  new York Shoe post orders require that shoe staff conduct
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  at least five cell searches during each shift during daytime
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  and evening hours seven forty five am to twelve am
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  in addition to other searches of the shoe cells and
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  common areas. NBOP policy end mcc new York Shoe post
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  orders require written documentation of cell searches. BOP policy explains
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  that the purpose of cell searches is to, among other things,
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  maintain sanitary conditions and eliminate safety hazards. To that end,
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  mcc new York General Housing Unit post orders provide that
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  when an inmate is transferred out of a facility, all
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  of the inmates linen should be taken to receiving and discharge.
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  The OIG reviewed mcc new York Shoe truscope entries for
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  August ninth and identify I had only one cell search
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  entered by mcc new York Shoe staff for the entire day.
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  During his interview with the OIG, the day watch shoe
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  officer in charge stated that multiple cell searches were conducted
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  in the mcc new York Shoe on August ninth. However,
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  the day watch shoe officer in charge stated that he
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  failed to document the cell searches within the true scope
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  system as required because he was too busy with other duties.
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  The day watch shoe officer in charge further stated that
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  any of the shoe staff could have logged the cell
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  searches into truth scope, but that it was primarily the
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  shoe officer in charge's responsibility to do so. The evening
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  watch shoe officer in charge told the OIG that he
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  and other staff members did not conduct any cell searches
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  during his shift in the shoe on August ninth. Additionally,
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  the OIG determined that there was an excessive amount of
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  bed linen within Epstein's cell. The captain reviewed photographs of
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  epstein cell and told the OIG that the excess of
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  linen's were a security issue because they could give inmates
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  materials to fashion and improvised noose or use as escape paraphernalia.
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  The OIG found that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, the
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  day watch shoe officer in charge either failed to conduct
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  or required cell searches or failed to document the cell
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  searches that he conducted in the shoe, and that the
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  evening watch shoe officer in charge failed to ensure that
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  mcc new York staff assigned to the shoe conducted cell
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  searches and himself fell to log cell searches in violation
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  of BOP policy. And mcc new York shoe post orders. Additionally,
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  the OIG found that it was a performance failure for
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  the day watch shoe Officer in charge, the evening watch
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  shoe Officer in charge, and Noel, who served as the
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  shoe officer in charge during their respective shifts on August
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  ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, to have permitted Epstein to
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  have an excessive amount of linens in his cell Section E.
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  Mcc new York staff failed to ensure that the institution's
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  security camera system was fully functional, resulting in limited recorded
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  video evidence. The investigation and review revealed long standing deficiencies
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  with mcc new york security camera system. These deficiencies resulted
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  in nearly all the cameras in and around the shoot
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  where Epstein was being housed to not record video, starting
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  in late July twenty nineteen and continuing through the date
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  of Epstein's death on August tenth, twenty nineteen. According to
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  forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death on
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  July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, a disc failure in mcc
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  new York's DVR two system caused approximately half of the
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  institution's cameras, including nearly all of the cameras in and
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  around the shoe, to display only live video feed with
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  no video recording. Mcc new York personnel did not learn
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  of this system failure until eleven days later. On August eighth,
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  twenty nineteen, mcc new York personnel determined that the DVR
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  two system needed to be rebuilt to restore recording functionality.
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  Despite the lack of recording functionality, this repair was not
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  completed until after Epstein's death. The Warden told the OIG
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  that he was generally aware that there were problems with
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  the camera system. The warden sought and received approval from
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  BOP to replace the entire camera system, and in September
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  twenty eighteen, BOP entered into contracts totaling over seven hundred
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  and thirty thousand dollars to purchase new equipment for the
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  camera replacement project. Although mcc new York management procured new
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  DVR components approximately nine months prior to Epstein's death, the
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  new system was not installed in a timely manner. The
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  new cameras were required new conduit and wiring to be
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  installed before the camera installation management phase. Staffing shortages temporary
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  rotating facility managers, and other competing priorities that did not
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  allow the completion of the installation of the wiring or
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  the new camera system. The OIG determined that as of
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  August twenty twenty one, nearly three years after mcc new
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  York contracted for replacement camera equipment, the system upgrade still
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  had not been completed. Mcc new York's failure to ensure
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  that its security camera system was fully functional and make
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  timely repairs is consistent with the OIG's previous observations regarding
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  weaknesses in the BOP's overall system of security cameras. Dating
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  back to at least twenty thirteen, the OIG has repeatedly
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  observed inadequacies in the BP's overall system of security cameras,
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  including inoperable cameras, an insufficient number of cameras, poor video quality,
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  and inadequate video storage. In a twenty sixteen report on
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  the BOP's contraband interdiction efforts, the OIG identified specific deficiencies
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  with the camera system and recommended that the BOP evaluate
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  the system to determine needed upgrades. In response to the
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  twenty sixteen recommendation, the BOP assessed the camera systems at
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  each institution over the next several years and determined that
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  forty five of its one hundred twenty two institutions, including
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  mcc New York, required camera system upgrades. The BOP worked
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  to upgrade the systems at those forty five institutions between
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  twenty nineteen and twan in twenty one. In June twenty
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  twenty one, the BOP reported that it had updated all
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  cameras at the forty five institutions with the latest software
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  end equipment, and that it had installed additional cameras to
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  bolster surveillance. However, as reported in October twenty twenty one,
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  management advisory memorandum issued to the BOP, had addressed some
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  but not all, of the deficiencies described in the twenty
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  sixteen OIG report. In its twenty twenty one management Advisory memorandum,
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  the OIG recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive strategic
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  plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system.
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  The BOP has provided the OIG with a strategic plan
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  that includes estimated cost projections and timelines for addressing the
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  camera system concerns and completing the system upgrades. As of
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  twenty twenty three. The OIG's twenty twenty one recommendation remains open.
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  The BOP's failure to address the issue of functional security
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  camera systems across the agency and that individual institutions presents
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  an ongoing risk to the safety of BOP staff and
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  inmates and has the potential to impair the investigation of
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  an accountability of staff and inmate misconduct. It is imperative
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  that the BOP prioritize the expeditious expansion and modernization of
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  its security camera system to mitigate security risks. All right, folks,
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  So we're going to end this episode here and we're
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  going to pick back up with part two of chapter seven,
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  which is Recommendations, and we're blazing through this. We're almost done,
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  probably another, oh, I don't know, three or four episodes
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  or so, and we'll have this whole entire OIG report
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  added to the catalog and then from there we're going
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  to go through it and we're gonna deconstruct the whole
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  entire thing. So as soon as we have it all
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  added to the catalog, that's going to be the next step.
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  All right, folks. All of the information that goes with
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  this episode can be found in the description box,