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Iain Davis on defining multipolarity | Jerm Warfare · UK Column Radio

• 0:30
  Speaker 1: My name is Jim. This is Germ Warfare, the Battle
• 0:33
  Speaker 1: of ideas. We've been chatting for years now, and I'm
• 0:37
  Speaker 1: a big admirer of your work, and your work has
• 0:40
  Speaker 1: has influenced me a lot over the years. I'm very
• 0:42
  Speaker 1: happy to say.
• 0:45
  Speaker 2: Very kind.
• 0:46
  Speaker 1: So I've been having a few discussions recently about multipolarity. Now,
• 0:52
  Speaker 1: I in its truest sense, I'm a fan of multipolarity,
• 0:56
  Speaker 1: and I think that the term has been hijacked, and
• 0:58
  Speaker 1: I think that's probably where the schism has has come in.
• 1:02
  Speaker 1: When we talk about multiplarity, what are we talking about, Well.
• 1:07
  Speaker 2: We're talking about a regional balance of power, system of
• 1:11
  Speaker 2: global governance. That's essentially what it what the idea is.
• 1:17
  Speaker 2: And I think, you know, if if we consider that
• 1:23
  Speaker 2: we had you know, probably let's take it in the
• 1:26
  Speaker 2: post Second World War period, we had what we might
• 1:31
  Speaker 2: call a bipolarity. We had the Cold War, so we
• 1:36
  Speaker 2: had broadly East versus West, or West versus East. But
• 1:43
  Speaker 2: I think it's more more important to say we had
• 1:45
  Speaker 2: an eastern sphere of Soviet influence and a western sphere
• 1:50
  Speaker 2: of US Anglo American influence. So bipolarity after the after
• 1:57
  Speaker 2: the you know, the the end of the Soviet area,
• 2:01
  Speaker 2: and you know, probably most significantly the taking down of
• 2:06
  Speaker 2: the Berlin Wall and the end of and you know,
• 2:09
  Speaker 2: Glasnost and Peristroika and so forth. Then what we had
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  Speaker 2: then was a period of unipolarity where you know, there
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  Speaker 2: was only really one one superpower in the world, so
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  Speaker 2: we had a global system of power exerted by a
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  Speaker 2: dominant superpower. And then the hoped for transition. And I
• 2:35
  Speaker 2: would point out that at the end of the at
• 2:39
  Speaker 2: the end of the kind of what we might call
• 2:42
  Speaker 2: the bipolar period and the collapse of the Berlin Wall,
• 2:46
  Speaker 2: it was it was the hoped for transition at that
• 2:50
  Speaker 2: point was to multipolarity. You get, you get the think
• 2:53
  Speaker 2: tanks like the Counts Council on Foreign Relations and so forth,
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  Speaker 2: that's what they envisaged, that's what they thought would happen.
• 3:00
  Speaker 2: But it didn't happen. Straight away. We had this unipolar moment.
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  Speaker 2: And the unipolar moment has not been good for the world.
• 3:07
  Speaker 2: You know, obviously there's been a lot of that's come
• 3:10
  Speaker 2: with a lot of military aggression and a lot of
• 3:12
  Speaker 2: violence and.
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  Speaker 3: Proxy wars all over the place.
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  Speaker 2: And then you know, now we're seeing but since then,
• 3:20
  Speaker 2: in the last certainly in the last forty or fifty
• 3:23
  Speaker 2: years seen the significant rise of China as an economic
• 3:29
  Speaker 2: and technological power and increasingly a military power, and Russia
• 3:35
  Speaker 2: asserting its independence really and that's moved us towards this
• 3:41
  Speaker 2: period of multipolarity as it's envisage to be, which is
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  Speaker 2: a regional as I said, would be a more global
• 3:49
  Speaker 2: governance system based on a regional distribution of power.
• 3:53
  Speaker 1: So it's on the face of it, it looks good
• 3:56
  Speaker 1: on the face of it.
• 3:57
  Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, and it could be. I mean, the idea
• 4:01
  Speaker 2: of multipolarity could be much better for the world, you know,
• 4:04
  Speaker 2: it could it could be much better. And you know,
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  Speaker 2: it could mean less war, it could mean less conflict,
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  Speaker 2: it could mean better trading relationships, more competition, better better
• 4:22
  Speaker 2: in many many respects. So yeah, I mean that that's
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  Speaker 2: that's the what the what multipolarity could be. My argument
• 4:32
  Speaker 2: is that that is certainly not what it is intended
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  Speaker 2: to be by by the people who are actually pulling
• 4:38
  Speaker 2: the strings. So I guess, I guess it boils down to,
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  Speaker 2: in my view, whether or not you think governments are
• 4:46
  Speaker 2: in charge or whether you think actually transnational capitalists are
• 4:52
  Speaker 2: in charge. In my view, it's trans transnational capitalists.
• 4:56
  Speaker 1: So okay, So now where does the discrepancy come in.
• 5:00
  Speaker 2: Well, I think it's important to I mean, I you know,
• 5:04
  Speaker 2: I reached out to you following the talk that you
• 5:07
  Speaker 2: did with Charles and Mike at UK column and your
• 5:11
  Speaker 2: video multipolarity is better than sliced bread or whatever it was.
• 5:17
  Speaker 2: I can't remember them.
• 5:18
  Speaker 1: Yeah, it was quite a funny title.
• 5:19
  Speaker 2: Yeah, because of the funny comment that Charles made at
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  Speaker 2: the end, So you know. Uh, And the thing that
• 5:27
  Speaker 2: I noted was that what you were arguing in terms
• 5:33
  Speaker 2: of the arguments against multipolarity, that that it suggested that
• 5:40
  Speaker 2: that you know, that people like myself at criticized multipolarity
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  Speaker 2: are in favor of YOUNI polarity, which we're not. Well,
• 5:49
  Speaker 2: I'm not you know, I don't speak for anybody else.
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  Speaker 1: So in other words, in other words, it would be
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  Speaker 1: a false dichard to me.
• 5:55
  Speaker 2: Yeah, and and you know, I don't speak for anybody else,
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  Speaker 2: but certainly in my criticisms of multipolarity, I'm certainly not
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  Speaker 2: suggesting that we should carry on with this kind of
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  Speaker 2: US Anglo zionist now, uh sorry, US zionist and Anglo
• 6:15
  Speaker 2: as well. Zionist dominance, because obviously that's not that's not good,
• 6:21
  Speaker 2: that's not that's not good for the world. And also
• 6:26
  Speaker 2: we're not necessarily criticizing the idea of multipolarity, you know,
• 6:32
  Speaker 2: the the idea of what it could be, you know,
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  Speaker 2: in preference to a unipolar order or what some people
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  Speaker 2: call the international rules based order. It could be better,
• 6:45
  Speaker 2: but it certainly isn't heading that way. You can look
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  Speaker 2: at the comments of for example, Sir Guy Lavrov recently
• 6:53
  Speaker 2: speaking to the Russian Institute at r E a C.
• 6:57
  Speaker 2: I can't remember the full title of it, but but
• 6:59
  Speaker 2: we're saying about, you know, what we're seeing as a
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  Speaker 2: breakdown in order as this as we move towards this
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  Speaker 2: new multipolar envisaged world. And that's very much the case.
• 7:12
  Speaker 2: But I would argue that what multipolarity suggests as it
• 7:18
  Speaker 2: is fold as it is unfolding, is not actually a
• 7:21
  Speaker 2: reduction in war. I think, I think there'll be more war,
• 7:27
  Speaker 2: but it will be a different type of war. It
• 7:28
  Speaker 2: will be more hybrid war. There'll be more i would say,
• 7:33
  Speaker 2: localized skirmishes. So for example, you know, if you take
• 7:37
  Speaker 2: what China is doing at the moment with regard to
• 7:40
  Speaker 2: the Ukraine War. It is providing what they call dual
• 7:45
  Speaker 2: use technology, which is military technology. It's providing it to
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  Speaker 2: both sides, providing it to the Russians and the Ukrainians.
• 7:52
  Speaker 2: So so you know, China is militarizing very heavily. Could
• 8:00
  Speaker 2: say that that's a defensive, defensive strategy. Of course, all
• 8:04
  Speaker 2: countries say that they militarize for defensive strategies. But whether
• 8:09
  Speaker 2: it's going to exert more military authority in in certainly
• 8:14
  Speaker 2: in you know, with regard to the Taiwan issue, whether
• 8:17
  Speaker 2: that will play out that way, who knows. But but
• 8:21
  Speaker 2: you know, certainly China is militarizing. So that that is
• 8:25
  Speaker 2: that is concerning if peace and less war is the hope.
• 8:32
  Speaker 2: So you know that That's what I would I would
• 8:36
  Speaker 2: and and fundamentally what I would say, and I think
• 8:40
  Speaker 2: where a lot of people are coming from with regard
• 8:42
  Speaker 2: to criticizing multipolarity is why do we need any kind
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  Speaker 2: of world order? Why do we need global governance of
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  Speaker 2: any kind?
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  Speaker 3: Right?
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  Speaker 2: Why why do we need this centralized, centralized system of governance?
• 8:59
  Speaker 2: What what what benefit is that to anybody? And another
• 9:03
  Speaker 2: thing that came up in the discussion and Mike was
• 9:06
  Speaker 2: Mike Robinson from the UK column was talking about the
• 9:09
  Speaker 2: Westphalian model and how that is preferable to to you know,
• 9:15
  Speaker 2: certainly to the rules based order and unipolarity. Let's stick
• 9:19
  Speaker 2: with simple things, the unipolarity versus multipolarity. That is preferable
• 9:24
  Speaker 2: to unipolarity, It certainly is, but I would also say
• 9:27
  Speaker 2: it's preferable to multipolar multipolarity. The West Falian model is
• 9:33
  Speaker 2: a decentralized system of global governance if you like so,
• 9:38
  Speaker 2: so decentralization is better. So why do we need any
• 9:43
  Speaker 2: kind of global order at all? Is the question?
• 9:49
  Speaker 1: Yeah, the question of why do we need any kind
• 9:53
  Speaker 1: of world order is obviously well taken and I would
• 9:59
  Speaker 1: agree with that. You know, why would you want to
• 10:02
  Speaker 1: be a slave? I get that, But isn't that replacing
• 10:06
  Speaker 1: one kind of hopium with another? Because one of the
• 10:08
  Speaker 1: criticisms is that, well, multipolarity is just hopium. But isn't
• 10:13
  Speaker 1: not wanting any world order also just hopium?
• 10:19
  Speaker 2: This is the problem when we get down to discussing
• 10:22
  Speaker 2: these this kind of things, And even if we talk
• 10:24
  Speaker 2: about the notion of challenging government authority, it is everything
• 10:31
  Speaker 2: will remain hopium unless people do something about it.
• 10:35
  Speaker 3: So there's no point.
• 10:35
  Speaker 2: There's no point talking about people having more independent lives
• 10:39
  Speaker 2: and freeing themselves up from reliance upon government systems if
• 10:43
  Speaker 2: they don't do anything about it. There's there's no point
• 10:47
  Speaker 2: talking about libertarian, real libertarian principles, not the kind of
• 10:51
  Speaker 2: libertarian principles that promoted people like Peter Thiel, but the
• 10:54
  Speaker 2: actual real libertarian principles. There they're not going to work.
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  Speaker 2: It is just hopium unless somebody does something about it.
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  Speaker 2: Unless unless you're prepared to make the changes in your
• 11:07
  Speaker 2: life that will enable you to achieve the things that
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  Speaker 2: you want to achieve. If that's important to you, then
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  Speaker 2: it's all hopium. Everything is everything is everything is hopium
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  Speaker 2: unless people act.
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  Speaker 3: They have to act.
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  Speaker 2: So you know, you could say the same about absolutely everything.
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  Speaker 2: So so hoping that that a better global order could emerge,
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  Speaker 2: I mean my problem with a multipote with hoping that
• 11:35
  Speaker 2: multipolarity specifically might be better, is that is that then
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  Speaker 2: you need to look at who's designed it, why they
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  Speaker 2: designed it, Why are we why are we heading in
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  Speaker 2: this direction? What is it that it is likely to deliver?
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  Speaker 2: What what what does it look like at the moment,
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  Speaker 2: and what it looks like, is the imposition globally of
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  Speaker 2: a technocratic order, That's what it looks like.
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  Speaker 1: Yes, it does look like that, and it probably will
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  Speaker 1: be like that because we know that Russia and China
• 12:12
  Speaker 1: and all of those global South countries very much did
• 12:18
  Speaker 1: the same thing during COVID. Is it possible to compartmentalize
• 12:24
  Speaker 1: rather than employe kind of binary thinking? Like, Okay, on
• 12:31
  Speaker 1: the macro scale, it is all hitting in the same direction,
• 12:35
  Speaker 1: but on the short term, immediate micro scale, there are
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  Speaker 1: definitely differences which are beneficial to say, those of us
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  Speaker 1: living on the African continent.
• 12:47
  Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, there are differences with the way so
• 12:49
  Speaker 2: for example, if you look at the way China uses
• 12:53
  Speaker 2: its debt diplomacy, it's different from the way that the
• 12:56
  Speaker 2: traditionally the IMF has used debt diplomacy. So, for example, Cuba,
• 13:00
  Speaker 2: at the moment, you know, China is offering to install
• 13:04
  Speaker 2: massive solar arrays in Cuba to to help alleviate its
• 13:09
  Speaker 2: problems with you know, obviously with it's with all the
• 13:12
  Speaker 2: blackouts that it's suffered and its energy it's energy infrastructure.
• 13:15
  Speaker 2: So China has come in and said, you know, it
• 13:18
  Speaker 2: will help you out right, rather than impose loans on you.
• 13:23
  Speaker 2: We will we will actually help by building Chinese by
• 13:27
  Speaker 2: building infrastructure for you. However, it will be Chinese firms
• 13:33
  Speaker 2: that build it. It will be controlled by Chinese firms.
• 13:37
  Speaker 2: Chinese multinationals will do the construction. You will have to
• 13:41
  Speaker 2: pay us to to for the construction. It is it
• 13:46
  Speaker 2: that you will you will owe us money for that.
• 13:48
  Speaker 2: There will be a debt, and obviously that will be
• 13:51
  Speaker 2: a Chinese own debt, So it's still debt trapped diplomacy,
• 13:57
  Speaker 2: but it comes with infrastructure rather than boots on the
• 14:01
  Speaker 2: ground soldiers pointing a gun at your head. So from
• 14:04
  Speaker 2: so from that perspective, yeah, sure, sure that's better. That's
• 14:08
  Speaker 2: that's better.
• 14:10
  Speaker 1: But why the barquad low?
• 14:12
  Speaker 2: Though?
• 14:14
  Speaker 3: Yeah, setting the bar low.
• 14:15
  Speaker 2: But but but that is the you know, that's better,
• 14:18
  Speaker 2: you know, in my in my experience, I mean one
• 14:20
  Speaker 2: of the things that I experienced. I spent quite a
• 14:23
  Speaker 2: lot of time in East East and Southern Africa, Southeast Africa.
• 14:27
  Speaker 3: I was, you know, I was.
• 14:29
  Speaker 2: I was in Malawi and Tanzania and Zambia and were
• 14:33
  Speaker 2: all around there for quite a while. And in Malawi,
• 14:40
  Speaker 2: China had a deal to build a hospital, so they
• 14:43
  Speaker 2: were going to build a hospital and for you know,
• 14:47
  Speaker 2: you know, they want Obviously it wasn't free, but they
• 14:50
  Speaker 2: were quite happy to build a couple of new hospitals
• 14:53
  Speaker 2: in Malawi. And the Malawi and government agreed, and China
• 14:58
  Speaker 2: came and built the hospitals. Uh. And that's what they built.
• 15:02
  Speaker 2: They built the shell of a hospital. UH. And then
• 15:06
  Speaker 2: the then the Malawi and government said, well, hang on
• 15:08
  Speaker 2: a minute, there's it's just a it's just a construct.
• 15:10
  Speaker 2: It's just a concrete construction. There's not it's not actually
• 15:13
  Speaker 2: a hospital. There's no equipment in it. There's nothing. And
• 15:16
  Speaker 2: and China said, well, you didn't say anything. You didn't
• 15:18
  Speaker 2: say anything about putting any equipment or any beds or
• 15:21
  Speaker 2: anything like that in it. We've built a hospital, but
• 15:23
  Speaker 2: there's nothing in it that will be more so, so
• 15:28
  Speaker 2: you know, it isn't it isn't you know, it is
• 15:32
  Speaker 2: debt diplomacy, but it's debt diplomacy with a smile, and
• 15:35
  Speaker 2: debt diplomacy with a different different And if you look
• 15:38
  Speaker 2: at like the bricks the bricks development banks like NDB
• 15:42
  Speaker 2: and and the Asian Development Bank and so forth, they
• 15:45
  Speaker 2: are in partnership, they are working in partnership with the
• 15:48
  Speaker 2: IMF and the World Bank. They're not. They're not, they're not.
• 15:51
  Speaker 2: They're not opposed to what the IMF and the World
• 15:54
  Speaker 2: Bank are doing, or either, I would look look at
• 15:56
  Speaker 2: it the other way. Actually, the IMF and the World
• 15:59
  Speaker 2: Bank are not opposed to what they're doing, so the
• 16:03
  Speaker 2: art that's why they're that's why they're working in partnership together.
• 16:07
  Speaker 2: So it's not like they are at odds.
• 16:14
  Speaker 1: One of the realities in though, is if you look
• 16:19
  Speaker 1: at the African continent, it is dominated by Western powers,
• 16:28
  Speaker 1: completely dominated. And you've got I think around fourteen countries
• 16:31
  Speaker 1: that still use the French currency and controlled effectively by Europe.
• 16:37
  Speaker 1: You've got South Africa, which is effectively driven by mining
• 16:44
  Speaker 1: and agriculture. I think every single mind is foreign owned.
• 16:50
  Speaker 1: At least some degree of sovereignty being taken back would
• 16:55
  Speaker 1: be a good thing long term, don't you.
• 16:58
  Speaker 2: Think, Oh of course, yeah, yeah, absolutely, it would be
• 17:01
  Speaker 2: a good thing, you know, obviously, I mean South Africa's
• 17:07
  Speaker 2: I was looking at some figures the other day, So
• 17:10
  Speaker 2: South Africa's got the highest rate of IF on the
• 17:14
  Speaker 2: on the Genie measurement measurement of economic inequality, South Africa's
• 17:20
  Speaker 2: got the highest rate of economic inequality in the world. Yes,
• 17:24
  Speaker 2: So the disparity between the between those that have access
• 17:29
  Speaker 2: to capital and resources and those that don't is the
• 17:32
  Speaker 2: greatest in South Africa in the world. So if that
• 17:38
  Speaker 2: sovereignty means, you know, a rebalancing of that of that problem, great,
• 17:47
  Speaker 2: that would be That would be great. And if sovereignty
• 17:51
  Speaker 2: can be achieved like it so for example, if you know,
• 17:54
  Speaker 2: the South African people through their government can buy back
• 17:59
  Speaker 2: some of their reasons horses and buy back because they're
• 18:01
  Speaker 2: not going to get there because that's the point, they'll
• 18:03
  Speaker 2: have to buy them back. They won't be given back,
• 18:05
  Speaker 2: They'll have to buy them.
• 18:09
  Speaker 3: That would be great.
• 18:11
  Speaker 2: But I mean, I'm not I'm not sure that that
• 18:13
  Speaker 2: is is going to happen as a result of a
• 18:18
  Speaker 2: China having a greater influence in or Russia or the bricks,
• 18:25
  Speaker 2: you know, the bricks bricks itself having a having a
• 18:28
  Speaker 2: greater influence in South African domestic politics. Do you do
• 18:35
  Speaker 2: you do you see that happening?
• 18:38
  Speaker 1: No, no, no, I don't see it happening at least
• 18:40
  Speaker 1: anytime soon. What I do see happening is an increase
• 18:46
  Speaker 1: in good trade relations between US and China and that
• 18:51
  Speaker 1: is that is noticeable on a day to day level.
• 18:54
  Speaker 1: We have almost no tariffs, which is a huge when
• 19:00
  Speaker 1: you have a lot of poor people.
• 19:03
  Speaker 2: Certainly, yeah, access access to you know, Chinese manufacturing product,
• 19:09
  Speaker 2: manufactured products and services. You know, that's of course, that's
• 19:12
  Speaker 2: that's going to be helpful. I mean if you look
• 19:15
  Speaker 2: at but I mean, so if you look at the
• 19:19
  Speaker 2: look at the way that the current uni unipolar world
• 19:22
  Speaker 2: or the western Western world order worked. What the West
• 19:27
  Speaker 2: West has done is is you know, it's if you like,
• 19:30
  Speaker 2: it's ahead of South Africa, and it's ahead of that
• 19:34
  Speaker 2: in a way because because the Western world has been
• 19:38
  Speaker 2: reliant upon Chinese manufacturing for longer. It's been reliant on
• 19:43
  Speaker 2: Chinese manufacturing for fifty years, for forty years, So Chinese
• 19:49
  Speaker 2: products and services are everywhere in the Western world because
• 19:53
  Speaker 2: it's the manufacturing hub of the planet. So so tariffs come
• 19:58
  Speaker 2: along with questionable, questionable political moves that are happening in
• 20:06
  Speaker 2: the Western and sanctions. So if you look at how
• 20:10
  Speaker 2: tariffs and sanctions work, it is to degrade and to
• 20:17
  Speaker 2: the Western economies.
• 20:19
  Speaker 3: So obviously, if you have a.
• 20:21
  Speaker 2: Tariff war with the country that is manufacturing and producing
• 20:26
  Speaker 2: or also producing and if we combine that with Russia
• 20:30
  Speaker 2: as well, which is a resource rich country and China
• 20:34
  Speaker 2: is to a great extent, but not so much in oil,
• 20:36
  Speaker 2: but energy energy from Russia and manufacturer goods and services
• 20:43
  Speaker 2: and technological development from China. If you cut yourself off
• 20:47
  Speaker 2: from that as some sort of political statement, which is
• 20:50
  Speaker 2: what the you know, certainly the Trump administration is doing.
• 20:53
  Speaker 2: That's isolationist and that's acting against your own economic interests.
• 20:58
  Speaker 2: So why would you do that?
• 21:00
  Speaker 3: Why?
• 21:01
  Speaker 2: I mean, if you look at the European sanctions, the
• 21:05
  Speaker 2: sanctions that they imposed on Russia in terms of energy
• 21:08
  Speaker 2: taking Russian energy, what all that's done is all that's
• 21:13
  Speaker 2: done is hobble the EU economy. Now the EU has
• 21:18
  Speaker 2: to buy really expensive LNG from the US, which is
• 21:22
  Speaker 2: not in the It's not in the EU's economic interest
• 21:25
  Speaker 2: to do with what they did. So why did they
• 21:27
  Speaker 2: do it? I mean, I mean, you can argue that
• 21:29
  Speaker 2: that's because in response to a quote unquote war, which
• 21:33
  Speaker 2: was a bizarre war, because you know, all the way
• 21:36
  Speaker 2: through it, Russia has been paying gas transit fees to
• 21:39
  Speaker 2: the Ukrainians to bolster their economy throughout a war with
• 21:46
  Speaker 2: it of Ukrainian diesel that fueled their military armor came
• 21:57
  Speaker 2: from Luke Oil Russian Loucal Old refineries in Bulgaria throughout
• 22:02
  Speaker 2: the war. That's a weird war where you are where
• 22:06
  Speaker 2: you are, you are ensuring that your enemy can fight.
• 22:12
  Speaker 3: So there's there's a there's many.
• 22:13
  Speaker 2: Many weird things that that are playing out on the
• 22:17
  Speaker 2: global stage at the moment, and it is all heading
• 22:20
  Speaker 2: towards multipolarity. The world is being driven towards multipolarity.
• 22:26
  Speaker 1: Look, sorry, sorry, go onion No, no, no, no, thank you,
• 22:30
  Speaker 1: go on No. I was gonna say, I've been having
• 22:32
  Speaker 1: a number of conversations in my circles about this, and
• 22:39
  Speaker 1: a number of the sort of quote unquote neo coon
• 22:43
  Speaker 1: type friends. We'll say, yes, but you see, Trump imposing
• 22:48
  Speaker 1: tariffs is a way to encourage local manufacturing. I think
• 22:53
  Speaker 1: that's absurd. I don't agree with that, but it is
• 22:57
  Speaker 1: a genuine argument that is consistently made.
• 23:01
  Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean, if you if you look at the
• 23:03
  Speaker 2: kind of you know, as the US becomes more isolationists,
• 23:07
  Speaker 2: so it's it's you know, it's on paper, it's becoming
• 23:09
  Speaker 2: more isolationists, you know, pulling out of Kyoto, pull it's
• 23:13
  Speaker 2: threatening to pull out of the UNFCCC, you know, pulling
• 23:17
  Speaker 2: out of the World Health Organization, or threatening to threatening
• 23:22
  Speaker 2: to distance itself from that, distancing itself from even from
• 23:25
  Speaker 2: NATO and the UN. All of this, though those are
• 23:30
  Speaker 2: good things, if if that means a better outcome for
• 23:33
  Speaker 2: the humanity, if that means a better outcome for humanity,
• 23:36
  Speaker 2: than those are good things. It doesn't because what's what
• 23:41
  Speaker 2: what are what is the US doing. It's extending its
• 23:45
  Speaker 2: influence over Central and South America, It's looking to expand
• 23:50
  Speaker 2: its military influence in the polar region. It's it's in
• 23:55
  Speaker 2: words and somewhat indeed, it is drawing out, drawing the technique,
• 24:01
  Speaker 2: it's pulling that together. So if you think about that,
• 24:03
  Speaker 2: the the North American technique being a pole, then you've
• 24:08
  Speaker 2: got the europe the European Union and being a pole.
• 24:14
  Speaker 2: The Eurasian the Eurasian Union being another potential pole. You know,
• 24:20
  Speaker 2: the Asian Union which is proposed by China, which would
• 24:24
  Speaker 2: be you know, linking up Asian and the GCC, the
• 24:28
  Speaker 2: golf golf you've forgot what it's tensil number, but linking
• 24:36
  Speaker 2: linking them together. So so that's that is the Balkanization
• 24:41
  Speaker 2: of the world, which would be required for a unipolar
• 24:45
  Speaker 2: world order, for a multipolar world order, that is the
• 24:48
  Speaker 2: basic kind of structure of it. So that is happening,
• 24:55
  Speaker 2: So they're doing it. The question is will that be
• 24:59
  Speaker 2: benefici for people? Will that be beneficial for us? Well,
• 25:04
  Speaker 2: certainly if you're rebalancing global economies, that would be better
• 25:08
  Speaker 2: for people potentially in developing and emerging economies. Will their
• 25:12
  Speaker 2: standard of livings raise, let's hope. So, yeah, that would
• 25:17
  Speaker 2: be great. That would be great, But it's also means
• 25:21
  Speaker 2: that people in the West are probably going to get
• 25:24
  Speaker 2: used to. It's not like they want to raise everybody
• 25:27
  Speaker 2: to the same level of consumption and the same level
• 25:30
  Speaker 2: of larges really that people in developed nations have enjoyed
• 25:37
  Speaker 2: for the last fifty years, sixty years. That's not the idea.
• 25:42
  Speaker 2: It's to slightly raise the economic prospects of people living
• 25:49
  Speaker 2: in developing and emerging economies, but also lower the prospects
• 25:55
  Speaker 2: and the economic potential of people for people living in
• 26:00
  Speaker 2: already living in developed nations. It's not to raise all
• 26:04
  Speaker 2: it's not to raise all houses simultaneously or raise all
• 26:07
  Speaker 2: boat simultaneously. It is to slightly raise one and lower
• 26:11
  Speaker 2: the other. That's that's that, that's the mean because the
• 26:14
  Speaker 2: ultimate objective, and people like the Rockefellers have been talking
• 26:20
  Speaker 2: to this, and the and the think tanks like the
• 26:25
  Speaker 2: Trilateral Commission and the Builder Burghers and all these these
• 26:28
  Speaker 2: kind of people have been planning this out for a
• 26:30
  Speaker 2: very very very long time, is to is to put
• 26:35
  Speaker 2: this multipolar world order in place so that they, the
• 26:40
  Speaker 2: transnational capitalists, the oligarch class, can more easily manage the
• 26:46
  Speaker 2: bureaucracy of global governance and impose their own will on it.
• 26:50
  Speaker 2: That's that's what it's for. That's that's the objective of it.
• 26:54
  Speaker 2: Not and sure whether relatively speaking, whether people benefit, some
• 27:02
  Speaker 2: people benefit from it and some people lose out by it. Sure,
• 27:06
  Speaker 2: but but ultimately we are all going to be subjected
• 27:09
  Speaker 2: to the technocratic control of transnational capitalist oligarchs. That's that's
• 27:16
  Speaker 2: what it's that's what it's for. That's the idea of.
• 27:18
  Speaker 1: It, which you also refer to as the three PP
• 27:22
  Speaker 1: or the three p's I think your.
• 27:23
  Speaker 2: Point, Yeah, well yeah, l G three P to make
• 27:26
  Speaker 2: it easier public pub global public private partnership. But yeah, yeah,
• 27:29
  Speaker 2: I mean which you which is everywhere, which.
• 27:32
  Speaker 3: Is you know, you see that.
• 27:34
  Speaker 2: I mean, ironically, why yes, go on, well no, ironically
• 27:40
  Speaker 2: I wrote about that quite a few years ago, and
• 27:44
  Speaker 2: now there's a Wikipedia page for global public private partnership,
• 27:49
  Speaker 2: which didn't exist when I when I wrote first started
• 27:51
  Speaker 2: writing about it saying that exactly that it's it's it's about,
• 27:56
  Speaker 2: you know, a way of administer stirring global affairs, and
• 28:05
  Speaker 2: you know which it is, that's what it is. But
• 28:08
  Speaker 2: it is a top down hierarchical structure with governments somewhere
• 28:15
  Speaker 2: in the middle.
• 28:16
  Speaker 1: You know, unipolarity and multipolarity ultimately are the same thing
• 28:22
  Speaker 1: in the end, Why worry about it?
• 28:26
  Speaker 2: Well, yeah, I wouldn't say they were necessarily ultimately the
• 28:29
  Speaker 2: same thing. They're different models of global order. That they're
• 28:35
  Speaker 2: different models of global order. But unipolarity unipolarity was a mistake.
• 28:40
  Speaker 2: I mean, I can't remember the name of the guy
• 28:44
  Speaker 2: that wrote it, but he was a senior analyst for
• 28:46
  Speaker 2: the Councilor on Foreign Relations. But when he wrote about
• 28:49
  Speaker 2: the unipolar moment, which is where we get the term
• 28:52
  Speaker 2: unipolarity from, you know, he openly said, you know, this
• 28:55
  Speaker 2: wasn't supposed to happen. We were supposed to transition from
• 28:59
  Speaker 2: a we were the intention was, you know, the think
• 29:03
  Speaker 2: tank intention was that we would transition from a bipolar
• 29:10
  Speaker 2: bipolarity cold War situation into the multipolar into a more
• 29:15
  Speaker 2: multipolar situation.
• 29:17
  Speaker 3: You know, when when.
• 29:20
  Speaker 2: Carol Quigley was looking at looking at what the ideas
• 29:23
  Speaker 2: were that were coming out of the US think tanks
• 29:26
  Speaker 2: in the you know, at the sort of beginning of
• 29:29
  Speaker 2: the twentieth century and through the early part of the
• 29:31
  Speaker 2: twentieth century and in you know, post early post world period.
• 29:35
  Speaker 2: What they were aiming for was a three powers world,
• 29:39
  Speaker 2: which was the same as the Trilateral Commission's idea of
• 29:43
  Speaker 2: a three powers world. You know, I mean, you've got
• 29:44
  Speaker 2: the mckinder kind of heartland idea that the battle for this,
• 29:48
  Speaker 2: for this this Eurasian kind of space, which is which
• 29:53
  Speaker 2: Lavrov now now refers to as the world majority, which
• 29:57
  Speaker 2: it is because it takes in the Indian Indian as well,
• 30:00
  Speaker 2: and so it is there is the world majority, and
• 30:04
  Speaker 2: part of it is considered to be the global South.
• 30:07
  Speaker 2: When you when you think about the think tanks obsession
• 30:14
  Speaker 2: with battling for control of this space, the best way
• 30:18
  Speaker 2: that they could think of for doing that would be
• 30:20
  Speaker 2: was multipolarity. Multipolarity would enable the control of that space,
• 30:25
  Speaker 2: geographical space, mckinder's heartland, it would multipolarity. Now there's always
• 30:31
  Speaker 2: been resistance against that, you know, So if you read Bozzinski,
• 30:35
  Speaker 2: he was he was very much in favor of maintaining
• 30:37
  Speaker 2: unipolarity because he was an American exceptionalist. So so, but
• 30:45
  Speaker 2: times change, certainly, the the the amazing amount of foreign
• 30:52
  Speaker 2: direct investment that went from West to east, certainly, you know,
• 30:58
  Speaker 2: to enable China's technological divers and its economic transition. Not
• 31:02
  Speaker 2: that China wouldn't have been able to do it itself,
• 31:04
  Speaker 2: but it wouldn't have been able to do it so fast,
• 31:06
  Speaker 2: I would suggest without that massive transfer of wealth and
• 31:12
  Speaker 2: technology from West to east. You know, because on why
• 31:18
  Speaker 2: were they doing that? Why were multinational corporations doing that?
• 31:21
  Speaker 2: Why were the Rockfellers so hell bent on building up
• 31:25
  Speaker 2: Chinese economy on the Chinese economy? Because A, you could say,
• 31:30
  Speaker 2: well that would that is just an economically good idea,
• 31:34
  Speaker 2: because you're developing a massive market, which is good for everybody.
• 31:39
  Speaker 2: But B it's because they very firmly had in their
• 31:42
  Speaker 2: mind the idea of moving to a multipolar world orders.
• 31:47
  Speaker 2: I mean, you've got the Club of Rome putting out
• 31:49
  Speaker 2: the Ten Kingdoms Model multipolar world order in nineteen I
• 31:54
  Speaker 2: want to say nineteen fifties, but I think that might
• 31:57
  Speaker 2: be wrong. It might have been the nineteen seventies anyway,
• 32:00
  Speaker 2: but certainly more than fifty years ago.
• 32:03
  Speaker 3: So this is what they want. This is what they want,
• 32:08
  Speaker 3: So why do they want it?
• 32:10
  Speaker 1: Well, I've read Hans Hermanhopp's Democracy, The God That Failed
• 32:14
  Speaker 1: of I'm not sure if you read it. It's an
• 32:15
  Speaker 1: excellent book, and he makes a number of arguments, but
• 32:24
  Speaker 1: he essentially says that democracy is a terrible system and
• 32:30
  Speaker 1: monarchy is actually better for any lists throughout the book
• 32:35
  Speaker 1: why a bunch of reasons, and it's an incredibly compelling argument,
• 32:39
  Speaker 1: but he says, look, ultimately, natural order, where you don't
• 32:42
  Speaker 1: have any state governing you, is the best. But in
• 32:48
  Speaker 1: the absence of natural order, which seems completely unlikely based
• 32:52
  Speaker 1: on the history of humanity, then he would opt for
• 32:58
  Speaker 1: monarchy over democracy. No, I'm saying this because I'm making
• 33:01
  Speaker 1: a parallel. We are probably always going to have state control. Well, no,
• 33:12
  Speaker 1: I haven't read that, so I need to read that.
• 33:14
  Speaker 1: But what we might call spontaneous order is how the
• 33:18
  Speaker 1: world works. The world it works by it through spontaneous order.
• 33:24
  Speaker 1: If you look at how For example, I mean, there's
• 33:26
  Speaker 1: a very good book that I might recommend you me
• 33:28
  Speaker 1: called Eyepencil, written written by a guy called Leonardy Read.
• 33:32
  Speaker 1: Leonardy Read, I think it was Leonard Read who basically
• 33:36
  Speaker 1: explains how a pencil is manufactured. So how is a
• 33:40
  Speaker 1: pencil manufactured? Well, you've got someone's got a mine, the graphite,
• 33:44
  Speaker 1: you know, someone's got a mine there, the iron ore,
• 33:47
  Speaker 1: someone's got a felder timber, someone's got a manufacture that.
• 33:50
  Speaker 1: You know, the manufacturing process, it's global.
• 33:55
  Speaker 3: That ends up.
• 33:56
  Speaker 2: You know this, This immensely complex supply supply chain and
• 34:01
  Speaker 2: production chain, global production chain all culminates to deliver a pencil,
• 34:09
  Speaker 2: a little pencil. But nobody in that chain, anywhere along
• 34:14
  Speaker 2: that line, no one is being told what to do
• 34:18
  Speaker 2: by anyone. Everybody is simply acting in their own self interest,
• 34:22
  Speaker 2: commercial self interests working together in order to ultimately produce
• 34:27
  Speaker 2: a pencil.
• 34:29
  Speaker 3: Now, there's no order in that.
• 34:33
  Speaker 2: If you look at if you look at how international
• 34:35
  Speaker 2: relations function currently, while we have nascent global government systems
• 34:41
  Speaker 2: like the United Nations, actually international there is no one
• 34:45
  Speaker 2: in charge of international relations, international relations operates between you know,
• 34:50
  Speaker 2: AKAC have things like treaties and nominally international law, but
• 34:57
  Speaker 2: it's just countries working together by a green and so
• 35:00
  Speaker 2: there's no one in charge. There is no power. The
• 35:03
  Speaker 2: point of the multipolar world order is to impose a
• 35:06
  Speaker 2: power structure on it. That's the point of it. So
• 35:10
  Speaker 2: we're going from a situation where spontaneous order actually exists
• 35:15
  Speaker 2: and it actually is the dominant structure of the earth,
• 35:19
  Speaker 2: contrary to what people constantly say that it doesn't exist,
• 35:24
  Speaker 2: that it can never happen.
• 35:25
  Speaker 3: It is how it happens. That is what we've got now.
• 35:29
  Speaker 2: So the difficulty that we have is that because people
• 35:36
  Speaker 2: think that having a power structure imposed on you is essential.
• 35:41
  Speaker 2: So if you're arguing, for example, that monarchy is a
• 35:44
  Speaker 2: better form of government, so did Aristotle and Plato, right,
• 35:50
  Speaker 2: So yeah, right, So that's what they say. Democracy is
• 35:54
  Speaker 2: a bad idea. Well, for a start, when people talk
• 35:57
  Speaker 2: about democracy, they're talking about representative democracy, and that isn't democracy.
• 36:02
  Speaker 2: Democracy has got nothing to do with electing people that
• 36:06
  Speaker 2: to tell you what to do. That's representative democracy, which
• 36:09
  Speaker 2: is a different thing, entirely democracy. If you go back
• 36:13
  Speaker 2: to ancient Greece, this guy called Kleisthenes came up with
• 36:18
  Speaker 2: the idea which was the basis of the of the
• 36:21
  Speaker 2: of the you know, the republic really was, or the
• 36:27
  Speaker 2: or the democratic part democracy democrat he he called it
• 36:31
  Speaker 2: was the rule of law through the exercise it. Basically,
• 36:35
  Speaker 2: it was just people coming together and abiding by the.
• 36:37
  Speaker 3: Rule of law. So they agree what the rule of
• 36:41
  Speaker 3: law is.
• 36:42
  Speaker 2: I you know, we don't think it's right that you
• 36:45
  Speaker 2: steal somebody else's possessions, or we don't think it's right
• 36:48
  Speaker 2: that you kill someone. And just ensuring that they all
• 36:53
  Speaker 2: live by some mechanism, which for him was trial by jury,
• 36:58
  Speaker 2: that they live. They live through some mechanism collectively together
• 37:02
  Speaker 2: by which they agree to enforce what they agree to
• 37:06
  Speaker 2: be the law. There's no government, there's no there's no hierarchy,
• 37:11
  Speaker 2: there's no somebody telling somebody what to do. That is democracy.
• 37:16
  Speaker 2: And if you look at international law, it kind of
• 37:20
  Speaker 2: operates along those Oh let's put it this way. It
• 37:23
  Speaker 2: is supposed to operate along those lines. So when people
• 37:27
  Speaker 2: say and they as they constantly do, as you've just raised,
• 37:30
  Speaker 2: there that spontaneous order, which is the opposite of imposed
• 37:34
  Speaker 2: order or the or the antithesis to imposed order can't work,
• 37:39
  Speaker 2: and there's no examples of it working anywhere. It is
• 37:43
  Speaker 2: how the planet functions. It is how the planet currently functions.
• 37:49
  Speaker 2: It is spontaneous order. The problem that we've got is
• 37:53
  Speaker 2: that governments and power structures, and not so much governments
• 37:57
  Speaker 2: even governments are just at all used by powers structures.
• 38:01
  Speaker 2: Is that power structures, which are transnational and capitalist at
• 38:06
  Speaker 2: the moment, are constantly seeking to exert their power and
• 38:11
  Speaker 2: control over spontaneous order. And while we carry on going
• 38:17
  Speaker 2: along with that by, for example, thinking that multipolarity might
• 38:21
  Speaker 2: be better than unipolarity, rather than questioning the fundamental concept
• 38:26
  Speaker 2: of whether any kind of hierarchical global power structure is
• 38:31
  Speaker 2: necessary at all, which it isn't, and we can we
• 38:36
  Speaker 2: know that because we function perfectly well without it. So
• 38:41
  Speaker 2: so that is what I would suggest, is is where
• 38:46
  Speaker 2: we should be looking at this from. Which is where
• 38:49
  Speaker 2: the where the you know, the different perspectives that you
• 38:53
  Speaker 2: and I have, how they how they they jar against
• 38:58
  Speaker 2: each other when when when we're talking about this issue multipolarity.
• 39:04
  Speaker 1: Let me give an example. Right, so, if you if
• 39:06
  Speaker 1: you have an opportunity to buy, In my case, I
• 39:08
  Speaker 1: always use my car as an example, because it's it's
• 39:11
  Speaker 1: it's a big expense buying a Chinese car which has
• 39:15
  Speaker 1: the same feature set as say a German car or
• 39:18
  Speaker 1: an American car, but for a third of the price,
• 39:20
  Speaker 1: that's a huge benefit.
• 39:23
  Speaker 2: Yeah, and you know, and of course I understand that.
• 39:25
  Speaker 2: I mean, you know, I mean, if I was faced
• 39:27
  Speaker 2: with that choice, you know, which which one would I choose?
• 39:29
  Speaker 3: Of the two?
• 39:30
  Speaker 2: You know, I'd probably of course i'd go with the
• 39:32
  Speaker 2: bet the cheaper, cheaper option, that's just as good, you know.
• 39:38
  Speaker 2: But if they're they're modern cars, you know, that's been
• 39:41
  Speaker 2: If they're modern construction, both the German car and the
• 39:45
  Speaker 2: Chinese car will be built with in built obsolescence in them,
• 39:49
  Speaker 2: so that you have to buy another one eventually, sooner
• 39:52
  Speaker 2: rather than later. Right So, so so you know, that's
• 39:56
  Speaker 2: that's that's you know, that's the thing I mean when
• 39:59
  Speaker 2: I say I wouldn't know, I wouldn't necessarily choose that path.
• 40:03
  Speaker 2: I mean, let's say, you know, I currently live in
• 40:07
  Speaker 2: the UK, right, so I could have a perfectly stable
• 40:12
  Speaker 2: power supply, right, but I haven't. I've gone offline because
• 40:17
  Speaker 2: I haven't got one, right, So, and I'm offered because
• 40:21
  Speaker 2: I've chosen to live off the grip, which is a
• 40:23
  Speaker 2: bit harder. That's a bit harder and a bit less convenient.
• 40:27
  Speaker 3: You know, I could.
• 40:29
  Speaker 2: Get a better price when I have to use supermarkets
• 40:32
  Speaker 2: if I use a store card, because then I'd get
• 40:34
  Speaker 2: a cheat. You get a better deal with a store card,
• 40:37
  Speaker 2: but I don't want to. I'm not using a store
• 40:39
  Speaker 2: card because I know what that means. That's that's pushing
• 40:43
  Speaker 2: me towards digital currency.
• 40:46
  Speaker 3: Basically.
• 40:48
  Speaker 2: You know, there are lots of things that we can
• 40:50
  Speaker 2: take advantage of. And one of the things that I
• 40:53
  Speaker 2: often know. Another thing that people often say is, you
• 40:56
  Speaker 2: know there's a lack of solutions offered by people that
• 40:59
  Speaker 2: question global in this case, multipolarity. Well there aren't.
• 41:05
  Speaker 3: That's not true either.
• 41:06
  Speaker 2: I mean, we we are suggesting solutions, but unfortunately they're
• 41:12
  Speaker 2: not the solutions that anybody wants to hear because.
• 41:15
  Speaker 1: They're because they're well, let's talk about some of those.
• 41:19
  Speaker 2: Well, I mean, you know, I mean, I'm just trying
• 41:21
  Speaker 2: to suggest that, you know, we need to think about
• 41:23
  Speaker 2: being independent, totally independent, because everything, everything that we're heading towards,
• 41:32
  Speaker 2: exerts centralized control over our lives. That's the point of
• 41:37
  Speaker 2: the multipolar world order, just as is much the point
• 41:39
  Speaker 2: of any kind of world order is to exert is
• 41:43
  Speaker 2: to exert centralized control over our lives. So the obvious antify,
• 41:49
  Speaker 2: you know, the obvious antidote to that is to free
• 41:52
  Speaker 2: yourself of controlling power structures.
• 41:54
  Speaker 3: But that's not easy.
• 41:55
  Speaker 2: It's not easy, and it's not it's not convenient, and
• 41:59
  Speaker 2: it's not good. And and I see it, I would
• 42:05
  Speaker 2: say from this way, So let's say that, you know,
• 42:07
  Speaker 2: if looking at it from the African perspective, for the
• 42:13
  Speaker 2: vast majority of people in South Africa, and you know,
• 42:16
  Speaker 2: in the whole sort of sub Saharan African region, life
• 42:20
  Speaker 2: is hard. It's it's it's harder than it is for
• 42:23
  Speaker 2: people living in the US or living in Europe. Life
• 42:28
  Speaker 2: is harder there. It's already harder. They already have to
• 42:32
  Speaker 2: make harder choices than most people in the in the
• 42:36
  Speaker 2: privileged West, would it would even even be able to
• 42:39
  Speaker 2: contemplate or understand. So of course, if someone comes along
• 42:45
  Speaker 2: and says, you know, we can alleviate some of your difficulties,
• 42:50
  Speaker 2: bye bye by opening up your economy to give you
• 42:54
  Speaker 2: more choices and more advantage, of course you would leap
• 42:59
  Speaker 2: at that chance, because it's got to be better than
• 43:03
  Speaker 2: what you what you've got at the moment. Right, So
• 43:06
  Speaker 2: I totally understand that. I totally get it, and I
• 43:09
  Speaker 2: am and I fully support that choice because it's not
• 43:13
  Speaker 2: the same as I've done the opposite. You know, I've
• 43:17
  Speaker 2: given up some of my some of my luxuries and
• 43:19
  Speaker 2: my conveniences because out of choice, because it's a choice
• 43:23
  Speaker 2: I can make. Would I have done that when I
• 43:25
  Speaker 2: had a young family and kids to probably not? Probably not?
• 43:32
  Speaker 2: That would have made that would have been very different.
• 43:35
  Speaker 2: So you know that that's it's in a way, I'm
• 43:41
  Speaker 2: making these choices because I have the luxury to make
• 43:44
  Speaker 2: the choice, you know, because I'm a privileged, privileged Mazungu,
• 43:49
  Speaker 2: right So I so I have that choice.
• 43:55
  Speaker 1: A comment that Mike made in that discussion that you
• 43:58
  Speaker 1: referenced earlier is that all of these discussions around the
• 44:03
  Speaker 1: critique of UNI and multipolarity come from a Western eye,
• 44:10
  Speaker 1: a Western perspective.
• 44:12
  Speaker 2: I mean, let's let's take this. Let's take the example
• 44:14
  Speaker 2: of Nigeria, right, Nigeria. I mean, Nigeria is a different
• 44:18
  Speaker 2: case because in Africa that is already know a fairly
• 44:21
  Speaker 2: strong emerging Austraia, it's fairly strong economy already. But but there,
• 44:27
  Speaker 2: but there's there's you know, it's still it's still by
• 44:31
  Speaker 2: Western standards, it's still got a lot of wealth, wealth inequality,
• 44:35
  Speaker 2: and there's still a lot of a degree of hardship
• 44:39
  Speaker 2: that most privileged Westerners probably wouldn't understand. For a lot
• 44:43
  Speaker 2: of people that live in Nigeria right now, when they
• 44:47
  Speaker 2: try to impose what central bank digital currency on Nigerians
• 44:53
  Speaker 2: because they've got a cash economy, Nigerians didn't react to
• 44:58
  Speaker 2: that very well. Now, if you've got nothing, if you
• 45:03
  Speaker 2: live in Malawi, for example, where you are like proper,
• 45:08
  Speaker 2: proper poor is there and someone says, oh, we're going
• 45:13
  Speaker 2: to introduce I mean, for a start, you couldn't do
• 45:15
  Speaker 2: it in Malawi because there isn't any banking infrastructure there
• 45:19
  Speaker 2: to speak of any kind of that. Most people don't
• 45:21
  Speaker 2: have access to the to the infrastructure that you would
• 45:24
  Speaker 2: need in order to introduce a digital currency, you know,
• 45:28
  Speaker 2: so you wouldn't be able to do it unless you
• 45:30
  Speaker 2: introduce the infrastructure first. So if you were if you
• 45:34
  Speaker 2: and I mean I haven't kept up with what's going
• 45:37
  Speaker 2: on in Malawi currently, you probably know more about it
• 45:40
  Speaker 2: than I do, but I do know that, you know,
• 45:43
  Speaker 2: Chinese firms have gone in there and are assisting it
• 45:47
  Speaker 2: to improve its infrastructure in many in many, many ways,
• 45:53
  Speaker 2: which is great.
• 45:55
  Speaker 3: But why why is it? Because?
• 45:58
  Speaker 2: Is it because China wants to improve the lives of
• 46:03
  Speaker 2: the people that live in Malawi? Maybe maybe and and
• 46:08
  Speaker 2: and the net effect of what they're doing, perhaps it
• 46:11
  Speaker 2: will perhaps it won't improve their lives good, which would
• 46:15
  Speaker 2: be good, but it's also so that they can impose
• 46:20
  Speaker 2: of it, ultimately technological control on the people that live
• 46:24
  Speaker 2: in Malawi.
• 46:26
  Speaker 1: What about a less cynical argument, and that is simply well,
• 46:30
  Speaker 1: it's these are developing countries and these opportunities to make money,
• 46:35
  Speaker 1: and it's purely pragmatic.
• 46:37
  Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I.
• 46:38
  Speaker 2: Mean, and that's you know, as I was saying, if
• 46:40
  Speaker 2: I was if I lived in South Africa, and I
• 46:44
  Speaker 2: was looking at a choice between unipolarity, the unipolar world order,
• 46:48
  Speaker 2: which is, you know, the US demanding that you do
• 46:52
  Speaker 2: whatever it says, or multipolarity, which is you know, the
• 46:57
  Speaker 2: bricks nations coming together and saying, hey, guys, let's try trade,
• 47:00
  Speaker 2: and let's let's let's have you know, let's bring inward investment.
• 47:04
  Speaker 2: From China in terms of infrastructure development.
• 47:08
  Speaker 3: Let's do that.
• 47:10
  Speaker 2: And of course I would, I would, I would go
• 47:12
  Speaker 2: for the multipolar option. You know that that is that
• 47:17
  Speaker 2: is makes perfect sense.
• 47:19
  Speaker 1: So another argument that we haven't really brought up is
• 47:22
  Speaker 1: the idea that they are competing factions for these global
• 47:32
  Speaker 1: governance orders.
• 47:33
  Speaker 2: No, yeah, I mean, I'm very much. I mean I
• 47:35
  Speaker 2: don't think there's a I mean a very interesting series.
• 47:39
  Speaker 2: I don't know whether you've had a chance to see it,
• 47:41
  Speaker 2: but David Brow's Pyramid of Power where he where he discusses.
• 47:46
  Speaker 3: He's done it.
• 47:46
  Speaker 2: It's taken him years, but you know, he discusses these
• 47:49
  Speaker 2: how that the big, the big kind of what wonn't
• 47:52
  Speaker 2: we called conspiratorial kind of themes like who's actually in control?
• 47:57
  Speaker 2: Who's running the world? And ultimately, you know, I agree
• 48:02
  Speaker 2: with him, and you know, it's very much my my
• 48:04
  Speaker 2: thesis that there isn't one there is no one power
• 48:09
  Speaker 2: that controls the world.
• 48:12
  Speaker 3: You know, because.
• 48:14
  Speaker 2: Ironically, because actually human beings function through spontaneous order. They
• 48:22
  Speaker 2: you know, we're animals, were animals that fight for supremacy.
• 48:26
  Speaker 2: That that is part of you know, how spontaneous order
• 48:30
  Speaker 2: inevitably is part of that. So, I mean even the
• 48:34
  Speaker 2: even the use of of of no power structure would
• 48:39
  Speaker 2: mean that you would have to accept limitations on your
• 48:42
  Speaker 2: behavior as an individual. You know, you have to commit
• 48:45
  Speaker 2: to live as an honorable human being. If people can't
• 48:48
  Speaker 2: do that, then you need someone to put some sort
• 48:51
  Speaker 2: of order on it. If people can't abide by basic principles.
• 49:01
  Speaker 2: So there is an element of you know that in
• 49:04
  Speaker 2: spontaneous order. But if you're talking about this one single,
• 49:11
  Speaker 2: all powerful entity that controls the world personally, I don't
• 49:16
  Speaker 2: think that exists. I think there's a network of trans
• 49:22
  Speaker 2: I would put it this way. There is a class.
• 49:25
  Speaker 2: I sometimes refer to them as the parasite class, but
• 49:28
  Speaker 2: call them what you like, Oligarch's transnational capitalists, whatever. There
• 49:32
  Speaker 2: is a class of people, probably not that great in number.
• 49:35
  Speaker 2: David Rothkopp suggests about the Committee of three hundred. I
• 49:39
  Speaker 2: don't think see that is to me, that is one
• 49:42
  Speaker 2: single you know, I mean quickly spoke about you know,
• 49:48
  Speaker 2: the you know, the society of the elect you know
• 49:51
  Speaker 2: that kind of thing. The Rounds Milner group control everything,
• 49:56
  Speaker 2: and I think there have been periods in history where
• 49:59
  Speaker 2: groups like that been dominant. So certainly the Anglo American
• 50:03
  Speaker 2: establishment Rounds Milner, you know, the round Table movement and
• 50:06
  Speaker 2: all those think tanks that that that come from that
• 50:10
  Speaker 2: certainly have had global influence and continue to have global
• 50:13
  Speaker 2: influence today. But as that, but as that has spread out,
• 50:18
  Speaker 2: it has incorporated, you know, people with their own ideas.
• 50:23
  Speaker 2: Chinese oligarchs for a start, Russian oligarchs, they've got their
• 50:28
  Speaker 2: own their own ideas about what they would like to see.
• 50:31
  Speaker 2: They've been invited into that round table think tank network
• 50:36
  Speaker 2: to discuss how they want, how they want to collectively
• 50:40
  Speaker 2: go about achieving their ends. Because even though they squabble
• 50:45
  Speaker 2: and fight with each other, this network is a power
• 50:48
  Speaker 2: struggle in it. You can see that power struggle in
• 50:50
  Speaker 2: it played out, you know, occasionally as a kinetic war
• 50:56
  Speaker 2: at its worst. Even though that exists, you could that
• 51:03
  Speaker 2: there's an agreement I would suggest as to the ultimate
• 51:06
  Speaker 2: destimate destination, and the ultimate destination is the imposition of
• 51:11
  Speaker 2: technological control on populations. That's what they want. That's everyone
• 51:16
  Speaker 2: agrees on that. Everybody agrees that that's what that's what
• 51:19
  Speaker 2: we want. We want to be able to control our
• 51:21
  Speaker 2: populations using technological meats, because that's easier.
• 51:25
  Speaker 3: That's better for us.
• 51:26
  Speaker 2: So so as long as that's that's the agree And
• 51:30
  Speaker 2: when I look when I talk about the global public
• 51:32
  Speaker 2: private partnership, I would put the monetary system whatever that
• 51:37
  Speaker 2: whatever that turns out to be, the monetary system as
• 51:41
  Speaker 2: like the myceelium layer that binds the whole thing together.
• 51:46
  Speaker 2: So so talking about like then you know the things
• 51:49
  Speaker 2: between Swift and and you know Russian and Chinese alternatives
• 51:57
  Speaker 2: was it SIPs and I can't remember that, I can't
• 51:59
  Speaker 2: remember the acronyms, but the russianal alternatives to Swift. That
• 52:07
  Speaker 2: is kind of like the Balkanization of the monetary system,
• 52:10
  Speaker 2: you would think, but it's all interoperable that they've they've
• 52:15
  Speaker 2: gone ahead with this Balkanization after they've agreed into operability,
• 52:20
  Speaker 2: so sure the systems can still work together. I mean,
• 52:23
  Speaker 2: the Russian system is eighty percent based on the Swift system,
• 52:27
  Speaker 2: So it's it's that they're still they're compatible, but just
• 52:32
  Speaker 2: for now its suits are narrative if you like to
• 52:35
  Speaker 2: say that to balcanize the monetary system. But I mean
• 52:40
  Speaker 2: that the what you commonly see is decentralization, which is
• 52:45
  Speaker 2: what multipolarity requires, you know, geopolitical in terms of geopolitics,
• 52:50
  Speaker 2: in terms of in terms of global monetary systems, in
• 52:53
  Speaker 2: terms of supply chains, energy corridors, everything that needs to
• 52:58
  Speaker 2: be balcanized to establish the system. But once it is balkanized,
• 53:04
  Speaker 2: then the point is that you lay in the infrastructure
• 53:08
  Speaker 2: from the beginning. So if you can think I MECH
• 53:11
  Speaker 2: will almost definitely, well, it already does. IMECH already connects
• 53:15
  Speaker 2: in multiple poises, multiple places to the Belt and Road initiative.
• 53:19
  Speaker 2: You know, Hypha being a good example, both both both
• 53:23
  Speaker 2: I MECH and Hypha could and there'd be a Belton
• 53:27
  Speaker 2: Road initiative. Connect at Hypha is one point, but there
• 53:31
  Speaker 2: are many others. So it's I would suggest, it's an
• 53:36
  Speaker 2: illusion that's being sold to us in order to get
• 53:39
  Speaker 2: us to go along with a global governance structure, because
• 53:42
  Speaker 2: then we go, oh, well that's better than that.
• 53:44
  Speaker 3: One's better than the other one. We'll go along with
• 53:46
  Speaker 3: this one.
• 53:48
  Speaker 1: Something that has always fascinated me is the way in
• 53:52
  Speaker 1: which animals exist. So I go to the Kruger National
• 53:55
  Speaker 1: Park regularly. I think you might not always talk about it.
• 53:58
  Speaker 1: I think everybody in the world should go to the
• 54:00
  Speaker 1: Kruger Park these ones in their life. It really is beautiful,
• 54:05
  Speaker 1: and you know, you're very close to nature, and it's
• 54:08
  Speaker 1: a very big game park. It's like the size of Israel,
• 54:11
  Speaker 1: so that you have a lot of space to play with.
• 54:14
  Speaker 1: And one thing that has always struck me is the
• 54:18
  Speaker 1: way in which animals exist. You will have no fences, right,
• 54:24
  Speaker 1: but you'll have giraffes, and just a little bit further
• 54:27
  Speaker 1: along you'll have lions. And these are not allies yet
• 54:36
  Speaker 1: they exist in harmony until they don't. But there's a
• 54:40
  Speaker 1: sense of respect and there's a sense of I don't know,
• 54:43
  Speaker 1: there's a mutual kind of negotiation that occurs just naturally.
• 54:48
  Speaker 2: I mean, conflict is created when people don't act responsibly,
• 54:54
  Speaker 2: with care, with due care and compassion and well at
• 54:59
  Speaker 2: least respect.
• 55:00
  Speaker 3: As you said, you use the word their respect for
• 55:03
  Speaker 3: each other.
• 55:05
  Speaker 2: Now, why do humans do that? Sometimes?
• 55:08
  Speaker 3: You know, who knows?
• 55:09
  Speaker 2: There are lots of social problems that lead to all
• 55:12
  Speaker 2: kinds of not have all kinds of knock on effects
• 55:16
  Speaker 2: in terms of the way that we interact with each other. Animals,
• 55:20
  Speaker 2: animals are a good are a good good thing to
• 55:24
  Speaker 2: talk about in terms of way animals construct their societies.
• 55:29
  Speaker 2: So if you look at lions, for example, you know,
• 55:33
  Speaker 2: a pride of lions is a family hub with a
• 55:37
  Speaker 2: dominant male that protects that pride from the other pride.
• 55:41
  Speaker 2: But when the when the prides expand territory, you know,
• 55:47
  Speaker 2: one male lion kills another one and we'll probably kill
• 55:50
  Speaker 2: all the cubs as well, so that there's a new
• 55:52
  Speaker 2: there's a new bloodline. So that's pretty brutal, brutal politics, politics,
• 55:58
  Speaker 2: politics at its most visceral, and an animal. And yeah,
• 56:03
  Speaker 2: and that's animals, an animal not I mean, I'm using line.
• 56:07
  Speaker 2: And different animals do behave in different ways in different
• 56:11
  Speaker 2: political systems, but they've got political systems. But the advantage
• 56:16
  Speaker 2: human beings have always had evolutionary and why we are
• 56:19
  Speaker 2: the apex predator is because, you know, despite our natures,
• 56:27
  Speaker 2: which we're animals just like any other animal. But despite
• 56:30
  Speaker 2: despite our natures we've always had, we're not physically stronger
• 56:35
  Speaker 2: than many animals.
• 56:36
  Speaker 3: We're not we're not.
• 56:37
  Speaker 2: Better physically adapted to our environments. In fact, worse than
• 56:42
  Speaker 2: in many many respects, but we have always our evolutionary advantage,
• 56:47
  Speaker 2: apart from opposable thumbs, is that that we can work
• 56:53
  Speaker 2: together to achieve collective objectives. With that that that's what
• 56:58
  Speaker 2: we can do with like like, no other animal, no
• 57:01
  Speaker 2: other animal is can work in the way that we
• 57:05
  Speaker 2: do and apply our problem solving skills and develop strategies
• 57:12
  Speaker 2: to overcome problems. There's no no other animal can do that.
• 57:16
  Speaker 2: But as as we do. Now, that's given us an advantage.
• 57:21
  Speaker 2: And what have we done with it? You know, we've
• 57:23
  Speaker 2: We've done wonderful things. We've built, a built and amazing things,
• 57:27
  Speaker 2: but we've also caused total carnage and havoc. Right, so,
• 57:31
  Speaker 2: so it's a it's a double edged sword. But there
• 57:37
  Speaker 2: is no reason why, nor do we need anyone to
• 57:42
  Speaker 2: tell us what to do in order to be at
• 57:44
  Speaker 2: a function as a society. It's just unnecessary. Human beings
• 57:49
  Speaker 2: know how to conduct themselves and live in peace. Then
• 57:54
  Speaker 2: it just innate to who we are. That's that's our nature. Sure,
• 58:01
  Speaker 2: what happens then is that conflict arises, and we've got
• 58:04
  Speaker 2: no mechanism to to to resolve that conflict other than
• 58:08
  Speaker 2: killing each other. But we are capable and we've already
• 58:13
  Speaker 2: done it. We've already created systems that enable us to
• 58:17
  Speaker 2: do that without killing each other. Right law law law
• 58:21
  Speaker 2: is a system that enables us to resolve conflicts without
• 58:24
  Speaker 2: killing each other.
• 58:27
  Speaker 3: So so we can live by that.
• 58:29
  Speaker 2: We've already got the mechanisms in place to live without
• 58:32
  Speaker 2: any kind of imposition of any kind of order. We
• 58:36
  Speaker 2: can We can do that. We have done it for
• 58:39
  Speaker 2: thousands of years. So you know, my I've gone off
• 58:45
  Speaker 2: on a bit of a tangent here, and I can't
• 58:47
  Speaker 2: remember the initial the initial question. No, I mean, but
• 58:50
  Speaker 2: so so my my contention is, you know, although if
• 58:54
  Speaker 2: you live you live in Africa, I can understand why
• 58:58
  Speaker 2: you would why you would prefer multipolarity to to unipolarity. Certainly,
• 59:08
  Speaker 2: I you know, from my perspective, in from my perspective
• 59:13
  Speaker 2: looking at this from the from a relatively privileged position,
• 59:18
  Speaker 2: that in the long run is not going to serve
• 59:21
  Speaker 2: your interests any more than it serves mine. I mean,
• 59:26
  Speaker 2: I'll be dead by the time this plays out. But
• 59:30
  Speaker 2: but but well I will I will make you know.
• 59:33
  Speaker 2: I mean, this isn't a people are going to I mean,
• 59:35
  Speaker 2: as multipolarity rolls out, like all the other systems that
• 59:38
  Speaker 2: roll out, like digital currency and digital ID, it will
• 59:41
  Speaker 2: be it will come with incentives. You know, people will think, wow,
• 59:45
  Speaker 2: digital currency is great. You know, foods af the price
• 59:48
  Speaker 2: with digital currency. Brilliant, Let's let's have digital currency. Then
• 59:54
  Speaker 2: the control systems once people have adopted it, then the
• 59:59
  Speaker 2: control systems will start shutting down everybody's freedom. And ultimately
• 1:00:04
  Speaker 2: where this ends it up with, you know, and this
• 1:00:07
  Speaker 2: sounds like hyperbally, but it isn't, because it's hard wired
• 1:00:11
  Speaker 2: and hard built into the digital control system that is
• 1:00:14
  Speaker 2: being delivered with multipolarity is the end of human freedom,
• 1:00:20
  Speaker 2: the end of it. That is that is that Yeah,
• 1:00:24
  Speaker 2: that is their goal. That's where they want us to be.
• 1:00:27
  Speaker 2: They want us to be utterly subservient to their rule.
• 1:00:33
  Speaker 2: And that's the only reason why ultimately we're even meet
• 1:00:38
  Speaker 2: you and I are even talking about the difference between
• 1:00:41
  Speaker 2: uni polarity and multipolarity.
• 1:00:44
  Speaker 1: Yeah, and I said transhumanism, because that's also part of
• 1:00:48
  Speaker 1: the long term goal is to remove humanity from itself.
• 1:00:52
  Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, I mean, if you if you look at
• 1:00:55
  Speaker 2: what the you know, the people that are currently in
• 1:00:56
  Speaker 2: charge of the Trump administration and the development of neuro
• 1:01:02
  Speaker 2: and their interest in the development of neurotechnology, they they
• 1:01:06
  Speaker 2: openly state, you know, one of their house philosophers, this
• 1:01:10
  Speaker 2: guy Nick Land, he openly states that we need to
• 1:01:13
  Speaker 2: be technoplastic bigs. You know that that we serve no value,
• 1:01:20
  Speaker 2: we have no purpose. So people like him him, you know,
• 1:01:24
  Speaker 2: people like Peter theil Elon Musk, Curtis yar Vin, Yeah,
• 1:01:30
  Speaker 2: and all that that they have. Well certainly you know,
• 1:01:33
  Speaker 2: you look at Mark Anderson, Larry Ellison, Peter theeel Elon Musk,
• 1:01:38
  Speaker 2: sam Oltman, Palmer Lucky, all the all these people, I
• 1:01:42
  Speaker 2: would I have strongly argued, are in control at the
• 1:01:45
  Speaker 2: moment of the Trump administration. And what that means is
• 1:01:47
  Speaker 2: they're in control of the US government. So so that's
• 1:01:52
  Speaker 2: a new class of oligarch. See there again, there again,
• 1:01:55
  Speaker 2: you've got a new new breed of oligarchs that have
• 1:01:58
  Speaker 2: come up. You know, and theel and Alex Cup from
• 1:02:02
  Speaker 2: Paleted they both sit on the steering group with the
• 1:02:04
  Speaker 2: Builderberg Committee now they have, so they've got immense influence.
• 1:02:10
  Speaker 2: I mean feel as often said one joke that he
• 1:02:14
  Speaker 2: well it not he wasn't joking, but it's funny from
• 1:02:17
  Speaker 2: my perspective. He said, if only there were people sitting
• 1:02:20
  Speaker 2: around the world that was sitting around planning the future.
• 1:02:24
  Speaker 2: Oh if only if only Peter, well, other than you, mate,
• 1:02:28
  Speaker 2: because you are actually doing that because you're because you're
• 1:02:32
  Speaker 2: you're on the steering committee the Builderberg group who who
• 1:02:36
  Speaker 2: created the European Union. This is a group of people
• 1:02:40
  Speaker 2: who decided that we would have a European Union and
• 1:02:44
  Speaker 2: then built one. Now that that, none of them are elected,
• 1:02:49
  Speaker 2: none of them are politicians. None of them have got
• 1:02:51
  Speaker 2: anything to do with government. Well a few occasionally get invited,
• 1:02:55
  Speaker 2: usually when they've retired to you know, uh. And then
• 1:03:00
  Speaker 2: they set about creating a continental union and did it.
• 1:03:08
  Speaker 3: Right.
• 1:03:08
  Speaker 2: So these are the people that can control things like
• 1:03:13
  Speaker 2: a multipolar world order.
• 1:03:15
  Speaker 1: Okay, times against us. You mentioned earlier a pride of lions,
• 1:03:21
  Speaker 1: and I was quite impressed that you knew the collective
• 1:03:23
  Speaker 1: non for that. Do you know the collective non for
• 1:03:28
  Speaker 1: for camels?
• 1:03:34
  Speaker 2: Is it a train?
• 1:03:39
  Speaker 1: No, it is a Corton cartle of camels.
• 1:03:43
  Speaker 3: Fantastic, brilliant.
• 1:03:49
  Speaker 1: I'm a dad. I'm allowed to make a dad joke.
• 1:03:51
  Speaker 3: That's great, all right?
• 1:03:56
  Speaker 1: And how can I follow your work?
• 1:03:58
  Speaker 2: Yeah, it's my website which is Ian Davis dot com.
• 1:04:02
  Speaker 2: You can follow my worker on my substat which is
• 1:04:05
  Speaker 2: Ian Davis dot substack dot com.
• 1:04:09
  Speaker 3: My name is i Ai N. Davis dot com.
• 1:04:11
  Speaker 2: Or one word you can get my latest book at
• 1:04:14
  Speaker 2: all one word, lowercase, the Technocratic Dark State dot com
• 1:04:19
  Speaker 2: and also follow my work at Unlimited Hangout which is
• 1:04:22
  Speaker 2: an Unlimited hangout dot com. And also my work is
• 1:04:27
  Speaker 2: often syndicated with people like The Off Guardian and Technology
• 1:04:32
  Speaker 2: using Trends and geopolitics and empire. And also please check
• 1:04:36
  Speaker 2: out the Independent Media Alliance because we're often talking about
• 1:04:41
  Speaker 2: these kind of things.
• 1:04:43
  Speaker 1: And yeah, that's me as always, Ian Davis. Thank you
• 1:04:47
  Speaker 1: for joining me in the trenches.
• 1:04:49
  Speaker 3: It was my pleasure. Thanks very much for inviting me