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Do Economists Have Practical Advice on Bargaining? Rubinstein, Myerson-Satterthwaite, Coase and Spectrum/M&A Design
Popular negotiation books tell you to anchor aggressively, bluff about your walk-away alternatives, and split the difference. Game theory proves that half of that folk wisdom is a recipe for leaving millions on the table or triggering an avoidable deadlock. We build the economic theory of bargaining from first principles: Nash's 1950 axioms, Rubinstein's 1982 alternating offers, Binmore-Shaked-Sutton's Outside Option Principle, Myerson-Satterthwaite's asymmetric information impossibility theorem, Schelling commitments, the Coase Conjecture, and practical institutional designs from Texas…
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