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That Report About January 6th and the FBI · Conspiracy! The Show

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Speaker 1: Winter insurance that I'm true the troth I'm a chestnut
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Speaker 1: with insurance. Get true. That is.
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Speaker 2: Hey, everybody, welcome to Conspiracy The Show. I'm your host,
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Speaker 2: Adam Todd Brown joining me as co host today Nobody,
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Speaker 2: I'm all alone, and I'm here to talk to you
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Speaker 2: about the news story that is at the top of
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Speaker 2: every conspiracy theory leaning mind in all the land right now,
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Speaker 2: the new Jersey drones.
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Speaker 1: No.
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Speaker 2: I actually covered that last week on the in broad
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Speaker 2: Daylight podcast, Get It wherever podcast are at. What I
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Speaker 2: am here to talk to you about today is the
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Speaker 2: Inspector General's Watchdog report about the FBI and their actions
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Speaker 2: leading up to and on the day of the January sixth,
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Speaker 2: twenty twenty one capital riots that dropped last week and
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Speaker 2: at a svelt eighty eight pages. It's not too labor
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Speaker 2: intensive of a read. Boring and frustrating in a lot
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Speaker 2: of parts, but it's not going to take you a
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Speaker 2: month to get through like those heroes who read all
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Speaker 2: four hundred pages of the Muller Report. If you want
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Speaker 2: to read it yourself, all ink to it. In the
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Speaker 2: show notes. Almost everything I will mention today in terms
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Speaker 2: of quotes, even just general information comes directly from that report.
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Speaker 2: The way this is being covered in the media is
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Speaker 2: kind of frustrating. In one corner, left leaning media outlets
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Speaker 2: are treating this report as proof positive that conspiracy theorists
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Speaker 2: are wrong about undercover FBIA agents being the true agitators
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Speaker 2: behind what happened on January sixth. In the other corner,
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Speaker 2: right leaning media outlets who are adamant that this is
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Speaker 2: all the evidence you need to prove their right and
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Speaker 2: that January sixth was all a big FBI set up
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Speaker 2: on account of all the FBI informants who were present.
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Speaker 2: We'll get to the informants versus agents thing later on,
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Speaker 2: but there's also a third aspect to this report that
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Speaker 2: some outlets have reported on, which is the idea that
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Speaker 2: the FBI missed a step in their preparation for January
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Speaker 2: sixth that could have helped prevent what happened. That part
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Speaker 2: is worth talking about too. It might even be the
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Speaker 2: most important finding in this report. You see in the
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Speaker 2: run up to huge events, including stuff like the Super Bowl,
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Speaker 2: that FBI will initiate a canvassing of all their confidential
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Speaker 2: human sources as we're supposed to call paid informants now
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Speaker 2: to identify possible threats that might be directed toward that event.
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Speaker 2: For some reason, they did that for almost every post
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Speaker 2: election event you can think of, including the meeting of
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Speaker 2: the electors on December fourteenth and the inauguration on January twentieth,
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Speaker 2: but not for the certification on January sixth. In this report,
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Speaker 2: FBI Deputy Director Paul Abat calls it a quote basic
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Speaker 2: step that was missed end quote. And I think it's
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Speaker 2: actually way more important than that, And I also think
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Speaker 2: it speaks to what might be the real conspiracy here.
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Speaker 2: Prior to January sixth, informants had shared all sorts of
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Speaker 2: information about January sixth with their respective handlers and field offices,
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Speaker 2: including that extremist members of the Oath Keepers may become
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Speaker 2: involved in violent activity on January sixth, that the oath
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Speaker 2: Keeper's contingent heading to DC was two hundred plus people.
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Speaker 2: They knew the travel plans being discussed by the Proud Boys.
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Speaker 2: They knew about a separate group of five hundred people
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Speaker 2: willing to storm the Capitol. One informant related that they
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Speaker 2: had concerns for the safety of members of Congress on
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Speaker 2: January sixth. But despite all that, the customary canvassing of
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Speaker 2: informants never happened, which is a very interesting choice, and
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Speaker 2: it wasn't just the words of confidential human sources that
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Speaker 2: should have prompted the FBI to do a little more
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Speaker 2: prep work prior to the riots. This report also reminds
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Speaker 2: us that there were two separate Million MAGA March events
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Speaker 2: in Washington, DC, one on November fourteenth, twenty twenty, the
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Speaker 2: other on December twelfth, twenty twenty, and that things got
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Speaker 2: kind of violent at both of those events. Also, the
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Speaker 2: report also mentions an FBI system called Guardian that's used
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Speaker 2: to keep track of tips that they receive. At the
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Speaker 2: end of the report, there's an appendix that include sixteen
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Speaker 2: different Guardian system tips that the FBI received pre January sixth,
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Speaker 2: and I don't know. The tips all seem pretty specific
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Speaker 2: to me and definitely suggest the FEDS should have at
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Speaker 2: least looked into what might happen a little more, like
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Speaker 2: one about the Proud Boys and their leader, Enrique Tario
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Speaker 2: that says, quote, these men are coming for violence. They
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Speaker 2: will cause mass unrest, destruction, and potentially kill many people
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Speaker 2: in the streets of DC on January sixth end quote
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Speaker 2: or another that said bring food and guns. If they
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Speaker 2: won't listen to our words, they can feel our led,
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Speaker 2: come armed end quote. And then one more January sixth,
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Speaker 2: we burn the place to the ground, leave nothing behind
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Speaker 2: end quote. And granted these are all mostly social media
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Speaker 2: posts and such, but there are enough of them just
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Speaker 2: in this report to suggest that someone should have had
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Speaker 2: some idea that something was coming. I want to reiterate.
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Speaker 2: It's mentioned at various points throughout the report that the
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Speaker 2: FBI issued all of the customary requests for information and
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Speaker 2: did all of the other customary FBI things for a
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Speaker 2: bunch of post election events like the meeting of the
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Speaker 2: electors on twelve to fourteen, various court cases, the inauguration,
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Speaker 2: but they didn't do it for the certification of the election.
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Speaker 2: There are details about several meetings or email chains where
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Speaker 2: the matter was discussed, but for this one post election activity,
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Speaker 2: the one that people online were talking about traveling to
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Speaker 2: and carrying out assorted acts of aggression, they didn't take
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Speaker 2: that step. The refusal to do it, at least officially,
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Speaker 2: seems like it came down to a matter of the
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Speaker 2: tips not including enough specific details or threats. At one point,
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Speaker 2: someone from the Washington Field Office complains about the abundance
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Speaker 2: of information they're getting and the lack of specifics. Here's
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Speaker 2: a quote. If there are no specifics, why are we
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Speaker 2: stating violence is an issue? End quote? And another lastly,
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Speaker 2: while there is a better way to tactfully say it,
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Speaker 2: if your reporting says or does not identify any violence threat,
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Speaker 2: criminal activity, then why is it being reported? End quote?
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Speaker 2: So basically, reports about potential violence on January sixth we're
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Speaker 2: met mostly with SaaS, which is weird because in the
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Speaker 2: case of the certification and the Trump rally that coincided
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Speaker 2: with it, there was zero mystery around when either of
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Speaker 2: those things were going to happen. And there's only so
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Speaker 2: many ways to disrupt the government function happening inside the capital.
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Speaker 2: You're going to have to get a lot of people
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Speaker 2: inside the capital. How much more specific do you need
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Speaker 2: this information to be? One interesting moment in the report
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Speaker 2: pertains to the discussions about whether the Department of Defense
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Speaker 2: or Department of Justice should take the lead in the
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Speaker 2: event of unrest. You might remember we covered a documentary
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Speaker 2: recently called Wargame, about a wargame exercise centered around another
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Speaker 2: other January sixth type event, happening in the future, and
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Speaker 2: a lot of the talk when it came to calling
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Speaker 2: in the National Guard in that documentary was optics. And
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Speaker 2: sure enough, when the DOJ and DoD are going back
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Speaker 2: and forth about who should take the lead in the
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Speaker 2: case of unrest leading up to January sixth, the Department
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Speaker 2: of Defense's main concern is that they quote didn't want
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Speaker 2: it to look like a militarized event, a militarized society
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Speaker 2: end quote. So they're having all of these meetings with
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Speaker 2: the various agencies, and the FBI keeps talking about no
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Speaker 2: specific or credible threats, and then, as if by magic,
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Speaker 2: on literally the eve of the certification January fifth, higher
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Speaker 2: ups within the FBI finally start getting the sinking feeling
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Speaker 2: that January sixth was going to be a bigger problem
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Speaker 2: than they expected. And what's crazy is that it's mentioned
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Speaker 2: that this change in attitude was based on quote a
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Speaker 2: number of factors, including the angry rhetoric about the election
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Speaker 2: results and the fact that Trump would be speaking at
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Speaker 2: the Ellipse, as well as the domestic terrorst suspects who
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Speaker 2: would be traveling, and the crowd size end quote. These
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Speaker 2: are pretty much all things that at least the FBI
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Speaker 2: knew about well before the evening of the fifth, at
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Speaker 2: least according to this report. As for the angry rhetoric,
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Speaker 2: that's the thing the entire country had known about for months,
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Speaker 2: but somehow the FBI didn't connect all those dots until
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Speaker 2: January fifth. That seems unthinkable to me. I don't know
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Speaker 2: that there was anything nefarious behind the decision to not
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Speaker 2: take this canvassing step in relation to January sixth, but
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Speaker 2: if you read this report, it's pretty clear that the
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Speaker 2: agency could stand to be I don't know, streamlined a
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Speaker 2: little bit maybe if I'm reading it correctly. Getting the
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Speaker 2: ball rolling on that canvassing thing would essentially just involve
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Speaker 2: sending an email. You send an email to your field offices.
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Speaker 2: You tell them, hey, ask all your confidential human sources
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Speaker 2: if they have any information about people traveling to Washington,
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Speaker 2: DC to tear shit up on January sixth, send all
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Speaker 2: that information to us. That's it. That to send an email.
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Speaker 2: Unless I'm completely missing some highly technical and complicated step
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Speaker 2: buried somewhere in this report that I read every damn
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Speaker 2: page of it seems like they just have to send
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Speaker 2: an email and there are what seems like two months
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Speaker 2: worth of meetings and email chains about whether or not
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Speaker 2: they should send that email. Just send the fucking email,
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Speaker 2: all right, Damn. At this point in the notes, I
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Speaker 2: was forty seven pages deep into this report, and it
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Speaker 2: felt like most of it was just descriptions of meetings
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Speaker 2: about whether to issue this one request for information. Meanwhile,
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Speaker 2: within three hours after the riots, the FBI did finally
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Speaker 2: issue a request to field offices to quote canvas all sources,
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Speaker 2: including confidential, human sources, liaison and technical end quote, and
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Speaker 2: it provided two questions that should be asked of those sources. One,
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Speaker 2: do you have any information about quote the perpetrators of
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Speaker 2: any criminal acts end quote at the Capitol? And two
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Speaker 2: do you know of any plans to commit further violent
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Speaker 2: criminal activity in Washington, DC or any other threats to
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Speaker 2: federal facilities or other property? And how hard was that?
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Speaker 2: The thing they debated doing tirelessly in the run up
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Speaker 2: to January sixth, took three hours to accomplish after the fact. Again,
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Speaker 2: it's probably not a nefarious thing, but it's also not
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Speaker 2: a good thing. And I do find it highly interesting
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Speaker 2: that this was the one post election event they decided
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Speaker 2: to not hit up confidential informants about I don't think
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Speaker 2: I knew December fourteenth is the day the electors meet
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Speaker 2: until this election. But the FBI viewed that event in
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Speaker 2: twenty twenty as enough of a risk to warrant seeking
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Speaker 2: further information to fend off any potential threats. But the
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Speaker 2: certification not so much. It's weird. It's weird as all.
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Speaker 2: Even weirder, the report says, after the fact, the FBI
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Speaker 2: started saying they did do that canvassing. I feel like
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Speaker 2: that's a detail I'm not seeing in a ton of
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Speaker 2: the reporting around this. But in the days after January sixth,
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Speaker 2: the FBI started getting a lot of questions about a
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Speaker 2: possible lack of preparedness on their part. In response, they
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Speaker 2: issued a nine page chronology document called FBI's Planning, Coordination
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Speaker 2: and Response to US Capital Breach. Under the section labeled
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Speaker 2: pre January sixth, twenty twenty one Coordination Summary Overview, there's
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Speaker 2: a bullet point that says the agency quote canvassed all
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Speaker 2: FBI field offices to review their pending investigations to determine
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Speaker 2: whether any of their subjects posed a threat to the
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Speaker 2: upcoming electoral certification and presidential inauguration end quote, and requested
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Speaker 2: their field offices to another quote, canvass their confidential human
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Speaker 2: sources for any reporting regarding the potential for violence at
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Speaker 2: such events end quote. But as this report makes clear,
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Speaker 2: they very much did not do that. That they said
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Speaker 2: they did when they didn't is portrayed in this report
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Speaker 2: as kind of an oopsie or a misunderstanding, But I
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Speaker 2: don't know. Read it and decide for yourself. This oversight
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Speaker 2: gets even harder to understand when you get to the
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Speaker 2: section in the report labeled several FBI field offices obtained
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Speaker 2: intelligence from confidential human sources related to January sixth, some
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Speaker 2: of which was not adequately shared with the Washington Field office,
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Speaker 2: or if shared, not adequately followed up on by the
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Speaker 2: Washington Field Office. That is a snappy title and one
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Speaker 2: that summarizes one of the longest sections of this report perfectly.
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Speaker 2: Various FBI field offices did receive relatively specific information about
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Speaker 2: threats to the certification, and a lot of that information
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Speaker 2: either did not get to the office in DC that
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Speaker 2: needed it the most, or it wasn't acted on when
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Speaker 2: it did arrive. Some of the concerns centered around Oathkeeper's
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Speaker 2: founder Stuart Rhodes, who ended up being charged with seditious
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Speaker 2: conspiracy over his role in the Capitol riots. As early
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Speaker 2: as September twenty twenty, there were field offices gathering details
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Speaker 2: about Roads and his plans to commit acts of violence
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Speaker 2: in the name of supporting Trump. By November, there was
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Speaker 2: talk about said acts of violence taking place in DC
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Speaker 2: by way of quote an armed force which could potentially
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Speaker 2: protect or take back the White House should there be
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Speaker 2: an attempt to remove the current administration end quote, and
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Speaker 2: that another quote, Roads anticipates receiving some sort of approval
14:57
Speaker 2: or request from the current imstration before he and Oathkeepers
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Speaker 2: would initiate any violent action end quote. But also, no
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Speaker 2: one needed confidential informants to be hip to what Rhodes
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Speaker 2: was planning, because he also posted the following statement on
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Speaker 2: the oath Keeper's public website. Here goes, we must all
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Speaker 2: march on Washington, DC and directly back up and defend
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Speaker 2: President Trump as he fights against the ongoing coup that
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Speaker 2: is attempting to steal the election. Start rolling towards DC
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Speaker 2: now end quote. The Inspector General's report confirms that the
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Speaker 2: FBI was aware of these and other website posts that
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Speaker 2: were similar in nature, and I don't know, I think
15:41
Speaker 2: on the basis of that alone, you send that canvassing email,
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Speaker 2: just like you did with everything else. Post election. Rhodes
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Speaker 2: was so open about his plans that one field office
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Speaker 2: wanted to open a domestic terrorism case against him based
15:56
Speaker 2: on potential violations of the Seditious Conspirac Statute, the exact
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Speaker 2: thing he was eventually charged with. In December, the same
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Speaker 2: field office reported that Rhodes was recruiting Oath Keepers members
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Speaker 2: to travel with him to DC for the events of
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Speaker 2: January sixth, and that they were quote very concerned that
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Speaker 2: extremist members of Oath Keepers or other groups may become
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Speaker 2: involved in unplanned violent activity on January sixth end quote.
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Speaker 2: Somehow these reports were never emailed to the Washington Field office. Again,
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Speaker 2: it's just an email. There was also information coming in
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Speaker 2: about the Proud Boys and their leader, Enrique Tario that
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Speaker 2: was similarly alarming, and again a lot of it was
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Speaker 2: never communicated to the Washington Field Office. There are pages
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Speaker 2: and pages and pages of this report that are all
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Speaker 2: about the information and warnings that were coming into these
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Speaker 2: field offices from confidential informants that never gets reported. To
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Speaker 2: the Washington office, and that's definitely a failure on the
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Speaker 2: part of those field offices. But at the same time,
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Speaker 2: if that canvassing request was sent out, the Washington Field
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Speaker 2: office probably would have gotten that information. So now let's
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Speaker 2: talk about the two parts of this report that are
17:17
Speaker 2: getting the most attention. Up First, the part that left
17:20
Speaker 2: leaning media is amplifying the most, which is the part
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Speaker 2: about how the FBI did not have any undercover employees
17:27
Speaker 2: at the Ellipse, on the National Mall or at the
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Speaker 2: Capitol on January sixth. That's actually the title of the
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Speaker 2: section about it. It's a really short section, literally two
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Speaker 2: paragraphs that say there's no evidence the FBI had undercover
17:42
Speaker 2: agents or employees at the Capitol that day. And I'm
17:47
Speaker 2: going to be honest, my first thought upon hearing that
17:49
Speaker 2: wasn't the conspiracy theorists are wrong? My first thought upon
17:54
Speaker 2: hearing there were no undercover FBI agents in the crowd
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Speaker 2: on January sixth was why not? Well, as it turns out,
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Speaker 2: the FBI forbids having undercover agents at quote First Amendment
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Speaker 2: protected events absence some investigative authority end quote. Was that
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Speaker 2: abundance of reports both online and from confidential informants that
18:16
Speaker 2: the Oathkeepers and Proud Boys both had plans to travel
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Speaker 2: to DC to tear shit up, Not enough to warrant
18:23
Speaker 2: some sort of investigation. Apparently not, because the report also
18:27
Speaker 2: says an FBI field office asked the Washington Field office
18:31
Speaker 2: if they could send an undercover agent, and the request
18:35
Speaker 2: was denied. I personally don't think this is the great
18:39
Speaker 2: exoneration and debunking of all conspiracy theories around January sixth,
18:46
Speaker 2: that it's being treated as, and you know, i'd say
18:49
Speaker 2: it if I did, But so much of what the
18:52
Speaker 2: FBI does involves informants as opposed to agents themselves, and
18:57
Speaker 2: there are plenty of informants on hand and at the Capitol.
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Speaker 2: That's the part the right leaning outlets are currently howling about.
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Speaker 2: There were twenty six informants there. In fact, that includes
19:09
Speaker 2: two who were sent there by their respective field offices
19:13
Speaker 2: and a third whose field office asked them to report
19:17
Speaker 2: on what they saw after he notified them he was
19:20
Speaker 2: traveling to DC. The other twenty three went there on
19:24
Speaker 2: their own. Thirteen of them told their respective FBI handlers
19:28
Speaker 2: that they were making the trip, ten others did not.
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Speaker 2: It stated all throughout this section of the report, that quote,
19:35
Speaker 2: no FBI confidential human source was authorized to enter the
19:40
Speaker 2: capital or a restricted area or to otherwise break the
19:45
Speaker 2: law on January sixth, Nor was any confidential human source
19:50
Speaker 2: directed by the FBI to encourage others to commit illegal
19:54
Speaker 2: acts on January sixth. End quote. That's pretty interesting when
19:59
Speaker 2: you couple it with this quote. Here goes. Of the
20:02
Speaker 2: twenty six confidential human sources who were in DC for
20:06
Speaker 2: the events of January sixth, the records we reviewed showed
20:09
Speaker 2: that four entered the capital on January sixth, thirteen entered
20:14
Speaker 2: the restricted area, and nine attended January sixth events, but
20:18
Speaker 2: did not enter the capitol or a restricted area or
20:22
Speaker 2: otherwise engage in illegal activity. End quote. And Okay, so
20:27
Speaker 2: what about the ones who did. Of the three that
20:29
Speaker 2: were officially sent there by their handlers, two entered that
20:33
Speaker 2: restricted area and one of them entered the capital. That's
20:36
Speaker 2: in addition to three other informants who we've also been
20:42
Speaker 2: told entered the capitol as well. I don't know, my
20:45
Speaker 2: people on the left, do we not want any additional
20:48
Speaker 2: details at all about this part. Here's some interesting math
20:52
Speaker 2: that probably means nothing, but four informants entered the Capitol,
20:57
Speaker 2: and a fifth who was sent there by their fi
21:00
Speaker 2: BI field office or handler whatever, entered the restricted area
21:04
Speaker 2: but not the building itself. So that adds up to five, right.
21:09
Speaker 2: I don't have a calculator on hand, but that feels correct,
21:11
Speaker 2: as coincidence would have it. That is the exact number
21:15
Speaker 2: of informants that the Washington Field Office knew would be there.
21:19
Speaker 2: The report says, if one field office officially sends an
21:23
Speaker 2: informant to another field office's area, they have to tell
21:26
Speaker 2: that field office that they're sending them, But if that
21:29
Speaker 2: informant is traveling to the area of their own volition,
21:32
Speaker 2: there's no such requirement on the part of the field office. Nevertheless,
21:36
Speaker 2: one Loan field office that knew of two informants traveling
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Speaker 2: to DC did notify the Washington Field Office how many
21:46
Speaker 2: of them entered the capital. Was it both of them?
21:49
Speaker 2: I sure hope not, because that would mean that of
21:52
Speaker 2: the four confidential human sources present that day who did
21:56
Speaker 2: enter the Capital, the Washington Field Office knew all four
21:59
Speaker 2: of them were coming. I honestly wish this report had
22:03
Speaker 2: an agent I could chat with or something, and by
22:06
Speaker 2: that I mean a customer service agent who will immediately
22:09
Speaker 2: answer my questions like when you're shopping for car insurance
22:12
Speaker 2: and whatnot. Because this report does not address how many
22:17
Speaker 2: of the five informants the Washington Field Office knew about
22:22
Speaker 2: entered the Capitol, and that feels like a huge oversight
22:25
Speaker 2: to me, because if it's four out of five, that
22:28
Speaker 2: feels like a smoking gun sort of thing. It's one
22:32
Speaker 2: thing if just that one informant who entered the building
22:35
Speaker 2: was joined by three others randomly, but if all four
22:38
Speaker 2: happened to be four of the five the FBI knew about,
22:40
Speaker 2: that strikes me as a much bigger deal. Unfortunately, again,
22:44
Speaker 2: that's not addressed in the report. After the paragraph about
22:47
Speaker 2: how the Washington Field Office knew about five confidential human
22:51
Speaker 2: sources traveling to DC, the report moves into recommendations for
22:54
Speaker 2: how the FBI can do better next time, and a
22:57
Speaker 2: response letter from the FBI that mostly boils down to
23:01
Speaker 2: them pointing out all the things the report says they
23:04
Speaker 2: did right and saying they don't agree with bad stuff
23:06
Speaker 2: and they'll consider fixing things in the future. So at
23:10
Speaker 2: least justice has served on that front. At this point.
23:13
Speaker 2: I'm not sold on the idea that this report is
23:16
Speaker 2: smoking gun proof that the FBI was instrumental in ster
23:20
Speaker 2: and shit up on January sixth, any more than I
23:23
Speaker 2: am that it's conclusive proof that there's nothing at all
23:27
Speaker 2: to see here when it comes to their actions that day.
23:30
Speaker 2: If it is somehow confirmed that the four informants who
23:33
Speaker 2: entered the Capitol were all among the group of five
23:37
Speaker 2: that Washington knew was coming, then we're getting a little
23:39
Speaker 2: closer to this feeling like something way bigger to me.
23:42
Speaker 2: Until then, if nothing else, I can definitely see this
23:45
Speaker 2: being a let it happen because it will benefit us
23:49
Speaker 2: kind of thing. Though it's mentioned at one point in
23:51
Speaker 2: this report, and I mentioned it earlier in the pod,
23:54
Speaker 2: that a field office wanted to open a domestic terrorism
23:57
Speaker 2: case against oath Keeper's founder, Stuart ro Roads, over potential
24:01
Speaker 2: seditious conspiracy charges. That effort eventually failed because it was
24:05
Speaker 2: deemed the FBI didn't have sufficient evidence to pursue it. Well.
24:10
Speaker 2: One of the unfortunate facts when it comes to a
24:12
Speaker 2: huge national emergency type of incident like January sixth, is
24:16
Speaker 2: that a lot of times someone somewhere along the way
24:20
Speaker 2: benefits from it somehow, Like how nine to eleven made
24:24
Speaker 2: the Bush administration's foreign policy goals way easier to accomplish,
24:29
Speaker 2: or how Pearl Harbor gave elements within the US government
24:32
Speaker 2: and military who desperately wanted to enter World War two
24:36
Speaker 2: all the reason they needed, even natural disasters, and with
24:40
Speaker 2: someone being paid to fix and rebuild things, you know,
24:44
Speaker 2: along those lines. The FBI didn't have sufficient evidence to
24:48
Speaker 2: pursue Stuart Rhodes and his ILK as domestic terrorists before
24:53
Speaker 2: January sixth, but they sure as hell did after that day.
24:57
Speaker 2: It's worth noting that part of the FBI's Lukewar response
25:00
Speaker 2: in the lead up to January sixth has to do
25:03
Speaker 2: with the Department of Homeland Security failing to designate the
25:06
Speaker 2: certification of the election as a national security event. If
25:10
Speaker 2: they'd done that, the Secret Service would have been responsible
25:14
Speaker 2: for event security and the FBI would have been the
25:17
Speaker 2: lead law enforcement agency on the intelligence collection side of things. Instead,
25:22
Speaker 2: because the Department of Homeland Security didn't issue that designation,
25:26
Speaker 2: these responsibilities fell to a combination of the Capitol Police,
25:31
Speaker 2: the Metro PD, and the US Park Police, some of
25:35
Speaker 2: the first names that come to mind when conducting the
25:38
Speaker 2: kind of intelligence and security operation needed to put down
25:42
Speaker 2: a potential insurrection. Honestly, that part seems as scandalous to
25:47
Speaker 2: me as anything else in this report. Secret Service is
25:50
Speaker 2: a law enforcement agency that exists under the Department of
25:54
Speaker 2: Homeland Security umbrella, So designating this as a national security
25:58
Speaker 2: event would have meant that they'd have to be involved
26:01
Speaker 2: in stopping the violence, as opposed to, you know, helping
26:04
Speaker 2: investigate the people who carried out the violence afterward. By
26:08
Speaker 2: the end of January twenty twenty one, the FBI had
26:11
Speaker 2: opened more than four hundred case files and issued more
26:15
Speaker 2: than five hundred subpoenas and search warrants related to the riots.
26:20
Speaker 2: As of right now, more than fifteen hundred people have
26:24
Speaker 2: been charged with federal crimes. According to the Inspector General's report,
26:28
Speaker 2: Though the three informants tasked with traveling to DC on
26:31
Speaker 2: January sixth, one of whom entered the capital that day
26:34
Speaker 2: a clear violation of laws they were instructed not to break,
26:37
Speaker 2: are not among those fifteen hundred go figure. But I'm
26:41
Speaker 2: sure we'll learn all about them and what they got
26:44
Speaker 2: up to inside the capital someday. Until then, that concludes
26:49
Speaker 2: this deep dive into the Inspector General's watchdog report about
26:53
Speaker 2: the FBI and the January sixth Riots. And hey, thanks
26:57
Speaker 2: for listening to the pod. Go to Patreon dot COM's
27:00
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27:03
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Speaker 2: the show a good review on Apple Spotify if you're
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Speaker 2: so inclined. And thanks everybody, I love you.