Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / PS (Price to Sales Ratio) Trap Explained
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome back to the Deep dive. Today we are, we're really going
- 0:05to take a sledgehammer to one of the most common, but I think
- 0:09most misunderstood metrics in finance.
- 0:12The price to sales ratio. Exactly the PS ratio.
- 0:15We're tackling A valuation puzzle.
- 0:16Well it makes comparing 2 completely different businesses
- 0:19seem almost impossible. It's a classic mistake, really.
- 0:22It's confusing volume with actual value.
- 0:25Analysts and in a lot of investors, they see that surface
- 0:28number, but they they completely failed to look under the hood.
- 0:31They don't see the business mechanics.
- 0:33So today we're here to provide that, that financial X-ray, if
- 0:37you will, to clear up all that confusion.
- 0:39OK, let's set the scene with a scenario.
- 0:41I think anyone listening has probably faced this or at least
- 0:44thought about it. So imagine you're evaluating two
- 0:46companies and these companies are at the complete opposite
- 0:49ends of the modern economy. Company A is a cutting edge
- 0:53software as a service company a sauce platform.
- 0:56It's pure digital tech, OK. And Company B is your standard
- 1:00massive, you know, brick and mortar supermarket chain, pure
- 1:03physical goods, the old economy versus the new.
- 1:06Got it. And here's the twist, the core
- 1:08of this whole paradox. You look at their financials and
- 1:11you find that both of these companies right now have the
- 1:14exact same price to sales ratio. An identical PS of let's say 10.
- 1:21APS ratio of exactly 10, which just to be clear for everyone,
- 1:24means the market cap of each company.
- 1:26The total price you paid on the whole thing is $10.00 for every
- 1:30$1.00 of revenue they make in a year.
- 1:32So for every dollar that rings through the till, you, the
- 1:34investor, are paying $10 to have a claim on it.
- 1:37So big question is, if the number is identical, are they
- 1:41equally valued? And the intuitive answer, the
- 1:43one that screams out at you, is absolutely not.
- 1:46It's a resounding no. And here's the conflict.
- 1:49Because if you go out and you ask say, 5 experienced tech
- 1:52investors about this, four of them would probably tell you the
- 1:5610 XPS for a good sauce company, one with decent growth, well,
- 2:00that's potentially cheap. Or at least reasonable.
- 2:03They might even see it as a bargain, a sign of future
- 2:05profitability. Exactly.
- 2:06But then you take that same number, that same 10 XPS, and
- 2:09you show it to a retail analyst looking at the supermarket
- 2:12chain. Oh, they'd.
- 2:13Laugh you out of the room. They would call it an
- 2:15astronomical and absurd a bubble valuation.
- 2:19So the exact same #10X is seen as cheap for one and just
- 2:23ruinous for another. The PS Paradox.
- 2:26That's it. It just proves that the metric
- 2:28by itself is basically meaningless.
- 2:31So our mission today on this deep dive is to resolve that
- 2:35conflict. We're going to introduce and
- 2:37really rigorously apply what we're calling the gross margin
- 2:41filter. We're going to look past that
- 2:42superficial revenue line and expose the fundamental flaw in
- 2:45just relying on PS alone. The whole point here is to move
- 2:49from the, you know, the noise of sales volume to the signal of
- 2:53actual spendable profit. Because that's what we care
- 2:55about as investors, right? At the end of the day, we're
- 2:58buying a piece of a company's future cash flows.
- 3:01And if you're paying $10.00 for $1.00 of revenue, you absolutely
- 3:04have to know how much of that $1.00 actually turns into money
- 3:08the company gets to keep. Before it pays the rent and the
- 3:10salaries and everything else. If you don't use that filter,
- 3:13you're essentially buying blind. OK, before we jump into the
- 3:16numbers, just our quick but very necessary legal note.
- 3:21All the analysis we're presenting here is based on
- 3:23publicly available sources. It is purely for educational
- 3:27purposes. And this is not investment
- 3:29advice. Please always conduct your own
- 3:31due diligence before making any investment decisions.
- 3:34All right, let's start with Section 1, the flaw in sales and
- 3:39the power of margin fundamentals.
- 3:41The PS ratio is so popular because it's simple, but that
- 3:45simplicity is its biggest weakness.
- 3:47It is. I mean, historically it gained
- 3:49traction because for these high growth companies, especially
- 3:53ones reinvesting every penny back into the business, revenue
- 3:56is a much more stable number than net income.
- 3:59Sure, net income can be negative.
- 4:00It can be volatile, especially in the early.
- 4:02Days. Exactly.
- 4:03But by relying on revenue, you are making this massive and
- 4:06frankly false assumption. You're assuming that a dollar of
- 4:09revenue earned by the software company is fundamentally the
- 4:12same quality as a dollar earned by the supermarket.
- 4:15That is just financially incorrect.
- 4:17Rofoundly incorrect. O let's prove why right now.
- 4:21Let's start with the supermarket example, the classic low margin
- 4:24business. We have to look really closely
- 4:27at what makes up that $1.00 of revenue.
- 4:29So the supermarket sells a bottle of soda for $1.00.
- 4:33That $1.00 goes into the Tash register.
- 4:35Right, the top line revenue is $1.00.
- 4:37Yes, but almost instantly a huge piece of that dollar is already
- 4:42spoken for. It has to be used to replace the
- 4:45soda that was just sold. That's the cost of goods sold,
- 4:48right? The Co.
- 4:49GS. That's the Co GS.
- 4:50And for a physical retailer, Co GS is a monster.
- 4:54It's not just buying the next bottle of soda, it's managing
- 4:57these incredibly complex supply chains, paying for shipping,
- 5:01warehousing, the electricity for the refrigerators.
- 5:03And things like spoilage or theft, I imagine all of that
- 5:06gets factored in, all of it. And our sources confirm that in
- 5:10this industry, which is known for being brutally low margin,
- 5:13the Co GS often eats up around $0.90 of that $1.00 sale.
- 5:17So 90 cents of every dollar that comes in the door immediately
- 5:20goes right back out just to keep the shells stocked.
- 5:22That's right. So what's leftover?
- 5:24What's the real cash or what we call gross profit?
- 5:28It's only $0.10, just $0.10, and that is the gross margin.
- 5:31In this case, the supermarket has a 10% gross margin.
- 5:34That tiny sliver of $0.10 is all the money the company has left
- 5:38to cover all of its other operational expenses.
- 5:41The fixed costs, the rent on that huge store, the utility
- 5:45bills, the marketing, the salaries for every single
- 5:47cashier, stalker and manager. The corporate overhead, all of
- 5:52it. And only after all of those
- 5:53expenses are paid, whatever tiny fraction might be leftover
- 5:56becomes the net profit that actually belongs to you, the
- 5:59shareholder. So the big take away here is
- 6:01that the supermarket's revenue dollar is mostly just cost.
- 6:04It's not really their money. The business model depends on
- 6:07moving incredible volumes of product super efficiently just
- 6:11to generate enough total gross profit to stay in business.
- 6:13Paying $10.00 for $1.00 of that kind of low quality revenue, it
- 6:18already sounds pretty crazy. Doesn't.
- 6:19It it really does. So OK, let's flip the coin.
- 6:21Let's move to the other side of the economy, the sauce company
- 6:24example, the high minibution business model.
- 6:26Here are the economics are almost perfectly inverted.
- 6:30With the software company, the main cost is building the
- 6:33product in the 1st place, right? Writing all that code.
- 6:36Yes, but that's an important distinction.
- 6:38That initial investment falls under research and development
- 6:41or R&D, which is an operating expense.
- 6:44It's not part of KOD GS. OK, that's a key point.
- 6:47It is because once the code is written, once the platform is
- 6:52live, the cost of selling a subscription to the next
- 6:55customer or the next 1000 customers is it's minimal.
- 7:00It's basically just clicking copy and paste.
- 7:02In a digital sense, it's replication.
- 7:03That's the magic right there. 0 marginal cost of production.
- 7:07The COD GS for a digital subscription is tiny.
- 7:10It's mostly things like server hosting fees, some customer
- 7:13support infrastructure, maybe payment processing fees.
- 7:16So for that same $1.00 subscription revenue, yeah, what
- 7:19would the COD GS be? Well, our analysis suggests it
- 7:21might only be about $0.10. $0.10 So we've gone from $0.90 for the
- 7:24supermarket to $0.10 for the software company.
- 7:26And that is the profound difference.
- 7:29The cash that flows into the company's gross profit line is a
- 7:33massive 90 cents. The sauce company's gross margin
- 7:37is 90%. OK, let's just pause on that.
- 7:40Company A, the supermarket, a dollar in the till, gives you
- 7:43$0.10 of potential profit. Company B the software company.
- 7:47A dollar in the till gives you $0.90.
- 7:49The revenue number $1.00 is identical, but the economic
- 7:53quality of that revenue is 9 time higher for the software
- 7:56company. And this really gets to the core
- 7:58of our thesis today. As shareholders, we don't really
- 8:01care about how much money passes through the register.
- 8:04That's just activity. We care about how much money
- 8:06stays in the vault. That's the profit.
- 8:08Exactly. And PS fails because it stops
- 8:11its analysis right at the cash register.
- 8:13It just assumes that all that volume is value.
- 8:15It's a great analogy to think of it like buying a mineral mine.
- 8:18You would never pay the same price for a ton of ore if one
- 8:21ton contains 90% pure silver and the other ton contains 90%
- 8:25worthless. Rock.
- 8:26Of course not. The gross margin is that purity
- 8:28filter. It tells you the composition of
- 8:30the revenue dollar you're buying.
- 8:32And until you apply that filter, the PS ratio is just financial
- 8:35background noise. It's distracting.
- 8:37And we should probably emphasize just how fragile that low margin
- 8:40can be for the supermarket, sure, but think about other
- 8:43industries, manufacturing, energy.
- 8:46Absolutely. They're Kaji S can be incredibly
- 8:48volatile. They're tied to global commodity
- 8:51prices to supply chains. A sudden spike in the price of
- 8:55oil or steel can instantly cut a 10% margin down to 5%,
- 9:00completely destroying their profit forecast for the year.
- 9:02Whereas in the software world, that 90% margin is usually far
- 9:06more stable. It's predictable.
- 9:08It's insulated from those wild swings in physical commodity
- 9:11prices. And that stability, that
- 9:13predictability also demands A valuation premium.
- 9:16It's less risky. Right.
- 9:17Think about a major airline. Their revenue, new numbers are
- 9:20huge, but their gross margin might be what, 15 or 20% on a
- 9:23good day? And it's totally dependent on
- 9:25the price of jet fuel completely.
- 9:26The kagias, the fuel, the maintenance, the variable crew
- 9:30costs are in a constant battle with the ticket price.
- 9:33A10 XPS for an airline would be. I mean, it's beyond nonsensical
- 9:37because once you factor in that fuel volatility, you realize
- 9:40you're paying an impossible price for a very fleeting and
- 9:44unreliable gross profit. OK.
- 9:46So we've laid the groundwork. We've established the 10 XPS
- 9:50paradox and we know fundamentally that the 90%
- 9:54margin dollar is way better than the 10% margin dollar.
- 9:57Now it's time to quantify that difference.
- 9:59Let's resolve the paradox with math.
- 10:02Perfect. That brings us right into
- 10:03Section 2. Applying the gross margin
- 10:06filter, calculating the real cost.
- 10:08We're moving from the concept to the cold, hard numbers.
- 10:11The gross margin isn't just a helpful indicator, it's the
- 10:14essential analytical tool you need to compare these companies.
- 10:17It transforms the PS ratio, which is just a multiple of
- 10:20volume, into something much more useful.
- 10:22The gross profit multiple. Exactly a multiple of actual
- 10:25earning potential. And the formula, as you
- 10:27mentioned is simple, but it's incredibly powerful.
- 10:29You just take the price to sales ratio and you divide it by the
- 10:32gross margin. And you have to express that
- 10:34margin as a decimal, so 80% becomes .80.
- 10:37Right. And that gives us the gross
- 10:39profit multiple, what you call the real cost of buying into
- 10:43that stream of profit. Let's do it.
- 10:45Let's start with case one, the sauce company valuation.
- 10:48The market in our scenario has priced it at APS ratio of 10X.
- 10:52That's the sticker price. And we said it's superior
- 10:54digital business model gives it an 80% gross margin, so .80.
- 10:59OK, apply the filter 10 / .80. The result is 12.5. 12.5 X is
- 11:06the gross profit multiple. What the market is actually
- 11:09saying. What it's really pricing is that
- 11:11it's willing to pay 12.5 times the amount of money the company
- 11:15has leftover after delivering its service.
- 11:17And for a high growth tech company paying 12 1/2 times the
- 11:20gross profit, yeah, that's generally seen as a pretty
- 11:22reasonable price, isn't it? It is.
- 11:24It reflects a certain premium for its future growth and the
- 11:27fact that it's high margin is probably quite defensible.
- 11:29It's not a Bergen basement price, but it's well within the
- 11:32realm of normal. So the 10 XPS was hiding a
- 11:35relatively acceptable profit based valuation.
- 11:38Yes. Now hold that thought.
- 11:40Let's run the same calculation for case 2, the supermarket
- 11:43valuation. It started at that same baffling
- 11:4710 XPS ratio. OK.
- 11:49But the supermarket's reality is that razor thin. 10% gross
- 11:53margin, so .10. Run the numbers PS of 10 divided
- 11:58by 110 gross margin. Wow.
- 12:00The result is 100. And absolutely staggering on
- 12:03100X. If the market really did price
- 12:05that supermarket at 10 XPS, it would be valuing the company at
- 12:08100 times its gross profit. This is it.
- 12:11This is the aha moment. This is where it all clicks into
- 12:14place. It is the identical PS number
- 12:16was concealing an 8 fold difference in the true valuation
- 12:1912.5 X from the software company versus 100 X for the
- 12:22supermarket. The difference isn't small, it's
- 12:24it's catastrophic. A100X gross profit multiple is
- 12:28an impossible number for a mature stable business.
- 12:31Just think about what that means.
- 12:33Gross profit is the money you have available to cover all your
- 12:35operating costs and then you hope leave something for net
- 12:38profit. If you pay 100 times that
- 12:40amount, you are basically saying you're willing to wait what, a
- 12:45century, maybe more, just for the profit to accumulate and pay
- 12:48back your initial investment. And that's assuming those thin
- 12:52margins never, ever go down. Which is a heroic assumption in
- 12:55the grocery business. So the market isn't necessarily
- 12:58irrational, but looking at that single PS metric is completely
- 13:02misleading it. Forces you to ask a different
- 13:04question. If you as an analyst saw a
- 13:07supermarket trading at 10 XPS, what would you have to believe?
- 13:11That's a great question. You wouldn't believe it's
- 13:13actually worth 100 X gross profit.
- 13:15You would have to believe that it's gross margin is about to
- 13:17experience some kind of massive, unprecedented, physics defying
- 13:21explosion. Right, for that 10 XPS to get a
- 13:23valuation like the sauce companies, let's say that 12.5 X
- 13:27gross profit, the supermarkets gross margin would have to jump
- 13:30from 10% all the way up to 80%. Which is it's physically
- 13:33impossible for a business that has to buy and ship physical
- 13:36goods. It can't happen and.
- 13:37This is where that powerful analogy from the source material
- 13:40comes in. When you see a high PS number on
- 13:44a low margin commoditized business, it's like paying
- 13:47Nvidia's valuation to buy the next small white cloth store.
- 13:51I love that analogy. It's perfect.
- 13:53You're assigning the scarcity, the growth, the margin quality
- 13:57of a technological monopoly to a business that is defined by
- 14:00competition and density. It just highlights this profound
- 14:03mistake of confusing revenue volume with revenue quality.
- 14:07And that's why the gross profit multiple is such a superior
- 14:10metric, especially for comparing companies across different
- 14:13sectors. It puts everyone on a level
- 14:15playing field. It forces every company, whether
- 14:18it's software or supermarket or an airline, to be valued based
- 14:21on how efficiently it turns the sale into spendable cash.
- 14:25It standardizes the comparison. It does.
- 14:27It brings clarity. So we've established the math.
- 14:29The filter works. It exposes these hidden
- 14:32valuation gaps brilliantly. But now let's take a step back
- 14:35and think about how this actually plays out in the real
- 14:38world, in the functioning global market.
- 14:40Right, which takes us into Section 3, the implications for
- 14:43low margin industries and market reality.
- 14:46If our hypothetical 10 XPS supermarket is just absurd, what
- 14:50does the real market actually look like for these companies?
- 14:53Well, the direct consequence of this filter is that low margin
- 14:56businesses by definition must have very low PS ratios to
- 15:00result in a same gross profit multiple.
- 15:02They have to, since only that $0.10 of real silver, as we
- 15:06called it, flows through. The market simply cannot justify
- 15:09paying $10.00 for that $1.00 revenue stream.
- 15:12So what does the market data actually show?
- 15:14What's a typical PS range? Our deep dive into the sector
- 15:17confirms this. The typical PS for a stable,
- 15:20mature, low margin retail or supermarket business usually
- 15:24sits somewhere between point 5X and 1X.
- 15:27Half to one times sales. That is a radically different
- 15:30universe from the tech world A. Completely different planet.
- 15:33So let's test our if then rule using those real market numbers.
- 15:36Let's assume a big stable supermarket is fairly valued
- 15:39right now at one XPS. OK.
- 15:41APS of one, we apply the filter again.
- 15:43We know the gross margin is still 10% or .10.
- 15:46So 1 / .1 half that gives us a gross profit multiple of 10 X.
- 15:52And a 10X multiple on gross profit.
- 15:54That feels extremely realistic, doesn't it?
- 15:57It feels palatable for a mature, slow growth, stable industry
- 16:01like groceries. It does.
- 16:03It suggests a reasonable expectation of payback time and
- 16:06profit generation for the shareholder.
- 16:08It makes sense. And this is the proof.
- 16:10This shows that the market, whether consciously or not, is
- 16:13pricing the profit potential. It's not pricing the sales
- 16:16volume. And look what happened.
- 16:17What's that? The supermarket's adjusted
- 16:19value, that 10X gross profit multiple, is now highly
- 16:22comparable to the sauce company's adjusted value of 12.5
- 16:26X gross profit. They're in the same ballpark.
- 16:29Exactly that small 2.5 X difference in the gross profit
- 16:32multiple. That is the premium the market
- 16:34is willing to pay for two things, higher growth and higher
- 16:37margin stability. So the market is saying the
- 16:39digital scalability and the higher quality revenue of the
- 16:42plus company is worth a little bit more and that makes perfect
- 16:45sense. It makes perfect sense.
- 16:47The gross profit multiple was the signal we were looking for
- 16:49all along. It explains the natural, the
- 16:51necessary and the vast pricing discrepancy between these
- 16:54sectors. It also helps you judge growth.
- 16:57If you're looking at a retail company and a software company
- 16:59and they're both growing revenue at 10% a year, this metric helps
- 17:03you see which company is generating better quality
- 17:06growth. Precisely which one is adding
- 17:08more to the bottom line potential for every new dollar
- 17:11of sales? OK, so let's think about the
- 17:13warning signs this metric can give us.
- 17:15What if you see a low margin company like a retailer or maybe
- 17:19a big commoditized manufacturer and it's PS ratio suddenly
- 17:23starts climbing? It gets to say 3X.
- 17:26The red flag should be waving wildly because if the PS it's 3X
- 17:30and that margin is still stuck at 10%, the gross profit
- 17:33multiple immediately inflates to 30X. 3 / .1030 X.
- 17:38And a 30X gross profit multiple is now what you might pay for a
- 17:42decent, maybe not spectacular, but a decent technology company.
- 17:45The market is suddenly pricing the gross profit of a highly
- 17:49competitive, low barrier to entry retail business the same
- 17:53way it prices a differentiated tech platform.
- 17:56And why would that happen? It's usually driven by a story,
- 17:58right? A narrative.
- 17:59Almost always an expectation of some radical shift.
- 18:03Maybe the market believes a huge e-commerce pivot is coming where
- 18:06they're launching A proprietary payment system, or there's some
- 18:08new tech that people think will magically raise that gross
- 18:11margin from 10% to 20 or 30%. But until that margin increase
- 18:15actually actually shows up on the income.
- 18:17Side you are paying a huge premium for speculation.
- 18:20The gross profit multiple acts as this stark mathematical
- 18:24reminder of the underlying economic reality.
- 18:26It's an instant check against an emotional, narrative driven
- 18:30bubble. So for you listening, this
- 18:32adjusted metric has immense utility if you're comparing an
- 18:36investment in, I don't know, a specialized high margin
- 18:39materials company against a company that does enterprise
- 18:42cloud storage. 2 totally different worlds.
- 18:45The filter lets you standardize the price you're paying.
- 18:47You're standardizing the price you pay for the core engine of
- 18:50profit generation. It converts that raw transaction
- 18:53volume into actionable value data.
- 18:55It. Really does change the question
- 18:56you ask you stop asking. Is 10 XPS cheap?
- 18:59And you start asking, is a 12.5 X gross profit multiple cheap
- 19:05for a company that's growing at 30% per year?
- 19:08That second question is so much more insightful.
- 19:10It's far more relevant to your actual investment return.
- 19:13OK. So we firmly established that a
- 19:15high gross margin is essential to justify a high PS ratio.
- 19:19But, and this is a big but, now we have to introduce the
- 19:22necessary dose of critical thinking.
- 19:24Right. We've defined success for the
- 19:26top half of the income statement, but what happens
- 19:28next? This brings us to Section 4, the
- 19:31leaky bucket warning beyond gross profit.
- 19:34And the essential question we have to ask now is, does a high
- 19:37gross margin, that beautiful 80 or 90% figure automatically mean
- 19:42you found a great investment? And our deep dive into financial
- 19:45theory and market history confirms the answer is
- 19:48absolutely not. And we use the leaky bucket
- 19:50metaphor to explain this. So you have a large amount of
- 19:53high quality gross margin, that $0.90 of every dollar flowing
- 19:56into the top of your bucket, that's fantastic efficiency.
- 20:00But the challenge, especially for high growth companies in
- 20:02competitive fields like software, is that they often
- 20:05have massive, expensive holes drilled into the bottom of that
- 20:08bucket. And those holes are the
- 20:10operating expenses. These are all the costs that sit
- 20:12below the gross profit line on the income statement, but are
- 20:15absolutely necessary to run and scale the business.
- 20:18For these companies, the cost of generating the revenue might be
- 20:21low, but the cost of sustaining that revenue stream and,
- 20:24crucially, acquiring the next dollar of revenue, is often
- 20:27enormous. Let's drill down into the
- 20:29specifics of where this gross profit gets drained away.
- 20:33There are two big ones, 2 mandatory expenditures for high
- 20:36growth tech, marketing and sales or S&M.
- 20:39And research and development R&D.
- 20:41Let's take marketing and sales first.
- 20:43The sauce world and high tech in general is often brutally
- 20:46competitive. Sometimes it's a winner take all
- 20:49market. So to grow quickly, to acquire
- 20:51customers, to capture market share before competitor does,
- 20:54they have to spend a phenomenal amount of money.
- 20:57And that spending, high salaries for big sales teams, huge
- 21:01digital ad budgets, costly customer support systems, all of
- 21:05that sits below the gross margin line.
- 21:07It's a leak in the bucket. It leads you to this concept of
- 21:09customer acquisition cost or CAC.
- 21:12You have to ask how much are they spending to get each new
- 21:14customer? If a company is spending say 60%
- 21:17of its total revenue on sales and marketing just to achieve
- 21:2030% growth, then that spending is basically eating up all of
- 21:24that beautiful 80 or 90% gross profit you were so excited
- 21:28about. Exactly.
- 21:29If your S&M expenses are perpetually that high relative
- 21:33to the revenue they bring in you, it's not really the
- 21:35scalable business model. Your customer lifetime value.
- 21:39The LTV might be high, but if your CAC is also high, the ratio
- 21:44is poor. So that high PS, that high
- 21:47multiple of gross profit, it's all based on the implicit
- 21:50promise that the company will eventually stop needing to spend
- 21:5460% of its revenue on marketing. It has to.
- 21:57And then there's the other big leak research and development.
- 21:59Right. These companies can't just stand
- 22:01still. Not for a second.
- 22:03To maintain that 90% margin, to keep their product ahead of the
- 22:06competition, they have to constantly innovate.
- 22:08They have to update their code, add features, expand the
- 22:11platform. This is the mandatory cost of
- 22:13just maintaining their competitive mode if they stopped
- 22:16investing in R&D. Their product would become a
- 22:18commodity within a couple of years and their high gross
- 22:21margin would start to erode and look more and more like the
- 22:23supermarkets. So this continuous high
- 22:25operational spending, the 1-2 punch of aggressive S&M and
- 22:28heavy R&D leads directly to what we call the net income problem.
- 22:33It does. Despite generating that
- 22:35impressive 90% gross profit, the ongoing spending is so high that
- 22:40when you get all the way down to bottom line, the net income is
- 22:44often negative. It's a minus figure.
- 22:46They're losing money quarter after quarter, year after year.
- 22:49And that is exactly what makes investing in these companies so
- 22:52difficult. The high PS is justified by the
- 22:54high gross margin, but the negative net income is only
- 22:57justified by the promise that this high spending is temporary.
- 23:00The valuation is a bet. It's a bet that future dollars
- 23:03of revenue will be cheaper to acquire.
- 23:05Which is why we need a second critical check.
- 23:08It's not enough to just use the gross margin filter, you have to
- 23:10pair it with an assessment of operating leverage.
- 23:13OK, let's define that operating leverage is the litmus test that
- 23:17separates a truly scalable, successful, high margin company
- 23:21from just a cash guzzling machine that can never actually
- 23:24turn a profit. The core idea is that as a
- 23:26company scales its revenue, it's fixed operating costs should go
- 23:29down as a percentage of those sales.
- 23:31If the business is genuinely scalable, its sales growth
- 23:35should outpace the growth in its operating costs.
- 23:37Let's break that down. The initial R&D investment,
- 23:40writing that core code, building the first data center, that's a
- 23:43huge fixed cost upfront. Right.
- 23:46But whether that software then serves 10,000 customers or 10
- 23:49million customers, that core R&D cost doesn't necessarily have to
- 23:53grow at the same rate. So if that fixed cost stays
- 23:56relatively constant, but your revenue explodes by 10 times.
- 24:00The R&D cost as a percentage of revenue immediately drops.
- 24:03That is the hole in the bucket being patched up.
- 24:05You are leveraging your fixed costs against a much, much
- 24:09larger revenue base. And that allows a higher
- 24:11percentage of your gross profit to finally flow all the way
- 24:14through to the net income line. This is what you have to look
- 24:16for as an investor. You have to look at the
- 24:18financial statements over a multi year period, track their
- 24:21S&M expense and their general and administrative or G and A
- 24:25expense as a percentage of total revenue.
- 24:27And you want to see those percentages going down over?
- 24:29Time you have to. If you see S&M consistently
- 24:31declining from say 60% of revenue down to 55%, then 50%,
- 24:36then 45% and G&E is moving from 15% to 10%, that is tangible
- 24:41hard evidence that operating leverage is kicking in.
- 24:44That reduction is the signal it shows the company's getting more
- 24:47efficient at turning its impressive gross profit into
- 24:51actual real net profit for shareholders.
- 24:53Because if you invest in a company with an 85% gross margin
- 24:57and a 12.5 X gross profit multiple, but those operating
- 25:01expense percentages just stay flat or worse, they increase as
- 25:05the company grows and. Then you're paying a huge
- 25:07premium for a business that is structurally inefficient.
- 25:11It may never generate positive cash flow.
- 25:13The ability to make that transition from a high spend,
- 25:16money losing model to a leveraged profitable model is
- 25:20the single greatest factor in determining whether that high PS
- 25:22valuation was ever justified. It's the difference between
- 25:25genius and hype. It is the ultimate goal is to
- 25:28achieve both sales efficiency and capital efficiency.
- 25:31So to wrap up this really critical section, a high PS is a
- 25:34promise. A high gross margin gives you
- 25:37the raw material to fulfill that promise.
- 25:39But operating leverage is the mechanism.
- 25:41It's the proof that management actually knows how to convert
- 25:44that raw material into real shareholder value.
- 25:48Without that leverage, a high margin just means you have a
- 25:50great product that you're spending way too much money to
- 25:53sell. So you need both filters, the
- 25:56gross margin filter for revenue quality and the operating
- 25:58leverage assessment for operational sustainability.
- 26:01That's the complete picture. OK.
- 26:03We have journeyed from that baffling paradox through the
- 26:07quantitative solution of the gross margin filter.
- 26:11And finally, we added that vital layer of complexity with
- 26:14operating leverage. We've seen the full path to
- 26:17shareholder return. And the core insight really is
- 26:20deceptively simple. PS on its own is just volume.
- 26:23PS Divided by gross margin is a proxy for value.
- 26:26Let's summarize that final formula for everyone listening
- 26:29just to really solidify this powerful take away.
- 26:32Always whenever you see a price to sales ratio you have to
- 26:35filter. It use it divided by the gross
- 26:37margin to understand the true cost you're paying for profit
- 26:39potential, the gross profit multiple.
- 26:42To bring back our original cases, example a, the SOS
- 26:45platform with APS of 10 was actually reasonable because its
- 26:48gross profit multiple was only 12.5 X.
- 26:52While Example B, the supermarket, also with the PS of
- 26:5510, was financially impossible because its gross profit
- 26:58multiple was 100 X. The filter revealed the truth
- 27:02instantly. And we learned that the market,
- 27:05when it's acting rationally, tends to settle on comparable
- 27:08gross profit multiples even across totally different
- 27:11sectors. The one XPS for the supermarket,
- 27:13which works out to a 10X gross profit multiple is in the same
- 27:17neighborhood as the 10 XPS for the sauce company.
- 27:20At 12.5 X gross profit, it confirms that underlying
- 27:24economic gravity. This process gives you such a
- 27:26powerful tool for comparing fundamentally different
- 27:28businesses. You're no longer comparing
- 27:30apples to oranges. You're comparing the financial
- 27:32efficiency of 2 completely different operating models.
- 27:35Now before we conclude, for our listeners who enjoy using these
- 27:38kinds of indicators to sort of gauge the temperature of the
- 27:40market, we did want to mention a tool that can help frame these
- 27:43valuation discussions. That's right, because it's one
- 27:46thing to value an individual company, but it helps to know
- 27:49the broader context. So if you're interested in
- 27:51tracking the total market temperature, we encourage you to
- 27:54search for and download the iOS App Buffett Indicator from the
- 27:58Apple App Store. Indeed, it's a very handy
- 28:00reference point for seeing overall market valuation levels,
- 28:03which can be a useful backdrop for this kind of deep dive
- 28:06analysis. It's a great companion tool and
- 28:09as always, just a reminder of our necessary disclaimer.
- 28:13All the analysis here is based on publicly available
- 28:15information and is strictly for educational purposes.
- 28:19It does not constitute investment advice.
- 28:21Please do your own due diligence.
- 28:23And for those of you who want to go even deeper on these topics
- 28:25and access more of our advanced content, we welcome you to join
- 28:29our Deep Value Club membership. OK.
- 28:31So on to our final provocative thought, something to leave you
- 28:34with that takes this concept of the gross margin filter and kind
- 28:37of projects it into the future. We focus today on why low margin
- 28:41businesses must have low PS ratios.
- 28:44But what happens when a historically low PS company like
- 28:48a big retailer or a manufacturer successfully bolts on a high
- 28:52margin sticky digital service? That's a fascinating question.
- 28:57Imagine a huge grocery chain launches a unique, highly
- 29:01profitable subscription based health and Wellness platform.
- 29:05And this platform has 85% margins and it's layered right
- 29:09on top of their existing 10% margin grocery business.
- 29:12The market would have to try and rewrite that company, right?
- 29:15You have to blend the two valuation models.
- 29:16You would and the challenge for an analyst becomes how do you
- 29:19properly value that? How do you isolate the valuation
- 29:22of the old low margin business from this new shiny high margin
- 29:26software service that's attached to it?
- 29:28What new metric would you need to create?
- 29:30Yeah, you'd need to factor in not just the ratio, but the
- 29:32sustainability of that new high margin.
- 29:33You'd have to measure the mote, the the duration, the stickiness
- 29:36of that new revenue stream. And that is really the leading
- 29:39edge of valuation analysis today.
- 29:42It's learning how to unbundle these complex hybrid companies
- 29:45based on margin quality and more importantly, predicting which of
- 29:49these new high margin services are genuinely defensible and
- 29:53which are just fleeting fat. So keep applying the filter,
- 29:56keep challenging the surface numbers.
- 29:58And always keep asking what you are really paying for.
- 30:01We hope this knowledge empowers you to look much deeper into the
- 30:04financials the next time you see a surprising valuation.
- 30:06We'll catch you on the next deep dive.