Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Greg Abel Puts Berkshires Billions to Work
Transcript
- 0:00Usually when we look at a companies financial report,
- 0:03there's this expectation of like total precision.
- 0:06Right, like it's a medical X-ray or something.
- 0:08Exactly. It feels like you're reading a
- 0:10Kleenex, Ray. You look at the bottom line,
- 0:12it's just this clean number and the analyst basically points to
- 0:15it and says, you know, there it is.
- 0:17That's exactly how much money they made this quarter.
- 0:19It is comforting to think of it that way, honestly.
- 0:21I mean, we like things to be binary.
- 0:24Oh, totally profitable or not profitable, right?
- 0:26So they can just be easily categorized on a on a
- 0:28spreadsheet. Right.
- 0:29But then you step into the world of a $1.1 trillion conglomerate
- 0:34and suddenly that X-ray machine is well, it's completely broken.
- 0:38Yeah, it really is. Because if you look at the top
- 0:41line numbers for Berkshire Hathaway's Q 22026 earnings,
- 0:45which literally just dropped today, August 8th, you aren't
- 0:49looking at a Kleene X-ray at all.
- 0:51You are looking at, honestly, a financial optical illusion.
- 0:55A massive illusion, yeah. And that is exactly what we're
- 0:58unpacking for you today on this deep dive.
- 1:00We're going to cut through the noise of this massive data
- 1:03release to figure out how this absolute behemoth is navigating
- 1:08a really monumental generational transition under CEO Greg Abel.
- 1:12Which is fascinating to watch play out in real time.
- 1:14It really is, yeah. But before we get into decoding
- 1:17that illusion, we do have a quick mandatory message to share
- 1:20with you all, and I'm just going to read this exactly as
- 1:22provided. Go for it.
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- 1:39All analysis is based on publicly available sources and
- 1:42may be subject to revisions or differing interpretations.
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- 1:50investment or financial advice or service.
- 1:53Conduct your own due diligence before making investment,
- 1:55financial decisions all. Right.
- 1:56So getting back to it, I think setting the baseline here is
- 2:00it's pretty essential because people still tend to view
- 2:03Berkshire Hathaway as a single monolithic stock.
- 2:07Right. Like it's just one big company.
- 2:08Exactly. But it's actually this
- 2:11sprawling, totally decentralized web.
- 2:14I mean, you have manufacturing, you have retail, you have these
- 2:17heavily regulated utilities through Berkshire Hathaway
- 2:19Energy B. HE.
- 2:21BHE plus a massive railway network with BNSF and you know,
- 2:25underlying it all is this colossal insurance float.
- 2:28Which is the real engine? It is.
- 2:30And what makes this specific Q2 report so pivotal, I think, is
- 2:34that the numbers prove Berkshire is no longer just Warren
- 2:37Buffett's waiting room. You know, Greg Abel is actively
- 2:40and aggressively shifting their capital strategies.
- 2:43So let's start by looking at those top line numbers, because
- 2:46this is where that optical illusion I mentioned hits you
- 2:48right in the face. Oh yeah, the jab versus
- 2:50operating difference. Right.
- 2:52So the Q22026 operating earnings came in at a wildly robust $13
- 2:57billion, which is? Huge.
- 2:59Yeah, that's up over 16% year over year.
- 3:01So very solid quarter by any normal metric, but then you
- 3:05know, you glance over at the gap net income and it's a staggering
- 3:09$25.6 billion, it basically doubled.
- 3:12Yeah, it looks ridiculous on paper.
- 3:15For anyone just reading the headlines, they might
- 3:17legitimately think Berkshire's actual day-to-day business
- 3:21doubled its profitability in three months.
- 3:23I mean, how does a discrepancy like that even happen?
- 3:26So it comes down to a really specific accounting rule known
- 3:29as ASU 2016 O1. Basically, generally accepted
- 3:33accounting principles, or GAP dictate exactly how companies
- 3:37have to report their earnings. And under this specific rule,
- 3:40any unrealized gains or losses from Berkshire's massive stock
- 3:44portfolio, they have to flow directly into their net income
- 3:48on the income statement. Just to clarify for anyone
- 3:50listening, unrealized basically means they haven't actually sold
- 3:53the stock, right? The price just went up on the
- 3:54ticker that day. Precisely.
- 3:56It's just a paper gain. So if the broader stock market
- 4:01has a great quarter, which, you know, it did hear the value of
- 4:04Berkshire's massive holdings in companies like Apple just goes
- 4:08up on paper. Oh, I see.
- 4:09And job rules force them to report those paper gains as if
- 4:13it were actual hard cash income. Consequently, their net income
- 4:17looks like it just exploded. But.
- 4:19It's not real cash from selling. Exactly.
- 4:21And on the flip side, you know, if the stock market crashes next
- 4:24quarter, they will be forced to report a massive statutory loss,
- 4:29even if they're underlying businesses like, you know, the
- 4:31railways and the utilities. Those are still churning out
- 4:34cash. Right.
- 4:34Even if they are quietly generating billions in actual
- 4:37cash, it just heavily, heavily distorts the reality of their
- 4:40operational performance. Wow.
- 4:42So if I'm trying to evaluate a normal business, I usually just
- 4:44look at the bottom line. But evaluating Berkshire using
- 4:47that gap net income is basically like judging a farmer's crop
- 4:52yield for the season by including the fluctuating market
- 4:56value of the tractor sitting in his barn.
- 4:58That is a great way to put it. Actually, it's kind of worse
- 5:00than that. Wait, worse half.
- 5:01Well, it's like judging the crop yield by valuing the tractor,
- 5:05but the tractor's price changes every single minute the stock
- 5:08market is open. Oh man, yeah.
- 5:10The tractor hasn't been sold. Its daily market value tells you
- 5:14absolutely nothing about how much corn the farmer actually
- 5:17grew and harvested this season. Right, the corn is what actually
- 5:20matter. Exactly.
- 5:21And Berkshire itself explicitly warns investors against using
- 5:25quarterly net income for this exact reason.
- 5:27I mean, they tell you to ignore it.
- 5:29We have to look at the actual corn, which they call the
- 5:31operating mix. And we actually dig into that
- 5:33operating mix. The engine driving this company
- 5:37is just fascinating. It really is.
- 5:39The manufacturing, service and retail division, the MSR
- 5:41division is the absolute powerhouse.
- 5:43Yeah, that division alone generated what, 34.4% of their
- 5:47operating earnings? Yep, over 1/3.
- 5:49Then you have insurance investment income at 23.6%,
- 5:53insurance underwriting at 13.1%, the BNSF Railway is pulling in
- 5:5712.3% and the BHE utilities are bringing up the rear at 6.8%.
- 6:03So when you look at that actual mix, you see a highly
- 6:07diversified, you know, real cash generating machine that is
- 6:11completely divorced from the daily swings of the stock
- 6:14market. Which naturally leads to,
- 6:16honestly, the biggest plot twist in this entire Q2 report.
- 6:20The cash pile. Yes, because if that operating
- 6:22engine is generating all of this cash week in and week out, where
- 6:27is that money going? Because for the first time in
- 6:29years, the legendary Berkshire cash pile is actually shrinking.
- 6:33Yeah, we are finally seeing a real contraction.
- 6:36Berkshire's horde of cash and short term treasuries dropped by
- 6:39about 2% from the end of 2025. Which is wild sea.
- 6:42Right, it landed at $365.5 billion as of June 30th.
- 6:47Which is still a mountain of money.
- 6:49But for years, critics have just, you know, watched this
- 6:51mountain grow and grow, constantly complaining that the
- 6:54company was way too concerned. Absolutely.
- 6:56They took a lot of sheet for it. But Greg Abel's actually put in
- 6:59the money to work. They executed $4.5 billion in
- 7:02stock buybacks in Q2 alone, and they didn't stop there.
- 7:07No, they didn't. They did another 3.3 billion in
- 7:10buybacks just in July 2026, and beyond buying their own stock,
- 7:15they also broke a 14 quarter streak of net equity selling.
- 7:20That's the part that really caught my eye.
- 7:21Right. They actually bought $20 billion
- 7:24more in public equities than they sold this quarter.
- 7:27The shift in behavior is what really matters here.
- 7:29I mean, the sources highlight some major moves, A $10 billion
- 7:33investment in Alphabet, for instance, huge.
- 7:36And the completion of a $6.8 billion acquisition of the home
- 7:40builder Taylor Morrison. But you know, the stock buybacks
- 7:44are arguably the absolute loudest signal management can
- 7:47ever send to the market. Especially because they are
- 7:49buying their own stock at around what, 521 dollars a share?
- 7:52Exactly. Think about what that actually
- 7:54means. A management team as famously
- 7:56disciplined and cheap honestly as Berkshire's doesn't buy back
- 8:00stock just to prop up the price. Right.
- 8:02They aren't playing Wall Street games, no.
- 8:04By aggressively repurchasing shares at 521 dollars, they are
- 8:08broadcasting to the world that they fundamentally believe the
- 8:11public market is undervaluing their intrinsic compounding
- 8:14power. They think the stock is on sale.
- 8:16Yes, they believe buying their own company is literally the
- 8:20best use of their capital right now.
- 8:22So if you own this stock or you know you're a listener thinking
- 8:26about buying it, you're probably looking at that $521.00 price
- 8:29tag and wondering if you already missed the boat, like is it
- 8:32actually still a good deal? It's the $1,000,000 question.
- 8:35The sources provided a deep value scorecard for us and at
- 8:38the August 7th close of $521.80, Berkshire is sitting at a 15.5
- 8:44times price to earnings ratio and a 1.55 times price to book
- 8:49ratio. And, well, for a strict deep
- 8:51value investor, those numbers might actually give them pause.
- 8:54Really. Why is that?
- 8:56Traditionally a deep value screen might look for APE under
- 8:5915, meaning you were paying less than $15.00 for every $1.00 of
- 9:03company earnings, and a price to book under 1.5 meaning you are
- 9:07buying the assets pretty close to their liquidation value.
- 9:10So they're a bit over that line. Right, Berkshire is hovering
- 9:13just above those strict historical thresholds.
- 9:16But I really have to push back on using that kind of
- 9:18traditional math here. I mean, the data package we
- 9:22reviewed ran a standard discounted cash flow model ADCF
- 9:26using free cash flow to try and find the true intrinsic value of
- 9:29a share. The DCF results on Berkshire are
- 9:31always hilarious. They're hopelessly confusing.
- 9:34In a minimum growth scenario, the model says the intrinsic
- 9:37value is $6.39 a share. Wow.
- 9:41And then in an average growth case, it spits out $379.
- 9:45Again, the stock is trading at 521.
- 9:47How can a mathematical model be this disjointed from reality?
- 9:52It's basically like trying to weigh a blue whale using a
- 9:55bathroom scale. Yeah, and the bathroom scale
- 9:57just absolutely shatters because it simply wasn't built for the
- 10:00subject. A standard discounted cash flow
- 10:02model fundamentally fails to capture the structural reality
- 10:04of Berkshire. How so?
- 10:06The problem lies in exactly how free cash flow is calculated.
- 10:10Standard free cash flow takes the cash a business generates
- 10:13and then it subtracts all capital expenditures.
- 10:15Meaning all the money they spend on physical assets.
- 10:17Right. And Berkshire spends an
- 10:20astronomical amount of money on physical assets.
- 10:22They have to to spend billions just to expand their utility and
- 10:25rail divisions. Right.
- 10:26Trains and power grids aren't cheap.
- 10:28Exactly. Berkshire Hathaway Energy alone
- 10:30has a planned $33.3 billion capital expenditure spend slated
- 10:36just between 2026 and 2028. That is massive.
- 10:39It is, but the standard free cash flow model treats all of
- 10:43that spending as a penalty. It acts as if that money is just
- 10:47gone rather than being invested into infrastructure that will
- 10:51generate guaranteed Eid predictable returns for decades.
- 10:55Oh I see. And at the exact same time the
- 10:57model completely ignores the hundreds of billions in cash
- 11:00they hold, their massive equity portfolio, and the 0 cost
- 11:04leverage of their insurance float.
- 11:06So the standard math is literally punishing them for
- 11:09investing in their own future physical infrastructure while
- 11:12entirely ignoring the, you know, mountain of gold sitting in
- 11:15their basement. That is exactly why serious
- 11:17analysts just discard standard free cash flow for Berkshire and
- 11:20instead use a metric called owner's earnings.
- 11:22Owner's earnings, OK. Yeah, owner's earnings solves
- 11:25this problem. It adds back non cash
- 11:28depreciation, but crucially it only subtracts maintenance
- 11:31capital expenditures. Yeah.
- 11:33Let's unpack that difference for a second.
- 11:34Maintenance CapEx versus growth CapEx.
- 11:37Sure, think of the BNSF Railway maintenance CapEx is the money
- 11:41required just to fix broken train tracks and, you know,
- 11:45replace aging engines so the current business doesn't
- 11:47literally fall apart. It's.
- 11:48Just the cost of keeping the lights on.
- 11:50Right. Growth CapEx, on the other hand,
- 11:52is the money spent laying down hundreds of miles of brand new
- 11:56tracks to expand into a totally new state.
- 11:58Got it? Standard free cash flow treats
- 12:00both of those expenses exactly the same.
- 12:03Owner's earnings only deducts the maintenance cost, which
- 12:06gives you a much truer picture of the actual cash the business
- 12:10generates before it actively decides to expand.
- 12:12And when you look at Berkshire's owner's earnings, it hit $53
- 12:16billion over the trailing 12 months.
- 12:18Which is staggering. It really is.
- 12:20That proves the underlying business quality is exceptional,
- 12:23even if the basic PE ratio makes it look, I don't know, a little
- 12:27expensive to an old school value investor.
- 12:29Exactly. But to truly grasp how they
- 12:32generate that $53 billion, you have to look under the hood at
- 12:36the structural advantages that no basic spreadsheet can easily
- 12:40capture. Which brings us to the secret
- 12:42sauce, the. Secret.
- 12:43Sauce. Yeah, the AQR Capital Management
- 12:45empirical study called Buffett's Alpha.
- 12:48This study is fascinating to me because it debunks the myth that
- 12:52Berkshire Success is just based on Warren Buffett being like a
- 12:56magical stock picker. Right.
- 12:58Like he just has a crystal ball. Exactly.
- 13:00It's not magic, it's structural leverage, specifically the
- 13:04insurance float. The float is the engine of the
- 13:06entire Berkshire model. I mean, Berkshire currently
- 13:09operates with $177.5 billion in insurance float.
- 13:13That's with AB billion. Yes, This is Money from premiums
- 13:16that policyholders have paid in, but that hasn't been paid out
- 13:19yet in claims. And while Berkshire holds that
- 13:22money, they get to invest it. So it's.
- 13:24Essentially a massive loan from their own customers.
- 13:26Yes, exactly, and the AQR study points out that Berkshire's
- 13:30historical cost for this capital is around 2.2%.
- 13:33That is incredibly cheap money. It really is often that cost is
- 13:38sitting below the actual rate of inflation, so Berkshire takes
- 13:41this near free money and applies an estimated 1.7 to 1 leverage
- 13:46ratio to buy what the study calls low beta equities.
- 13:51Just so we're all on the same page, low beta basically means
- 13:54stocks that are stable and don't swing wildly up and down with
- 13:57the broader market. Right.
- 13:58Correct. They aren't borrowing money to
- 14:01go gamble on highly volatile tech startups.
- 14:04They are using extremely cheap leveraged capital to buy stable,
- 14:08high quality companies that predictably compound overtime.
- 14:12And they don't just use this brilliant structuring in
- 14:14insurance. I really want to spend a minute
- 14:16on the Japanese yen natural hedge arbitrage that was
- 14:18detailed in the sources, because this is just a master class in
- 14:21risk management. Oh, this is one of my favorite
- 14:23moves I've ever made. It's so smart.
- 14:25So Berschel wanted to buy stakes in five massive Japanese trading
- 14:28houses that were yielding about 5% in dividends.
- 14:31Which is a very attractive yield, but it comes with a
- 14:34massive catch for an American company, which is currency risk.
- 14:37Right, because if you take U.S. dollars, convert them to
- 14:40Japanese yen, and then buy those stocks, you are completely at
- 14:43the mercy of the foreign exchange market.
- 14:44Exactly. If the yen crashes by, say, 20%
- 14:47against the dollar, your nice little 5% dividend yield is
- 14:51instantly wiped out and you're taking a massive loss on the
- 14:54principal. Poof, gone.
- 14:57And the traditional way to solve this is to buy expensive
- 15:00financial derivatives to hedge the risk, which of course eats
- 15:04right into your profits. But instead of paying Wall
- 15:06Street for derivatives, Berkshire engineered this
- 15:10breathtakingly simple solution. They just issued 1.3 trillion in
- 15:14yen denominated bonds, right? So they borrowed the money
- 15:17directly in Japan from Japanese investors at incredibly low
- 15:21interest rates. I think it was under 1%.
- 15:23The mechanics of this are just beautiful to look at.
- 15:25Because they borrowed Japanese yen to buy Japanese yen
- 15:28denominated assets, the exchange rate of the US dollar became
- 15:32completely irrelevant to the trade.
- 15:34Totally neutralized. Right.
- 15:36If the yen collapses, the value of the company stocks they own
- 15:39goes down in dollar terms, sure, but the value of the massive
- 15:42debt they owe also goes down by the exact same amount.
- 15:46It's genius. They neutralize the currency
- 15:48risk entirely on their own balance sheet.
- 15:51It is the absolute definition of macro arbitrage.
- 15:54I mean, they pay less than 1% interest on the debt, they
- 15:56collect 5% on the dividends, and they just pocket that massive 4%
- 16:01spread completely risk free, insulating the $1.1 trillion US
- 16:06mothership from foreign exchange volatility.
- 16:09It's brilliant financial engineering for sure.
- 16:11Neutralizing risk on a spreadsheet.
- 16:13Right, but you know you can't financially engineer your way
- 16:16out of physical reality. No you cannot.
- 16:18And that is exactly the frontier Berkshire is pushing into next
- 16:22with their AI infrastructure investments.
- 16:24I mean, we hear the word AI and we naturally think of software
- 16:27algorithms or, you know, NVIDIA chips.
- 16:29The digital side. Right, but AI has to live in the
- 16:32physical world. Yeah, it requires massive GW
- 16:34scale data centers, and data centers require an unprecedented
- 16:38amount of electricity. And this is exactly where
- 16:41Berkshire Hathaway energy steps in.
- 16:43They are positioning as the ultimate pick and shovel play
- 16:46for the AI revolution. The pick and shovel.
- 16:48Yeah, like during the gold rush, the people who made the most
- 16:51reliable money weren't the gold miners out there taking wild
- 16:55risks. It was the merchants selling the
- 16:57pecs and the shovels to the miners.
- 16:59Oh, that makes sense. Today, BHE basically holds
- 17:01geographic monopolies in regions where hyper scalers like Google
- 17:05and Micro are desperately trying to build out their
- 17:08infrastructure. BHE has already contracted over
- 17:119000 megawatts of data center load.
- 17:14So they don't even have to guess whether Google's AI model will
- 17:17beat Microsoft's AI model. They don't care at all.
- 17:20Right. Whoever wins still has to buy
- 17:22the electricity from Berkshire to run the servers.
- 17:24Exactly, and because BHE operates as a regulated utility,
- 17:28they are actually guaranteed a set rate of return by the
- 17:31government on the massive capital expenditures they are
- 17:34making to build out this grid. It sounds totally foolproof.
- 17:37It does. But nature always gets a vote,
- 17:39and only the physical grade comes with terrifying real world
- 17:42liabilities. Yeah, the flip side of owning
- 17:45all that physical infrastructure is climate risk, specifically
- 17:48these massive existential threats from wildfire
- 17:50liabilities, right? The sources detail a recent $575
- 17:54million settlement with the US government involving ABHE
- 17:58subsidiary Pacificorp, and this stems from the devastating 2020
- 18:03Labor Day wildfires in Oregon. Over half a billion dollars just
- 18:06gone because the utility line sparked a fire.
- 18:09And that's just one settlement. Right.
- 18:11The structural conflict here is terrifying for a utility
- 18:14operator. On one hand, BHE is legally
- 18:17mandated to provide continuous power to these communities into
- 18:20these massive new data centers. They can't just turn it off.
- 18:23Exactly. But on the other hand, if a
- 18:26public utility Commission decides not to let BHE pass the
- 18:29massive cost of wildfire litigation and the subsequent
- 18:32grid hardening expenditures onto the consumers through higher
- 18:35rates, the utility just has to eat the loss.
- 18:37And if that happens, the guaranteed return on equity for
- 18:40these utility investments is permanently impaired.
- 18:43The whole financial model just breaks down.
- 18:44It does. It's a striking irony to me.
- 18:47I mean, you have this $1.1 trillion conglomerate that is
- 18:51practically bulletproof against standard macroeconomic shocks.
- 18:55Like if the Federal Reserve spikes interest rates, Berkshire
- 18:58has $365 billion in short term cash suddenly earning higher
- 19:02yields. If there's a deep recession,
- 19:05people still need electricity and train freight so their
- 19:08baseline cash flow continues. They are financially invincible.
- 19:11What? But they are highly, highly
- 19:14vulnerable to a dry summer and high winds in the Pacific
- 19:17Northwest. That is the ultimate burden of
- 19:20owning reality rather than just software.
- 19:22You are subject to the literal laws of physics and the changing
- 19:25climate. I mean, you can hedge currency
- 19:27risk on a spreadsheet all day long, but you cannot hedge
- 19:30against a wildfire. So true.
- 19:32So synthesizing this entire Q22026 picture for you,
- 19:36Berkshire Hathaway is behemoth that's successfully navigating
- 19:39one of the most highly scrutinized leadership
- 19:41transitions in corporate history.
- 19:43Greg Abel is firmly at the wheel, and it's worth noting he
- 19:46has real skin in the game. The data shows he used his own
- 19:50after tax salary to buy $15.3 million in Berkshire stock.
- 19:55That's a serious commitment. Yeah, they're finally deploying
- 19:58that legendary cash hoard into aggressive buybacks and
- 20:01acquisitions. Breaking a year's long selling
- 20:03streak. And strategically, they are
- 20:05positioning their sprawling utility empire to be the literal
- 20:09physical power source for the AI revolution.
- 20:13They are adapting to a new economic reality, which really
- 20:16is the hallmark of any enduring institution.
- 20:18However, as this transition progresses, it raises one final,
- 20:22you know, lingering question. Yeah, a question rooted in the
- 20:25unyielding math of the law of large numbers.
- 20:28The law of large numbers always catches up eventually.
- 20:30It does. Berkshire now spans a market
- 20:32capitalization of over $1.1 trillion.
- 20:35At that immense scale, finding acquisitions large enough to
- 20:38actually move the needle on their aggregate growth rate
- 20:41becomes mathematically prohibitive.
- 20:43Right. Buying a highly successful $5
- 20:45billion company is practically A rounding error for them now.
- 20:48Exactly so, as the cash generative power of their
- 20:51operating businesses keeps producing 10s of billions of
- 20:54dollars every single year, how long can Berkshire Hathaway
- 20:58truly continue to compound value solely through internal
- 21:01reinvestment? You mean before they literally
- 21:03run out of things big enough to buy?
- 21:05Precisely. The cash has to go somewhere.
- 21:07How long before they are inevitably forced to do the one
- 21:11thing Warren Buffett spent his entire career strictly avoiding?
- 21:15Pay a dividend directly to their shareholders?
- 21:17Wow. A Berkshire Hathaway dividend
- 21:20that would truly mark the end of an era and the beginning of a
- 21:23completely new one It. Would change everything.
- 21:26That is definitely something for you to Mull over as you watch
- 21:28this $1.1 trillion engine keep churning.
- 21:32Remember, when you're looking at companies of this immense scale,
- 21:35the financial X-ray machine is always going to be a little
- 21:37blurry. Keep questioning the headline
- 21:39numbers, look deeply at the operating reality, and never
- 21:43take the math at face value. Thanks for joining us on this
- 21:46deep dive. See you next time.