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The Shadow Dossier — Episode 22: The Cuban Missile Crisis · The Shadow Dossier

• 0:00
  The Shadow Dossier, Episode 22, The Cuban Missile
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  Crisis On the clear, crisp morning of Sunday,
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  October 14, 1962, CIA pilot Major Richard S.
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  Hazer strapped himself into the cockpit of Lockheed
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  U -2F Article 342 at McCoy Air Force Base near
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  Orlando, Florida. His mission, a high -altitude
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  reconnaissance sweep over the western province
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  of Pinar del Rio in communist Cuba, codenamed
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  Flight 3101. Climbing to 72 ,000 feet into the
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  stratosphere, Hazer crossed the Cuban coastline
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  near San Cristobal, triggering the motorized
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  scanning mechanism of his high -resolution HIKON
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  Model B panoramic camera. For 12 continuous minutes,
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  as Article 342 glided far above the reach of
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  Cuban anti -aircraft guns, the camera lens scanned
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  back and forth, exposing 928 frames of 70mm Kodak
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  Estar film reels. Below his aircraft, hidden
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  beneath trapezoidal canvas tarpaulins inside
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  a palm grove near the village of San Cristobal,
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  lay something that would bring the world to the
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  brink of thermonuclear extinction. Upon landing
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  back at McCoy AFB, the classified film canisters
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  were rushed aboard a fast military jet transport
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  to the National Photographic Interpretation Center
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  in Washington, D .C. Working under high -power
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  stereoscopic microscopes through the night of
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  October 15, NPIC director Arthur C. Lundahl and
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  chief photo interpreter Dino Brigioni leaned
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  over the enlarged film frames. My God, Dino,
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  Lundahl whispered. analyzing the distinct trapezoidal
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  concrete launch pads, missile transporters, and
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  oxidizer trailers. The Soviets are installing
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  nuclear medium -range ballistic missiles in Cuba.
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  Major Richard S. Hazer was a veteran U .S. Air
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  Force pilot attached to the CIA's reconnaissance
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  wing, logging over 400 hours in the U -2. McCoy
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  Air Force Base in Orlando, Florida, served as
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  the primary staging airfield for U -2. two reconnaissance
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  flights over the Caribbean. The HICON Model B
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  panoramic camera carried by Flight 3101 held
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  6 ,500 feet of high -definition 70mm black -and
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  -white film. The National Photographic Interpretation
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  Center was located in the Stewart Building on
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  M Street in Washington, D .C. Arthur C. Lundahl
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  served as the founding director of NPIC from
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  1961 to 1973, serving as principal photographic
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  intelligence advisor to five U .S. presidents.
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  Dino A. Brigioni served as chief of information
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  intelligence at NPIC, supervising the team of
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  photo analysts during the 13 days. The missile
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  launch sites discovered at San Cristobal belonged
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  to the Soviet 51st Missile Division, deployed
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  under top -secret Operation Anadyr. Operation
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  Anadyr was the Soviet code name for the covert
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  deployment of troops, ballistic missiles, and
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  medium bombers to Cuba. The Soviet ballistic
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  missiles identified at San Cristobal were AR
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  -12 Dvina single -stage medium -range ballistic
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  missiles. The SS -4 Sandal missile possessed
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  an operational range of 1 ,200 nautical miles,
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  placing Washington, D .C., and 40 percent of
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  the U .S. mainland under direct nuclear threat.
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  Each SS -4 missile carried a 1 -megaton nuclear
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  warhead, 70 times more powerful than the atomic
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  bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The stereoscopic microscopes
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  used at NPIC provided up to 80 times optical
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  magnification, resolving ground details down
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  to two feet. Major Hazer's flight path covered
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  a 200 -mile swath across western Cuba from San
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  Cristobal to Guanaje. The Kodak Estar polyester
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  film base retained dimensional stability under
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  processing chemical temperatures up to 140 degrees
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  Fahrenheit. Arthur Lundahl immediately alerted
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  CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Ray S. Klein
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  at 8 .30 p .m. on Oct. 15. The Soviet SS -4 missile
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  launch battery at San Cristobal comprised four
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  launcher pads, eight missiles, and associated
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  fueling trailers. Ray S. Klein telephoned National
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  Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy at 9 .30 p .m.
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  to request an immediate morning briefing with
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  the president. The Stuart building on M Street
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  housed NPIC's secure photo interpretation vaults
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  behind biometric cipher locks. Dino Brigioni
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  prepared briefing boards containing side -by
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  -side photographic comparisons of Soviet missile
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  sites in the USSR and Cuba. The U -2F Article
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  342 was equipped with specialized wing -mounted
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  air sampling pods for detecting nuclear particle
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  emissions. The San Cristobal missile complex
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  was defended by S -75 Dvina surface -to -air
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  missile batteries deployed in ring formations.
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  NPIC photo interpreters identified eight Soviet
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  R -12 missile transporter erector vehicles parked
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  under camouflage netting. Arthur Lundahl maintained
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  a personal briefing binder titled Operation Brass
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  Knob containing master target location maps.
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  The Kodak Estar film reels from Flight 3101 were
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  developed using continuous automated processing
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  tanks at the Eastman Kodak Laboratory in Rochester.
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  2F Article 342 was powered by a Pratt & Whitney
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  J57P -31 turbojet engine providing 16 ,000 pounds
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  of thrust. The NPIC photointerpretation vault
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  on M Street operated continuous 24 -hour shift
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  schedules during October 1962. The San Cristobal
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  launch pads were positioned inside dense palm
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  tree groves to obstruct visual observation from
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  low -altitude aircraft. Major Hazer's flight
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  plan was authorized by CIA Director John McCone
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  following intelligence reports of suspicious
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  cargo shipments arriving at Mariel Harbor. The
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  HICON Model B camera shutter operated at speeds
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  up to one -thousandth of a second, compensating
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  for aircraft motion blur. NPIC photo interpreters
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  utilized precision light table illuminators to
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  examine high -contrast film negatives. Major
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  Hazer completed pre -flight oxygen breathing
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  for 90 minutes prior to takeoff to prevent decompression
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  sickness. The McCoy Air Force Base Reconnaissance
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  Detachment maintained three Lockheed U -2 aircraft
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  on five -minute alert status. NPIC photo interpreter
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  Ralph Mayer identified the specific Soviet missile
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  oxidizer trailers from shadow angle measurements.
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  The U -2F reconnaissance camera lens incorporated
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  anti -reflective magnesium fluoride coatings
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  maximizing optical transmission efficiency. NPIC
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  chief photo interpreter Dino Brigioni organized
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  32 photo analysts into three specialized exploitation
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  teams. Major Hazer's U -2F aircraft carried two
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  hundreds gallons of specialized JP -7 high -altitude
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  fuel in integral wing tanks. The McCoy Air Force
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  Base Ground Maintenance Team conducted three
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  hours of pre -flight system diagnostics prior
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  to Flight 3101 launch. NPIC photo interpretation
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  technicians logged 2 ,400 individual image frames
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  during the first 24 hours of Operation Brass
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  Knob. The HIKON Model B camera optical glass
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  was polished to a surface tolerance within 1
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  20 ,000th of an inch. Major Hazer received the
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  Distinguished Flying Cross for his successful
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  reconnaissance overflight of San Cristobal. At
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  11 .45 a .m. on Tuesday, October 16, 1962, President
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  John F. Kennedy convened an emergency secret
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  meeting inside the Cabinet Room of the White
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  House. Around the long mahogany table sat the
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  nation's top national security advisors, a group
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  that would become known as the Executive Committee
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  of the National Security Council. Arthur Lundahl
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  and Dino Brigioni placed large easel briefing
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  boards on the table, displaying high -magnification
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  U -2 aerial photographs showing Soviet missile
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  erectors, fuel trucks, and warhead bunker construction
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  at San Cristobal. The president looked at the
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  photographs with grim concentration. How long
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  before these missiles become operational, Arthur?
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  Kennedy asked. 10 to 14 days, Mr. President,
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  Lundahl replied. Once the liquid fuel trailers
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  arrive and warheads are mated, these missiles
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  can be launched within eight hours of an order
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  from Moscow. Deep divisions immediately emerged
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  within EXCOMM regarding the appropriate US response.
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  The Military Hawks and Airstrike Faction The
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  Diplomatic and Blockade Faction For seven agonizing
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  days, XCOM debated in total secrecy while the
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  American public remained completely unaware of
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  the looming catastrophe. The Executive Committee
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  of the National Security Council comprised 12
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  permanent members and primary national security
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  advisers. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
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  served as Defense Secretary from 1961 to 1968
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  under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. General
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  Curtis LeMay served as Chief of Staff of the
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  U .S. Air Force from 1961 to 1965, previously
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  directing Strategic Air Command. General Maxwell
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  D. Taylor served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
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  of Staff during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Attorney
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  General Robert F. Kennedy served as the President's
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  closest personal confidant and chief back -channel
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  negotiator. Secretary of State Christian Herter
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  was replaced by Dean Rusk, who served as Secretary
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  of State throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
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  The EXCOMM meetings were recorded secretly using
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  hidden microphones installed under the cabinet
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  room table by President Kennedy. The term quarantine
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  was selected instead of blockade because under
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  international law, a blockade was an explicit
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  act of war. General Curtis LeMay argued that
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  a naval quarantine was ineffective and would
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  allow the Soviets time to complete missile installation.
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  Robert McNamara proposed a three -stage response,
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  naval quarantine, diplomatic ultimatum, and selective
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  airstrikes if missiles remained. The XCOM secret
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  tape recordings were declassified and released
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  by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in
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  1997. Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen was tasked
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  by President Kennedy with drafting alternate
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  policy option memos for EXCOMM review. Treasury
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  Secretary C. Douglas Dillon supported the naval
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  quarantine option during EXCOMM deliberations.
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  CIA Director John A. McCone advocated for strong
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  military action, warning that Soviet missiles
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  in Cuba altered the global strategic balance.
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  Under Secretary of State George Ball supported
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  the naval quarantine option, arguing that surprise
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  airstrikes violated international law. The EXCOMM
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  meetings were conducted behind closed doors with
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  White House staff ordered to maintain normal
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  public schedules. President Kennedy maintained
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  his scheduled re -election campaign trips to
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  Connecticut and Illinois to prevent news leaks.
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  The White House press corps was told the president
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  had contracted a mild cold when he returned early
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  from Chicago on Oct. 20. The XCOM secret tape
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  recorder system was activated by a toggle switch
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  concealed beneath the president's desk. Defense
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  Secretary Robert McNamara established a dedicated
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  XCOM war room inside the Pentagon's National
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  Military Command Center. Special Counsel Theodore
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  Sorensen spent 48 hours drafting the president's
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  quarantine address inside his White House office.
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  President Kennedy met privately with former President
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  Dwight D. Eisenhower at Camp David on October
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  21 to seek strategic advice. General Curtis LeMay
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  strongly criticized the naval quarantine proposal
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  during XCOM sessions, calling it appeasement.
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  Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy organized
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  smaller informal EXCOMM working sessions at his
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  Justice Department office to draft policy recommendations.
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  EXCOMM member Llewellyn Thompson, former U .S.
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  Ambassador to the Soviet Union, provided crucial
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  insights into Khrushchev's decision -making mindset.
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  National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy chaired
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  the EXCOMM subcommittee tasked with drafting
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  military target selection plans. The White House
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  executive resident staff maintained strict confidentiality
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  regarding late -night EXCOMM arrivals and departures.
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  The EXCOMM secret tape system recorded 500 hours
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  of confidential policy debate during the 13 days.
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  Defense Secretary Robert McNamara conducted daily
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  press briefings from the Pentagon briefing room
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  explaining quarantine execution. President Kennedy
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  instructed White House Press Secretary Pierre
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  Salinger to issue strict guidance prohibiting
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  government officials from discussing Cuban overflights.
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  The EXCOMM Subcommittee on Military Planning
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  evaluated five separate tactical options ranging
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  from targeted airstrikes to a multi -division
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  amphibious assault. President Kennedy maintained
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  private handwritten notes tracking EXCOMM delegate
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  position shifts during the seven days of secret
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  debate. Kennedy emphasized that surprise airstrikes
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  would destroy America's moral standing among
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  non -aligned nations. Unknown to the public,
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  the CIA's ability to interpret the U -2 photographs
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  of Soviet missile sites with such speed and accuracy
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  relied on intelligence provided by one of the
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  greatest double agents in history, Colonel Oleg
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  Penkovsky. Penkovsky was a senior officer in
• 14:20
  Soviet military intelligence stationed in Moscow.
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  Disillusioned with Nikita Khrushchev's reckless
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  foreign policy, he was recruited jointly by the
• 14:29
  British Secret Intelligence Service and the CIA
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  in 1961. Over 16 months, using a miniature Minix
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  B camera provided by his MI6 handler Greville
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  Wynn, Penkovsky photographed over 111 rolls of
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  classified Soviet military documents, over 5
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  ,000 pages of secret technical manuals. Critical
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  technical intelligence provided by Penkovsky.
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  Tragically, just as the missile crisis erupted
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  in October 1962, the KGB uncovered Penkovsky's
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  espionage activities. On October 22, 1962, as
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  President Kennedy prepared to address the nation,
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  Oleg Penkovsky was arrested by KGB officers inside
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  his Moscow apartment, subjected to intense torture
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  at Lubyanka prison. and executed by firing squad
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  in 1963. His courageous sacrifice gave President
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  Kennedy the vital intelligence needed to navigate
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  the crisis without miscalculation. Colonel Oleg
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  Vladimirovich Penkovsky was a decorated Soviet
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  Red Army artillery officer and GRU senior staff
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  officer. Greville M. Wynn was a British businessman
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  operating as a courier for MI6. arrested by the
• 15:45
  KGB in Budapest in November 1962. The Min -XB
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  sub -miniature camera utilized 8mm film strips,
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  capturing 50 exposures per film cassette. Codename
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  HERO was the CIA operational designation for
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  the Penkovsky Intelligence Collection Program.
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  The R -14 Chusevaya was an intermediate -range
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  ballistic missile with a range of 2 ,200 nautical
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  miles. MI6 handler Janet Chisholm served as the
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  primary contact receiving film drop canisters
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  from Penkovsky in Moscow parks. Penkovsky provided
• 16:22
  top -secret Soviet military journal articles
• 16:25
  detailing Soviet strategic doctrine. The Min
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  -XB camera measured 3 .8 inches in length, weighing
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  just 3 .2 ounces. Penkovsky's technical manuals
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  enabled NPIC photo interpreters to identify specific
• 16:40
  missile components from partial U -2 shadows.
• 16:44
  The KGB's second chief directorate counterintelligence
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  team monitored Penkovsky's apartment on Maxim
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  Gorky Street for six months prior to his arrest.
• 16:54
  Greville Wynne was tried in Moscow in May 1963
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  alongside Penkovsky, serving 11 months in Vladimir
• 17:01
  Central Prison before being exchanged. Penkovsky's
• 17:05
  debriefing transcripts were published in the
• 17:07
  West in 1965 under the title The Penkovsky Papers.
• 17:11
  The CIA awarded Penkovsky posthumously the Intelligence
• 17:15
  Cross for extraordinary heroism. Penkovsky's
• 17:19
  technical intelligence confirmed to EXCOMM that
• 17:22
  Soviet ICBM forces in the USSR were not on high
• 17:25
  alert status during October 1962. The KGB counterintelligence
• 17:31
  team utilized secret pinhole cameras installed
• 17:34
  in the hallway ceiling outside Penkovsky's apartment.
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  Penkovsky's MI6 contact Janet Chisholm was the
• 17:41
  wife of MI6 Moscow station officer Ruari Chisholm.
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  Penkovsky delivered his microfilmed intelligence
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  using dead drops concealed inside wooden handrails
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  along Moscow Park footpaths. Penkovsky's technical
• 17:55
  manuals provided exact operational diagrams for
• 17:58
  the R -12 missile propellant loading trucks.
• 18:02
  The CIA's Clandestine Services Directorate established
• 18:05
  a dedicated task force codenamed Chikiti to process
• 18:08
  Penkovsky's intelligence. Penkovsky was interrogated
• 18:13
  by KGB Second Chief Directorate Chief General
• 18:16
  Oleg Gribanov during his detention at Lubyanka.
• 18:20
  Penkovsky's trial was conducted before the military
• 18:22
  division of the Supreme Court of the USSR in
• 18:25
  Moscow. The CIA and MI6 conducted joint debriefing
• 18:30
  sessions with Penkovsky in London and Paris during
• 18:33
  his official trade delegation trips. Penkovsky's
• 18:37
  technical manuals cataloged the exact radio frequency
• 18:40
  channels used by Soviet SS for missile guidance
• 18:43
  systems. MI6 Director General Sir Roger Hollis
• 18:48
  personally briefed British Prime Minister Harold
• 18:50
  Macmillan on Penkovsky's intelligence contributions.
• 18:54
  Penkovsky's covert communication equipment included
• 18:57
  a specialised one -time pad cipher book bound
• 19:00
  inside a leather wallet. Penkovsky's intelligence
• 19:03
  collection provided the United States with precise
• 19:06
  technical data on over 30 Soviet weapon systems.
• 19:10
  The CIA counterintelligence chief James Jesus
• 19:13
  Angleton managed the security clearance validation
• 19:16
  for Pankowski's film reels. Pankowski's MI6 handler
• 19:21
  Greville Wynne was awarded the Order of the British
• 19:23
  Empire following his prisoner exchange in 1964.
• 19:28
  Pankowski's microfilm documents were catalogued
• 19:31
  inside three vault safes at CIA headquarters
• 19:34
  in Langley. Penkovsky's covert microdot messages
• 19:38
  were analyzed using high -magnification optical
• 19:40
  scanners at the CIA Technical Services Division.
• 19:44
  Penkovsky passed microfilmed intelligence rolls
• 19:47
  to CIA officer Roderick Chisholm during scheduled
• 19:50
  diplomatic receptions in Moscow. At 7 p .m. Eastern
• 19:55
  Standard Time on Monday, October 22, 1962, President
• 19:59
  John F. Kennedy sat before television cameras
• 20:02
  in the Oval Office to deliver a live, 20 -minute
• 20:05
  address to the American public. Over 100 million
• 20:09
  citizens in the United States and tens of millions
• 20:11
  more around the world tuned in to their television
• 20:14
  sets and radios. The president's face was stern,
• 20:18
  his voice steady as he revealed the shocking
• 20:20
  truth. Asterisk, good evening, my fellow citizens.
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  This government, as promised, has maintained
• 20:28
  the closest surveillance of the Soviet military
• 20:30
  build -up on the island of Cuba. Within the past
• 20:34
  week, unmistakable evidence has established the
• 20:36
  fact that a series of offensive missile sites
• 20:39
  is now in preparation on that imprisoned island.
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  Asterisk. Kennedy outlined the explicit seven
• 20:46
  -point U .S. response. 1. Naval Quarantine establishing
• 20:51
  a strict naval exclusion zone around Cuba to
• 20:54
  interdict all offensive military equipment shipments.
• 20:57
  2. Increased surveillance, ordering continuous,
• 21:01
  aggressive aerial reconnaissance over Cuba. 3.
• 21:05
  Targeting policy, declaring that any nuclear
• 21:08
  missile launched from Cuba against any nation
• 21:11
  in the Western Hemisphere would be treated as
• 21:13
  an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States,
• 21:16
  requiring a full retaliatory response. 4. Guantanamo
• 21:21
  Defense, reinforcing the U .S. naval base at
• 21:24
  Guantanamo Bay. 5. OAS Emergency Meeting, calling
• 21:29
  for an immediate meeting of the Organization
• 21:31
  of American States to invoke the Rio Treaty.
• 21:34
  6. U .N. Security Council, requesting an emergency
• 21:38
  session of the United Nations Security Council
• 21:41
  to demand the immediate dismantling and removal
• 21:43
  of Soviet missiles under U .N. inspection. 7.
• 21:48
  Direct appeal to Khrushchev, appealing directly
• 21:50
  to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to abandon
• 21:53
  his reckless quest for world domination and pull
• 21:56
  back from the abyss of war. The speech sent shockwaves
• 22:00
  across the globe. Supermarket shelves were emptied,
• 22:04
  civil defense air raid sirens were tested, and
• 22:07
  U .S. military forces worldwide entered DEFCON
• 22:09
  3 alert status. The Oval Office television broadcast
• 22:14
  was carried live by CBS, NBC, and ABC networks
• 22:18
  across North America. DEFCON 3 placed all U .S.
• 22:23
  armed forces on high readiness, with air bases
• 22:25
  preparing bombers for immediate takeoff. The
• 22:29
  Organization of American States voted 19 -0 on
• 22:32
  October 23 to endorse the U .S. naval quarantine
• 22:35
  of Cuba. The Inter -American Treaty of Reciprocal
• 22:39
  Assistance provided the legal framework for collective
• 22:42
  regional security defense. U .S. Naval Base Guantanamo
• 22:47
  Bay evacuated 2 ,000 civilian dependents to Florida
• 22:50
  via military transport ships on Oct. 22. The
• 22:54
  Strategic Air Command under Gen. Thomas S. Power
• 22:57
  deployed 90 percent of its B -52 bomber fleet
• 23:00
  to airborne alert status. The United Nations
• 23:04
  Security Council emergency session was convened
• 23:07
  by U .S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson on October
• 23:10
  23. The Oval Office broadcast was translated
• 23:14
  live into Spanish for transmission across Latin
• 23:16
  America over the Voice of America. DEFCON 3 required
• 23:21
  U .S. military units to be capable of deploying
• 23:24
  operational forces within 15 minutes of an execution
• 23:27
  order. The U .S. Second Fleet commanded by Vice
• 23:31
  Admiral Alfred G. Ward was designated Task Force
• 23:34
  136 to execute the naval quarantine. The Rio
• 23:38
  Treaty authorization provided legal backing under
• 23:41
  Article 52 of the United Nations Charter Governing
• 23:44
  Regional Arrangements. Civil defense authorities
• 23:48
  across 40 states issued emergency fallout shelter
• 23:51
  preparation guidelines to public schools. Strategic
• 23:55
  Air Command maintained 65 B -52 nuclear bombers
• 23:59
  continuously airborne on 24 -hour patrols along
• 24:02
  the Soviet border. The U .S. Air Force Tactical
• 24:06
  Air Command deployed 500 fighter aircraft to
• 24:09
  airfields across Florida and Georgia. President
• 24:12
  Kennedy briefed congressional leaders at the
• 24:14
  White House two hours prior to his televised
• 24:17
  broadcast. The Voice of America expanded its
• 24:21
  shortwave transmission power to 1 million watts,
• 24:23
  broadcasting the speech across Eastern Europe.
• 24:27
  U .S. civil defense directors reported a 300
• 24:30
  % increase in family fallout shelter construction
• 24:33
  inquiries on October 23. The British Cabinet
• 24:37
  under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan held an
• 24:39
  emergency meeting endorsing President Kennedy's
• 24:42
  quarantine policy. The U .S. Federal Communications
• 24:45
  Commission directed all commercial radio stations
• 24:48
  to maintain 24 -hour emergency broadcast availability.
• 24:52
  Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker initially
• 24:55
  hesitated to place Canadian forces on DEFCON
• 24:58
  3 alert before agreeing on October 24. The U
• 25:03
  .S. Army 82nd Airborne Division placed 20 ,000
• 25:06
  paratroopers on two -hour deployment readiness
• 25:08
  at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The U .S. Navy
• 25:12
  deployed 16 attack submarines to form an outer
• 25:16
  anti -submarine barrier across the North Atlantic
• 25:18
  transit routes. President Kennedy's Oval Office
• 25:22
  speech was monitored live by Soviet Embassy intelligence
• 25:25
  officers in Washington. The French President
• 25:28
  Charles de Gaulle offered unconditional French
• 25:31
  diplomatic support to President Kennedy's envoy
• 25:33
  Dean Acheson. The West German Chancellor Konrad
• 25:37
  Adenauer reaffirmed Western Allied solidarity
• 25:40
  during an emergency cabinet meeting in Bonn.
• 25:43
  The U .S. Information Agency distributed 200
• 25:46
  ,000 copies of President Kennedy's address in
• 25:49
  24 languages worldwide. Strategic Air Command
• 25:53
  intercontinental ballistic missile crews entered
• 25:55
  continuous terminal countdown readiness across
• 25:58
  20 bases. At 10 a .m. on Wednesday, October 24,
• 26:03
  1962, the official U .S. naval quarantine took
• 26:07
  effect along an arc 500 nautical miles off the
• 26:10
  coast of Cuba. Positioned along the interception
• 26:13
  line was Task Force 136, commanded by Vice Admiral
• 26:17
  Alfred G. Ward aboard the cruiser USS Newport
• 26:20
  News. The task force fielded 85 warships, including
• 26:25
  aircraft carriers USS Enterprise and USS Independence,
• 26:29
  heavy cruisers, destroyers, and submarine hunting
• 26:32
  groups. Rushing toward the quarantine line from
• 26:36
  the Baltic Sea were 18 Soviet merchant vessels
• 26:39
  carrying military cargos, escorted by four diesel
• 26:42
  -electric attack submarines. Inside the EXCOMM
• 26:46
  meeting room in Washington, the tension reached
• 26:49
  an unbearable breaking point as intelligence
• 26:51
  reports confirmed that the lead Soviet merchant
• 26:53
  ships, the Gagarin and the Komelis, were just
• 26:57
  two miles from the quarantine line. Secretary
• 27:00
  of Defense Robert McNamara reported, the Soviet
• 27:03
  ships are maintaining course and speed. If they
• 27:07
  cross the line, our destroyers will fire warning
• 27:09
  shots across their bows. If they refuse to stop,
• 27:13
  we will disable their rudders with high -explosive
• 27:16
  shells. Suddenly, at 10 .25 a .m., a naval intelligence
• 27:21
  officer handed a typed message tape to John McCone.
• 27:25
  McCone read the paper, looking up with a look
• 27:27
  of immense relief. Mr. President, we have just
• 27:31
  received an ONI intercept. Some of the Soviet
• 27:35
  ships, including the Gagarin and Kamalys, have
• 27:38
  stopped dead in the water and are turning back
• 27:40
  toward the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Dean
• 27:44
  Rusk leaned over to McGeorge Bundy, uttering
• 27:47
  one of the most famous quotes of the Cold War.
• 27:50
  Asterisk, we're eyeball to eyeball, and I think
• 27:53
  the other fellow just blinked. Asterisk. Vice
• 27:58
  Admiral Alfred G. Ward commanded the U .S. 2nd
• 28:01
  Fleet and Task Force 136 from his flagship USS
• 28:04
  Newport News. USS Enterprise was the world's
• 28:08
  first nuclear -powered aircraft carrier, embarking
• 28:11
  85 combat aircraft. USS Independence was a Forestal
• 28:16
  -class supercarrier carrying F -4 Phantom interceptors
• 28:20
  and A -4 Skyhawk attack jets. The Office of Naval
• 28:24
  Intelligence processed radio direction -finding
• 28:27
  intercepts tracking Soviet merchant vessel positions.
• 28:31
  The Soviet freighter Gagarin was carrying specialized
• 28:34
  missile propellant equipment when it reversed
• 28:36
  course. The Soviet freighter Kamalys was carrying
• 28:40
  crane equipment intended for unloading heavy
• 28:42
  SS, for missile components. The 500 -mile quarantine
• 28:47
  arc was later reduced to 500 miles from Cuban
• 28:50
  territory to give Khrushchev additional time
• 28:52
  to react. The USS Newport News was a Des Moines
• 28:57
  -class heavy cruiser armed with nine 8 -inch
• 28:59
  automated rapid -fire guns. Task Force 136 deployed
• 29:04
  anti -submarine warfare aircraft patrols from
• 29:07
  the carrier USS Essex. The ONI high -frequency
• 29:11
  direction -finding network intercepted Soviet
• 29:13
  merchant marine radio transmissions routed through
• 29:16
  Murmansk. The Soviet freighter Kimovsk reversed
• 29:20
  course two hours prior to reaching the naval
• 29:22
  quarantine line. The U .S. Navy destroyers assigned
• 29:26
  to the interception line maintained continuous
• 29:29
  radar tracking on approaching Soviet vessels.
• 29:32
  President Kennedy ordered Task Force 136 warships
• 29:36
  not to fire on Soviet vessels without his explicit
• 29:39
  personal authorization. The naval quarantine
• 29:42
  line covered 800 ,000 square miles of ocean space
• 29:46
  in the western Atlantic. Task Force 136 deployed
• 29:50
  24 anti -submarine destroyers operating active
• 29:54
  sonar search sweeps along the 500 -mile quarantine
• 29:57
  line. The USS Enterprise flight deck operated
• 30:01
  round -the -clock combat air patrols maintaining
• 30:03
  air superiority over the Caribbean. The Soviet
• 30:07
  Merchant Marine Communications Center in Odessa
• 30:10
  issued reversal orders to 16 non -essential supply
• 30:13
  freighters. Task Force 136 destroyers maintained
• 30:18
  continuous visual watch teams using high -magnification
• 30:21
  naval spotting scopes. The USS Newport News Combat
• 30:25
  Information Center plotted target track vectors
• 30:28
  for 40 surface contacts simultaneously. The U
• 30:32
  .S. Navy ASW patrol aircraft dropped 500 passive
• 30:36
  sonoboys across the Sargasso Sea approach corridors.
• 30:40
  The Soviet tanker Bucharest was intercepted on
• 30:43
  October 25, permitted to pass after confirming
• 30:46
  its cargo comprised petroleum only. The USS Blandy
• 30:51
  escorted the Soviet tanker Bucharest through
• 30:53
  the quarantine line following visual illumination
• 30:56
  checks. Vice Admiral Ward maintained a dedicated
• 31:00
  secure radio link with the Chief of Naval Operations
• 31:03
  Admiral George Anderson at the Pentagon. The
• 31:06
  USS Lawrence conducted illuminated searchlight
• 31:09
  boarding checks on the East German passenger
• 31:11
  liner Völkerfreundschaft. The U .S. Navy anti
• 31:15
  -submarine carrier USS Wasp maintained 24 -hour
• 31:19
  helicopter -dipping sonar patrols. The Task Force
• 31:23
  136 flag bridge on USS Newport News processed
• 31:27
  radio intelligence reports from 40 picket ships.
• 31:30
  The U .S. Navy destroyer USS Pierce shadowed
• 31:34
  the Soviet freighter Poltava carrying heavy machinery
• 31:37
  components. On Thursday, October 25, 1962, the
• 31:43
  world watched a dramatic live television showdown
• 31:45
  inside the chamber of the United Nations Security
• 31:48
  Council in New York. U .S. Ambassador to the
• 31:51
  U .N. Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador
• 31:54
  Vanderbilt Zorin, who vigorously denied that
• 31:57
  the Soviet Union had placed any offensive missiles
• 32:00
  in Cuba. Standing before the crowded Security
• 32:03
  Council chamber, Ambassador Stevenson delivered
• 32:06
  a searing cross -examination. Do you, Ambassador
• 32:10
  Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and is placing
• 32:13
  medium and intermediate range missiles and sites
• 32:16
  in Cuba? Yes or no? Don't wait for the translation.
• 32:21
  Yes or no? Zoran smirked, attempting to evade
• 32:26
  the question, I am not in an American court of
• 32:28
  law, Mr. Stevenson, and I do not wish to answer
• 32:31
  a question put to me in the manner of a prosecutor.
• 32:35
  Stevenson slammed his hand on the podium. Asterisk,
• 32:39
  I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell
• 32:42
  freezes over, if that's your decision. Asterisk.
• 32:47
  Stevenson then signaled to assistants who wheeled
• 32:50
  in large easel display stands into the Security
• 32:52
  Council chamber. Unveiling giant, blown -up U
• 32:56
  -2 aerial photographs of the San Cristobal missile
• 32:59
  sites, Stevenson pointed out the concrete launcher
• 33:02
  pads, missile erectors, and nuclear warhead storage
• 33:05
  bunkers to the international press. These are
• 33:08
  the facts, Stevenson declared. The evidence is
• 33:12
  undeniable. The dramatic UN presentation completely
• 33:16
  shattered Soviet diplomatic denials, galvanizing
• 33:20
  global public opinion behind the United States.
• 33:23
  Adlai E. Stevenson II served as U .S. Ambassador
• 33:27
  to the United Nations from 1961 to 1965, previously
• 33:32
  serving as Governor of Illinois. Valerian Zorin
• 33:35
  served as Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations
• 33:38
  and President of the UN Security Council during
• 33:41
  October 1962. The UN Security Council chamber
• 33:45
  exhibition included 20 enlarged 30 -by -40 -inch
• 33:49
  photographic prints prepared by NPIC. The UN
• 33:53
  live broadcast was watched by an estimated 80
• 33:56
  million viewers across 40 countries. Dino Brigioni
• 34:00
  and NPIC technicians personally transported the
• 34:03
  heavy display boards to UN headquarters in Manhattan
• 34:05
  under armed guard. The photographic evidence
• 34:09
  presented at the UN included imagery of SS -4
• 34:12
  missile sites at San Cristobal and Guanaje. Ambassador
• 34:17
  Zorin was caught completely unprepared for the
• 34:19
  photographic presentation, having been misinformed
• 34:22
  by the Kremlin. The UN Security Council session
• 34:26
  was attended by representatives from Great Britain,
• 34:29
  France, Republic of China, and non -permanent
• 34:32
  member states. Adlai Stevenson's speech was drafted
• 34:36
  with assistance from State Department advisor
• 34:38
  Harlan Cleveland. The enlarged U -2 photographs
• 34:42
  showed clear annotations indicating missile transporter
• 34:45
  dimensions and fueling vehicle locations. The
• 34:49
  Soviet delegation at the UN offered no technical
• 34:52
  rebuttal to the photographic evidence presented
• 34:54
  by Stevenson. The UN Security Council meeting
• 34:58
  concluded with non -aligned nations urging immediate
• 35:00
  peaceful negotiations between Washington and
• 35:03
  Moscow. Ambassador Stevenson's presentation lasted
• 35:07
  two hours, featuring detailed optical pointers
• 35:10
  highlighting missile launch pads. The Security
• 35:14
  Council delegates from Great Britain and France
• 35:16
  delivered immediate statements endorsing the
• 35:19
  US photographic evidence. Dino Brugioni provided
• 35:23
  live technical assistance during Stevenson's
• 35:25
  photographic briefing to explain scale dimensions.
• 35:29
  The United Nations Security Council transcript
• 35:32
  of the October 25 meeting was published in five
• 35:35
  official UN languages. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
• 35:39
  received a standing ovation from Western diplomatic
• 35:41
  delegations following his presentation. UN Secretary
• 35:46
  -General U Thant issued an urgent appeal to Kennedy
• 35:49
  and Khrushchev proposing a 21 -day moratorium.
• 35:52
  Dino Brigioni utilized high -intensity arc lamps
• 35:56
  to illuminate the U -2 briefing boards inside
• 35:58
  the Security Council chamber. Ambassador Stevenson's
• 36:03
  speech was covered on the front page of every
• 36:05
  major international newspaper on October 26.
• 36:09
  The UN Security Council gallery was packed with
• 36:12
  over 500 international diplomats and press correspondents.
• 36:16
  The Security Council debate transcript was printed
• 36:19
  in the official UN Security Council official
• 36:21
  record series. Ambassador Stevenson's optical
• 36:25
  pointers highlighted the specific R -12 missile
• 36:28
  fueling trucks parked adjacent to launch pads.
• 36:32
  Ambassador Stevenson was accompanied by Deputy
• 36:34
  U .S. Ambassador Francis T .P. Plimpton during
• 36:37
  the Security Council proceedings. The Soviet
• 36:41
  U .N. delegation dispatched an urgent cipher
• 36:43
  cable to Moscow requesting revised instructions
• 36:46
  following the photo revelation. Saturday, October
• 36:50
  27, 1962, known to historians as Black Saturday,
• 36:55
  was the single most dangerous 24 hours in human
• 36:58
  history. At 10 .19 a .m. Cuban time, 35 -year
• 37:02
  -old U .S. Air Force Major Rudolph Anderson Jr.
• 37:05
  was flying a high -altitude reconnaissance mission
• 37:07
  over eastern Cuba in his U -2F aircraft. As Anderson
• 37:12
  glided at 72 ,000 feet over the naval base at
• 37:16
  Baines, his aircraft was detected by the RSN
• 37:19
  -75 radar of a Soviet S -75 Dvina surface -to
• 37:23
  -air missile battery. Without waiting for authorization
• 37:27
  from Moscow, the local Soviet air defense commander
• 37:30
  in Cuba, Lieutenant General Stepan Grechko, issued
• 37:33
  the order to engage. Target locked. Fire salvo.
• 37:39
  Two V -750 missiles roared off their launch rails,
• 37:43
  accelerating to Mach 3 .5 toward the high -flying
• 37:47
  U -2. Boom! The proximity warhead detonated 50
• 37:52
  feet from Anderson's cockpit. Shrapnel punctured
• 37:56
  his pressure suit. causing instant explosive
• 37:58
  decompression and killing Major Anderson instantly
• 38:01
  as the U -2 crashed into the jungle near Baines.
• 38:05
  When news of the shoot -down reached EXCOMM,
• 38:07
  the military Joint Chiefs immediately urged President
• 38:10
  Kennedy to execute pre -planned retaliatory airstrikes
• 38:13
  to wipe out all Soviet SAM sites in Cuba. Mr.
• 38:18
  President, General LeMay insisted, our rules
• 38:20
  of engagement state that if a reconnaissance
• 38:22
  plane is shot down, we strike back immediately.
• 38:26
  Kennedy refused to be rushed into war, if we
• 38:29
  strike back now, Khrushchev will respond by attacking
• 38:32
  our bases in Europe or taking West Berlin. We
• 38:36
  will wait one more day. Major Rudolph Anderson
• 38:40
  Jr. was a decorated USAF pilot and the only combat
• 38:43
  fatality of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Lieutenant
• 38:47
  General Stepan Grechko served as commander of
• 38:50
  air defense forces for the group of Soviet forces
• 38:52
  in Cuba. The S -75 Divina SAM site at Baines
• 38:57
  deployed six V -752 stage surface -to -air missiles.
• 39:02
  Major Anderson's U -2F wreckage was recovered
• 39:05
  by Cuban military forces and displayed at the
• 39:08
  Museum of the Revolution in Havana. President
• 39:12
  Kennedy posthumously awarded Major Rudolph Anderson
• 39:14
  Jr. the first Air Force cross in U .S. history.
• 39:18
  The Air Force Cross is the second -highest military
• 39:21
  decoration awarded to members of the U .S. Air
• 39:24
  Force for extraordinary heroism in combat. The
• 39:27
  V -750 missile warhead contained 430 pounds of
• 39:31
  composition B -high explosive. Lt. Gen. Gretchko
• 39:36
  acted under Standing Order 14, which allowed
• 39:39
  local commanders to fire if attacked or under
• 39:41
  imminent threat. President Kennedy telephoned
• 39:44
  Major Anderson's widow, Jane Anderson, to express
• 39:48
  his personal condolences. Major Anderson's body
• 39:52
  was returned to the United States in November
• 39:54
  1962, buried with full military honors in Greenville,
• 39:58
  South Carolina. The U .S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
• 40:02
  placed all U .S. armed forces on DEFCON 2 alert
• 40:05
  status following Anderson's shootdown. DEFCON
• 40:09
  2 was the highest state of military readiness
• 40:11
  short of total war, with strategic nuclear bombers
• 40:14
  sitting on runway edges with engines running.
• 40:18
  DEFCON 2 was declared for the only recorded time
• 40:21
  in United States military history during the
• 40:23
  Cuban Missile Crisis. Major Rudolph Anderson's
• 40:27
  U -2F Article 343 was shot down by the 2nd SAM
• 40:31
  Battalion commanded by Captain Ivan Cherchenov.
• 40:35
  The SAC DEFCON 2 alert deployed 1 ,436 strategic
• 40:39
  bombers armed with nuclear weapons across worldwide
• 40:42
  bases. President Kennedy's refusal to retaliate
• 40:46
  against the Bains SAM site was hailed by historians
• 40:48
  as his finest hour of crisis leadership. Major
• 40:52
  Rudolph Anderson Jr. was posthumously awarded
• 40:55
  the Distinguished Service Medal by the CIA. The
• 40:59
  Soviet SAM battery radar operator tracked Anderson's
• 41:02
  youth. 2F for 20 minutes prior to launching the
• 41:05
  V -750 salvo. The Bains SAM site radar guidance
• 41:10
  antenna array transmitted guidance correction
• 41:12
  pulses on five discrete frequency channels. Major
• 41:17
  Anderson's helmet and pressure suit fragments
• 41:19
  were recovered by Cuban intelligence officers
• 41:21
  at the crash site. The USAF 4080th Strategic
• 41:26
  Reconnaissance Wing established a memorial scholarship
• 41:28
  fund in honor of Major Rudolph Anderson Jr. Major
• 41:33
  Anderson's U -2F engine tailpipe assembly was
• 41:36
  returned to the United States in 1995 for museum
• 41:39
  display. Lt. Gen. Grechko received an official
• 41:43
  reprimand from Soviet Defense Minister Rodion
• 41:46
  Malinovsky for authorizing the shootdown without
• 41:49
  Kremlin approval. The U -2F Article 343 wreckage
• 41:54
  spread across a three -square -mile debris field
• 41:56
  near Baines Harbor. While EXCOMM debated Anderson's
• 42:00
  shootdown in Washington, A far more terrifying
• 42:03
  nuclear crisis was occurring 500 miles off the
• 42:06
  coast of Cuba, deep beneath the waves of the
• 42:08
  Sargasso Sea. The US Navy destroyer USS Beale
• 42:13
  had trapped a Soviet Foxtrot -class attack submarine,
• 42:16
  the B -59, submerged at 400 feet. Unbeknownst
• 42:21
  to the US Navy, the B -59 was armed with a secret
• 42:25
  10 -kiloton nuclear torpedo capable of destroying
• 42:28
  the entire American ASW task group in a single
• 42:31
  atomic blast. Under orders to force the submarine
• 42:35
  to surface for identification, the captain of
• 42:38
  the USS Beale began dropping practice depth charges,
• 42:41
  hand -grenade -sized explosive charges intended
• 42:44
  as a signal to surface. Asterisk Thump Thump
• 42:49
  Thump Asterisk Inside the suffocating, sweltering
• 42:54
  hull of the B -59, where the air conditioning
• 42:57
  had failed and carbon dioxide levels reached
• 43:00
  dangerous concentrations, the depth -charge explosion
• 43:03
  sounded like steel sledgehammers smashing against
• 43:06
  the hull. Cut off from radio contact with Moscow
• 43:10
  for days, the Soviet captain, Valentin Savitsky,
• 43:13
  panicked, believing World War III had already
• 43:16
  begun. The war has started above us. Savitsky
• 43:21
  screamed, ordering the chief engineer, arm the
• 43:24
  nuclear torpedo. We will blow them out of the
• 43:27
  water and die with them. Under Soviet naval regulations,
• 43:31
  launching the nuclear torpedo required the unanimous
• 43:34
  agreement of three senior officers aboard, Captain
• 43:37
  Savitsky, Political Officer Ivan Maslenikov,
• 43:40
  and Brigade Executive Officer Vasily Arkhipov.
• 43:44
  Political Officer Maslenikov agreed with Savitsky.
• 43:48
  But 36 -year -old executive officer Vasily Arkhipov
• 43:52
  stood firm, refusing to authorize the launch.
• 43:55
  No. They are dropping signal charges, not warheads.
• 44:00
  We will surface and establish radio contact before
• 44:04
  committing suicide and destroying the world.
• 44:07
  After a heated, screaming argument inside the
• 44:10
  sweltering torpedo compartment, Arkhipov convinced
• 44:13
  Savitsky to surface the submarine. At 8 .50 p
• 44:17
  .m., the B -59 broke the surface, flashing its
• 44:21
  navigation lights to the surrounding American
• 44:23
  warships. Vasily Arkhipov's courage and cool
• 44:27
  judgment single -handedly prevented a global
• 44:29
  nuclear holocaust. Vasily Alexandrovich Arkhipov
• 44:34
  was a Soviet Navy officer who served as commander
• 44:37
  of the four -submarine Foxtrot flotilla during
• 44:39
  Operation Anadyr. The Soviet Foxtrot -class submarine
• 44:44
  was a diesel -electric attack submarine carrying
• 44:46
  22 torpedoes. The 10 -kiloton nuclear torpedo
• 44:51
  carried by the B -59 was the T -5 nuclear torpedo,
• 44:55
  possessing an explosive yield equal to 10 ,000
• 44:58
  tons of TNT. Practice depth charges were small
• 45:02
  signal explosives containing four ounces of TNT
• 45:05
  designed to emit audible underwater acoustic
• 45:08
  signals. The USS Beale was a Fletcher -class
• 45:12
  destroyer assigned to Anti -Submarine Hunter
• 45:14
  -Killer Group Task Group 83 .2. The carbon dioxide
• 45:18
  concentration inside the B -59 hull reached 3%,
• 45:23
  causing severe disorientation and nausea among
• 45:26
  the crew. The internal air temperature inside
• 45:29
  the engine compartments of the B -59 exceeded
• 45:32
  140 degrees Fahrenheit. Vasily Arkhipov was awarded
• 45:37
  the Future of Life Award posthumously in 2017
• 45:40
  for preventing nuclear war. The B -59 submarine
• 45:45
  was escorted out of the Sargasso Sea by US Navy
• 45:48
  destroyers after charging its batteries on the
• 45:50
  surface. The Soviet Navy flotilla comprised four
• 45:54
  Foxtrot -class submarines, B -4, B -36, B -59,
• 46:00
  and B -130. The T -5 nuclear torpedo carried
• 46:05
  by the B -59 was designed to detonate at depths
• 46:08
  down to 100 meters, creating a massive underwater
• 46:11
  shockwave. The USS Coney assisted the USS Beale
• 46:16
  in maintaining sonar tracking on the B -59 throughout
• 46:19
  the engagement. Vasily Arkhipov had previously
• 46:23
  survived the 1961 K -19 nuclear submarine reactor
• 46:27
  accident, earning a reputation for extraordinary
• 46:30
  composure under extreme stress. The U .S. Navy
• 46:34
  ASW operators utilized N -SQS -23 active sonar
• 46:40
  arrays operating at 10 kHz. The B -59 submarine
• 46:45
  crew suffered severe dehydration due to ambient
• 46:48
  interior temperatures exceeding 50 degrees Celsius.
• 46:52
  Executive Officer Vasily Arkhipov maintained
• 46:55
  control of the torpedo room firing key throughout
• 46:58
  the four -hour standoff. The USS Beale dropped
• 47:01
  five practice depth charges in sequence at five
• 47:04
  -minute intervals to signal the B -59 to surface.
• 47:09
  Vasily Arkhipov was promoted to Rear Admiral
• 47:11
  in 1975, serving as head of the Caspian Higher
• 47:15
  Naval School. The B -59 submarine diesel generators
• 47:20
  required four hours of surface ventilation to
• 47:22
  purge toxic gas buildup. The B -59 crew received
• 47:27
  official commendations from Soviet naval headquarters
• 47:30
  following their safe return to Murmansk. The
• 47:33
  USS Beale crew utilized high -intensity searchlights
• 47:37
  illuminating the B -59 conning tower as it surfaced.
• 47:41
  The Soviet Navy T -5 nuclear torpedo warhead
• 47:45
  contained 12 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
• 47:48
  -235. Captain Valentin Savitsky reported the
• 47:52
  depth charge engagement to Soviet submarine flotilla
• 47:55
  headquarters via encrypted radio upon surfacing.
• 47:59
  On the evening of Saturday, October 27, 1962,
• 48:04
  as the world stood on the edge of destruction,
• 48:06
  Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy invited Soviet
• 48:09
  Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to his private office
• 48:12
  inside the Department of Justice on Pennsylvania
• 48:14
  Avenue. The meeting was unscripted, confidential,
• 48:18
  and completely off the record. RFK spoke with
• 48:22
  grave intensity, Ambassador Dobrynin, we are
• 48:25
  at a point of no return. A U. two pilot was shot
• 48:29
  down today. Our military leaders are pressing
• 48:33
  for an immediate attack. If your government does
• 48:36
  not agree to remove these missiles by tomorrow
• 48:39
  morning, military action will be inevitable.
• 48:42
  Dobrynin asked about Premier Khrushchev's public
• 48:45
  demand that the US remove its Jupiter intermediate
• 48:47
  -range ballistic missiles from NATO bases in
• 48:50
  Turkey in exchange for removing Soviet missiles
• 48:52
  from Cuba. RFK delivered President Kennedy's
• 48:56
  delicate top -secret proposal. The secret compromise
• 49:00
  package. Dobrynin immediately cabled the terms
• 49:04
  of the secret offer to Premier Khrushchev in
• 49:07
  Moscow. Anatoly Fyodorovich Dobrynin served as
• 49:11
  Soviet ambassador to the United States from 1962
• 49:14
  to 1986, spanning six U .S. presidencies. The
• 49:19
  PGM -19 Jupiter was an American intermediate
• 49:22
  -range ballistic missile deployed in Turkey and
• 49:25
  Italy, armed with a 1 .45 -megaton W49 nuclear
• 49:29
  warhead. Fifteen Jupiter IRBMs were stationed
• 49:33
  at five launch sites near Izmir, Turkey, operated
• 49:37
  jointly by the U .S. Air Force and Turkish Air
• 49:39
  Force. The secret Jupiter removal agreement was
• 49:43
  kept classified by the U .S. government for 27
• 49:46
  years until declassified in 1989. RFK met Dobrynin
• 49:51
  at 7 .45 p .m. in room 5111 of the Department
• 49:55
  of Justice building. The PGM -19 Jupiter missile
• 50:00
  possessed a range of 1 ,500 nautical miles, placing
• 50:03
  Western Soviet industrial cities within striking
• 50:06
  distance. President Kennedy had ordered the State
• 50:09
  Department to arrange the phase -out of Jupiter
• 50:12
  missiles in Turkey months earlier, as they were
• 50:14
  obsolete and vulnerable to attack. Anatoly Dobrynin
• 50:18
  transmitted RFK's proposal via high -priority
• 50:21
  cipher cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at
• 50:24
  9 p .m. President Kennedy approved the secret
• 50:27
  Jupiter proposal during a private meeting with
• 50:30
  RFK, McNamara, Rusk, and Sorensen in the Oval
• 50:33
  Office. The Department of Justice building on
• 50:37
  Pennsylvania Avenue served as the primary venue
• 50:39
  for secret RFK Dobrinin back -channel exchanges.
• 50:44
  Anatoly Dobrinin noted in his memoirs that RFK
• 50:47
  appeared exhausted and deeply concerned during
• 50:49
  their October 27 meeting. The secret side agreement
• 50:53
  was fulfilled in April 1963, when the last U
• 50:57
  .S. Jupiter missiles were dismantled and removed
• 50:59
  from Turkey. RFK emphasized to Dobrynin that
• 51:03
  President Kennedy faced intense pressure from
• 51:06
  U .S. military commanders to launch airstrikes
• 51:08
  within 48 hours. Ambassador Dobrynin's cipher
• 51:12
  cable reached Premier Khrushchev's desk in Moscow
• 51:15
  at 4 a .m. Moscow time on October 28. Robert
• 51:20
  F. Kennedy maintained a personal diary recording
• 51:22
  his daily meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin during
• 51:25
  October 1962. The Soviet Foreign Ministry cipher
• 51:30
  department utilized five -unit tape teleprinter
• 51:32
  ciphers for high -priority ambassadorial cables.
• 51:36
  President Kennedy instructed RFK to state that
• 51:39
  any public disclosure of the Jupiter deal would
• 51:41
  compel the U .S. to deny its existence. Anatoly
• 51:45
  Dobrynin transmitted RFK's exact words using
• 51:49
  top -secret Soviet embassy one -time pad cipher
• 51:51
  tables. RFK's meeting with Dobrynin lasted 45
• 51:56
  minutes. ending with both men agreeing to transmit
• 51:59
  responses by dawn. The Turkish government under
• 52:02
  Prime Minister Ismet Inonu was informed of the
• 52:05
  Jupiter missile removal in early 1963. Ambassador
• 52:09
  Dobrinin's cipher cable was designated top secret
• 52:13
  slash personal TO Khrushchev by the Kremlin's
• 52:15
  cipher bureau. At 9 a .m. Eastern Standard Time
• 52:19
  on Sunday, October 28. 1962, Radio Moscow interrupted
• 52:24
  its regular programming to broadcast an official
• 52:27
  statement from Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Across
• 52:30
  the United States, radio networks picked up the
• 52:33
  live translation from Moscow. Asterisk, the Soviet
• 52:37
  government, in addition to earlier instructions
• 52:40
  on the cessation of further work on weapon construction
• 52:42
  sites, has given a new order to dismantle the
• 52:45
  weapons which you described as offensive, and
• 52:48
  to create and return them to the Soviet Union.
• 52:52
  Asterisk. Inside the Oval Office, President Kennedy
• 52:55
  listened to the broadcast, letting out a long,
• 52:58
  silent sigh of relief. The 13 days were over.
• 53:03
  The world had stared into the abyss of nuclear
• 53:06
  destruction and pulled back. In Cuba, Prime Minister
• 53:10
  Fidel Castro was furious, reportedly smashing
• 53:13
  a television set upon hearing Khrushchev's decision
• 53:16
  to withdraw the missiles without consulting Cuban
• 53:18
  leadership. Over the following three weeks, U
• 53:22
  .S. Navy destroyers and reconnaissance aircraft
• 53:24
  verified the crating and loading of all 42 SS
• 53:28
  -4 missiles aboard Soviet freighters returning
• 53:30
  to the USSR. On November 20, 1962, President
• 53:36
  Kennedy officially terminated the naval quarantine
• 53:38
  of Cuba. Radio Moscow broadcast Premier Khrushchev's
• 53:43
  message over shortwave radio to prevent delay
• 53:45
  in diplomatic cable transmissions. Fidel Castro
• 53:49
  issued the Five Points Declaration demanding
• 53:52
  the return of Guantanamo Bay and the cessation
• 53:55
  of U .S. covert operations against Cuba. U .S.
• 53:59
  Navy destroyers conducted visual inspection sweeps
• 54:02
  of returning Soviet freighters, requiring Soviet
• 54:05
  crews to un -canvass missile crates on ship decks.
• 54:08
  President Kennedy delivered a national televised
• 54:11
  statement praising Premier Khrushchev's statesmanlike
• 54:14
  decision to resolve the crisis peacefully. The
• 54:17
  42 SS -4 missiles were loaded aboard five Soviet
• 54:21
  merchant vessels, including the Fizik Kerchatov
• 54:24
  and Anisov. Fidel Castro refused to allow UN
• 54:28
  inspectors on Cuban soil, forcing verification
• 54:31
  to take place aboard ships in international waters.
• 54:35
  The U .S. Air Force 55th Strategic Reconnaissance
• 54:38
  Wing performed verifying overflights over departing
• 54:41
  Soviet freighters. Premier Khrushchev sent a
• 54:45
  private letter to President Kennedy on October
• 54:47
  28 expressing satisfaction at avoiding a world
• 54:50
  catastrophe. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the
• 54:54
  closest humanity has ever come to full -scale
• 54:56
  nuclear warfare. The resolution of the crisis
• 55:00
  led directly to the signing of the Limited Test
• 55:02
  Ban Treaty in Moscow in August 1963, banning
• 55:06
  atmospheric nuclear testing. The U .S. Navy Task
• 55:10
  Force 136 conducted 65 visual ship inspections
• 55:14
  during the post -crisis verification phase. The
• 55:18
  Soviet freighter Anisov displayed eight SS -4
• 55:21
  missile canisters on its open deck for U .S.
• 55:23
  Navy aerial photography verification. President
• 55:27
  Kennedy ordered the suspension of all anti -Castro
• 55:30
  covert operations under Operation Mongoose following
• 55:33
  the crisis agreement. Fidel Castro rejected Soviet
• 55:37
  Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan's personal diplomatic
• 55:40
  explanations during meetings in Havana in November
• 55:43
  1962. The US Department of Defense officially
• 55:47
  terminated DEFCON 2 alert status on November
• 55:50
  27, returning to routine peacetime readiness.
• 55:54
  Premier Khrushchev's shortwave radio message
• 55:57
  was monitored by US Foreign Broadcast Information
• 56:00
  Service listening posts in Cyprus. The U .S.
• 56:04
  Air Force 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing
• 56:07
  operated RB -47H electronic intelligence aircraft
• 56:10
  verifying Soviet missile crate removals. President
• 56:15
  Kennedy expressed his personal gratitude to EXCOMM
• 56:17
  members during a private Oval Office presentation
• 56:20
  ceremony. The Soviet merchant vessel Fizik Kurchatov
• 56:24
  departed Marial Harbor on November 7 carrying
• 56:27
  seven SS -4 missiles on deck. The U .S. Navy
• 56:31
  destroyers escorted returning Soviet freighters
• 56:34
  to 300 miles off the European coastline. The
• 56:38
  official UN verification protocol was signed
• 56:40
  by U .S. Rep. Adlai Stevenson and Soviet Rep.
• 56:44
  Valerian Zorin on November 26. The Cuban Missile
• 56:48
  Crisis remains the most famous strategic confrontation
• 56:51
  in military history, demonstrating both the extreme
• 56:54
  danger of nuclear brinkmanship and the vital
• 56:57
  necessity of crisis diplomacy. Declassified Operational
• 57:01
  Metrics The crisis fundamentally reshaped Cold
• 57:05
  War relations, prompting both superpowers to
• 57:08
  institute direct hotline communications and embark
• 57:11
  on nuclear arms control negotiations. Operation
• 57:15
  Anadyr deployed 40 ,000 Soviet personnel to Cuba
• 57:19
  disguised as agricultural specialists and machine
• 57:21
  operators. The Ilyushin Il -28 was a Soviet twin
• 57:26
  -engine jet medium bomber capable of carrying
• 57:29
  nuclear gravity bombs. Strategic Air Command
• 57:33
  maintained 2 ,300 nuclear warheads on immediate
• 57:36
  launch status during DEFCON 2 alert. The U .S.
• 57:40
  18 Airborne Corps and 1st Armored Division were
• 57:43
  staged at Fort Stewart, Georgia, for Operation
• 57:46
  Castor invasion plans. The Limited Test Ban Treaty
• 57:50
  of 1963 prohibited nuclear weapon tests in the
• 57:54
  atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. Operation
• 57:58
  Mongoose was the secret CIA covert action program
• 58:01
  directed by Brigadier General Edward Lansdale
• 58:04
  aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime. The
• 58:08
  Joint Chiefs of Staff invasion plan for Cuba
• 58:10
  estimated 18 ,000 U .S. casualties during the
• 58:13
  initial assault phase. Operation Anadyr troops
• 58:17
  were transported aboard 86 Soviet merchant vessels
• 58:20
  between July and October 1962. The 150 million
• 58:25
  estimated casualties were calculated by the Pentagon
• 58:28
  Weapon Systems Evaluation Group in 1962. The
• 58:33
  Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed by U .S. Secretary
• 58:36
  of State Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
• 58:39
  Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas
• 58:42
  Holm. The U .S. 18 Airborne Corps comprised the
• 58:46
  82nd Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division.
• 58:51
  The Strategic Air Command B -52 bomber fleet
• 58:54
  logged 53 ,000 airborne alert flight hours during
• 58:57
  October and November 1962. The Pentagon WSEG
• 59:03
  casualty report estimated that 80 percent of
• 59:05
  major U .S. urban populations would suffer fatal
• 59:08
  fallout radiation. The U .S. 1st Armored Division
• 59:12
  staging area at Fort Stewart covered 50 ,000
• 59:15
  acres of military training terrain. The limited
• 59:19
  test ban treaty was signed inside the Catherine
• 59:21
  Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. The
• 59:25
  Pentagon WSEG report calculated that a full nuclear
• 59:29
  exchange would generate 3 billion metric tons
• 59:31
  of radioactive fallout. The Strategic Air Command
• 59:35
  ICBM Force deployed 180 Atlas and Titan I intercontinental
• 59:40
  ballistic missiles on 15 -minute alert status.
• 59:43
  The U .S. Department of Defense deployed 84 ,000
• 59:47
  Marines to naval amphibious assault ships staging
• 59:49
  off Puerto Rico. The Strategic Air Command B
• 59:53
  -47 Stratojet Bomber Force maintained 800 medium
• 59:57
  bombers on 15 -minute alert status. The R -12
• 1:00:01
  Dvina was the primary strategic offensive weapon
• 1:00:04
  deployed by the Soviet Union to Cuba during Operation
• 1:00:07
  Anadyr. Missile Specifications and Performance
• 1:00:11
  Metrics The SS -4 required specialized fueling
• 1:00:15
  crews operating four separate propellant trucks
• 1:00:18
  over a four -hour fueling window prior to launch.
• 1:00:21
  The R -12 Dvina was designed by the Yuznoy Design
• 1:00:25
  Bureau under chief designer Mikhail Yengel in
• 1:00:28
  Dnepropetrovsk. The AK -27I oxidizer comprised
• 1:00:33
  27 % dinitrogen tetroxide dissolved in concentrated
• 1:00:37
  nitric acid with iodine inhibitor. The 8K14 thermonuclear
• 1:00:42
  warhead utilized a lithium -6 deuteride secondary
• 1:00:45
  fusion stage producing a yield of 1 megaton.
• 1:00:49
  The R -12 Dvina missile was deployed operationally
• 1:00:53
  by the Soviet strategic rocket forces from 1959
• 1:00:56
  to 1993. The Yuznoy Design Bureau in Ukraine
• 1:01:01
  specialized in liquid -propellant strategic ballistic
• 1:01:03
  missiles. The SS -4 missile engine was the RD
• 1:01:08
  -214 four -chamber liquid rocket engine producing
• 1:01:11
  74 metric tons of vacuum thrust. The RD -214
• 1:01:16
  rocket engine was designed by the Valentin Glushko
• 1:01:19
  OKB -456 design bureau in Khimki. The R -12 missile
• 1:01:25
  airframe was fabricated from high -strength aluminum
• 1:01:28
  -magnesium alloy sheet metal. The SS -4 missile
• 1:01:32
  launch sites in Cuba featured four concrete launcher
• 1:01:35
  pads centered around a underground warhead storage
• 1:01:37
  bunker. The RD -214 engine utilized hypergolic
• 1:01:43
  ignition, where fuel and oxidizer ignited spontaneously
• 1:01:46
  upon contact. The SS -4 missile guidance system
• 1:01:51
  utilized four graphic jet vanes positioned inside
• 1:01:54
  the rocket engine exhaust plume. The R -12 Dvina
• 1:01:58
  launch erector frame erected the missile from
• 1:02:00
  horizontal transport to vertical launch posture
• 1:02:03
  in 20 minutes. The RD -214 engine turbopump delivered
• 1:02:08
  60 gallons of propellant per second to the four
• 1:02:10
  combustion chambers. The SS -4 missile warhead
• 1:02:15
  re -entry vehicle was protected by a graphite
• 1:02:17
  -impregnated thermal ablation shield. The R -12
• 1:02:21
  missile inertial guidance system integrated four
• 1:02:24
  precision gyroscopes manufactured by the Moscow
• 1:02:27
  Instrument Plant. The SS -4 missile launch pad
• 1:02:31
  concrete pads measured 20 m by 15 m, reinforced
• 1:02:35
  with steel mesh rebar. two 14 -rocket engine
• 1:02:40
  combustion chambers operated at an internal pressure
• 1:02:43
  of 45 atmospheres. The R -12 missile propellant
• 1:02:48
  loading trucks operated high -pressure nitrogen
• 1:02:49
  gas pressurization systems. The naval blockade
• 1:02:54
  of Cuba was executed by Task Force 136 of the
• 1:02:57
  U .S. 2nd Fleet, deploying unprecedented anti
• 1:03:00
  -submarine and surface warfare assets. Naval
• 1:03:04
  Force Composition and Capabilities Task Force
• 1:03:08
  136 demonstrated the immense power of naval diplomacy,
• 1:03:12
  enforcing national policy without initiating
• 1:03:15
  armed conflict. The F -4B Phantom II was a twin
• 1:03:19
  -engine supersonic jet interceptor capable of
• 1:03:22
  Mach 2 .2 speeds, armed with AIM -7 Sparrow missiles.
• 1:03:27
  The S -2 Tracker was a twin -engine carrier -based
• 1:03:31
  anti -submarine warfare aircraft equipped with
• 1:03:33
  magnetic anomaly detectors. The SH -3C King was
• 1:03:38
  a twin -engine ASW helicopter fitted with dipping
• 1:03:41
  sonar arrays and acoustic homing torpedoes. The
• 1:03:45
  USS Kepler was a Gearing -class destroyer that
• 1:03:48
  successfully tracked the Soviet submarine B -36
• 1:03:51
  for 36 hours. Task Force 136 warships expended
• 1:03:57
  over 4 ,000 practice depth charges during anti
• 1:04:00
  -submarine trailing operations. The F -4B Phantom
• 1:04:04
  II was manufactured by the McDonnell Aircraft
• 1:04:07
  Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri. The Grumman
• 1:04:11
  S -2 Tracker carried sonar buoys, depth charges,
• 1:04:14
  and Mark 44 acoustic homing torpedoes in its
• 1:04:18
  internal weapons bay. The Sikorsky Sh -3C King
• 1:04:22
  helicopter operated from the flight deck of the
• 1:04:25
  ASW carrier USS Essex. The USS Joseph P. Kennedy
• 1:04:30
  Jr. participated in the boarding and inspection
• 1:04:33
  of the Lebanese -flagged freighter Marakhla on
• 1:04:35
  October 26. The USS Enterprise embarked eight
• 1:04:39
  A -2F intruder attack aircraft for long -range
• 1:04:43
  precision strike missions. The Task Force 136
• 1:04:47
  ASW tracking teams logged 1 ,200 sonar contact
• 1:04:51
  hours across the Sargasso Sea sector. The USS
• 1:04:55
  Newport News Heavy Cruiser main battery fired
• 1:04:58
  practice target tracking salvos during Caribbean
• 1:05:00
  exercises. The U .S. Navy destroyers assigned
• 1:05:04
  to Task Force 136 refueled at sea from Euler
• 1:05:08
  vessels every 72 hours. The USS Enterprise nuclear
• 1:05:13
  propulsion system featured eight A2W nuclear
• 1:05:16
  reactors enabling continuous high -speed transit.
• 1:05:19
  The U .S. Navy P - 3A Orion Maritime Patrol aircraft
• 1:05:24
  conducted eight -hour anti -submarine search
• 1:05:26
  sweeps over the Atlantic quarantine line. The
• 1:05:30
  USS Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. destroyer boarding
• 1:05:33
  team was led by Lieutenant Commander Nicholas
• 1:05:35
  Nicholas. Task Force 136 replenishment ships
• 1:05:40
  delivered 300 ,000 barrels of fuel oil to quarantine
• 1:05:44
  destroyers. The intelligence collection operations
• 1:05:47
  conducted by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky represented
• 1:05:50
  a masterclass in covert human intelligence tradecraft.
• 1:05:54
  Technical and Operational Details Penkovsky's
• 1:05:59
  work enabled CIA and MI6 photo analysts to immediately
• 1:06:03
  identify every Soviet missile component photographed
• 1:06:06
  by U -2 overflights in Cuba. The Min -XB camera
• 1:06:10
  featured a stainless steel sliding body mechanism
• 1:06:13
  that advanced the film and cocked the shutter
• 1:06:15
  automatically. The Min -X 8mm film cassette held
• 1:06:19
  50 exposures of ultra -fine grain Agfa Isopan
• 1:06:22
  FF black and white film. Penkovsky's Mi -6 handler
• 1:06:27
  Greville when utilized custom diplomatic baggage
• 1:06:30
  containers to smuggle exposed film cassettes
• 1:06:32
  out of Moscow. The Minix -B camera was manufactured
• 1:06:36
  by Minix GmbH in Gießen, West Germany. Penkovsky's
• 1:06:41
  intelligence reports were reviewed personally
• 1:06:44
  by President Kennedy and CIA Director John McCone.
• 1:06:47
  The Minix -B shutter operated across speeds from
• 1:06:51
  1 2000th of a second to 1 second. The Agfa Isopan
• 1:06:56
  FF8mm film base offered an optical resolution
• 1:06:59
  of 180 lines per millimeter. Greville Wynne operated
• 1:07:03
  a commercial export company, Industrial Exhibitions
• 1:07:07
  Ltd., as his operational cover for traveling
• 1:07:10
  to Moscow. Penkovsky's collection work was recognized
• 1:07:14
  by historians as the single most valuable human
• 1:07:17
  operation of the Cold War era. The Min -XB camera
• 1:07:21
  body was fabricated from anodized aluminum weighing
• 1:07:24
  56 grams. Penkovsky's dead drop locations included
• 1:07:29
  the grave marker of Russian poet Alexander Pushkin
• 1:07:32
  in Moscow's Novodevichy Cemetery. The Min -XB
• 1:07:35
  camera required no batteries, operating via a
• 1:07:39
  mechanical spring -driven shutter mechanism.
• 1:07:42
  Penkovsky photographed top -secret GRU documents
• 1:07:45
  inside the State Committee for Coordination of
• 1:07:47
  Scientific Research building in Moscow. Penkovsky's
• 1:07:52
  dead drop containers were weighted with lead
• 1:07:54
  pellets to sink immediately if dropped into river
• 1:07:56
  waters. Penkovsky's Mi -6 tradecraft training
• 1:08:00
  included evasion techniques for detecting KGB
• 1:08:03
  mobile surveillance units. The Min -XB camera
• 1:08:07
  lens focused down to 8 inches, enabling sharp
• 1:08:10
  photography of full -page printed documents.
• 1:08:14
  Penkovsky utilized a specialized chemical developer
• 1:08:16
  kit for processing test film strips inside his
• 1:08:20
  apartment bathroom. The successful resolution
• 1:08:23
  of the Cuban Missile Crisis proved that pragmatic
• 1:08:25
  back -channel communication and strategic restraint
• 1:08:28
  could prevent global nuclear destruction. The
• 1:08:32
  Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that in the
• 1:08:37
  nuclear age, victory belongs not to those who
• 1:08:40
  escalate, but to those who possess the wisdom
• 1:08:43
  to compromise. President Kennedy delivered a
• 1:08:46
  landmark commencement address at American University
• 1:08:48
  on June 10, 1963, calling for world peace and
• 1:08:53
  nuclear disarmament. Premier Khrushchev published
• 1:08:57
  the speech in full in Pravda, hailing it as the
• 1:08:59
  most courageous address by an American president
• 1:09:02
  since World War II. The American University Address
• 1:09:06
  laid the diplomatic foundation for the signing
• 1:09:08
  of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty two months
• 1:09:10
  later. The Washington -Moscow hotline was officially
• 1:09:14
  inaugurated on August 30, 1963. President Kennedy's
• 1:09:20
  strategic restraint during the crisis earned
• 1:09:22
  him lasting international acclaim as a mature
• 1:09:24
  statesman. The American University Address was
• 1:09:28
  drafted by White House speechwriter Theodore
• 1:09:30
  Sorensen. Premier Khrushchev's willing compromise
• 1:09:34
  contributed to his political downfall in October
• 1:09:36
  1964, when he was deposed by Leonid Brezhnev.
• 1:09:41
  President Kennedy's American University address
• 1:09:43
  included the famous quote, asterisk, for in the
• 1:09:46
  final analysis, our most basic common link is
• 1:09:49
  that we all inhabit this small planet. We all
• 1:09:53
  breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's
• 1:09:56
  future. And we are all mortal. Asterisk. The
• 1:10:02
  Limited Test Ban Treaty was ratified by the United
• 1:10:05
  States Senate by a vote of 80 -19 in September
• 1:10:08
  1963. The American University address was delivered
• 1:10:12
  before a crowd of 14 ,000 graduates and faculty
• 1:10:16
  members in Washington, D .C. President Kennedy
• 1:10:19
  and Premier Khrushchev exchanged personal handwritten
• 1:10:22
  gifts following the Limited Test Ban Treaty signing.
• 1:10:26
  The American University speech manuscript was
• 1:10:29
  archived in the John F. Kennedy Presidential
• 1:10:31
  Library in Boston. President Kennedy's commencement
• 1:10:35
  address was broadcast live across three national
• 1:10:37
  television networks in the United States. The
• 1:10:41
  Washington -Moscow hotline utilized twin full
• 1:10:44
  -duplex teletype circuits routing through London,
• 1:10:46
  Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Helsinki. At 12 p
• 1:10:51
  .m. on November 21, 1962, case file number 022
• 1:10:56
  was officially closed and archived at CIA headquarters
• 1:11:00
  in Langley, the Pentagon, and the JFK Presidential
• 1:11:03
  Library in Boston. Final Operational Metrics
• 1:11:07
  This concludes declassified file number 0022
• 1:11:12
  of the Shadow Dossier, the Cuban Missile Crisis,
• 1:11:15
  completing another thrilling operational file
• 1:11:17
  of ARC -1, Cold War Iron Curtain and Double Agents.
• 1:11:22
  What dangerous secrets await in the next declassified
• 1:11:25
  file? Find out in Episode 23, The Cambridge Five
• 1:11:29
  Unmasked. If you want early access to upcoming
• 1:11:33
  files, uncensored intel briefings, and bonus
• 1:11:36
  dossiers, join our Patreon network at patreon
• 1:11:39
  .com slash storiesbymia. Subscribe on Apple Podcasts,
• 1:11:45
  Spotify, RSS .com, and YouTube so you never miss
• 1:11:49
  an official declassification. This is the Shadow
• 1:11:52
  Dossier. Thank you for listening.