Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / The F-35 vs Iran: Can Stealth Beat Tehran’s Air Defences?
Transcript
- 0:16If the United States or Israel ever launched A sustained air
- 0:19campaign against Iran, 1 aircraft would sit at the center
- 0:23of that operation via 35 Lightning, too.
- 0:26Not because it is invisible. Not because it is unbeatable,
- 0:31but because modern air warfare increasingly depends on which
- 0:34side can see the other first, process information faster, and
- 0:38survive inside heavily defended airspace long enough to matter.
- 0:42This episode is about that contest, the F35 against Iranian
- 0:47air defenses. 2 sophisticated systems, each designed with the
- 0:52other broadly in mind, each carrying serious strengths and
- 0:56serious limitations. Understanding both of them
- 0:59honestly, without exaggeration, in either direction, tells us
- 1:02something important about what a major air campaign against Iran
- 1:05would actually look like, and why The outcome is far less
- 1:08certain that either confident Hawks or reassured skeptics tend
- 1:11to suggest. The F35 Lightning 2 is the most
- 1:15expensive weapons program in human history.
- 1:18Its total life cycle cost across all variants have been estimated
- 1:21at over $1.7 trillion. The aircraft entered service
- 1:26with United States Air Force in 2016 and has since been procured
- 1:30by the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, Japan, South Korea,
- 1:34Norway, Italy, the Netherlands and several other nations.
- 1:37Israel operates the F35 IA, locally modified variant known
- 1:41as the Adir, which carries Israeli specific avionics,
- 1:44electronic warfare systems, and weapons integration not found in
- 1:48any other country's fleet. The aircraft was designed around
- 1:52a set of capabilities that, taken together, represent a
- 1:55fundamental philosophy about how air warfare should be conducted
- 1:59in the 21st century. That philosophy can be
- 2:01summarized in three principles. First, reduce the probability of
- 2:06being detected. Second, collect and process
- 2:10information at a quality and speed that exceeds any
- 2:13adversary. 3rd, operate as a network node in a broader system
- 2:17rather than as a stand alone fighting platform.
- 2:20Each of those principles is achievable to a degree.
- 2:24None of them is absolute, and the degree to which each holds
- 2:28in a specific operational environment is precisely what
- 2:31makes air campaign planning so difficult.
- 2:34The stealth characteristics of the F35 are among its most
- 2:37discussed and most misunderstood qualities.
- 2:40The aircraft is not invisible. It has never been marketed as
- 2:44invisible by the engineers who designed it, though that word
- 2:47appears frequently in popular coverage.
- 2:50What stealth actually means in precise technical terms is a
- 2:53significant reduction in radar cross section.
- 2:56The effective size of the aircraft is seen by radar
- 2:58returns. A conventional fighter like an
- 3:01F16 had a radar cross section roughly comparable to a small
- 3:05car. The F35, depending on aspect,
- 3:08angle and radar frequency band, presents a radar cross section
- 3:12many orders of magnitude smaller, often compared to a
- 3:15metal golf ball or in some assessments, something closer to
- 3:18a marble. The reduction is achieved
- 3:21through a combination of airframe shaping that deflects
- 3:23radar energy away from the emitting source, internal
- 3:26weapons carriage that eliminates the large external pylons
- 3:29present on conventional fighters, radar absorbent
- 3:32surface materials bonded to the airframe, and careful management
- 3:35of heat signatures and radio frequency emissions.
- 3:38What this means operationally is that the range at which an
- 3:41adversary radar can detect the F35 is dramatically compressed.
- 3:45A radar system that might detect a conventional fighter at 200
- 3:49kilometers might only detect an F35 at 30 or 40 kilometers.
- 3:54That difference in detection range is the margin inside which
- 3:57the F35 pilot can act before the adversaries fire control
- 4:00solution is complete. It does not make the aircraft
- 4:04immune to detection. It changes the geometry of the
- 4:07engagement in ways that fundamentally disadvantage the
- 4:10defender. There are well documented
- 4:13limitations to stealth that any serious analysis must
- 4:16acknowledge. Low frequency radar systems,
- 4:19specifically very high frequency and ultra high frequency bands,
- 4:23sometimes referred to as metric wave radar, can detect stealth
- 4:26aircraft at longer ranges than high frequency fire control
- 4:29radars. The physics of radar absorption
- 4:32and airframe shaping are less effective at wavelengths longer
- 4:35than the aircraft's own physical dimensions.
- 4:38Soviet era long range surveillance radars, several of
- 4:41which remain in service with Iran, operate on these lower
- 4:45frequency bands. The challenge for defenders is
- 4:48that these systems can provide warning and general bearing
- 4:50information, but generally cannot generate targeting
- 4:53quality data with sufficient precision to guide a surface to
- 4:56air missile to a successful intercept.
- 4:59They can tell a commander that something is approaching.
- 5:02They struggled to tell a missile battery exactly where to point.
- 5:06During the 1999 Kosovo campaign, the United States F117
- 5:10Nighthawk, the first operational stealth aircraft, was shot down
- 5:14by a Serbian surface to air missile battery.
- 5:17That incident is frequently cited as evidence that stealth
- 5:20can be defeated. The full picture is considerably
- 5:23more nuanced. Serbian operators reportedly
- 5:26used a combination of an older Soviet era radar operating on a
- 5:29lower frequency band, intelligence about the
- 5:32aircraft's relatively predictable flight path and
- 5:35schedule, and a degree of tactical patients that allow
- 5:38them to wait for a more favorable engagement geometry.
- 5:41The lesson from Kosovo was not that stealth is fundamentally
- 5:44ineffective. The lesson was that stealth
- 5:47combined with predictable tactics, lapses and emissions
- 5:50discipline or repeated sorties on identical routes creates
- 5:54exploitable windows that a sophisticated and patient
- 5:57defender can attempt to use. The F35 sensor fusion capability
- 6:01is arguably more consequential than its reduced radar
- 6:04signature. The aircraft carries the IN
- 6:07Slash APJ 81 Active Electronically Scan Array radar,
- 6:11an Electro optical targeting system, a distributed aperture
- 6:14system consisting of 6 infrared cameras providing 360°
- 6:18situational awareness around the entire aircraft, and the IN
- 6:22slash SQ239 electronic warfare suite.
- 6:26All of this information is integrated and presented to the
- 6:28pilot through a helmet mounted display that projects the sensor
- 6:32picture directly onto the visor regardless of where the pilot is
- 6:35physically looking. What this means in practice is
- 6:38that an F35 pilot possesses a level of situational awareness
- 6:42that was simply impossible in previous generations of combat
- 6:46aircraft. The aircraft sees threats from
- 6:48directions the pilot cannot physically face.
- 6:52It classifieds radar emitters automatically and presents
- 6:55identification data. It builds and continuously
- 6:58updates a tactical picture without requiring the pilot to
- 7:02manually correlate information from multiple sources beyond
- 7:05what the individual aircraft sees.
- 7:08The F35 is designed as a node in a networked architecture by the
- 7:12multifunction Advanced Data Link.
- 7:14It shares sensor data in near real time with other F-30 fives,
- 7:18with 4th generation fighters, with airborne early warning and
- 7:21control systems, and with ground stations.
- 7:24A formation of F-30 Fives operating together shares its
- 7:27combined picture across every platform simultaneously.
- 7:31The first aircraft to detect a threat can share that detection
- 7:34with every other aircraft in the network within seconds,
- 7:37potentially before the adversary radar operator has even
- 7:40processed the initial return. This network capability operates
- 7:44within a broader infrastructure that a modern air campaign would
- 7:48bring to any contested theater. Airborne early warning and
- 7:51control aircraft operating while outside threat envelopes provide
- 7:55long range surveillance and coordination.
- 7:58Electronic warfare aircraft in the United States Inventory The
- 8:0218G Growler conduct dedicated suppression of enemy air
- 8:06defenses through both active jamming and the use of high
- 8:09speed anti radiation missiles at home on radar emissions.
- 8:12Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, including
- 8:16satellites, high altitude unmanned systems, and signals
- 8:19intelligence platforms, map the adversary air defense network
- 8:23continuously before any strike aircraft enter contested
- 8:26airspace. Aerial refueling tankers extend
- 8:29the reach and combat persistence of every element in the strike
- 8:32package. Iran has spent several decades
- 8:35building an air defense architecture that attempts to
- 8:38account for this kind of multi domain pressure.
- 8:41Its approach is layered, geographically dispersed and
- 8:44deliberately redundant, with explicit doctrinal goal of
- 8:47ensuring that no single strike package can collapse the entire
- 8:51system simultaneously at the long range tier.
- 8:54Iran's most capable system is the S300 PMU 2, delivered by
- 8:59Russia following a protracted diplomatic dispute and
- 9:02ultimately supplied in 2016 after years under arms embargo.
- 9:06This 300 family is a serious and well regarded system by any
- 9:10objective measure. Its radar can track multiple
- 9:13targets simultaneously at long range.
- 9:16Its missiles carry engagement ranges extending to roughly 150
- 9:20kilometers against certain target types, though effective
- 9:23range against low observable aircraft will be considerably
- 9:26shorter. Given that reduced radar cross
- 9:28section directly compresses the engagement envelope available to
- 9:32any surface to air missile system, Iran has invested
- 9:35significantly in operator training and in integrating the
- 9:38S 300 into its broader command and control network.
- 9:42Alongside the S 300, Iran has developed the Bavar 373, a
- 9:46domestically produced long range surface to air missile system
- 9:50that Iranian officials and state media have described as
- 9:53competitive with or superior to the S 300 in certain performance
- 9:56categories. Independent assessment of the
- 9:59Bavar 373 is constrained by limited, publicly verifiable
- 10:04technical data. Western analysts generally
- 10:06approach Iranian claims about domestically produced defense
- 10:10systems with appropriate skepticism, while acknowledging
- 10:12that the Brevard 373 represents A genuine engineering program
- 10:17that should not be reflexively dismissed at medium range.
- 10:20Iran operates the Kordat family of systems, most notably the
- 10:24third of Kordat system, which received sustained international
- 10:27attention in June 2019 when Iran claimed it had engaged and
- 10:31destroyed a United States Navy RQ for a Global Hawk
- 10:34surveillance drone operating near the Strait of Hormuz.
- 10:37The precise circumstances of that incident remain a matter of
- 10:41dispute between Washington and Tehran, but the episode
- 10:44confirmed that the Chordad system is operationally active
- 10:47and capable of engaging real targets at operationally
- 10:51relevant altitudes. Critically, the system is
- 10:54mobile, and mobility is one of its most significant tactical
- 10:57advantages against a force conducting suppression
- 11:00operations. Mobility is a theme running
- 11:03through Iran's entire air defense posture.
- 11:06The lessons of the 1991 Gulf War were studied carefully in Tehran
- 11:10as they were studied by military establishments around the world.
- 11:14In Operation Desert Storm, the United States and coalition
- 11:17forces demonstrated that fixed, networked air defense
- 11:20infrastructure, however densely layered, could be systematically
- 11:24dismantled through coordinated suppression and destruction
- 11:27operations. The Iraqi air defense system,
- 11:30which on paper was among the most capable in the region, was
- 11:33effectively defeated within the 1st 72 hours of the air
- 11:36campaign. Iran has spent the subsequent
- 11:39decades designing a system that is harder to locate precisely
- 11:43and therefore harder to target precisely than the Iraqi system
- 11:46was. Iranian air defense units
- 11:49trained to relocate regularly. Radar systems are operated under
- 11:53strict emission control, transmitting intermittently
- 11:56rather than continuously, which dramatically reduces the time
- 11:59available for anti radiation missiles or electronic
- 12:02intelligence assets to fix their position.
- 12:05Decoy emitters are used to attract anti radiation missiles
- 12:08away from operational systems. Underground facilities provide
- 12:12survivable infrastructure for command and control nodes and
- 12:15for some radar capabilities. Communications between elements
- 12:19of the air defense network use a mixture of digital data link,
- 12:23hardened fiber optic cable, and low probability of intercept
- 12:26radio protocols to complicate signals intelligence collection
- 12:29by opposing forces. Iran's geography adds complexity
- 12:33that any attacking force must account for systematically.
- 12:37Iran is not a compact country. Its territory covers an area
- 12:41roughly equivalent to Western Europe.
- 12:43The very terrain, the Zagaris and Alborz mountain ranges,
- 12:47central desert plateaus, the coastal plains bordering the
- 12:50Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Caspian Seashore,
- 12:54creates radar coverage gaps that defenders can exploit and that
- 12:58attackers must plan around carefully.
- 13:00A suppression campaign that might take 48 to 72 hours in a
- 13:03geographically confined theater could require sustained
- 13:06operations over several weeks in Iran simply because the physical
- 13:10distances involved demand more sorties, more aerial refueling,
- 13:14more continuous logistics support, and longer period of
- 13:17exposure to whatever residual air defense capability survives
- 13:20each phase of the campaign. The opening phase of any serious
- 13:24air campaign against Iranian air defenses would almost certainly
- 13:27prioritize the suppression and destruction of radar networks,
- 13:31communications infrastructure and command nodes before
- 13:34attempting to strike the hardened sites deeper in the
- 13:36interior. This is the established doctrine
- 13:39that evolved from Desert Storm and was refined in every
- 13:42subsequent major air campaign. 18G Growlers and dedicated anti
- 13:47radiation missiles would target emitting radar systems during
- 13:50the initial wave. Low observable aircraft,
- 13:53including the B2 Spirit stealth bomber and the F35, would
- 13:57penetrate the highest threat defended areas where 4th
- 13:59generation aircraft would face attrition rates judged
- 14:02unacceptable. Tomahawk cruise missiles
- 14:05launched from surface ships and submarines operating well beyond
- 14:08Iranian retaliatory reach would strike fixed infrastructure
- 14:11targets without requiring strike aircraft to enter contested
- 14:15airspace at all. Whether Iran could realistically
- 14:18detect and successfully engage in F35 during such a campaign is
- 14:22a question that resists a simple answer.
- 14:24The honest analytical assessment is that Iran's realistic
- 14:27opportunities lie in a specific combination of circumstances.
- 14:31Early warning from lower frequency radars providing
- 14:33general threat bearing rather than precision tracking.
- 14:36Passive intelligence gathered over time about operational
- 14:39flight patterns. Opportunistic engagement during
- 14:42phases when aircraft behavior is more predictable, such as during
- 14:45aerial refueling at lower altitudes over coastal
- 14:49approaches, or during sortie patterns that become repetitive
- 14:53over the course of a sustained campaign.
- 14:55And the cumulative statistical possibility that in an operation
- 14:58involving many hundreds of sorties over several weeks, some
- 15:01encounter results in a successful engagement through a
- 15:04combination of factors that no individual planning step fully
- 15:07controlled against. A well managed F35 operation
- 15:10employing proper emissions discipline, varied ingress and
- 15:13egress routing, prior suppression of the radar network
- 15:16and dedicated electronic warfare support.
- 15:19Iran's probability of successfully engaging in F35 on
- 15:23any given sortie is assessed by most Western analysts as low.
- 15:26That is not the same as zero in an extended campaign.
- 15:30Over weeks, cumulative risk rises with every mission flown.
- 15:35The broader challenge for any sustained campaign is not the
- 15:38opening phase. Opening phases are what advanced
- 15:41air forces do best Concentrated, coordinated, exploiting the full
- 15:46suite of capabilities against the system that is not yet
- 15:49adapted to the specific operational approach being used.
- 15:52The harder phase is what follows.
- 15:55Mobile systems that survive the initial suppression effort begin
- 15:58to reconstitute in new positions.
- 16:01Operators who have observed the attack sequence adapt their
- 16:03emission patterns and their engagement procedures.
- 16:06The electronic order of battle that was painstakingly mapped
- 16:09before the campaign began is now partially obsolete.
- 16:13This dynamic has been demonstrated at varying scales
- 16:16in recent conflicts in Nagorno Karabakh.
- 16:19In 2020, Azerbaijani drone operation showed the lethal
- 16:23vulnerability of static or predictably positioned air
- 16:26defense systems to persistent surveillance combined with
- 16:29precision strike. In the ongoing war in Ukraine,
- 16:32both sides have demonstrated that air defense is ultimately
- 16:35an attrition contest as much as a technical one.
- 16:38Systems are destroyed, replaced or relocated, improvised and
- 16:41adapted in a continuous cycle that does not end with an
- 16:45opening salvo and does not resolve cleanly for the United
- 16:48States or Israel operating against Iran, the military
- 16:51technical balance does favor the attacker in the opening phases
- 16:55and against fixed infrastructure.
- 16:57The F35 sensor architecture, it's reduced detection range,
- 17:01it's networked integration with a broader air campaign
- 17:03structure, and the full depth of American air power create a
- 17:07combination that Iran's current air defense inventory would
- 17:09struggle to defeat comprehensively.
- 17:12But struggle to defeat comprehensively is not the same
- 17:15as being defenseless, and a prolonged campaign introduces
- 17:18variables, attrition across all systems, munitions inventory
- 17:22depletion, maintenance demands on complex platforms, political
- 17:26sustainability, and adversary adaptation that cannot be
- 17:30resolved by any single technological advantage.
- 17:33There is a dimension of this contest that deserves more
- 17:36attention than it typically receives.
- 17:38The information competition that precedes and shapes the physical
- 17:41exchange. Modern air campaigns are decided
- 17:44substantially before the 1st aircraft crosses a border.
- 17:48The side with better intelligence about the
- 17:50adversary's radar network, more accurate knowledge of where
- 17:53mobile systems have repositioned, more complete
- 17:55understanding of the adversary's operational procedures and
- 17:58emission patterns, that side holds an advantage that no
- 18:01quantity of missiles can simply overcome.
- 18:03Conversely, a defender who successfully denies that
- 18:06intelligence picture, who presents a system that looks
- 18:09meaningfully different from what was mapped in preparation, who
- 18:12maintains deception and unpredictability across the
- 18:15campaign, the defender imposes uncertainty that translates
- 18:19directly into risk for attacking Cruz and higher cost for the
- 18:22attacking force. The F35 was designed to operate
- 18:25inside that information contest and to tip it decisively in
- 18:29favor of the attacker. Iran's air defense doctrine and
- 18:33its investment in mobility, redundancy and emission control
- 18:36were designed to complicate and disrupt it.
- 18:39Neither has yet faced the other in a full, sustained campaign at
- 18:42scale. What military planers on both
- 18:45sides understand, and what drives the continued investment
- 18:48on each side, is that the outcome would depend less on any
- 18:51individual piece of hardware and more on which side could
- 18:54maintain a clearer picture of the other, act on that picture
- 18:56faster, and keep its own dispositions in the dark.
- 19:00In modern air warfare, the most dangerous weapon is not the one
- 19:03that fires the furthest, it is the one that knows where to
- 19:06look.