Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Scaling Only Magnifies a Broken Model
Transcript
- 0:00Have you ever noticed how like some tech startups seem to grow
- 0:03into these massive global giants before they've made a single
- 0:07dollar in profit? Oh, absolutely.
- 0:09It's everywhere. Right.
- 0:10But then you look at a local business like a bakery or a
- 0:13plumber and they are expected to be profitable on day one.
- 0:18Yeah, there's no runway for a bakery.
- 0:19Exactly. I mean, you open a coffee shop
- 0:22and if you're losing money on every cup of coffee you sell,
- 0:24you literally have to close your boom.
- 0:26There's no safety net. Which makes total sense in the
- 0:28real world. Right.
- 0:29But if you launch a tech platform and lose, you know, a
- 0:32billion dollars over 5 years, suddenly you're on the cover of
- 0:35business magazines. People call you a visionary.
- 0:38It is so backward when you actually say it out loud.
- 0:41It really is. So today, as mission for this
- 0:44deep dive is to decode that massive discrepancy, we're going
- 0:48back to the basics to unpack this whole Silicon Valley
- 0:51obsession with scaling up versus the, I guess, traditional boring
- 0:56concept of actually making money.
- 0:58Yeah. And it is arguably the most
- 1:00fundamental contradiction in how we view Business Today.
- 1:03And to get to the bottom of it, we're analyzing a really
- 1:06fascinating breakdown from financial expert Azwath
- 1:09Demoderin A. Legend in the finance space.
- 1:12Truly, and he takes a hard look at this exact trade off between
- 1:15scaling and profitability. He actually builds this
- 1:18incredibly compelling case that the venture capital industry,
- 1:23the very people we kind of trust to fund the future, might
- 1:26actually be the weakest link in building sustainable businesses.
- 1:28Which is a huge claim but hey, before we get into that, a quick
- 1:32note for you listening to access more advanced researches, follow
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- 1:51Links are in the description of course.
- 1:53Also disclaimer time. All analysis is based on
- 1:56publicly available sources and may be subject to revisions or
- 1:59differing interpretations. All contents from this channel
- 2:02is for research and entertainment purposes only and
- 2:05does not constitute any investment or financial advice
- 2:08or service. Conduct your own due diligence
- 2:10before making investment or financial decisions.
- 2:13Always do your own research, folks.
- 2:14Exactly. OK, so where does Damodaran even
- 2:18start with this VC mindset? What What's fascinating here is
- 2:21how deep this bias actually goes.
- 2:24He kicks off his analysis by pointing to a tweet from the
- 2:26legendary venture capitalist Vinod Khosla.
- 2:29OK, what did Khosla say? He essentially claims that if a
- 2:32company's focusing on profitability, they are
- 2:35admitting defeat. Wait.
- 2:37Admitting defeat by making money.
- 2:40Yeah, I know it sounds crazy, but Khosla's argument is that
- 2:43focusing on profit is basically an admission that a leadership
- 2:45team has nowhere left to invest for growth.
- 2:47In his view, you know, you should either be generating
- 2:50massive profits at the very end of a long journey, or you should
- 2:53be actively generating assets and growth right now.
- 2:56There's like no middle ground for him.
- 2:58Wow, so it just frames growth at all costs as the only acceptable
- 3:02default setting if you want to be an ambitious company?
- 3:05Precisely, it pushes the actual mechanics of a functioning
- 3:09business, you know, bringing in more money than you send out
- 3:12completely into the backseat. Yeah.
- 3:14I mean, that single tweet perfectly encapsulates the
- 3:17entire venture capital mindset. But if we take a step back and
- 3:21look at the broader economy, you really have to ask if that
- 3:24mindset makes sense for every single business model.
- 3:26And Damodarin argues it definitely doesn't.
- 3:29He says that before a company even considers taking outside
- 3:32money to scale, the founder has to look at the underlying
- 3:35physics of their specific business.
- 3:37Because not everything is destined to be a global empire,
- 3:41or even should be. Exactly.
- 3:42So where does the founder even begin to figure out if their
- 3:45idea can scale like that? Well, it starts with market size
- 3:48and market growth, and the framing of your market matters
- 3:51immensely here. What do you mean by framing?
- 3:54Think about Uber in its earliest days.
- 3:56If they had framed themselves strictly as a a black car
- 4:00service, their total addressable market was relatively small.
- 4:05The ceiling was low. Right, because there's only so
- 4:06many people taking black cars. Exactly.
- 4:09But by shifting their narrative and framing themselves as a
- 4:12logistics company that handles delivery moving global
- 4:15transportation, the potential for scale exploded.
- 4:19Oh, I see. Suddenly, the ceiling is the
- 4:21entire transportation sector. Spot on.
- 4:24And market growth acts as a massive tailwind too.
- 4:27Look at Apple and Samsung in the early twenty 10s.
- 4:30Oh yeah, the smartphone. Boom.
- 4:31Right. They scaled almost effortlessly
- 4:34because the entire smartphone market was expanding so rapidly.
- 4:37Everyone on Earth was transitioning from flip phones
- 4:39to smartphones. So when the pie itself is
- 4:41growing every single day, you don't really have to fight as
- 4:43hard for your slice. Exactly.
- 4:45But you know that era leveled off.
- 4:47Today, the smartphone market is totally saturated.
- 4:50You can't just ride the wave anymore.
- 4:52No, you have to steal market share from a competitor, which
- 4:55is a much more expensive, brutal fight.
- 4:57OK. So market size and growth, what
- 4:59else? Then you introduce the mechanics
- 5:01of capital intensity and customer inertia.
- 5:04Capital intensity, like how much money it takes to build the.
- 5:07Thing exactly. It is infinitely easier to scale
- 5:09a software company. The product is entirely digital,
- 5:12meaning you don't have to build physical factories, and your
- 5:15early adopters tend to be younger demographics who have
- 5:18very low inertia. Meaning they are perfectly
- 5:21willing to just try a new app. Exactly.
- 5:23Compare that to a heavy asset industry like hospitality.
- 5:27Building a global chain of hotels requires billions in
- 5:30physical real estate. Though you know Airbnb managed
- 5:33to bypass that completely. They scaled massive global
- 5:36logistics without actually owning the underlying real
- 5:39estate, right? Which completely removed that
- 5:42capital intensity bottleneck from their balance sheet.
- 5:44Which is exactly why they scale so fast.
- 5:46But there is another bottleneck. Damodar and points out which is
- 5:50the key person constraint. The key person constraint, like
- 5:53relying on one specific talent. Yeah, if your business relies on
- 5:57highly specialized, unreplicable human talent, scaling becomes an
- 6:02absolute nightmare, right? If you're a master Carpenter
- 6:05making bespoke furniture, your product is literally the output
- 6:08of your own two hands. You cannot manufacture 10,000
- 6:12tables a month without losing the exact quality that made you
- 6:15successful. I suppose a few people figure
- 6:17out a workaround though. Like Gordon Ramsay is a master
- 6:20chef, but he obviously isn't cooking the steak at all of his
- 6:24restaurants globally. Good point.
- 6:25He managed to franchise his exact operational standards and
- 6:29his brand identity across the globe, effectively cloning his
- 6:33key person value. He systematized his expertise
- 6:36exactly. Which actually brings us to the
- 6:38psychological battle inside the founder's own head.
- 6:41De Maderon highlights this tension between control and
- 6:44ambition. Oh.
- 6:45This is a big one. Yeah, scaling a company almost
- 6:47always requires raising outside capital.
- 6:50Raising capital means giving up equity, giving up board seats
- 6:54and ultimately surrendering control.
- 6:55Yeah, you get a boss again. Exactly.
- 6:57If a founder prioritizes absolute control, they have to
- 7:00grow slowly using only their own revenues.
- 7:03But if their ambition requires rapid world dominating growth,
- 7:07they literally have to surrender the keys to the castle.
- 7:09Yeah. You're also choosing between
- 7:11building something long lived versus building for fast growth.
- 7:16The source material mentions Kongo Gumi, this Japanese
- 7:19company that specialized in building shrines.
- 7:22They stayed incredibly small, fiercely focused on their craft,
- 7:26remained family owned, and lasted for 1500 years.
- 7:30Wow. 1500 years. Contrast that with a modern
- 7:34example like Peloton. During the pandemic lockdowns,
- 7:37they saw this massive spike in demand and instead of growing
- 7:40sustainably, their ambition took over.
- 7:42They overreached. Heavily.
- 7:44They built massive factory infrastructure to scale as fast
- 7:48as humanly possible, and when the pandemic ended, the demand
- 7:51just evaporated. That ambition practically ruined
- 7:54the company. The drive for hyper growth often
- 7:57masks the fragility of the foundation.
- 7:59But you know, I hear what you're saying about Kongagumi lasting
- 8:011500 years by staying small. But let's be real, in the modern
- 8:04context, Kev was here. If I am a founder today and I
- 8:07walk into a room of investors and say I want to stay small to
- 8:10maintain control and build 100 year legacy, they're going to
- 8:13politely show me the door. Probably, yeah.
- 8:15We are taught that if a business isn't aggressively growing, it
- 8:18is dying. So isn't staying small just a
- 8:21polite way of spinning a failure to capture a larger market?
- 8:24Well, it depends entirely on your definition of success,
- 8:27right? Damodar encounters that exact
- 8:30startup mentality by introducing the concept of the niche *.
- 8:33Niche star? Like who?
- 8:35Look at a company like Ferrari, they deliberately cap their
- 8:39production volume, keeping it incredibly low, selling maybe 10
- 8:42to 13,000 cars a year globally. Oh, interesting.
- 8:45By artificially restricting their scale, they command
- 8:49massive pricing power. Their profit margins are
- 8:52astronomical, sometimes over 20%, and they retain an
- 8:55untouchable brand mystique, right?
- 8:57They aren't failing to scale, they are successfully utilizing
- 9:00scarcity as a business model. So staying small can actually be
- 9:04a mechanism for protecting profit margins.
- 9:06I like that. But let's say our founder
- 9:07decides they do want to be the next global giant.
- 9:10They decide to hit the gas. OK.
- 9:12Hitting the gas. What happens mechanically when
- 9:15that intense desire to grow collides with the actual
- 9:18underlying math of their business?
- 9:20This is where we transition from the dream of scaling into the
- 9:24brutal reality of unit economics.
- 9:26Ah. Unit economics, the fun stuff.
- 9:30The essential stuff Unit economics is the fundamental
- 9:34building block of profitability. It's simply the price you charge
- 9:38a customer minus the direct cost to produce that one specific
- 9:42additional unit. If you're operating a
- 9:45traditional discount retail store, your unit economics are
- 9:48generally terrible. You buy a product wholesale,
- 9:51mark it up maybe 8%, and that tiny sliver is your gross
- 9:55margin. So to make enough money to pay
- 9:57your rent and employees, you have to sell a staggering volume
- 10:00of goods. Exactly.
- 10:02But if you flip over to software, the cost to produce
- 10:04the second copy of a digital program or add a second user to
- 10:08a cloud platform is practically 0.
- 10:10Right. The unit economics are
- 10:11incredible because almost every dollar of revenue from that new
- 10:14user drops straight to the bottom line.
- 10:16So when you take that drive to scale and apply it to those
- 10:18different types of unity, economics damaged and outlines 4
- 10:22distinct scaling outcomes. OK, what's the first one?
- 10:24The first is what he calls lightning in a bottle.
- 10:27This is the dream scenario. Think of Google or Facebook.
- 10:31In their early days. They had incredible unit
- 10:33economics, they scaled rapidly and they were generating massive
- 10:37profits almost instantly. But this outcome is incredibly
- 10:41rare. Very rare.
- 10:43The second outcome is the Field of Dream scenario.
- 10:46Build it and the profits will eventually come.
- 10:48Exactly. Amazon is the poster child here.
- 10:51They famously lost money for a decade, subsidizing shipping and
- 10:54undercutting competitors. But their underlying unit
- 10:57economics, the logistics network they were building, were
- 10:59fundamentally sound. So once they hit critical mass,
- 11:02the massive profits finally materialized.
- 11:05Yes, but the danger is that every single modern founder
- 11:08thinks they're building the next Amazon.
- 11:10They assume that if they just get big enough, the profits will
- 11:13magically appear. But that assumption leads
- 11:15directly to the third outcome, right?
- 11:17The Field of Nightmares. Yes, Field of Nightmares.
- 11:20This happens when a company scales up, captures a massive
- 11:22audience, but never actually figures out a pathway to profit
- 11:26because the underlying business model doesn't mathematically
- 11:29work at scale. You end up with a giant company
- 11:31that is perpetually bleeding cash.
- 11:34Yep. And then there's the absolute
- 11:36worst case scenario, the big bad business model.
- 11:39Oh boy. This is where a founder takes an
- 11:42inherently broken idea, an idea with negative unit economics,
- 11:46and just pours venture capital gasoline on it to make it
- 11:49massive. And the ultimate textbook
- 11:51example of this has to be We Work.
- 11:54We work is a master class in ignoring the physics of
- 11:56business. Mechanically, they were taking
- 11:58on massive 40 year commercial real estate leases.
- 12:02They were legally on the hook for decades of rent.
- 12:04Insane overhead. And then they took that same
- 12:07space, painted the walls, added kombucha on tap and subleased it
- 12:11to freelancers and startups on three month flexible contracts.
- 12:14So they were locking in long term liabilities while relying
- 12:17on highly volatile short term revenue.
- 12:19Exactly. It's a duration mismatch in
- 12:21finance. Borrowing short term to fund
- 12:24long term assets is notoriously dangerous.
- 12:27Wework's solution to this fundamental existential flaw was
- 12:30just to ignore it and simply multiply the model across
- 12:33hundreds of buildings globally. It sounds like scaling is
- 12:36essentially just a giant magnifying glass.
- 12:39How so? Well if you have a beautiful
- 12:41diamond, meaning you have strong unit economics, the magnifying
- 12:46glass makes it look spectacular. The whole world can see the
- 12:49value. But if you have a massive crack
- 12:52in the stone, like a duration mismatch like we work, scaling
- 12:56just makes the flaw impossible to ignore.
- 12:59The magnifying glass doesn't fix the crack, it just amplifies it.
- 13:03That is a great way to put it. Building on that analogy,
- 13:05scaling a broken model means instead of having one crack
- 13:08diamond, you now have 500 cracked diamonds in 50 different
- 13:12countries and you are paying a premium commercial lease on
- 13:15every single one of them. The structural integrity fails
- 13:18spectacularly. Exactly.
- 13:19Which brings up the $1,000,000 question for me.
- 13:22If big bad business models like we work are obviously flawed at
- 13:25their core, like if anyone looking at the basic math can
- 13:28see the crack in the diamond, why do highly educated,
- 13:31incredibly wealthy people keep funding them?
- 13:34That is the big question. To answer that, we really have
- 13:37to dismantle some of the deeply ingrained mythology surrounding
- 13:40venture capitalists. The popular narrative is that
- 13:43VC's are these financial visionaries.
- 13:46Probably fueled by watching too many seasons of Shark Tank,
- 13:49honestly. Completely.
- 13:51We assume they have this elite, almost magical ability to look
- 13:55at a founder's pitch deck and immediately calculate whether
- 13:58the underlying business architecture is sound.
- 14:01But Damodarian's analysis of the data shows a very different
- 14:04reality. Instead of being independent
- 14:06financial architects, VC's heavily exhibit herd mentality.
- 14:10Herd mentality, really. Yeah, they suffer from the same
- 14:13FOMO fear of missing out as retail investors.
- 14:16If a few prominent VC firms start pouring billions into
- 14:19artificial intelligence, suddenly every other VC firm
- 14:23pivots entirely to AI to avoid looking like they missed the
- 14:26boat. Wow.
- 14:27So the capital allocation isn't necessarily driven by screening
- 14:30for viable unit economics, it is largely driven by following the
- 14:34crowd. The source material also makes a
- 14:36crucial distinction between pricing a company and valuing a
- 14:39company right. Yes, this is key.
- 14:40We assume VC's are doing deep intrinsic valuation, you know,
- 14:45calculating cash flows and margins, but they're mostly just
- 14:48pricing. Right.
- 14:49They look at what the public markets are currently paying for
- 14:51similar companies, and then they apply an arbitrary multiple to
- 14:54some vanity metric like projected subscriber growth five
- 14:58years down the road. Wait, they project those vanity
- 15:00metrics into the future and then they bring that future value
- 15:03back to today using what they call hurdle rates, right?
- 15:06Yes, and this is a fascinating piece of financial engineering.
- 15:09In traditional finance, a discount rate is based on the
- 15:12actual mathematical risk of the business failing.
- 15:16But VCs will look at a startup and arbitrarily demand a 30
- 15:20percent, 50%, or even 70% hurdle rate.
- 15:23They claim they need that level of return to justify the risk of
- 15:27the investment. Let's unpack the mechanics of
- 15:29that for a second. How does AVC walking into a
- 15:32boardroom and demanding a 70% return actually affect the
- 15:35founder? It mathematically shrinks the
- 15:37present day valuation of the startup.
- 15:40If AVC agrees that a company will be worth a billion dollars
- 15:43in five years, but they apply a massive 70% discount rate
- 15:47backwards to figure out what it's worth today, the current
- 15:51valuation plummets. Oh I see.
- 15:52And when the current valuation is artificially pushed down, the
- 15:56VC gets to buy a much larger percentage of the company's
- 15:59equity for the exact same amount of cash.
- 16:02So these hurdle rates aren't really objective measures of
- 16:05risk. Not at all.
- 16:06They're aggressive negotiating tools used to grab more
- 16:09ownership. We tend to view VC's as these
- 16:12stabilizing forces building the economy, but when you look at
- 16:15how they follow trends and manipulate pricing models, they
- 16:18start to look less like financial architects and more
- 16:21like sports bettors playing long odds.
- 16:23That is heavily supported by data from Cambridge Associates
- 16:26Actually, which tracks VC performance.
- 16:29What does the data say? On average, across almost every
- 16:31measured time period, the venture capital industry
- 16:34collectively underperforms the NASDAQ.
- 16:36The average VC delivers negative alpha wait.
- 16:39Negative alpha. Let's translate that for a
- 16:41second. Are you saying that after all
- 16:44the hype, all the exclusive networking events, and the
- 16:47exorbitant management fees, the average venture capital fund is
- 16:51literally doing worse than if they had just blindly put their
- 16:55clients money into a basic NASDAQ index fund?
- 16:59Yes, that is exactly what the math shows.
- 17:02Trying to pick individual winners in the startup space is
- 17:05incredibly inefficient for the average fund.
- 17:08The entire industry survival relies heavily on the power law
- 17:11of returns. Meaning a tiny microscopic
- 17:14fraction of massive winners has to pay for all the spectacular
- 17:18failure. Right.
- 17:18And that power law is getting way more extreme.
- 17:21Back in the 2005 to 2010 period, the top 10% of their investments
- 17:26drove about 53% of all their returns.
- 17:28It's already a pretty steep curve.
- 17:30Look at the data from the 2023 to 2026 period.
- 17:32Now the top 1% of winners is driving 80% of all returns. 1%
- 17:37so 99% of the companies they invest in are either complete
- 17:40failures or totally irrelevant to their bottom.
- 17:42Line basically, yeah. That isn't traditional
- 17:44investing. That is playing the lottery.
- 17:46You're buying 100 tickets hoping one hits the jackpot.
- 17:49Exactly. And if VC's are essentially
- 17:52playing a high stakes momentum game, we have to look at how
- 17:55that specific behavior has broken containment.
- 17:59It isn't just a Silicon Valley problem anymore.
- 18:02It's infected the broader public stock market.
- 18:05Oh, for sure. Damodaron points to the rise of
- 18:07what he calls the Gray market. 10 or 20 years ago, if a startup
- 18:11needed to raise billions of dollars to scale globally, they
- 18:14had to do an initial public offering.
- 18:16They had to go public. Right, But the landscape has
- 18:19shifted. Today, mutual funds, massive
- 18:22pension funds and sovereign wealth funds are bypassing the
- 18:25public markets and pouring money directly into private companies.
- 18:28So startups can raise 10s of billions of dollars while
- 18:31staying completely private. Operating in this Gray market,
- 18:34yes, we are seeing this play out right now with the massive
- 18:37artificial intelligence companies.
- 18:39The traditional mechanism of going public forces, a company
- 18:42to open its books, exposes unit economics and face scrutiny from
- 18:46everyday investors. The Gray market delays that
- 18:48scrutiny, sometimes indefinitely.
- 18:50And this ties into a massive structural shift in how the
- 18:54public markets actually behave. The source references data from
- 18:58Ken French going back to 1927, analyzing 2 competing market
- 19:02forces, momentum and reversal. OK.
- 19:05Break those down for us. Momentum is essentially the
- 19:07traders mindset. You buy a stock because it's
- 19:10already going up, you assume the crowd is right and you just ride
- 19:13the wave. Scaling and hype are heavily
- 19:16rewarded here and. Reversal.
- 19:17Reversal is the fundamental value investors mindset, the
- 19:21idea that eventually a company's actual fundamentals, its ability
- 19:25to generate cash, will force the stock price to correct.
- 19:28If a company is unprofitable, the price will eventually
- 19:31reverse downward. Right.
- 19:32So for a healthy functioning market, you need both of these
- 19:36forces keeping each other in check.
- 19:38But the data tells a very clear story.
- 19:41While momentum is still going incredibly strong, the reversal
- 19:44mechanism has effectively died. Died completely.
- 19:47Since the 1990s, betting on fundamentals to eventually
- 19:50correct the market has been a losing strategy.
- 19:53The market's immune system is broken.
- 19:55Wow, so why did reversal die? What is the mechanism actually
- 20:00killing it? There are a few key culprits
- 20:03working together here. First, we had over a decade of
- 20:06extremely low interest rates, often called ZIRP or 0 Interest
- 20:11rate policy. When money is practically free
- 20:14to it encourages reckless risk taking.
- 20:17Investors aren't punished for funding unprofitable companies
- 20:20because capital is so cheap. And then you have the massive
- 20:23rise of passive index funds and ETFs, which now make up over 50%
- 20:28of the entire market. The mechanics of passive
- 20:31investing completely break fundamental analysis.
- 20:34When you buy an S&P 500 index fund every two weeks with your
- 20:37paycheck, your money is automatically distributed to the
- 20:40companies in the index based on their size.
- 20:42You aren't looking at their unit economics.
- 20:44No, you're just brinely buying the basket.
- 20:46Historically, the stock market acted as a weighing machine.
- 20:50It weighed the actual fundamental value of a business.
- 20:52But passive investing turns the market into a blind voting
- 20:55machine. If a stock's price goes up due
- 20:58to hype, it takes up a larger percentage of the index, meaning
- 21:01passive funds are forced to mechanically buy more of it,
- 21:04driving the price up further regardless of profit.
- 21:08And you add the social media effect on top of that.
- 21:10Everyone gets their financial news from a fire hose of
- 21:13information like Twitter or TikTok.
- 21:15It creates this constant flood of noise where everyone has an
- 21:19opinion, but it dilutes the real financial catalysts.
- 21:22Exactly. The fundamental truth about a
- 21:24company's balance sheet gets completely buried under an
- 21:27avalanche of hype and memes. And because these companies have
- 21:31access to unlimited private capital from the Gray market,
- 21:34and because the public market only rewards momentum while
- 21:36ignoring fundamentals, the types of companies eventually entering
- 21:40the public fear fundamentally changed.
- 21:42This is the fallout companies are IP owing much later in their
- 21:45life cycles. They are vastly bigger in terms
- 21:48of revenue and market cap when they finally do hit the Stock
- 21:51Exchange. But here is the terrifying
- 21:53metric, Damodarin points out. Far fewer of them are actually
- 21:57profitable compared to the companies going public decades
- 22:00ago. We are minting global giants
- 22:03entirely built on unproven business models.
- 22:07And because they stay private for so long, insulated by this
- 22:10culture of founder worship from their VC backers, they develop
- 22:14severe corporate governance nightmare.
- 22:17Oh for sure. You increasingly see these
- 22:19companies going public with dual class share structures.
- 22:22Which means the everyday public investor buying the stock gets 0
- 22:26voting rights. Exactly.
- 22:28While the founder retains absolute voting control, the
- 22:31founder is completely entrenched and unaccountable to the public
- 22:34market. Which creates a massive danger
- 22:36because of what we can call the too big to fix problem.
- 22:40Explain that well, if you're a nimble startup with $10 million
- 22:43in revenue and you realize your business model is mathematically
- 22:45flawed, you can pivot. You can change direction over a
- 22:48weekend. But if you only realize your
- 22:51unit economics are broken when you have $10 billion in revenue
- 22:55and 50,000 employees, you cannot pivot a battleship on a dime.
- 22:59The structural flaw is permanently baked into the
- 23:01foundation. Which really brings us back to
- 23:04the current AI boom. We hear a lot about the
- 23:06importance of visionary storytelling.
- 23:09AI companies are promising they will fundamentally change how
- 23:12humanity operates. Storytelling is necessary to
- 23:15attract capital to build the future.
- 23:18Vision is great, but isn't Damodaran a specific critique
- 23:22that the stories being told to investors today are dangerously
- 23:25incomplete? That is exactly his point.
- 23:27Listen to the pitches for these massive AI startups.
- 23:30They talk endlessly about their total addressable market.
- 23:33They emphasize scale, but they almost never talk about unit
- 23:37economic. Because it's probably terrible
- 23:38right now. Right.
- 23:39They avoid explaining how, mechanically, the immense cost
- 23:42of computing power and data storage will eventually yield to
- 23:46sustainable profit margins. And that leads to the most
- 23:48chilling scenario in this entire analysis.
- 23:51What happens when disruptors are armed with unlimited VC capital
- 23:55but fundamentally lack a sustainable, profitable business
- 23:59model? We have seen this play out
- 24:01before. Look at the early days of Uber
- 24:03and Lyft. They came into cities and
- 24:05systematically dismantled the traditional taxi industry
- 24:08infrastructure. They disrupted a status quo
- 24:11that, frankly, many consumers felt needed disrupting.
- 24:14That is true, but we have to look at how they did it.
- 24:17They didn't beat the taxi industry simply by having a
- 24:20better app, they beat them by using billions of dollars of
- 24:23venture capital money to artificially subsidized every
- 24:26single ride. They offered prices that were
- 24:29mathematically unsustainable to starve out the competition.
- 24:32Exactly. Uber and Lyft eventually figured
- 24:34out a path to sustainability by raising prices, but imagine the
- 24:37alternative scenario. What's the alternative?
- 24:40Imagine if they had permanently destroyed the old taxi
- 24:42infrastructure, eventually realized their own business
- 24:45model was mathematically impossible at scale, and went
- 24:48bankrupt. The old functional way is gone
- 24:52and the new way is dead. You are left with a smoking
- 24:54crater. When you build massive economy
- 24:57altering disruptors using VC subsidies instead of actual
- 25:01sustainable profits, you are playing with fire.
- 25:04That is incredibly stark. Let's recap the journey we have
- 25:08been on today. We started at the Foundation
- 25:10exploring the Founders dilemma and realizing that the Silicon
- 25:13Valley push to scale at all costs isn't a universal law of
- 25:16physics. Sometimes restricting scale to
- 25:19protect your margins, like Ferrari does, is actually the
- 25:21winning move. We explored how terrible unit
- 25:24economics, like a duration mismatch, don't get fixed by
- 25:27scaling. They just turn into massive
- 25:29disasters like we work. We peeled back the mythology of
- 25:32venture capital, seeing that their returns are heavily
- 25:34reliant on a gambling style power law where they need one
- 25:37massive winner to pay for 99 failures.
- 25:40We also tracked how the rise of the Gray market and the death of
- 25:43fundamental value investing killed by cheap money and
- 25:45passive index funds have created an environment where massive
- 25:49profitless giants are allowed to reshape our economy without
- 25:52accountability. So.
- 25:54Why does all of this matter to you?
- 25:56The next time you're scrolling through your news feed and you
- 25:58see a breathless headline about a new Unicorn startup valued at
- 26:02$50 billion, take a breath. Look past the valuation, look
- 26:07past the hype, and ask yourself a very simple, boring question.
- 26:11Wait, do they actually make more money on their product than it
- 26:14costs to produce? I want to leave you with one
- 26:16final thought to Mull over. If our entire broader economy is
- 26:20increasingly relying on disruptors that are kept alive
- 26:23purely by VC power law, gambling, a system where 99% of
- 26:28ideas are expected to fail but are still given enough money to
- 26:31severely damaged stable legacy industries along the way, what
- 26:35happens to the everyday workers and to you the consumer when
- 26:38that venture capital well of eventually dries up and the
- 26:41artificial subsidies disappear? When the music stops, someone
- 26:43has to pay the bill. That is a question we might all
- 26:46have to face sooner rather than later.
- 26:48Thank you for joining us on this deep dive.
- 26:50Stay curious.