Latest / Credit Union Exam Solutions Presents With Flying Colors / CAMELS Gets an Overhaul: Inside the NCUA’s Proposed Changes
Transcript
- 0:00treichel: Hey, everyone.
- 0:00This is Mark Trakel with another episode of With Flying Colors.
- 0:03I'm here today with Todd Miller and Steve Farr of my team, also formerly of NCUA.
- 0:08Guys, how are you doing today?
- 0:10farrar: Good morning.
- 0:11Windy and cold here in Montana today.
- 0:13treichel: Windy and cold.
- 0:14A good day to talk about CAMELS.
- 0:18Miller: Absolutely.
- 0:19farrar: So- We
- 0:19treichel: even had
- 0:20farrar: some road closures around here-
- 0:21treichel: Road closures ⦠from the
- 0:22Miller: weather.
- 0:22It's,
- 0:23treichel: it's gonna be 90 degrees where I'm at I wish I
- 0:26was windy and road closures.
- 0:2890 is a little too hot for me.
- 0:30But speaking of hot, we're gonna talk about CAMELS, but guys, can you guys
- 0:34in case someone's listening for the first time or watching for the first
- 0:36time, could you give a short summary of your background before we jump into
- 0:41what's going on in the world of CAMELS?
- 0:44farrar: I'll go first.
- 0:4530-plus year at, years at NCUA.
- 0:48NCUA career is broke into two parts.
- 0:51The first half would've been in the field as primarily a problem case
- 0:55officer, predominantly on the West Coast, but involved with a lot of
- 0:59turnaround situations, conservatorships enforcement actions and that sort.
- 1:04And then I followed you to the central office, and I worked
- 1:08remotely from there for many years in the Division of Risk Management.
- 1:13And in that, I got to be involved in a lot of things.
- 1:15Ma- the best thing was I did the tr- a lot, a week of training
- 1:19for the problem case officers.
- 1:20Actually, everybody had to take it problem resolution.
- 1:23Worked on the enforcement instruction, and just a lot of issues, the,
- 1:29when the 2008, the corporate s- situation, helped with that.
- 1:33And then I worked towards the end, I worked a lot on
- 1:35the risk-based capital rule.
- 1:37And then we've been at this consulting now forâ¦
- 1:40Isn't it, what do we say, sixth year?
- 1:42treichel: Yeah, we're in the sixth year.
- 1:43Yeah.
- 1:43Isn't that wild?
- 1:44Wild and
- 1:45farrar: crazy.
- 1:45Yeah, so along those lines, it's been really nice because we can
- 1:48apply what all we learned, and then we also, enfor- it allows us to keep
- 1:52up with what's going on out there.
- 1:54treichel: Yeah, said.
- 1:55Said.
- 1:55Todd?
- 1:57Miller: I spent 34 years with NCUA.
- 2:00I can break my career into three parts.
- 2:02First part, like Steve, I was spent as an examiner, problem case officer.
- 2:07Then I spent a decade as a capital markets specialist in the West Coast.
- 2:11Did a lot of training and developed a lot of NCUA's training on interest
- 2:16rate risk management and liquidity.
- 2:18Spent a lot of time in complex credit unions, both good and bad.
- 2:22The last decade of my career, I spent it as the director of special actions
- 2:26in the Western region, supervising problem case officers, capital markets
- 2:30specialists, regional lending specialists.
- 2:33As a director of special actions, of course, you're dealing with the
- 2:36most complex credit unions and the biggest problem cases in the region.
- 2:40I did do a number of conservatorships.
- 2:43I never kept count of how many I did, but I did keep count of the two I returned
- 2:47to the members 'cause those were kinda highlights in the career and it always
- 2:51satisfying when you can take a troubled institution, put it in conservatorship,
- 2:55and then give it back to the members.
- 2:58There was a lost year there where I was reassigned to Mark on
- 3:02the conservatorship of WesCorp.
- 3:04I call it a lost year 'cause I wasn't allowed to talk to anyone.
- 3:08I did stay with NCUA about a year longer than Mark and Steve Mark called me in when
- 3:13I retired, and I've only been at it five years 'cause I stayed with the agency-
- 3:17a year longer than these other two guys.
- 3:19treichel: That's right.
- 3:20Miller: Very satisfying career at NCUA, and it's been very satisfying
- 3:24the last five years working with Mark and helping credit unions out.
- 3:28treichel: Yeah, this is a lot of fun.
- 3:29I I've learned a lot since leaving NCUA about how NCUAâ¦
- 3:32I learned a lot while I was there, but I've learned even more, I think since.
- 3:34So guys camels, a lot of, A lot of time and en- energy and angst goes
- 3:39into what's the CAMEL rating gonna be, and I'll probably use CAMEL
- 3:42and CAMELS inter- intermittently, because CAMEL just sounds better.
- 3:45But we, of course, we have the S that we've thrown on the end there.
- 3:48But under the the leadership of the Trump administration, we
- 3:51have a lot of deregulation going on, and that's bled into CAMELS.
- 3:55And they've rewritten the rule for the first time in 30 years.
- 3:59I've got a PowerPoint here that we may go through in detail,
- 4:03but it's really our agenda.
- 4:04But i- it's been 30 years since the last the last comprehensive change in 1996.
- 4:10It's approved by the FFIEC.
- 4:12All the banking regulators have to use it, so they run in unison,
- 4:16which is why NCUA is part of this.
- 4:18We may point out some of the reasons that th- that it's a little different for NCUA.
- 4:22But anything on this slide you guys wanna hit, or any opening comments you
- 4:26wanna make- Yeah ⦠before we jump in?
- 4:27Y-
- 4:27farrar: yeah, Mark.
- 4:28Do you recall what the system that we had at NCUA when we first started was called?
- 4:33And-
- 4:34treichel: Early, early warning system.
- 4:36farrar: EWS.
- 4:38treichel: EWS.
- 4:38farrar: And how did we decide what that EWS code would be?
- 4:42treichel: Based on management.
- 4:44farrar: Yeah, probably.
- 4:45Also up around here, because of our distance and travel, we were my
- 4:49trainer had taught me, "Don't code anything more than 100 miles from
- 4:53your house a code three or above."
- 4:57treichel: Yeah.
- 4:58And so they got rid ofâ¦
- 5:00Y- that's a really good talking point, too.
- 5:01They got rid of the early warning system because it put too much judgment
- 5:05into it for the examiner, and you could get ticked off about one thing.
- 5:09So they led to the CAMELS score, where it was originally, I think, based on
- 5:14we had a matrix and if your earnings was X, you'd start off as a two, and if
- 5:18it was Y, you'd start off as a three.
- 5:21But then it would all come home to roost in the M rating which
- 5:24still had a lot of judgment.
- 5:26And a little bit of what's happening here is some ability to use
- 5:29judgment is is going out the door.
- 5:31Todd any thoughts from you as we jump in here?
- 5:34Miller: No, as you mentioned the EWF, I just think of the multi-part carbons
- 5:37and the fact that you only had about a half inch to explain each thing.
- 5:43treichel: Yeah, that's right.
- 5:44And if you started using your typewriter and you got into the middle of a sentence,
- 5:47by God, you'd figure out how to get out of it so that it mostly made sense.
- 5:52And the goldenrod and pink.
- 5:54I didn't know what goldenrod was till I had those carbon papers.
- 5:58Miller: We might be dating ourselves here, though.
- 6:00We
- 6:00treichel: might be.
- 6:01Miller: Yeah.
- 6:01Getting average marks on carbon, three-part carbon.
- 6:04treichel: Yeah, that's right.
- 6:05We are dating ourselves, but that doesn't mean we don't
- 6:07know what we're talking about.
- 6:09farrar: Yeah, we had to do our own math.
- 6:12treichel: R- that's a great point, right?
- 6:13Because then when they turned it into spreadsheets, we knew where
- 6:16the numbers flowed from, and they had to actually train that into
- 6:20examiners a little bit more than us because we had to do the math.
- 6:23Like you said, we had to figure out what the solvency ratio
- 6:26was versus the net worth ratio.
- 6:28Ah, th- thatâ¦
- 6:29Bringing back lots of good memory, good and bad memories.
- 6:32All right, so this slide, we just, of course, we've got capital
- 6:35adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, sensitivity.
- 6:39You get a one, two, three, four or five in those categories.
- 6:43I'm gonna blow by this one here.
- 6:46So here we're getting into some of the meat of what's being proposed.
- 6:49So there's a proposal out there that talks about making changes to CAMELS,
- 6:55and these are some of the highlights.
- 6:56Guys, is there anyâ¦
- 6:57Let's walk through these or anything else you might wanna say
- 7:00relative to what's on the slide.
- 7:03Anybody wanna start?
- 7:06Miller: It's a chicken or egg question in my mind.
- 7:08So you walk into a credit union as an examiner, do you start with the composite
- 7:12and then figure out your components, or do you figure out your components
- 7:16and then decide on composite rating?
- 7:19I will just say over my career I did it both ways.
- 7:23treichel: Steve?
- 7:24farrar: Y- yeah, I was a real numbers-driven person
- 7:28m- more than anything.
- 7:30And, but my difference was is I was more interested in what do the
- 7:34numbers look like six months from now.
- 7:37That had a lot to do with how we're- we'd ultimately decide on that
- 7:41especially the composite score.
- 7:43treichel: And itâ¦
- 7:44This reminds me of a thing I say on occasion, which is it's it's
- 7:47more like classical music thanâ¦
- 7:49It's more like jazz music than classical music, or vice versa.
- 7:53But by getting rid of judgment, it becomes more like classical music that
- 7:57you need to play in a particular way.
- 7:59J- jazz music is a little bit more impromptu and and free-flowing.
- 8:04And the changes to the CAMELS is going to take away some judgment.
- 8:08And judgment I relate to that that jazz comparison.
- 8:12Any thoughts on the first bullet here?
- 8:14Management no longer gets primacy in the composite.
- 8:16The agency's own data shows that that was the most influential factor.
- 8:22Any thoughts on management there you wanna mention?
- 8:27farrar: Not on that one
- 8:29treichel: Okay.
- 8:29Next up, trim management factors.
- 8:32Removes depth and succession, responsiveness
- 8:35to auditors and supervisors.
- 8:36We had a client recently that got dinged for not being responsive in a way that
- 8:41didn't make a whole lot of sense from our perspective, but and willingness
- 8:45to conserve to serve community needs.
- 8:48Thoughts on that on what can go into management?
- 8:53farrar: I think on that, that one there, really FDIC is reevaluating
- 8:58what they call process related issues, and then that's kinda where that
- 9:02one comes into play, is like these items are more along those lines
- 9:07Miller: Give an example of that whole process thing.
- 9:11So we had out there a group of credit unions, I'd call them perpetual threes.
- 9:15A lot of them were smaller credit unions.
- 9:18They would have these unresolved findings.
- 9:21Sometimes they would sit there for literally a decade as a code
- 9:25three, the same unresolved findings.
- 9:28You'd have these process issues that were giving them the CAMEL threes, but their
- 9:33financial performance would be consistent.
- 9:36It wouldn't be great, but it would be consistent.
- 9:38Capital would stay level.
- 9:40We weren't gonna give them a code four.
- 9:42We weren't gonna give them a C and D.
- 9:44We weren't gonna code them a four when they're, 300 miles away from
- 9:47home because they just floated along.
- 9:52You knew eventually management was gonna retire and, they would probably merge.
- 9:58But a lot of those, they were process-related code threes.
- 10:01Really, the credit unions were fairly resilient, and that's one of the--
- 10:07maybe getting ahead of ourselves- That's okay ⦠but that's the things
- 10:10that disappeared in all the ratings.
- 10:12So if you look before, there was a lot of mention about
- 10:15resiliency to financial change.
- 10:18All that language is gone in this one.
- 10:21It's a little bit with the three and four composite but, in NCUA's CAMEL
- 10:25system, they mentioned resiliency in just about every single component.
- 10:30And that language about resiliency to financial changes, that's all gone.
- 10:36That kind of jumps out at me.
- 10:37We throw in the material risk threshold, and we take out all
- 10:41this language about resiliency.
- 10:44treichel: And in that regard, so resiliency when I hear that
- 10:47disappearing and I think what Steve talked about, what's it gonna be
- 10:50like six months down the road?
- 10:52And, basing it on the numbers, but you wanna also be for-forward-looking.
- 10:56Resiliency seems to be a forward-looking m-m-m-concept, right?
- 11:03A-and it makes it harder to, to look to the future.
- 11:09It sounds like it almost has to be more based on just the math.
- 11:13Miller: It almost sounds like when you read their definition, do you
- 11:16want to code them based on your exam date, not where they're going?
- 11:20Steve had said-
- 11:22treichel: Yes
- 11:22⦠Miller: give them credit where I'm going.
- 11:23It's no, we want to give them a grade where they're at today.
- 11:26And there's good and bad to that.
- 11:28treichel: Yep, good point.
- 11:32Any other, on this slide, anything else jump out, guys?
- 11:35farrar: Yep.
- 11:35Number three is a big one.
- 11:36treichel: Okay.
- 11:37farrar: This is that material financial risk, right?
- 11:39Are we covering that later or-
- 11:41treichel: We canâ¦
- 11:42Let's do it now.
- 11:42We can piggyback off it later.
- 11:44farrar: All right.
- 11:45'Cause it, it, in the notice and request for comment, it is in there 38 times,
- 11:52so it tells you that is a major issue.
- 11:54And so I was like, okay, make, you make sure that we really understand what they
- 12:00believe is a material financial risk.
- 12:02And the definition that I could find material financial risk is, "Any act,
- 12:07practice, or failure to act by a financial institution that has already caused
- 12:14material harm to its financial condition or, if continued, could reasonably be
- 12:19expected to do this includes risks that threaten the stability of an institution's
- 12:24earnings capital, or present a material risk of loss to the insurance funds."
- 12:31So that is the, basic under definition of material financial risk.
- 12:37But it's not- Which is nice that it's defined
- 12:39⦠treichel: it's defined.
- 12:40It's a littleâ¦
- 12:40It's not like defining beauty exactly, 'cause it is defined, but
- 12:44then anytime anything is defined with words, what do those individual
- 12:48words mean within that definition?
- 12:51Yes.
- 12:51And then how does this relate to safety and soundness or unsafe and unsound,
- 12:54which I think we'll get to as well.
- 12:56Todd, any thoughts on this number three here?
- 12:59Miller: Yeah.
- 12:59When do the immaterial things become material?
- 13:06It's that forward-looking thing.
- 13:07You look at new programs, for instance.
- 13:10Let's just take Centrix for m- many years ago because no credit
- 13:14unions are involved in it.
- 13:16treichel: Good
- 13:17Miller: example.
- 13:17It, it started out very small in a lot of credit unions.
- 13:19Examiners did identify a lot of process-related holes, and eventually
- 13:25it became quite large and it caused several credit union failures.
- 13:29But when along to that matrix, does this new program that started out
- 13:34small become a material financial risk because you have the processes
- 13:39and eventually things crumble?
- 13:40Which is- Well- ⦠an interesting question, is when along, when does
- 13:46that concentration risk hit a point where this becomes a material thing?
- 13:51treichel: Wow.
- 13:52That's a, that's an interesting take.
- 13:53Yeah.
- 13:53And NCUA is big on concentration risk.
- 13:56They have letters to credits.
- 13:57They, they-- I believe the letters are still out there.
- 13:59Maybe they'll pull some of them under, you know- the concentration- the
- 14:02Miller: 53
- 14:03treichel: more
- 14:04⦠Miller: concentration risk is mentioned a couple times in the revision.
- 14:07treichel: Okay, good.
- 14:08Miller: But still, it's back to Steve's thing.
- 14:10He was looking where things were going.
- 14:13This proposal seems to, I wanna grade you on this day.
- 14:18And, is it gonna resultâ¦
- 14:21And, part of it is gonna be how well are examiners trained on this and
- 14:24how does it change their behavior.
- 14:27But there's still a piece of it, do examiners catch things and address
- 14:31them early enough before they become that material financial risk?
- 14:35This is almost, let's wait till it's a problem before we deal with it a thing.
- 14:40Or there could be a propensity for that to occur the way this is written.
- 14:46treichel: Sure.
- 14:46And when you say that, I think short term, if I'm a credit union or if I'm talking
- 14:50to one of my clients a more restrictive CAMEL code downgrade is viewed as a good
- 14:57thing because if you don't downgrade me as quickly or you don't do a a warning shot
- 15:03code three, or I just wanna make a point code three you're limiting those options.
- 15:09That's a good thing for a credit union.
- 15:10Long term if you're focusing on the past instead of what's on the road in front
- 15:15of you the likelihood of that leading to some insurance fund losses is real.
- 15:21And I'm gonna be recording a podcast, updating a podcast I did on conser-
- 15:26the conservatorship that happened at NCUA recently, where there's about
- 15:30a $70 to $90 million loss that's brewing to the insurance fund.
- 15:34And so when those things start dropping out of the sky and credit unions might
- 15:38have to pay money into the insurance fund and there might be a change, in
- 15:41the White House that has a reaction to change all this CAMELs back it won't be
- 15:47as fun for credit unions at that juncture.
- 15:49But that's kinda one way to look at it
- 15:55Any four, five or six on here.
- 15:57Anything here you wanna highlight, guys?
- 16:01Miller: It says a composite recalibration.
- 16:04If you read the definitions, they didn't change very much.
- 16:07Like I said, they took out the resiliency type of things.
- 16:11But I think for the vast majority of credit unions, this isn't gonna
- 16:16change their CAMEL composite at all, and the definitions are very
- 16:20similar to what they were before.
- 16:23You mentioned the big changes in that material risk threshold.
- 16:27They took out a lot of process-related stuff.
- 16:30If the credit union's just kinda right at the edge between, a two and a three
- 16:35or a three and a four, where this may have some impact on how they get rated.
- 16:41And the big question will always be how does NCUA institutionalize a new
- 16:46rating system with examiners that have been using the same one for 30 years?
- 16:52treichel: Sure.
- 16:53A lot of those 30-year-old, 30-year-old folks that have been doing it,
- 16:56not 30-year-old, people who've been doing it for 30 years left in
- 16:59the buyout, and of course they've got 27 to, what, 30% less staff.
- 17:03How will they train?
- 17:04How will they socialize this?
- 17:06Is going to be a very big part of of what actually does or doesn't happen here.
- 17:10But you're right, a lot of credit unions that have been Code 1s and Code 2s forever
- 17:14aren't even really gonna notice anything.
- 17:16It's when you get to the edge of a 3 or the edge of a 4 where
- 17:19it's gonna get more challenging
- 17:26So what is it?
- 17:27This, we got the big one demoting the M.
- 17:29Management loses the special consideration that let it override the other five
- 17:37Thoughts on this on this concept, guys?
- 17:41Miller: You have most of them captured in the slide, but there's another
- 17:45little piece that kind of affects our, a lot of our clients, 'cause we
- 17:50see this in findings all the time.
- 17:52NCUA's current rating system, and they have it in literally
- 17:57every composite rating, they have it in all the components.
- 18:02They talk about it in the management rating.
- 18:04They take out the word risk management systems commensurate
- 18:08with size and complexity.
- 18:10That's only in this proposal once or twice, where before it was everywhere.
- 18:15treichel: Okay.
- 18:16Miller: Examiners use that a lot in their findings.
- 18:20When you read examiners' exam reports, when they describe their
- 18:24composite rating, especially when it was down there in a three and a
- 18:27four, they would use that language all the time to justify their rating.
- 18:31Your risk management system are not sufficient for the size and
- 18:35complexity of the credit union.
- 18:37They took that size and complexity out of the rating system just about everywhere.
- 18:42So it speaks to maybe there's more objective criteria involved here rather
- 18:46than the size and complexity, which means different things to different examiners.
- 18:52treichel: Yeah, that's a great point.
- 18:53Size and complexity is a judgment matter, and they're trying
- 18:56to eliminate the judgment.
- 18:57Steve, any thoughts on that or anything else on this slide?
- 19:00farrar: No, that was a good point that Todd made there.
- 19:03treichel: And then I'll just highlight the for those of you who are listening
- 19:06and not watching under the proposal, management is weighed alongside
- 19:10the other five, not above them.
- 19:12The composite is meant to reflect overall financial condition.
- 19:15No single leg- leg should quietly drive the score.
- 19:19So that could be where, y- if you got a three in capital and you had twos
- 19:22in other things, but the capital was something that the examiner wanted
- 19:25to make a big point on, they might give management a, a two or a three.
- 19:30The ability to weigh heavily on one thing in management is being
- 19:36watered down for lack of better word
- 19:41So let's see.
- 19:42Here we got the new bar for a downgrade to land on a three or worse on management.
- 19:46There now has to be a material financial risk, not just a process gap.
- 19:51Thoughts on this?
- 19:58Miller: I think it's a good thing, i-- We see this all the time with exam reports.
- 20:04They'll get downgrades, not because management is doing something wrong,
- 20:08but because there's no documentation of their decision-making process.
- 20:13Or they'll get downgrades because of policy issues.
- 20:17We've seen this with liquidity, especially where their liquidity position is
- 20:22fine, management has strengthened, but their policy allows a risk threshold
- 20:26that's quite low, so two or three, and they'll hang a three on that component
- 20:30just because their policy allows it, not because management does it.
- 20:35I thought it was always interesting when I was in credit, especially with loans.
- 20:39I would go look at a half dozen or twenty loans, and then I'd go read the policy.
- 20:43But what do the loans really look like?
- 20:45'Cause sometimes, good policies don't necessarily mean good practices, and
- 20:50weak policies don't always indicate that you have bad practices either.
- 20:55Sometimes experience weighs a lot and management can be really effective,
- 20:59even all that documentation isn't there.
- 21:02And this is going to give those folks a leg up, if you will
- 21:10treichel: Yeah, that I always used to use the example of I'd rather have a
- 21:12good quality commercial loan portfolio and a policy that needs some tweaks,
- 21:18as opposed to a great policy but the quality wasn't as good, right?
- 21:23So that's a great point.
- 21:24Steve any thoughts here on this on this slide or what
- 21:28we've been chatting about here?
- 21:30farrar: Yeah, the, one of the main goals that is in the notice
- 21:34is the improving consistency.
- 21:37So I think in the, a, a, what a, a three in management looks like and what a
- 21:43three composite looks like would be a little bit more comparable credit union
- 21:48to credit union than it can be now.
- 21:51treichel: Yeah.
- 21:52Great point.
- 21:52Great point.
- 21:53And on the slide I'm gonna, I'm gonna pull out an item here
- 21:55I had highlighted in yellow.
- 21:57The carve out to watch.
- 21:59Examiners can still assign a three plus, so three or worse, for
- 22:02unreliable reporting, failure to safeguard assets, or significant
- 22:06non-compliance with law or regulation.
- 22:08So compliance still has a lot of teeth.
- 22:11I could see as they're de-emphasizingâ¦
- 22:14Just thinking how, how this plays out once it's up and
- 22:18running, one, two or three years.
- 22:19You have less judgment that you could you could instill.
- 22:23And Todd you said do you walk in and come up with the, the
- 22:26code and then work backwards?
- 22:28Or do you come up with the individual components and then you come up with the
- 22:31final, and sometimes you've used either.
- 22:33What I could see is if your gut is tellingâ¦
- 22:36'Cause you have your gut instinct, right?
- 22:38When you do what we did for 30, 34 years, you're there a week and you know just
- 22:44because of everything you know in your head that this is a three or this is a
- 22:47two, and then you work backwards to that.
- 22:49What I see happening here is if that's where your brain is going and you can't
- 22:53use it with judgment, they're gonna highlight failure to safeguard assets.
- 22:57They're gonna highlight significant non-compliance with law or regulation.
- 23:01So where NCUA may put the hammer down is that law or regulation.
- 23:06When they really wanna support a three, if you violated it in less than a material
- 23:12way or a material way, if they wanna support that three, they might use that
- 23:15hammer a little bit more than normal.
- 23:18Miller: You can drive a semi through unreliable reporting.
- 23:23treichel: Good point.
- 23:24But unreliable reporting to who, right?
- 23:27To NCUA, to the board.
- 23:29N- not documenting enough corporate governance.
- 23:32Would that fall into unreliable reporting?
- 23:34I don't know.
- 23:36Miller: I could shoehorn it in there
- 23:37treichel: Right?
- 23:38Yep.
- 23:39So that's the thing is when you change a de- even at, like Steve, earlier
- 23:42we talked about it's good we have a definition, but that definition is made
- 23:45up of words, and then the reality is they have what now, four, 4,500 credit unions
- 23:51that get exams done every 18 months.
- 23:53As you get out there these fixes that make it less judgmental will get watered down
- 24:00over time as they figure out how to use their judgment based on these new words
- 24:06Miller: The saving grace for credit unions, like the unreliable
- 24:09reporting, like I said, you could put anything under that.
- 24:12Your credit risk management systems, your liquidity cashflow forecasting,
- 24:17your budget reports and everything.
- 24:20But at the end of the day, when they write citations, they still have to come
- 24:24back to a regulation, not a CAMEL letter, unless they turn this into a regulation,
- 24:30which I don't think they're going to do.
- 24:32So there is that little bit of protection still on some of these, and
- 24:36they still have to cite regulation.
- 24:41treichel: Great point.
- 24:41Great point.
- 24:42And so the slide I pulled up here talks about is this good or bad?
- 24:45What does the-- what are the pros, what are the cons?
- 24:48The supporters out there in the those who crafted it those who are talking
- 24:52about it from overzealous examiners that, is that the M became a catch-all.
- 24:58That exams got bogged down in dotting I's and crossing T's on documentation
- 25:02instead of, appropriate things.
- 25:04And that it's clearer, more measurable factors mean more predictable outcomes.
- 25:09The other side of it is tying concerns to financial weakness can
- 25:12miss problems before they surface.
- 25:14Management is the early warning system.
- 25:16Weak oversights creates tomorrow's losses, and it could water down examiner
- 25:21discretion to flag emerging risks.
- 25:23Any of those you wanna flush out?
- 25:27Miller: I'll just say one thing.
- 25:28They removed the whole management succession plan and things.
- 25:34In the western region, examiners got reports when there were changes to CEOs.
- 25:39Because there's the big time supervision you need to pay attention when places
- 25:43get new management teams 'cause they take new directions, and 90% of the
- 25:47time that new direction is really good.
- 25:50And then there's that other percentage of time where that new
- 25:52management team takes a left turn and goes off the road, so to speak.
- 25:59treichel: And along those lines to get the last time they changed the
- 26:02exam cycle, they di- they previously didn't allow billion-dollar-plus credit
- 26:06unions to have the extended exam cycle.
- 26:09When they put them into the pool of eligibles, I think one of the things
- 26:13they have on their qualifications is you can't-- you've had to have
- 26:17the same examiner, or excuse me, the same CEO for the last two cycles.
- 26:22So if there's a new CEO, they're going to come in quicker, which is a good thing
- 26:31farrar: And then your point down there in, in blue where it talks
- 26:34about, the failures mainly.
- 26:36Signature Bank is the one that's most often pointed to.
- 26:39There's also Silicon Valley Bank that was a big failure.
- 26:42And that oneâ¦
- 26:43and then the quote I find from FDIC documents, "Failure of Silicon Valley
- 26:48ill- illustrated the issue where most of the outstanding supervisory
- 26:52criticisms when the bank failed were unrelated to core financial risk."
- 26:57Miller: There you
- 26:58farrar: go.
- 26:58And the one criticism related to interest rate risk was focused
- 27:01on the bank's modeling rather than a hole in the balance sheet.
- 27:06So it's, and you gotta figure examiners might have been even
- 27:10living in that institution.
- 27:12treichel: Yep.
- 27:13Yep.
- 27:13farrar: And we had people living in WesCorp.
- 27:17Touché.
- 27:18treichel: Yeah.
- 27:18No, absolutely.
- 27:19farrar: Yeah.
- 27:20And, sometimes you just, you just gotta shake your head at some of
- 27:23the things that, how that ended up g- getting what happened there.
- 27:28treichel: Great point.
- 27:29Great point.
- 27:30And Signature and Silicon Valley Bank were huge losses to the FDIC fund
- 27:35that got charged back to credit union.
- 27:37Or sc- excuse me, got charged back to banks.
- 27:39And any time you make it harder for an examiner you can argue that it's a good
- 27:44thing, and it might be a good thing, but if you take away some of their tools,
- 27:47eventually there will be some losses.
- 27:50And of course, NCUA is a, an insurance company and insurance fund, right?
- 27:53So there should be some losses.
- 27:55And you shouldn't have unlimited resources, but you should
- 27:57have the right resources.
- 27:58So here we are in a period where they've, cut 30% of their staff,
- 28:02and they're watering things down.
- 28:04No doubt in my mind that in the short term that's good for credit unions
- 28:08individually on exams, but in the long term it's gonna lead to some losses.
- 28:11And then when there's losses over certain dollar amounts, the inspector
- 28:14general has to do a loss report and then comes up with recommendations.
- 28:18What do you think those recommendations will be when that happens?
- 28:21Maybe you should go back to a harsher CAMEL.
- 28:23Maybe you should hire more staff.
- 28:26Maybe you shouldn't do this, should do that, et cetera, et cetera.
- 28:28So life is a pendulum in Washington, DC, and we've seen it go both ways.
- 28:35Any thoughts on what I just threw out there?
- 28:41Miller: Maybe a topic for a different podcast, but we're not always very
- 28:45honest about what really went on with our postmortems N- not really that honest.
- 28:50Could you repeat that on the postmortems?
- 28:52We're not really honest about what really happened in a credit
- 28:55union with our postmortems.
- 28:56They, they all kind of point to examiner or to management mistakes.
- 29:02On the credit union side, they're rarely willing to admit NCUA's mistakes.
- 29:08They will have recommendations that, you know, because, as a director of
- 29:12special action problem case officer, you get to read postmortems and you've
- 29:18actually been there and that's not exactly what really happened here."
- 29:22farrar: Yeah.
- 29:23Yeah.
- 29:23That's a really good example because, they came and interviewed me for the
- 29:27postmortem of WestStar, and I kept telling them, the thing you can't forget is just
- 29:32it was the mezzanine structure of the investment that they held, which is why
- 29:37they in- they fell the way they did."
- 29:40The word mezzanine never occurred in the postmortem.
- 29:43As soon as I got it, I was like, we did a word search for it, and
- 29:46I'm like, "I can't believe it."
- 29:47The whole issue as to why those investments were ba- didn't really
- 29:51have to do with the fact that we had those poor mortgages under behind it.
- 29:56It had to do with the structure.
- 29:58treichel: Missed.
- 29:58Yeah.
- 29:58farrar: And that was missed by our examiners in the postmortem, everything.
- 30:01So it can be as simple as somethingâ¦
- 30:04The failure can be caused as, by something as simple as that, and then
- 30:07if you concentrate in it, y- you're you put the insurance fund at risk.
- 30:12treichel: Yeah.
- 30:13Said.
- 30:13Said.
- 30:13Great point.
- 30:14I hadn't heard that word mezzanine.
- 30:15Usually, Iâ¦
- 30:16It's when I'm on Ticketmaster.
- 30:18Look, looking for the nosebleed seats.
- 30:21But yeah, the mezzanine is where the higher risk was, and even
- 30:24though it was triple A rated the mezzanines were blowing up.
- 30:27A- and they had a lot of them.
- 30:33So other items that that kind of relate to this, and Steve, yesterday when we
- 30:37were t- when we had a little bit of pre-conversation on a pre-meeting on the
- 30:41recording of this all right, guys Steve, you had mentioned unsafe and unsound
- 30:46and that there's a, an advantage to banks in some instances because there's
- 30:50a definition of unsafe and unsound, and NCUA doesn't really have one.
- 30:54And that kind of weaves in here.
- 30:56And then another thing that recently got watered down on CAMEL was
- 31:00the re- the removal of reputation risk from consideration in CAMELs.
- 31:05Any thoughts on either of these topics, guys?
- 31:09farrar: The unsafe and unsound one is a issue that I always have had a
- 31:13lot of interest in because when I was training examiners, I'd always ask
- 31:17them, "Where in the regulation i- is unsafe and unsound defined in there?"
- 31:21Because we talk about it all the time, so where is it?
- 31:24And you'd see them, looking through the materials and, where is it?
- 31:27And it didn't exist.
- 31:29It was all based on kinda case loss practices on it.
- 31:33Then, in October, as you have on here the FDIC did issue a it's not a rule, but
- 31:40it's one that's out for comment, I think.
- 31:42The, to establish uniform definition for the term unsafe and unsound, and
- 31:47they define the term unsafe and unsound practices for their purpose of 12 USC 1818
- 31:54as a practice act or failure to act alone or together with other practices, acts,
- 32:00or failures to act that is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent
- 32:04operation, and has materially harmed the financial condition of the institution,
- 32:10or if continued, is likely to materially harm the financial insti- condition of
- 32:15the institution, or present a m- material risk of loss to the insurance fund,
- 32:21treichel: interesting.
- 32:22Todd-
- 32:23farrar: Yeah, and then along those lines, they've also kinda are directing that
- 32:27their kinda their documents of resolutions would be more specifically addressing
- 32:33just kinda those major, like we c- we call them, this s- significant financial risk.
- 32:41They're trying to have those doors much more specific to material financial risks.
- 32:49And I think we see the same thing as Todd, and I can tell you, when we
- 32:52would take over cases as problem case officers and we'd look at the document
- 32:56of resolutions, and it was just like they didn't make them get meteorite insurance.
- 33:02It would have so much stuff in there- ⦠and not focus them
- 33:06on the most important issue that was the material financial risk.
- 33:10So when we took over cases, a lot of times they'd go from a door that contained 15
- 33:15items, that we might have five And be like, "We gotta fix these five things."
- 33:21And then, then we'll work on the oth- we will work on the others,
- 33:24but they're not as important.
- 33:25So that was I think what hopefully might come out of this.
- 33:30treichel: That's I like that.
- 33:31Yeah, and if everything's a priority, nothing's a priority.
- 33:34And that's one of the things.
- 33:34You, you- credit unions will get assigned to special actions and thinks
- 33:37it was gonna get worse, and oftentimes it got better 'cause the staff was
- 33:42the most experienced, and there wasâ¦
- 33:44The staff had seen more.
- 33:45It's like the three of us, sometimes I'll describe to clients is, we saw
- 33:49everything that happened at NCUA.
- 33:50We were involved in the most crazy things.
- 33:53So when we things, when we see things that are less than crazy, we don't overreact.
- 33:57And that can be an overreaction where you have 15 15 doors or 15 findings when you
- 34:03really only need to focus on these three.
- 34:05So maybe that'll be the silver lining, is that they'll use a
- 34:08little bit more discretion on what actually gets into these reports.
- 34:11Todd, any thoughts on unsafe or unsound or reputation risk to add here?
- 34:18Miller: Reputation risk came up very rarely.
- 34:20Occasionally in a small town, you did a stupid program or something.
- 34:24But in my career, it hadâ¦
- 34:28It was very rare for it to have immediate impact on a credit union.
- 34:32Yes, you could get a bad reputation as an institution, and it could
- 34:35affect your growth for a decade.
- 34:37You would hear bad things sometimes about credit unions as long as a
- 34:42decade out when they did foolish things that were known to the public.
- 34:46But in the big scheme of things, it didn't play into CAMEL ratings
- 34:51or risk ratings very often.
- 34:53treichel: Yeah.
- 34:53Great point.
- 34:54Great
- 34:54Miller: point.
- 34:55So it was just a rare thing.
- 34:57And then the whole, and this NCUA getting rid of its experienced
- 35:02staff, this plays into it.
- 35:04You mentioned the problem case officers and folks like Steve
- 35:07and I focusing on just the three or four more important things.
- 35:11That's an experience.
- 35:13The younger examiners, less experienced people, less experienced supervisors.
- 35:18There is a quality control thing, so supervisors should be controlling it, too.
- 35:23But less experienced people, they tend to err on the side of,
- 35:26let's get everything in there.
- 35:28It's a CYA type of move.
- 35:31farrar: Yep.
- 35:32Miller: And, it takes time and experience to be comfortable to say,
- 35:35"Let's set these other things aside and fix these two or three things first."
- 35:39And, NCUA's lost a lot of experience, and it'll be interesting
- 35:44to see how that plays out.
- 35:45But, we've seen it with some of our clients where there are 17, 18, 30 things
- 35:50that they're supposed to deal with.
- 35:52They're just not gonna be able to deal with all of it.
- 35:53And if I do these- There's not enough hours in the
- 35:57day
- 35:57⦠treichel: And if I do these three, it's not mathematically
- 35:59impossible to do these four, right?
- 36:01Yeah.
- 36:03Incongruent reporting.
- 36:07So this is we're getting closer to a wrap here.
- 36:10What it means for your credit union.
- 36:12Succession and soft findings.
- 36:14We've got share insurance fund framing.
- 36:16Newer, newer to full CAMELS.
- 36:19CU's only adopted the sixth component.
- 36:21Yeah, that's not that big a deal here.
- 36:23Compliance still bites.
- 36:24Any thoughts here on this slide on any of those four topics, guys?
- 36:31farrar: I think we've touched on a lot of it, but Todd and I can never
- 36:34overemphasize the reliable reporting issue, 'cause it was just a thing that
- 36:39we- you just could never get past.
- 36:41And it still comes up more often than you would expect.
- 36:46And that was always the, our, the biggest headache.
- 36:49And then your immediate fear is if I don't know what's going on, I'm uncomfortable.
- 36:55treichel: Yep.
- 36:56Yeah, 'cause un- unreliable reporting can lead to losses, can lead to
- 36:59fraud, e- et cetera, et cetera.
- 37:00Great point
- 37:08I think to, toâ¦
- 37:11This goes into the whole safe- this slide goes into the unsafe or unsound.
- 37:15I think eventually NCUA's gonna have to come up with aâ¦
- 37:18The- they'll approve this change, and then there will be this gap on
- 37:23safe and sound, and hopefully NCUA will, and their new chair, if and
- 37:27when he gets in, will define that.
- 37:28Any thoughts on this slide, guys?
- 37:30farrar: Essentially, the FTC's definition of unsafe and unsound in
- 37:34terms of if it's really defined by case law will become basically the
- 37:39standard that- the way point- Great
- 37:41treichel: point.
- 37:41farrar: Yeah
- 37:42⦠treichel: through the
- 37:42farrar: industry.
- 37:42treichel: It'll bleed to credit unions.
- 37:44Great point
- 37:47And again, if you have thoughts on what we said here, reach out to us.
- 37:52If you have thoughts on what should or shouldn't be in the proposal, you have
- 37:56until August 17th to reply and provide your comments to NCUA or the FFIEC
- 38:02or wherever those comments should go.
- 38:04It's outlined in the proposal, no doubt.
- 38:07farrar: Yeah.
- 38:07And they, they did have specific, what is it?
- 38:09It's 11 specific requests for comments on questions that they have proposed, and
- 38:15that's what you do when you're sending out the first part when you're sending
- 38:19out a notice and a request for comment.
- 38:22That is essentially the fishing expedition in the rule making, and then you do a
- 38:27proposed rule and then final kind of rule.
- 38:30So I imagine it would follow the same process.
- 38:32treichel: That's right ⦠if you want- y- I don't think you mentioned it
- 38:35this time, but you were the architect of the Risk-Based Capital Rule.
- 38:38And like you s- you've said several times, once they figure out you
- 38:41know how to write a rule, they have you write several others.
- 38:44So you understand how that mechanics of that all works.
- 38:47All right, guys.
- 38:48farrar: Okay.
- 38:48treichel: Go ahead.
- 38:48Go.
- 38:48farrar: Yeah.
- 38:48There's already ⦠You can go on, and you can see there's already a number
- 38:52of, I think it was 20 yesterday.
- 38:54treichel: Really?
- 38:55I
- 38:55farrar: didn't read them, but if you really wanna find out what
- 38:57people are really saying about this, y- you can always look at the,
- 39:02what comments they're getting in.
- 39:03treichel: And were those on on the NCUA website?
- 39:06Is that where they're Google-
- 39:06farrar: No, it links through with, if you just,
- 39:09treichel: Okay
- 39:10⦠farrar: pull up just any Google search off of it.
- 39:12I think I ended up in it.
- 39:14It's off of the Federal Register site where you it, it has where
- 39:19the comments g- get posted.
- 39:21treichel: Very good.
- 39:22Very good.
- 39:23All right, guys, so Todd, I'm gonna go to you.
- 39:24Any final thoughts
- 39:25Miller: on- Yeah
- 39:26⦠treichel: CAMELS?
- 39:27Miller: We only talked about the management component rating, but the
- 39:30capital markets specialist in me just has to go look at, how they change the
- 39:34sensitivity rating language in this.
- 39:37We've always done podcasts for our, for the whole exam solutions where we talk
- 39:43about, hey, earnings should be weighed much more r- than this whole NEV.
- 39:49And you go look at all the component things in the sensitivity, heavy emphasis
- 39:53on earning, a little bit on market risk.
- 39:56Let's just say NCUA supervisory test as a risk rating measure is not
- 40:01congruent with what this letter says.
- 40:04treichel: Really?
- 40:04Really?
- 40:07Miller: as factors to evaluate sensitivity.
- 40:10treichel: That's that's fascinating.
- 40:12Maybe, maybe that will disappear in the longer term.
- 40:17I know that the current executive director, Larry Fazio was a
- 40:21big push behind that NEV model back when it was put to- put in
- 40:25place to solve some real issues.
- 40:28And of course, we've talked here about how it's not as good as income simulation,
- 40:31and it can create some issues, and it's a little bit of rough justice.
- 40:34But maybe the NEV test is something that'll fall away as a positive because
- 40:39the CAMELS is incongruent with it.
- 40:40I like that take.
- 40:43farrar: Yeah.
- 40:43And I think just this whole n- notice a- and request for comment it essentially
- 40:49would be a good training tool for board members to, if they've been around for
- 40:54a while, and say to read because it's as with some of the other stuff that's been
- 40:58put out, it- it's got a lot of really good basic information that m- that will
- 41:03enhance the ability of board members to certainly understand what's, what they're,
- 41:09they should be doing and looking forward.
- 41:12So I would say it's a, be a good learning tool for board members
- 41:16and staff, senior management staff.
- 41:20treichel: Great point.
- 41:20I'll put a link to it in the show notes.
- 41:23Miller: I thought it, they did well in writing it.
- 41:26It follows the plain writing.
- 41:28They shortened things up down to just the meat.
- 41:31They took out all the little flowery language that regulators like to
- 41:34use, like the size and complexity and all this resiliency stuff.
- 41:39It makes it an easier read than what you had before.
- 41:42And, they laid out, here's the factors that we're gonna use
- 41:45to evaluate each component.
- 41:47And it says, "Examiners, you throw in something else, you really
- 41:50gotta justify those other things."
- 41:53And like I said, in the big scheme of things, I don't think people's
- 41:55ratings are gonna change very much, just those at the edge that we
- 41:59talked about during the podcast.
- 42:01When you're just right on the border, you may end up with a different rating
- 42:05under this if it comes to fruition.
- 42:09treichel: Excellent.
- 42:10Yep, great point.
- 42:11All right, guys, this has been a lot of fun as always.
- 42:13Thank you for your time and your service.
- 42:15And listeners, watchers, I wanna thank you for listening or watching.
- 42:19I hope you will do the same again soon.
- 42:21This is Mark Trakel signing off with flying colors