Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / What's Wrong, Warren?
Transcript
- 0:00Imagine being told right at the absolute peak of market madness,
- 0:05that one of the, well, the biggest names in finance, a real
- 0:08genius, was losing his magic touch.
- 0:12Sounds almost crazy, right? Like questioning gravity.
- 0:15But that's exactly what happened.
- 0:16December 1999, Barron's magazine ran this now pretty infamous
- 0:21cover story. The question, What's wrong,
- 0:23Warren? So today we're diving deep into
- 0:26that article. You we're going to explore how
- 0:28it really captures the challenges, the incredible
- 0:31resilience and honestly the evolution of Warren Buffett's
- 0:34whole investment philosophy over what the last 25 years.
- 0:37The sources you've pulled together are just fascinating,
- 0:39really paints a picture. So our plan is to unpack what
- 0:42happened right after that article came out, you know, the
- 0:44immediate fallout. Then look at how spectacularly
- 0:46right he turned out to be, even if it was, well, relatively
- 0:49short lived in terms of that specific crisis.
- 0:51And then trace how surprisingly relevant those criticisms and
- 0:54his response. Yeah, our mission today is
- 0:56pretty specific. We want to trace how this
- 0:58critique, which seemed almost, well, wrong at the time,
- 1:02targeting someone like the Oracle of Omaha, how it turned
- 1:06into this timeless case study. It's about more than just
- 1:09Buffett, really. It's about big themes like
- 1:11adapting when everything changes around you or, you know, the
- 1:15psychology that drives these crazy market cycles and that
- 1:18constant tension, that push and pull between value investing and
- 1:21growth investing. So this deep dive isn't just
- 1:25about Buffett's story. It's really about understanding
- 1:28these huge market shifts, figuring out what's a real trend
- 1:31versus just hype, and recognizing, you know, the
- 1:34limits. Even the best strategies have
- 1:36limits, especially when things get massive like Berkshire
- 1:38Hathaway did. There are crucial lessons here
- 1:40for everyone listening, I think. OK, let's really try and unpack
- 1:43this. Let's transport ourselves back
- 1:44late 1999. If you weren't really there,
- 1:47it's hard to capture the feeling.
- 1:48The air wasn't just optimistic, it was electric.
- 1:51Just pure speculative energy. What was it actually like?
- 1:54That economic environment right at the peakofthe.com bubble.
- 1:57Oh, it was something else, a real heady mix.
- 2:00You had this explosion of tech innovation, obviously the
- 2:02Internet changing everything. Plus you had low interest rates
- 2:05making money cheap, fueling speculation.
- 2:07The stock market was just moving it.
- 2:09Well, breaking tech speed. That's the phrase everyone used.
- 2:12We saw valuation levels that were frankly unprecedented.
- 2:14Just look at the NASDAQ Composite, the tech index.
- 2:16In 1999 alone, it returned a mind boggling 85.59%.
- 2:21And that was on top of a 400% rise from 95 to its peak in
- 2:25March 2000. It was staggering.
- 2:27Wow. 85% in one year. Exactly.
- 2:30Meanwhile, the Dow Jones, you know, the more traditional
- 2:32index, crossed 10,000 and then 11,000 for the first time ever.
- 2:36And get this, the federal government was actually running
- 2:38budget surpluses. It felt like prosperity without
- 2:40limits, a new golden age driven by clicks and code.
- 2:43Headlines were just screaming about instant millionaires in
- 2:46new tech. And the crazy thing wasn't just
- 2:48the numbers flying around, was it?
- 2:49It was this widespread, almost aggressive rejection of the old
- 2:53rules. Things like, you know, profits,
- 2:56earnings, cash flow, the stuff that had always mattered for
- 2:59valuing a company. I mean, get this, you The Wall
- 3:01Street Journal itself suggested investors should rethink the
- 3:05quaint idea of profits. What does that tell you?
- 3:08What does that dismissal of fundamentals say about the
- 3:10psychology back then? How?
- 3:11How did people even justify these valuations?
- 3:14It tells you everything about the perceived paradigm shift
- 3:17that was the buzzword. People truly believe the
- 3:19fundamental rules of economics had changed traditional metrics.
- 3:23They weren't just ignored, they were openly mocked as relics of
- 3:26the old economy. Valuations went completely off
- 3:29the charts. The Nasdaq's peak price to
- 3:32earnings ratio, the PE ratio, hit 202 hundred. 200 PE Yeah.
- 3:37To put that in perspective, Japan's huge bubble in the 80s
- 3:41that peaked at APE of 80. This was more than double that
- 3:44extreme Investors, big institutions, small retail guys,
- 3:48everyone was just pouring money into companies that have never
- 3:50made a dime. Some didn't even have real
- 3:52revenue. Yet the focus shifted
- 3:54completely. It wasn't about earnings, it was
- 3:56about eyeballs, website visitors, and market share.
- 3:59There was this almost religious belief that profits would just
- 4:02inevitably follow if you got big enough.
- 4:04Capture the users first, figure out money later.
- 4:07It was all narrative, all hope, all these wild growth
- 4:10projections, not much connection to actual financial reality.
- 4:13People genuinely believed this time it's different.
- 4:16But you know, it's usually a red flag.
- 4:17And it felt like it seeped into the whole culture, didn't it?
- 4:21I remember Who Wants to Be a Millionaire was the number one
- 4:23show on TV. Everyone wanted that quick
- 4:25fortune. You heard these stories
- 4:27constantly, people quitting good jobs to become day traders,
- 4:30convinced they'd cracked the code, buying and selling stocks
- 4:33online. And then you have Jeff Bezos,
- 4:34founder of Amazon, which was still losing money back then,
- 4:37named Taimi's person of the year.
- 4:39That just Fed itself, didn't it? This powerful feedback loop.
- 4:43Absolutely. The culture reflected the market
- 4:45perfectly. Yeah, Bezos as person of the
- 4:47year, hugely symbolic, wasn't just about a successful guy.
- 4:51It was the triumph of the young Internet innovator over the old
- 4:54guard. This wasn't just a bull market.
- 4:56People thought. It was that paradigm shift.
- 4:58The Internet had changed the fundamentals forever.
- 5:00That was the belief. And rising stock prices just
- 5:02proved the theory right, which sucked in more money, pushing
- 5:05prices even higher. You felt like you had to be in
- 5:07or you'd miss out completely in this feeling, this absolute
- 5:10conviction. But the rules were different,
- 5:12and old strategies were useless. That's crucial context for
- 5:16understanding the criticism aimed at Buffett.
- 5:17He wasn't just seen as lagging behind.
- 5:19He was seen as, well, irrelevant, a dinosaur.
- 5:23OK, so against that backdrop, this feeling of unstoppable
- 5:27change, a world turned upside down, comes this specific
- 5:30attack. Andrew Berry's Barron's Article,
- 5:33December 27th, 1999 And Barron's is, you know, a serious
- 5:37financial publication, not some fringe blog.
- 5:39And the opening line just pulls no punches.
- 5:42After more than 30 years of unrivaled investment success,
- 5:46Warren Buffett may be losing his magic touch.
- 5:49I mean, accusing Buffett of losing his magic, That's a
- 5:51direct hit, isn't it? Well, it's incredibly direct.
- 5:54Scathing, really, and the timing was perfect for the critics
- 5:56because Buffett's perceived failure to adapt looked really
- 5:59bad right then compared to Tex. Insane returns The main evidence
- 6:03was Berkshire Hathaway's performance, or rather
- 6:05underperformance. In 1999.
- 6:06Berkshire's Class A stock, the big one, was down about 23.
- 6:09Percent down 23. Percent.
- 6:10While the S&P 500, the benchmark index, had an 18% total return.
- 6:15That's a huge gap. And look at book value assets
- 6:18minus liabilities. Berkshire's grew by a tiny .5%.
- 6:21The SP 500's total return? 21.0%.
- 6:24That's a 20.5 percentage point underperformance, which
- 6:28significantly was the second worst relative performance in
- 6:31Berkshire's entire history since 1965.
- 6:34The numbers at that moment seem to back up the critique
- 6:36completely. And like you said, it went
- 6:38beyond the numbers. It felt personal.
- 6:40The article really hammered this idea of him being out of touch,
- 6:43almost 70 years old, of failure to adapt to tech, stuck with an
- 6:46anachronistic portfolio. You know, a portfolio from
- 6:48another time. The sources even dug up this
- 6:51quote from some Internet message board calling Berkshire a
- 6:54middlebrow insurance company studded with a bizarre melange
- 6:57of assets that's including candy stores, hamburger stands,
- 7:00jewelry shops, a Shoemaker and a third rate encyclopedia company.
- 7:04Ouch, that's just brutal. That quote just perfectly nails
- 7:07the old economy versus new economy narrative.
- 7:10The article really played that up, this idea that Buffett was
- 7:14obsolete, too slow, too traditional for the digital age.
- 7:17And to really drive the point home, Barron's used this
- 7:20comparison that just blew people's minds at the time.
- 7:23They pointed out that Yahoo largely unprofitable Yahoo had a
- 7:26market cap total stock value of $120 billion, right?
- 7:30Which absolutely dwarfed Berkshire Hathaway's $83 billion
- 7:34market cap, even though Berkshire was expected to earn
- 7:3710 times more actual profit, $2 billion, versus maybe $200
- 7:41million for Yahoo. That comparison says it all.
- 7:44It was the ultimate expression of the bubble mentality.
- 7:46Pure potential, pure speculation, pure eyeballs
- 7:49valued way, way higher than proven profits in real assets.
- 7:53It's felt like the market had completely lost its bearings on
- 7:56value. So you, the listener, need to
- 7:58understand this. The article wasn't just
- 8:01questioning his strategy. It was basically declaring it
- 8:03dead, obsolete in a world that everyone thought had changed
- 8:06forever. A really bold claim to make
- 8:09about Warren Buffett. OK, so with all that pressure,
- 8:13the public criticism being called out of touch, was he
- 8:16actually missing something or was there a deeper reason, a
- 8:20principled reason for him sitting at the party?
- 8:22This is where it gets really good you because his inaction
- 8:25wasn't a mistake, it was deliberate.
- 8:27Absolutely deliberate. His refusal to jump into the.com
- 8:30madness wasn't ignorance. It wasn't being out of touch.
- 8:32It was profoundly disciplined and unwavering commitment to
- 8:37principles he'd spent his whole life refining.
- 8:40His inaction was a strategic choice grounded in a philosophy
- 8:43totally opposed to the mania. The key concept, as always with
- 8:47Buffett, is his circle of competence.
- 8:49Right. Invest in what you understand.
- 8:50Exactly. He only invests in businesses he
- 8:52feels he can thoroughly understand, analyze and predict
- 8:55long term prospects for. And the tech sector back then
- 8:59with its crazy pace of change, short product lives, unproven
- 9:03business models focused only on growth that was way outside his
- 9:07circle. He couldn't confidently project
- 9:10cash flows for these dot coms 1020 years out.
- 9:13And that's fundamental to how he values a business.
- 9:15He needs that clarity and Tech just didn't offer it then.
- 9:18And he always talks about looking for businesses with that
- 9:21durable competitive advantage, right?
- 9:23The economic mode. Can you break that down?
- 9:25What did that mean compared to those flashy tech startups?
- 9:28Sure, an economic mode is basically something that
- 9:30protects a company's profits and market share from competitors
- 9:34over the long haul, Like a real Moat around a castle.
- 9:37For many of those early tech companies, anyone to jump in,
- 9:39the barriers were low and innovation was so fast.
- 9:42Today's leader could be tomorrow's nobody if something
- 9:45better came along. No staying power.
- 9:47It's exactly Compare that to his core holdings like Coca-Cola or
- 9:50American Express. They had deep, lasting
- 9:53advantages. Brand recognition, network
- 9:55effects, customer loyalty, things that are hard to
- 9:57replicate. Buffett's philosophy has always
- 10:00been about business fundamentals, about intrinsic
- 10:02value at a company's truly worth, separate from its stock
- 10:05price. He sees stocks as owning a piece
- 10:08of a real business, not just ticker symbols to trade.
- 10:11And those dot coms focused only on eyeballs, not profits.
- 10:15They just failed his basic tests.
- 10:17No sustainable advantage. And that famous saying of his Be
- 10:20fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy only when others
- 10:23are fearful. That wasn't just a slogan in
- 10:251999. It was his operating manual, his
- 10:27antidote to the irrational exuberance, as Alan Greenspan
- 10:30called it. Refusing to chase those tech
- 10:32stocks was him literally putting his deepest principle into
- 10:34action, Courageously, I might add.
- 10:37He showed incredible patience, which is always rare in mania.
- 10:40He knew eventually fundamentals had to matter again.
- 10:42He knew chasing Muggles leads to disaster.
- 10:45So yeah, his inaction wasn't failure.
- 10:47It was a conscious choice, deep discipline.
- 10:49He wasn't missing the party. He was deliberately avoiding
- 10:52what he knew would be an epic hangover.
- 10:55He just waited, and his patience was about to pay off, wasn't it?
- 10:59And boy, did that hangover arrive.
- 11:00It was definitely epic. And it proved Buffett
- 11:03spectacularly right. That whole new economy thing,
- 11:05which felt unstoppable, It started falling apart in March
- 11:082000. So what happened next for the
- 11:10market and crucially for Buffett, the guy Barron said was
- 11:13obsolete just months earlier? The collapse was incredibly
- 11:16swift and brutal. The Nasdaid, which had peaked
- 11:20over 5000, just plummeted. It ended up losing nearly 80% of
- 11:23its value by October 2280%. This wasn't just a correction,
- 11:29it was a crash. Billions just wiped out.
- 11:31Shareholder equity vanished. Hundreds of dot coms, many that
- 11:35had just gone public, burning through huge rounds of VC and
- 11:37IPO cash without ever making a profit.
- 11:39They just went bankrupt, their eyeball business models totally
- 11:42unsustainable. It was carnage.
- 11:44A really harsh lesson in speculation versus sustainable
- 11:46business. Remember pets.com?
- 11:47The sock. Puppet.
- 11:48Oh yeah, the sock puppet. Became the symbol of the excess.
- 11:52Went bust super fast. And amidst all that wreckage,
- 11:55while the tech darlings were crumbling, what about Buffett's
- 11:58boring old companies? The ones Barons called
- 12:00anachronistic. They suddenly looked pretty
- 12:02good, didn't they? A fortress.
- 12:04The reversal was stunning, Immediate, undeniable.
- 12:08It was absolutely undeniable, A decisive indication.
- 12:11Look at the numbers. The three years from the start
- 12:14of 2000 to the end of 2002, Berkshire Hathaway stock gained
- 12:17a cumulative 36%. Gained 36% during the crash.
- 12:21Gained 36%, while the S&P 500, the broad market, lost 37% over
- 12:25that same period. That's a 73 percentage point
- 12:27swing. 73 point. It just blew away the idea that
- 12:30Buffett had lost his touch. It was proof.
- 12:33Tangible assets, stable earnings, contrarian thinking.
- 12:36They still mattered. A lot of people suddenly wish
- 12:38they listened. Let's break it down year by year
- 12:39because the contrast is just so stark. 2000 Double births,
- 12:44Berkshire up 26.6%. S&P 500 down 9.1 percent. 2001
- 12:50Tech recession deepens. Berkshire gains another 6.5%.
- 12:54S&P down another 11.9%. 2002 The bottom of the bear market.
- 12:58Berkshire posts small loss 3.8%, but the S&P disaster down 22.1%.
- 13:04The difference is just massive. It really was.
- 13:06And that Yahoo comparison, the one barons used to show Buffett
- 13:08was behind the times. It became the ultimate
- 13:10punchline. Berkshire's market cap grew from
- 13:12$83 billion then to over $500 billion two decades later,
- 13:15eventually passed a trillion. Yahoo peaked at $120 billion,
- 13:19collapsed, and we should get sold out to Verizon for just
- 13:21$4.5 billion. Ouch.
- 13:23Yeah, so that 2000, 2003 period, that was definitely Buffett's
- 13:26last laugh. Master class and discipline,
- 13:28patience, contrarianism. It cemented as legend.
- 13:30And for you listening, this really sealed the deal, didn't
- 13:33it? It seemed like the ultimate
- 13:34proof against that Barron's article.
- 13:36Stick to your principles. Ignore the hype.
- 13:37That seemed to be the lesson. But, you know, was that really
- 13:41the end of the story? When you look at Berkshire's
- 13:43performance over the next couple of decades, things get, well,
- 13:47more complicated, more nuanced. That amazing outperformance he
- 13:51showed in the early 2000s, it started to fade.
- 13:54His historical edge, his alpha, it began to shrink.
- 13:57What does the longer term data show us?
- 13:58Right. This is where the story takes A
- 14:00twist. The long term data reveals this
- 14:02waning. AA, remember, is the extra
- 14:04return you get above the market benchmark.
- 14:07Like the S&P 500, it measures skill.
- 14:09So from 1965 to 2002, that's 38 years, Berkshire only
- 14:13underperformed the S&P 504 times, just 10% of the time.
- 14:17Incredible consistency. But in the 17 years after that,
- 14:20from 2003 to 2019, Berkshire underperformed.
- 14:24In eight of those years, that's 47% of the time, a huge jump.
- 14:28And it wasn't just how often, it was how much.
- 14:31Before 2002, Berkshire beat the S&P by double digits more than
- 14:34half the time, 53%. After 2002, that only happened 4
- 14:38* 24% of the time. The trend is pretty clear.
- 14:41His ability to consistently crush the market diminished.
- 14:44And there's even more recent data that hammers this home.
- 14:46If you bought Berkshire at the end of 2002, right after his big
- 14:49vindication thinking you'd ride that wave, you actually would
- 14:52have underperformed the S&P 500 by 2% year through 2020.
- 14:55Look at the decade ending 2023. Berkshire's annual growth rate
- 14:59CAGR was 11.8%, the S&P 512.0% slightly behind.
- 15:04And over the full 20 years, 2003 to 2023, Berkshire returned
- 15:0810.55% annually while the S and did 11.10%.
- 15:12That legendary, consistent beating of the market that
- 15:14defined his career? It really became a thing of the
- 15:16past. It's subtle, maybe, but
- 15:17significant. And here's the really
- 15:19fascinating paradox in all this the.com crash.
- 15:23Yes, it proved Buffett right in the short term, but weirdly, it
- 15:27kind of validated the long term idea behind the new economy.
- 15:30How? Because the crash didn't kill
- 15:32the Internet revolution, it just cleared out the weak players,
- 15:35the pure speculators with no real business.
- 15:37Survival of the fittest. Precisely.
- 15:39Billions in wasted capital got reallocated, and the companies
- 15:43that survived that fire, Amazon, eBay, soon Google.
- 15:47They emerge stronger, leaner, with real business models and
- 15:50those companies became the massive drivers of growth and
- 15:53market returns for the next 20 years.
- 15:55Berkshire's performance coming back towards the market average.
- 15:58A big part of that was being underweight, not only enough of
- 16:00those very tech giants that led the charge.
- 16:03So if you step back and think about it, that Barron's article,
- 16:06yeah, it was spectacularly wrong about Yahoo in the timing,
- 16:08terrible advice at that moment, but it was kind of right about
- 16:12the trend, the massive shift towards a tech driven economy
- 16:15that was happening. The 2000 crash was Buffett's
- 16:18short term win, validating his discipline, but it also cleared
- 16:21the path for the tech survivors who ultimately proved the core
- 16:24idea that tech would reshape business was correct, even if
- 16:27the initial hype was nuts. The annual return numbers really
- 16:30show this story visually. Big out performance and slowly
- 16:33converging back towards the market as those tech Titans
- 16:36became the new leaders. And this paradox is key for you
- 16:39to grasp. There's a difference between a
- 16:40speculative bubble in some companies and a real underlying
- 16:44technological shift. The crash punished the bubble,
- 16:48but the shift continued. Discerning that difference,
- 16:50that's the hard part for any investor.
- 16:52OK, so given this clear shift, this tech dominance and
- 16:56Berkshire's alpha fading, how did Warren Buffett adapt?
- 17:00He was famously anti tech for so long.
- 17:03This is really central to his story isn't it?
- 17:06And it led to probably the biggest strategic change in
- 17:08Berkshire's history. Yeah, for decades, that tech
- 17:11skepticism was almost part of his brand.
- 17:13Wasn't it rooted in his circle of competence?
- 17:16He always said the pace of change, the disruption, made it
- 17:19too hard to predict long term winners.
- 17:21Famously, he didn't invest in Microsoft even though he was
- 17:24close friends with Bill Gates. He just felt he didn't
- 17:26understand it well enough. I don't invest in what I don't
- 17:29understand. Stick into his guns.
- 17:30Absolutely, but that also meant Berkshire largely missed that
- 17:33first wave of huge tech growth. Now, his first big step into
- 17:37tech that IBM investment around 2011.
- 17:39That didn't quite work out as planned, did it?
- 17:42He kind of misjudged the cloud computing shift and he admitted
- 17:45the error later, selling it off around 2017.
- 17:48What was the lesson there? That's right, IBM was a big bet.
- 17:51But it became a, well, valuable learning experience.
- 17:54Maybe a costly 1. He thought IBM's corporate
- 17:57customers made it a classic mode business, but he underestimated
- 18:01how fast and deep the shift to the cloud would be and how much
- 18:04it would hurt IBM's traditional hardware and software business.
- 18:07He said it himself later. I was wrong on IBM.
- 18:10He owned the mistake. He did, but crucially, that
- 18:13didn't make him swear off tech forever.
- 18:16If anything, it seems like it sharpened his thinking.
- 18:18It paved the way for something much bigger, much more
- 18:20successful. Which brings us to the landmark
- 18:23investment in Apple starting in 2016.
- 18:25This wasn't just dipping a toe in.
- 18:27This was a massive pivot. Apple became and still is
- 18:30Berkshire. Single biggest stock holding by
- 18:33far, sometimes around 45% of their entire public stock
- 18:36portfolio. Huge concentration.
- 18:38But why Apple? That's the question everyone
- 18:40asks. How did Apple fit his criteria?
- 18:42A tech company? It seemed like he broke his own
- 18:43rules. What was the thinking?
- 18:45The key was how we reframed Apple.
- 18:47In his mind, he stopped seeing it as just a hardware company
- 18:50subject to fickle tech cycles. Instead, he came to view it as a
- 18:54dominant consumer products company with one of the
- 18:57strongest economic moats on the planet.
- 19:00He explicitly compared it more to Coke than to other tech
- 19:03firms. Interesting.
- 19:04A consumer product. Exactly.
- 19:06He saw the power of the iPhone, yes, but also the whole iOS
- 19:09ecosystem, The software, the services, how it all locks you
- 19:11in. It creates this incredibly
- 19:13sticky, loyal customer base. And that loyalty gives Apple
- 19:17huge pricing power. They can raise prices without
- 19:19losing tons of customers. Those are the classic signs of a
- 19:22wonderful business that he could understand because the consumer
- 19:25behavior around Apple felt predictable, durable.
- 19:28Right, so he saw it less as just a gadget maker and more like an
- 19:32essential part of modern life for millions, maybe billions
- 19:36like Coke or Amex were in the last century.
- 19:38So it wasn't really abandoning his principles, it was finding
- 19:41companies that met those principles, even if they happen
- 19:44to be tech companies, applying the old rules to new winners.
- 19:48That adaptability, especially later in his career, is pretty
- 19:51remarkable. So was Apple just a one off
- 19:54special case or did it signal a broader shift, an expansion of
- 19:58his thinking about tech and the digital age?
- 20:01Did he keep looking? It seems like part of a broader,
- 20:03though still very selective, adaptation.
- 20:06Apple's the giant, yes. But remember, Berkshire also
- 20:08disclosed investing about $2.1 billion in Amazon in 2019.
- 20:13That was significant because Buffett had openly said before
- 20:16that not investing in Amazon earlier was a big mistake.
- 20:18A mistake of omission. Right, he admitted he missed
- 20:20that one. Yeah, he said.
- 20:22He underestimated the brilliance of Jeff Bezos, didn't grasp the
- 20:25scale of Amazon's vision, not just in shopping but crucially
- 20:29in cloud computing with AWS, which is now huge in the AI
- 20:33world too. So investing in Amazon showed he
- 20:36was willing to look beyond Apple once these other tech giants
- 20:40proved their dominance in their moats.
- 20:42And he's been pretty open about other misses, too, right?
- 20:44Like Google Now, Alphabet. He said he regretted not buying
- 20:48that one, admitting he didn't fully get the power of its
- 20:50search advertising Moat. Which is ironic because
- 20:53Berkshire owns newspapers and other media, so advertising
- 20:56wasn't totally foreign to him. That honesty about his own blind
- 20:59spots is pretty powerful, isn't it?
- 21:01It really is shows a commitment to learning and this whole
- 21:04evolution. You have to see the influence of
- 21:06Charlie Munger, his longtime partner who we sadly lost
- 21:09recently. Munger was the one who famously
- 21:11pushed Buffett away from Ben Graham's cigar butt style,
- 21:15buying super cheap junky companies for one last puff.
- 21:19Right, the deep value stuff. Towards buying wonderful
- 21:22businesses at fair prices. Quality over just cheapness.
- 21:27Buffett's eventual careful move into tech that feels like the
- 21:30ultimate application of Munger's wisdom.
- 21:32In this new era. He wasn't chasing speculative
- 21:35startups. He was waiting until tech
- 21:37companies matured into those wonderful businesses with
- 21:40lasting advantages. OK, so let's summarize his
- 21:42refined approach. He didn't ditch his core value
- 21:45principles. He just waited.
- 21:47Waited for the tech sector to grow up, basically to produce
- 21:50companies that met his old school criteria for quality.
- 21:53He wasn't betting on the next big thing, the unpredictable
- 21:56innovation. He invested after the innovation
- 21:58had already built something solid and defensible.
- 22:01These huge locked in ecosystems, dominant platforms, powerful
- 22:04network effects. And here's a key point for you
- 22:07to think about. He wasn't investing in the
- 22:09messy, volatile process of disruption.
- 22:12He was investing in the stable, often near monopoly result of
- 22:15that disruption. He waited until the new economy
- 22:18had basically created the new old economy giants, companies
- 22:22that, yeah, we're tech based, but show the predictability and
- 22:26defensibility he always looked for, like brand loyalty, high
- 22:29switching costs, network effects where more users make it better
- 22:33for everyone. That shift shows incredible
- 22:36adaptability, applying timeless principles to a totally changed
- 22:39landscape. And for you, the listener, it
- 22:41shows a deep learning curve, doesn't it?
- 22:43Owning mistakes, adapting core ideas.
- 22:45A powerful lesson that even the best are always learning, always
- 22:49refining. OK, so Fast forward 1/4 century
- 22:52after Barons asked what's wrong, Warren, that question still kind
- 22:55of echoes, but in a totally new way.
- 22:57Now, one of the biggest criticisms, the thing you always
- 22:59hear about is Berkshire's cash pile.
- 23:01It's just massive and growing. What's the latest on that and
- 23:03what does it really signal? Yeah, the cash word is
- 23:06staggering. As of the second quarter of
- 23:082025, Berkshire's holding something like $344 billion in
- 23:12cash and short term treasuries. Basically super safe, easy to
- 23:16access funds. $344 billion just sitting there.
- 23:21Pretty much. And this leads to the constant
- 23:23critique. Is the company just too big now?
- 23:26Too big to find deals that are large enough elephant sized, as
- 23:29Buffett calls them, to actually make a difference to Berkshire's
- 23:32overall results. The worry is a kind of paralysis
- 23:35by success. It's sheer size makes finding
- 23:38good investments really, really hard.
- 23:40I mean, for a company worth over a trillion dollars, you need
- 23:42deals in the 10s, maybe hundreds of billions, to move the needle.
- 23:46Those don't come along every day.
- 23:47Especially prices Buffett likes. And the irony is thick, right?
- 23:50Buffett himself has always said cash is a terrible long term
- 23:53asset, said it depreciates because of inflation.
- 23:55Yet here he is sitting on a mountain of it.
- 23:57Seems like a contradiction. It does seem like a
- 23:59contradiction, but Buffett and his team have a consistent
- 24:02answer. They don't see it as paralysis,
- 24:04They see it as strategy, as financial ammunition, or like a
- 24:09call option with no expiration date.
- 24:11It fits his whole philosophy. Keep powder dry.
- 24:14Be ready to strike when markets panic, when everyone else is
- 24:17fearful, and when great companies go on sale.
- 24:20Greedy when others are fearful. Exactly.
- 24:23He refuses to swing at pitches he doesn't like.
- 24:26He won't force an investment just because the cash is piling
- 24:28up, especially if he thinks the market is generally overvalued.
- 24:32For him, overpaying is the biggest sin, not waiting
- 24:35patiently. That discipline hasn't changed,
- 24:37even if the numbers are way bigger.
- 24:39And this whole debate gets new fuel from what Berkshire isn't
- 24:42doing lately. They've actually been net
- 24:44sellers of stocks for what, 11 straight quarters selling more
- 24:47than they're buying? Plus, in Q22025 they didn't even
- 24:50buy back their own shares even when the price dipped.
- 24:53Buybacks usually signal confidence that your stock is
- 24:55cheap, so their inaction really reinforces this idea that they
- 24:59just don't see many good deals anywhere right now, not even in
- 25:02their own stock. So the big question this raises
- 25:04for you as an investor looking at this is is this just classic
- 25:08Buffett? Prudence, discipline, patience,
- 25:11waiting for the inevitable storm?
- 25:13Or has Berkshire's sheer scale created a genuine strategic
- 25:17paralysis? It's just too big to find
- 25:19opportunities regularly. It's that tension between
- 25:22discipline and deployment. And right now, he seems heavily
- 25:25weighted towards discipline. OK, beyond the cash, there's the
- 25:29other huge question, the one you can't avoid forever, especially
- 25:32with a company so tied to one person succession.
- 25:35Buffett's approaching his mid 90's.
- 25:37The market's looking harder now at the future under his
- 25:40successor Greg Abel, who runs the non insurance side.
- 25:43What's really at stake here for you watching the market?
- 25:46What's at stake is often called the Buffett premium, the idea
- 25:49that part of Berkshire stock price isn't just the value of
- 25:51its assets, but the market's immense confidence in Buffett's
- 25:54unique genius for allocating capital, You know, deploying
- 25:58where to put the money. And we saw some evidence for
- 26:00this premium, didn't we? When the news of his eventual
- 26:02retirement plans came out, Berkshire's Class A shares
- 26:05dropped 14%, while the S&P 500 actually gained 11% over that
- 26:09same period. Wow, that's a big divergent.
- 26:11It's just a lot of the valuation is tied to him personally, his
- 26:14reputation, the trustee commands.
- 26:17Now, to be fair, Berkshire's whole structure is designed to
- 26:19be decentralized, durable. The subsidiaries run themselves
- 26:23mostly. It's built to last beyond him.
- 26:25But the core question won't go away.
- 26:27Can anyone, even someone as capable as Greg Abel clearly is,
- 26:31truly replicate Buffett's legendary skill in deploying the
- 26:35absolutely massive cash flows of a multi trillion dollar company?
- 26:38It's just a different ball game at that scale.
- 26:40And this ties into a recurring theme, almost like a modern
- 26:43version of 1999. Back then, it was tech, media,
- 26:47telecom dominating. Today, it's a handful of mega
- 26:50cap tech companies largely fueled by the promise of
- 26:52artificial intelligence, AI. So the challenge for Berkshire
- 26:56feels structurally similar. Can this huge diversified value
- 26:59focused conglomerate consistently keep up with, let
- 27:02alone beat a market where returns are so concentrated in
- 27:05just a few super high growth, high valuation tech names its
- 27:08value versus concentrated growth again?
- 27:10And it all comes back to that law of large numbers, doesn't
- 27:14it? The reason, and the cash pile so
- 27:16big, is because the company is so big, finding deals large
- 27:19enough to make a real difference at good prices incredibly tough.
- 27:23A small, smart investment that might be great for a smaller
- 27:26fund is just a rounding error for Berkshire now.
- 27:29Even a billion dollars doesn't move the needle much.
- 27:31And connecting this to the bigger picture for you, the
- 27:33listener, Berkshire's return to more market like performance,
- 27:37that waning alpha, it's not necessarily a failure of the
- 27:40philosophy. It might just be an inevitable
- 27:42result of its own massive scale. That 9/19/99 article question,
- 27:46Buffett's whole philosophy said it was outdated to these
- 27:50critiques. They're really about the
- 27:51inescapable math of being that big.
- 27:54His own incredible success created this new challenge.
- 27:56And that principle applies beyond Buffett.
- 27:58For you, it suggests that chasing alpha, trying to
- 28:01consistently beat the market get exponentially harder as your own
- 28:04capital grows. Maybe it prompts you to think
- 28:07about your own goals. Is squeezing out an extra
- 28:08percent worth of risk and effort?
- 28:10Where does capturing broad market returns reliably make
- 28:12more sense long term? It's about defining your own
- 28:15success. Hashtag tag #outro pleasant.
- 28:17What a story we've covered today.
- 28:19Started with that wild market call in 1999 that crashed and
- 28:23burned. Then Buffett's incredible
- 28:25vindication, followed by this long period of, well, his edge
- 28:29shrinking. Then his big strategic shift,
- 28:31finally embracing tech, and now these modern questions about
- 28:35cash succession and just the sheer size of his success.
- 28:39It's been about resilience, adaptation and sticking to your
- 28:42guns mostly. Yeah, it's fascinating how that
- 28:44what's wrong Warren article became such a famous baby
- 28:47infamous piece of financial journalism as a short term call,
- 28:51a total disaster, a warning about betting against wisdom
- 28:54during a mania. But as a long term marker, it
- 28:58became this incredible case study because it did nail the
- 29:00huge shift coming. The move to a tech driven
- 29:03economy was the biggest challenge his model faced.
- 29:05So the legacy isn't justthe.com crash.
- 29:07It's in how Buffett himself evolved, how his principles
- 29:10adapted over these last 25 years and really show that even the
- 29:13Oracle never stops learning. So wrapping up, what does all
- 29:15this mean for you, the learner trying to navigate today's
- 29:18markets? They feel pretty complex and
- 29:20concentrated too. How do you apply these lessons?
- 29:22Well, here's a final thought to chew on.
- 29:24If the law of large numbers eventually makes it almost
- 29:27impossible for even the greatest investor to consistently beat
- 29:30the market, as we've sort of seen play out with Buffett, what
- 29:33does that really imply for the average investor?
- 29:36For you chasing alpha, that extra bit of performance, how
- 29:40should it shape your expectations for your own long
- 29:42term returns, especially in the world where few giant companies
- 29:45seem to drive so much of the market?
- 29:48It's a deep question to ponder as you build your own strategy
- 29:51and figure out what financial success really means to you.