Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 017 - Collapse of the Diem Government
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter sixteen of Vietnam the Advisory Years to nineteen sixty
- 0:05Speaker 1: five by Robert Feutelle and Martin Blumensen. This is a
- 0:09Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:14Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
- 0:20Speaker 1: Chapter sixteen Collapse of the DM government. At the Secretary
- 0:25Speaker 1: of Defense conference in Honolulu on May sixth, nineteen sixty three,
- 0:30Speaker 1: the participants discussed the tensions between the American and Vietnamese governments.
- 0:36Speaker 1: Ambassador Nolting labeled American Vietnamese relations as somewhat less than good.
- 0:42Speaker 1: President DM was intimating that the United States was infringing
- 0:46Speaker 1: on Vietnamese sovereignty. Knew his brother and Councilor was suggesting
- 0:51Speaker 1: that the American advisory effort was appearing to tamper with
- 0:55Speaker 1: DM's political base. Both were suspicious of the strength of
- 0:59Speaker 1: the American commitment and the thrust of US policy. Nevertheless,
- 1:04Speaker 1: Noting said NU was efficient and continues to accumulate power
- 1:10Speaker 1: despite causes for concern. The country team is of the
- 1:14Speaker 1: unanimous opinion that the current leadership is the best the
- 1:17Speaker 1: US can get. It is sincere, albeit not particularly adept,
- 1:21Speaker 1: but it is better than most in Southeast Asia. Two
- 1:25Speaker 1: days later, in Saigon, demonstrators celebrating Buddhas's birthday paraded with
- 1:29Speaker 1: religious flags, banners, and devotional images. The procession violated the
- 1:34Speaker 1: nineteen fifty ordinance forbidding the flying of any flag in
- 1:38Speaker 1: public without the national emblem beside it. A monk delivered
- 1:42Speaker 1: a sermon protesting the DM government's discrimination against Buddhists. When
- 1:47Speaker 1: Civil Guard troops moved to break up the rally, an
- 1:50Speaker 1: explosion killed several persons, including children. In a communicate to
- 1:55Speaker 1: the press, Buddhist leaders demanded that the government emit responsibility
- 1:59Speaker 1: for the laws of life, rescind the flag regulation, and
- 2:03Speaker 1: give Buddhist equality with Catholics. Some million Vietnamese were Buddhists,
- 2:09Speaker 1: as compared with one in one half million Christians. D M.
- 2:13Speaker 1: Nieu and his families had connections with French missionaries who
- 2:16Speaker 1: represented the Old Order. When a Washington newspaper published an
- 2:21Speaker 1: anti American statement attributed to Nego den Nieu, Representative Otto Passman,
- 2:28Speaker 1: chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations, vented his indignation to
- 2:33Speaker 1: Defense Secretary Macnamara. Certainly. Passman said that DM government ought
- 2:39Speaker 1: to be made to understand that the American people have
- 2:41Speaker 1: no interest in propping up in unpopular regime if it
- 2:45Speaker 1: is more concerned with the pursuit of personal aims than
- 2:48Speaker 1: with the protection of the country from communism. In embarrassed,
- 2:52Speaker 1: President Kennedy told newsmen that he hoped to withdraw some
- 2:55Speaker 1: Americans by the end of the year. D M meanwhile
- 2:59Speaker 1: offered no redut addressed to a Buddhist delegation, but promised
- 3:02Speaker 1: to investigate the Bard incident, which he believed had political
- 3:06Speaker 1: rather than religious roots. Dissatisfied Buddhists demonstrated early in June
- 3:12Speaker 1: and way Several debts resulted and disorder spread to Kwang
- 3:16Speaker 1: Tri and Nuang Trang. While the Defense Department ordered US
- 3:21Speaker 1: aircraft not to transport Vietnamese troops on anti Buddhist missions,
- 3:25Speaker 1: and while General Harkins instructing Americans to stand aloof from
- 3:29Speaker 1: the controversy, DM acknowledged various errors by his officials. In Saigan,
- 3:35Speaker 1: on June eleventh, an aged Buddhist monk burned himself alive
- 3:39Speaker 1: and public. Three days later, a New York newspaper carried
- 3:43Speaker 1: a Washington correspondent story that the United States would condemn
- 3:47Speaker 1: DM if he failed to settle the Buddhist grievances. The
- 3:51Speaker 1: Vietnamese Foreign Minister told William C. Truhart, in charge of
- 3:55Speaker 1: the embassy during Nolting's temporary absence, that he was deeply
- 3:58Speaker 1: distressed and angry over the news report. True Heart then
- 4:02Speaker 1: asked and received permission to publicly reaffirm u S support of
- 4:06Speaker 1: d M. Within a few days, the government acceded to
- 4:09Speaker 1: most of the Buddhist demands, but refused to accept responsibility
- 4:13Speaker 1: for the deaths end Wait. Buddhists demonstrated again on July sixteenth.
- 4:19Speaker 1: Crowds of monks and nuns milled in front of Nolting's
- 4:22Speaker 1: residence in Saigon, calling on the United States to compel
- 4:25Speaker 1: the d M government to keep its promises. Violence erupted.
- 4:29Speaker 1: On the following day, The U. S Air attache and
- 4:33Speaker 1: Saigon Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. F. Tyrrel informed the Defense
- 4:38Speaker 1: Intelligence Agency that the Buddhist situation was causing continuing animosity
- 4:43Speaker 1: between the government and the armed forces and is spreading
- 4:46Speaker 1: to all segments of the population. It is now common
- 4:50Speaker 1: to hear of Vietnamese discussed the possible overthrow of the
- 4:53Speaker 1: present government at a dinner party. On July seventeenth, Major
- 4:57Speaker 1: General Duang Van Minh, d m's military adviser, stated that
- 5:02Speaker 1: the present government cannot continue. There was speculation that Mihn
- 5:07Speaker 1: or Major General Tron Van Dunn, chief of Staff of
- 5:10Speaker 1: the Joint General Staff, might head a coup. We cannot
- 5:14Speaker 1: determine if a coup is imminent, Terrell concluded, but all
- 5:18Speaker 1: the elements are present, and it appears to us to
- 5:21Speaker 1: be only a matter of timing. The radio addressed by
- 5:25Speaker 1: d M on July nineteenth seemed cold to American observers,
- 5:29Speaker 1: and Madame Knew was said to have termed the Buddhist
- 5:32Speaker 1: suicide a barbecue. Admiral felt sink Pack estimated in view
- 5:37Speaker 1: of the widespread distrust and hatred of the news man
- 5:41Speaker 1: and wife, far overshadowing the popular consensus. To d M himself,
- 5:46Speaker 1: it seems most likely that the news would be a
- 5:49Speaker 1: primary target for any serious coup group. The government's failure
- 5:53Speaker 1: or unwillingness to handle properly the Buddhist demonstrations made a
- 5:58Speaker 1: coup more likely if the d M government fails to
- 6:01Speaker 1: accomplish reasonable and acceptable concessions to the Buddhist or of
- 6:06Speaker 1: the Buddhist contagion fan by political opportunists, and the VC
- 6:10Speaker 1: spreads into the countryside to the extent that it adversely
- 6:14Speaker 1: affects the progress of war. President Kennedy had meanwhile announced
- 6:19Speaker 1: on June twenty seventh that Henry Cabot Lodge, a major
- 6:23Speaker 1: political figure, would secede Ambassador Nolting, a career civil servant.
- 6:28Speaker 1: Preparing for his new post. Lodge had a long talk
- 6:31Speaker 1: in Washington with a distinguished Vietnamese who said that unless
- 6:35Speaker 1: they left the country, no power on earth could prevent
- 6:38Speaker 1: the assassination of mister d m his brother, Mister New,
- 6:42Speaker 1: and mister New's wife. Their debts were inevitable. Over August
- 6:48Speaker 1: fourteenth through sixteen, several more immolations took place as expressions
- 6:52Speaker 1: of discontent. Madam Knew favored ignoring the burnings and charged
- 6:57Speaker 1: the US embassy with pressuring the DMGs government to silence
- 7:01Speaker 1: her to General Anthus, Second Air Division Commander DM was
- 7:05Speaker 1: fairly well liked by his people, even though he had
- 7:08Speaker 1: not developed all the reforms they desired and the United
- 7:11Speaker 1: States wished. In contrast, Anthus deemed the news not too popular,
- 7:18Speaker 1: and four people in Saigon expected sweeping changes from Ambassador Lodge,
- 7:22Speaker 1: who appeared to be pro consul for President Kennedy. Perhaps
- 7:26Speaker 1: to clear the decks before Laga's arrival, DM held in
- 7:29Speaker 1: an emergency meeting with the Joint General Staff on August twentieth.
- 7:34Speaker 1: He appointed Tron Van Dahn the Armed Forces Chief of Staff,
- 7:38Speaker 1: and Knew invited the senior generals to sign a paper
- 7:41Speaker 1: calling upon the government to seize and silence the Buddhist leaders.
- 7:46Speaker 1: At midnight, DM declared martial law in a state of
- 7:48Speaker 1: siege under nominal army authority. The Vietnamese special forces and
- 7:53Speaker 1: police storm Buddhist pagodas and Saigon in way before dawn.
- 7:58Speaker 1: They rounded up monks, nuns, and st students, but the
- 8:01Speaker 1: Buddhist leaders escaped and took refuge in the U. S Embassy.
- 8:05Speaker 1: The pogoda raid strengthened those officials in Washington who had
- 8:09Speaker 1: always questioned the fitness of d M and his family
- 8:11Speaker 1: to govern. On August twenty first, Under Secretary of State
- 8:15Speaker 1: George W. Ball released an official statement that the United
- 8:18Speaker 1: States deplored the repressive factions against the Buddhists. Ambassador Lodge
- 8:24Speaker 1: reached Saigon on August twenty second. He found Embassy officials,
- 8:28Speaker 1: thinking that the Vietnamese generals could depose d M, but
- 8:32Speaker 1: General DoD told General Harkins that they were too weak
- 8:35Speaker 1: to do so. The generals wanted to and martial law quickly,
- 8:39Speaker 1: to have the United States support d M while forcing
- 8:41Speaker 1: him to clean house and showing him how to delegate authority,
- 8:45Speaker 1: and possibly to create an interim cabinet of officers and civilians.
- 8:50Speaker 1: On August twenty fourth, Ball, Harriman, Bilsman, and Forrestahal drafted
- 8:55Speaker 1: and cleared with a President by phone a message of
- 8:58Speaker 1: instructions to Lodge. The United States could no longer tolerate
- 9:02Speaker 1: the systematic suppression of the Buddhists or news domination of
- 9:06Speaker 1: the government. We wish to give DM reasonable opportunity to
- 9:10Speaker 1: remove news, but if he remains obdurate, then we are
- 9:13Speaker 1: prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no
- 9:17Speaker 1: longer support DM. Lodge was to tell the Vietnamese generals
- 9:21Speaker 1: that the United States would renounce DM unless he righted
- 9:24Speaker 1: the Buddhists wrongs and formed a more responsive and representative government.
- 9:30Speaker 1: The United States would take no part in any ouster,
- 9:33Speaker 1: but would recognize an interim anti communist military regime as
- 9:37Speaker 1: the successor to the DM government. On the twenty six
- 9:41Speaker 1: a Voice of America broadcast in Vietnamese said that high
- 9:44Speaker 1: American officials blamed NU for the Pagoda attacks and the
- 9:49Speaker 1: mass arrests of monks and students. The United States, it continued,
- 9:53Speaker 1: might sharply curtail aid unless President DM rid himself of
- 9:57Speaker 1: certain associates. The Joint General Staff profeued at the broadcast.
- 10:01Speaker 1: On the following day, responsible military commanders the Press Communicate
- 10:05Speaker 1: announced had unanimously proposed martial law and related measures to DM.
- 10:12Speaker 1: Ambassador Lodge became convinced during his first week in Saigon
- 10:15Speaker 1: that the DM government was dying. The abuse of police
- 10:18Speaker 1: power having caused deep resentments among the Vietnamese. The Buddhist
- 10:23Speaker 1: immolations had also turned the American people and government against DM.
- 10:28Speaker 1: Secretary of State Rusk told Nolting when he returned to Washington,
- 10:32Speaker 1: we can't stand any more burning, Rusk said. At a
- 10:36Speaker 1: National Security Council discussion, Nolting made the point that refusal
- 10:40Speaker 1: to support DM and knew would renee on pass commitments.
- 10:45Speaker 1: Ball argued that continued support for them risked losing the
- 10:48Speaker 1: war against the Vietcam. Moreover, D M and NUX had
- 10:52Speaker 1: massively violated their promises. Herreman felt that Nolting had been
- 10:56Speaker 1: profoundly wrong for quite some time. Lying to the cabled instructions,
- 11:01Speaker 1: Ambassador Lodge suggested telling the General's hostile to DM that
- 11:06Speaker 1: the United States had grave reservations about the news The
- 11:10Speaker 1: State Department approved on August twenty eighth, and commented that
- 11:13Speaker 1: the news would have to go and a coup would
- 11:15Speaker 1: be needed. Lodge responded, on the twenty ninth, we are
- 11:19Speaker 1: launched on a course from which there is no respectable
- 11:21Speaker 1: turning back the overthrow of the DM government. President Kennedy
- 11:26Speaker 1: weighed this appraisal, then ordered Lodge and Harkins to support
- 11:30Speaker 1: a coup if it had a good chance of success,
- 11:33Speaker 1: but to avoid any direct American involvement. He authorized them
- 11:37Speaker 1: to suspend US air support to the DM government whenever
- 11:41Speaker 1: they wished. Also, on the twenty ninth, Secretary of State
- 11:44Speaker 1: Rusk permitted Lodge to explore harkins suggestion that a threat
- 11:48Speaker 1: to withdraw US assistance might well force DM to drop
- 11:52Speaker 1: the news. This seemed to Lodge to cancel the earlier
- 11:56Speaker 1: instrumentations to make detailed plans as to how we might
- 12:00Speaker 1: bring about DM's replacement. He now understood the President to
- 12:04Speaker 1: want him not to help plan ekup, but rather to
- 12:06Speaker 1: keep in close touch with Plotters so he could let
- 12:09Speaker 1: Kennedy know of developments that might need American decisions. Looking
- 12:14Speaker 1: for the imminent overthrow of the government, Lodge stopped seeing
- 12:18Speaker 1: DM and Mule. By August twenty ninth, sink Pak alerted
- 12:23Speaker 1: two Marine Corps battalions for possible commitment, and moved naval
- 12:27Speaker 1: task forces and air transports to within supporting distance. Plans
- 12:32Speaker 1: were set for the air evacuation from Saigon of one thousand,
- 12:36Speaker 1: five hundred and seventy four US dependents, one thousand, one
- 12:40Speaker 1: hundred and two civilian employees, nine hundred and eighty one
- 12:44Speaker 1: US sponsored aliens, twenty five taurusts and seventeen alien dependents,
- 12:49Speaker 1: and from way another one hundred and fifty seven persons.
- 12:53Speaker 1: Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with Vietnam on August twenty seventh,
- 12:58Speaker 1: citing border violations and ill treatment of Buddhists. Two days later,
- 13:02Speaker 1: Charles de Gaul offered his good officers to restore peace
- 13:05Speaker 1: and harmony into China by reunifying North and South Vietnam
- 13:10Speaker 1: in independence and neutrality at the request ofation in African
- 13:14Speaker 1: members U thought. United States Secretary General wrote on August
- 13:19Speaker 1: thirty first to ask DM to ensure the exercise of
- 13:22Speaker 1: fundamental human rights to all sections of the population. On
- 13:27Speaker 1: that day, Chang Kai Chek talked at length with General
- 13:30Speaker 1: Jacob E. Smart, Pacific Air Force Commander. Chang said it
- 13:35Speaker 1: was essential to win the war because Asian states were
- 13:38Speaker 1: closely watching the United States and Vietnam. In Thailand, influential
- 13:42Speaker 1: figures told Smart that some officials doubted that the United
- 13:46Speaker 1: States could be depended upon in a crisis. In a
- 13:49Speaker 1: national television address on September two, Kennedy said that the
- 13:53Speaker 1: government of Vietnam could win the war only if it
- 13:56Speaker 1: had popular support. In his opinion, the government was out
- 13:59Speaker 1: of touch with the people. The Buddhist repressions had been unwise.
- 14:04Speaker 1: Could the government regain the affection of the people with
- 14:08Speaker 1: changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, The President said,
- 14:12Speaker 1: I think it can. It doesn't make those changes, I
- 14:15Speaker 1: would think that the chances of winning would not be
- 14:18Speaker 1: very good. Dugaul's scheme to unify and neutralize Vietnam led
- 14:23Speaker 1: Nigodin Niu to admit having contacted leaders of the National
- 14:27Speaker 1: Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Apparently he was also in
- 14:32Speaker 1: touch with Hanoi. On September second, he told Lodge of
- 14:35Speaker 1: his talk with a Polish member of the International Control Commission.
- 14:39Speaker 1: The poll had sought news reaction to de Gaul's proposal
- 14:43Speaker 1: so that he could forward it to the North Vietnamese
- 14:45Speaker 1: Foreign Minister. Many top level Vietnamese officers were convinced that
- 14:50Speaker 1: Nu would make a deal with Hanoi if he felt
- 14:53Speaker 1: it to be in his best interest. Dim answered U
- 14:56Speaker 1: Thant's letter on September fifth. He stressed his government its
- 15:00Speaker 1: action to free the Buddhist hierarchy from political agitation and
- 15:04Speaker 1: propaganda which benefited foreign interests and harm the Buddhist's religion,
- 15:09Speaker 1: and the Vietnamese state invited U Thont to send a
- 15:12Speaker 1: fact finding mission to Vietnam. When a United Nations group visited,
- 15:16Speaker 1: it reached no conclusions. Nevertheless, the Costa Rican member said
- 15:21Speaker 1: that he personally had found no religious discrimination or persecution.
- 15:26Speaker 1: He believed that the troubles were political and involved but
- 15:30Speaker 1: a small part of the Buddhist community. On eight September,
- 15:34Speaker 1: General Smart radio General le May, my own feeling is
- 15:38Speaker 1: that if we intend to remain committed in Vietnam, and
- 15:41Speaker 1: I believe that it is strongly in the national interest
- 15:44Speaker 1: that we do so, then we must support d M.
- 15:48Speaker 1: Whether we like him or his family is not germane.
- 15:51Speaker 1: My conclusion is that we must stick with DM, and
- 15:54Speaker 1: that we must quickly demonstrate this by positive action, even
- 15:58Speaker 1: though we may have to pay some price in terms
- 16:00Speaker 1: of embarrassment. We are probably going to have to swallow
- 16:04Speaker 1: the fact that DM will not exile his brother, and
- 16:07Speaker 1: from my discussions I am not at all convinced that
- 16:10Speaker 1: this should be our objective. I get the distinct impression
- 16:14Speaker 1: from Vietnamese that he is valuable and important to DM,
- 16:19Speaker 1: just as DM is important to the nation. Unlike Nolton,
- 16:23Speaker 1: who had used the country team to secure policy consensus,
- 16:27Speaker 1: Lodge was ordered by Kennedy to guard closely the cables
- 16:31Speaker 1: they exchanged, keep even Harkins in the dark. He thus
- 16:34Speaker 1: appeared to be running the US mission as a one
- 16:37Speaker 1: man operation conducted in total secrecy. General Smart noted the
- 16:43Speaker 1: American team left me with the impression of a divided
- 16:46Speaker 1: house in divergent directions. Opinions about DM, as observed by Smart,
- 16:52Speaker 1: range from the view held by John H. Richardson, CIA
- 16:56Speaker 1: Station chief that DM could be supported and knew was
- 17:00Speaker 1: useful to the view that the DM government must go
- 17:03Speaker 1: no matter what took its place. Reports to Washington from
- 17:07Speaker 1: the Embassy, mac Vee and the Heir Attache differed markedly.
- 17:11Speaker 1: Joseph A. Mendenhall of the State Department and Major General
- 17:15Speaker 1: Victor H. Krulock of the Marine Corps visited the country
- 17:19Speaker 1: together to determine Vietnamese attitudes toward DM's government. After hearing
- 17:25Speaker 1: their disparate findings, President Kennedy asked whether they had visited
- 17:29Speaker 1: the same country, suspending USA to pressure DM, as Lodge
- 17:33Speaker 1: now suggested seemed to Secretaris Ruskin macnamara to threaten the
- 17:38Speaker 1: war effort. President Kennedy inclined to agree. On September twenty first,
- 17:44Speaker 1: he again sent McNamara and General Taylor j SC chairman
- 17:49Speaker 1: since October nineteen sixty two, to gather information and to
- 17:53Speaker 1: encourage DM to solve his problems. Lodge, in his briefing
- 17:58Speaker 1: was pessimistic about the survival of the d M regime,
- 18:02Speaker 1: but other observations led macnamara and Tailor to conclude that
- 18:06Speaker 1: the DM government was consolidating its control throughout the country,
- 18:10Speaker 1: and that the military efforts still had momentum. Some military
- 18:15Speaker 1: men were hostile toward the government, but they were more
- 18:18Speaker 1: hostile toward the vietcom Reluctant to cut off economic aid,
- 18:22Speaker 1: Macnamara wanted more potent military action against the insurgents. More
- 18:27Speaker 1: dangerous than the political ferment in Vietnam was the rising
- 18:31Speaker 1: descent among Americans at home. A need existed to build
- 18:35Speaker 1: a case to be put to the people in Congress
- 18:39Speaker 1: to submit their confidence in the Kennedy administration and its
- 18:42Speaker 1: handling of the war. Consequently, Macnamara emphasized it DM that
- 18:47Speaker 1: he must conduct his military and political affairs in a
- 18:51Speaker 1: way that would win the support of the American people. Finally,
- 18:55Speaker 1: Macnamara and Taylor were convinced that the war could be
- 18:58Speaker 1: favorably ended in nineteen six five, with the insurgency then
- 19:02Speaker 1: shrinking to sporadic banditry in outlying areas. They accordingly announced that,
- 19:08Speaker 1: as scheduled, there would be one thousand fewer US military
- 19:12Speaker 1: advisers by the close of nineteen sixty three. On October two,
- 19:17Speaker 1: subsequent to a National Security Council discussion of the Macnamara
- 19:21Speaker 1: Tailor Report and Lodges recommendations. President Kennedy approved the following
- 19:26Speaker 1: policy statement. Since the military program in Vietnam was sound
- 19:31Speaker 1: in principle and progressing, the United States would go on
- 19:34Speaker 1: working with the Vietnamese people and their government. The goal
- 19:38Speaker 1: would be to deny the country to Communism and to
- 19:41Speaker 1: suppress the externally stimulated and supported Vietcom insurgency. Furthermore, the
- 19:47Speaker 1: United States had made clear its continued opposition to any
- 19:51Speaker 1: repressive actions in South Vietnam. While such actions have not
- 19:56Speaker 1: yet significantly affected in the military effort, they could so
- 20:00Speaker 1: in the future. Events in Saigon were far from reassuring.
- 20:05Speaker 1: On October third, Vietnamese plain clothesmen assaulted American newsmen and
- 20:10Speaker 1: lodge protested. The next day, a Buddhist monk burned himself,
- 20:14Speaker 1: the sixth and most publicized case. On October sixteenth, the
- 20:19Speaker 1: Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved an amendment to the Foreign
- 20:24Speaker 1: Aid Authorization Bill. It empowered the President to extend to
- 20:28Speaker 1: Vietnam assistants designed purely to further the objectives of victory
- 20:33Speaker 1: in the war against Communism and the return to their
- 20:37Speaker 1: homeland of Americans involved in the struggle. New On the
- 20:41Speaker 1: seventeenth declared to the press that he failed to understand
- 20:44Speaker 1: why the United States had initiated a process of disintegration
- 20:49Speaker 1: in Vietnam, accused the CIA of inciting a coup against
- 20:53Speaker 1: the government. Five days later, the United States announced the
- 20:56Speaker 1: end of support to the Vietnamese forces unless they wor
- 21:00Speaker 1: shifted from police duties to field operations or related training programs.
- 21:05Speaker 1: At this point, a major plot against DM was hatching
- 21:08Speaker 1: under the leadership of Generals Duang Van Minh trand Van
- 21:13Speaker 1: dun In Lee von Kim. They represented a coalition of
- 21:18Speaker 1: older men who wanted a neutralist solution to the war,
- 21:21Speaker 1: and of younger men who sought him military victory and
- 21:24Speaker 1: felt sure that they could secure it with the promise
- 21:27Speaker 1: of cooperation from the first, Second, and Third Corps commanders.
- 21:32Speaker 1: The coalition resolved to remove the Fourth Corps commander, who
- 21:35Speaker 1: was also military governor of Saigon and loyal to DM.
- 21:40Speaker 1: Although American officials took care to avoid any part in
- 21:43Speaker 1: the coup, some U S military circles received persistent reports
- 21:47Speaker 1: that a conspiracy was afoot. On October twenty eighth, the
- 21:52Speaker 1: Joint Chiefs directed sink Pack to sail a naval task
- 21:55Speaker 1: force to positions off Vietnam, and that same day three
- 21:59Speaker 1: U s U S Air Force F one two jet
- 22:03Speaker 1: interceptors flew to Tansun Nu. General Harkins was taken aback
- 22:08Speaker 1: when told of these moves. He had no idea that
- 22:11Speaker 1: d M's overthrow was near. On the morning of November first,
- 22:15Speaker 1: the conspirators gathered in the Joint Chief Staff Compound and
- 22:19Speaker 1: began to bring troops into Saigon. General Don announced that
- 22:23Speaker 1: a coup had begun, and in the afternoon American CIA
- 22:27Speaker 1: personnel were informed. Troops with red neckerchiefs poured into Saigon
- 22:32Speaker 1: from the north. By mid afternoon, they captured and imprisoned
- 22:36Speaker 1: all Vietnamese special forces in the city who were loyal
- 22:39Speaker 1: to Niu. The rebellion ran with precision troops, took over
- 22:44Speaker 1: key installations and surrounded d M and Nux in the
- 22:48Speaker 1: palace for a one h s and two T twenty
- 22:52Speaker 1: eighths made gun in rocket strikes against the Presidential compound.
- 22:57Speaker 1: Efforts of the Fourth Corps commander to march troops town
- 23:00Speaker 1: the capital fizzled that evening. D M and Niu escaped
- 23:05Speaker 1: from the palace through an underground passage. On the following day,
- 23:08Speaker 1: they surrendered. They were assassinated while being taken to the
- 23:12Speaker 1: Joint General Staff Complex. As the fighting at Saigon ceased
- 23:17Speaker 1: on November two, a Military Revolutionary Council of twenty four
- 23:21Speaker 1: generals and colonels under under Generals Dong Van Ming and
- 23:26Speaker 1: Tran Van Dun became the provisional government. Besides dissolving the
- 23:30Speaker 1: National Assembly, it suspended the nineteen fifty six constitution and
- 23:35Speaker 1: decreed an interim one. The United States recognized the new
- 23:39Speaker 1: government on November the eighth, judging that the council was
- 23:43Speaker 1: united and set on stepping up the war. Ambassador Lodge
- 23:47Speaker 1: proposed that the United States not pressed for instant political reforms.
- 23:52Speaker 1: The generals had agreed to pursue the Strategic Hamlet program
- 23:56Speaker 1: now called fortifi at Hamlets, and to consolidate and upgrade
- 24:00Speaker 1: their defenses. They spoke of massing all military, paramilitary, and
- 24:05Speaker 1: civilian forces for an all out campaign against the communist's threat.
- 24:10Speaker 1: In addition, they recognized the Joint General Staff. Despite their designs,
- 24:15Speaker 1: major tasks remained stalled. Wholesale purchase and transfers sowed concern.
- 24:21Speaker 1: There was little military movement. North Vietnam exploited at once
- 24:25Speaker 1: the confusion created by the coup, viet Cong attacks rose
- 24:30Speaker 1: because the Vietnamese Air Force was temporarily on coup duty,
- 24:35Speaker 1: United States Air Force crews shouldered the bulk of the
- 24:38Speaker 1: operational load. On the night of November one, for example,
- 24:42Speaker 1: the mere appearance of flair ships caused the Viet Cong
- 24:45Speaker 1: to break golf attacks on eight outposts. Over the following week,
- 24:49Speaker 1: the guerrillas assaulted seventy one outposts and hamlets. Enemy pressure
- 24:54Speaker 1: prompted a total of two hundred and eighty four flare
- 24:57Speaker 1: and two hundred and ninety eight strikes in November. The
- 25:02Speaker 1: insurgents nevertheless inflicted about twenty eight hundred casualties that month,
- 25:07Speaker 1: demoralizing the Civil Guard and Self Defense Court. Though Vicon
- 25:12Speaker 1: losses were put at twenty nine hundred for the period,
- 25:15Speaker 1: government forces lost nearly three weapons for every one they captured.
- 25:20Speaker 1: President Kennedy on November fourteen announced that Rusk and macnamara
- 25:24Speaker 1: were going to Honolulu for a meeting on the twentieth.
- 25:28Speaker 1: Its purpose was to size up the situation and to
- 25:31Speaker 1: find out how to intensify the struggle and to end
- 25:34Speaker 1: the American involvement now, the President said, this is our
- 25:38Speaker 1: objective to bring Americans home permit the South Vietnamese to
- 25:43Speaker 1: maintain themselves as a free and independent country and permit
- 25:47Speaker 1: democratic forces within the country to operate. Among the impressive
- 25:51Speaker 1: group at the meeting and Honolulu were Secretaries Ruskin macnamara,
- 25:56Speaker 1: Ambassador Lodge, Presidential Aide McGeorge, b D CIA Director John A.
- 26:03Speaker 1: Mc cone, j c S Chairman Taylor, Admiral Felt, and
- 26:07Speaker 1: General Smart Harkins and Anthos. Secretary Macnamarre remarked that a
- 26:13Speaker 1: certain euphori had set in since the coup, but actually
- 26:16Speaker 1: the generals had a very fragile government. Rusk asked whether
- 26:20Speaker 1: an increase in dollars would make a difference in shortening
- 26:23Speaker 1: the war. Lodge said he thought the Vietnamese had enough dollars.
- 26:27Speaker 1: What they needed was greater motivation. Macnamara argued that more
- 26:32Speaker 1: funds would help. Despite continuing difficulties, the conferees resolved to
- 26:38Speaker 1: adhere to present plans. The United States would hurry the
- 26:41Speaker 1: growth of Vietnamese military power and perry U S personnel
- 26:45Speaker 1: in Vietnam. The much publicized withdrawal of one thousand Americans
- 26:50Speaker 1: would therefore proceed as scheduled. The first three hundred departed
- 26:54Speaker 1: on December third, The rest ten days later, but the
- 26:59Speaker 1: assassination of Resident Kennedy on November nineteen sixty three signaled
- 27:03Speaker 1: the end of an error, and the accession of Lendon B.
- 27:07Speaker 1: Johnson to the presidency marked the beginning of another end
- 27:13Speaker 1: of Chapter sixteen