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NAPOLEON BONAPARTE’S 78 MAXIMS OF WAR — Timeless Strategies for Power, Leadership, Victory & Success · SECRETS OF SUCCESS & WEALTH: Hidden Laws of Money, Power & Success

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  Napoleon Bonapartes Maxims of War eighteen sixty two. Maxim one, the frontiers of
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  states are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of
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  all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome
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  is the desert. Mountains come next, and broad rivers occupy the third place.
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  Note Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon
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  to surmount every difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion. In Egypt,
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  he traversed deserts and vanquished and destroyed the Mameluks, so celebrated for their address
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  and courage. His genius knew how to accommodate itself to all the dangers of
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  this distant enterprise in a country I'll adapted to supply the wants of his troops.
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  In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed the Alps by the most
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  difficult passes, and at a season two which rendered this undertaking still more formidable.
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  In three months he passed the Pyrenees, defeated and dispersed four Spanish armies
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  in short from the Rhine to the Bersthenes. No natural obstacle could be found
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  to arrest the rapid march of his victorious army. Maxim too. In forming
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  the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may
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  do and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of
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  campaign may be modified at infinitem according to circumstances, the genius of the general,
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  the character of the troops, and the topography of the theater of action.
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  Note sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is
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  directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this success
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  depends generally on the caprice of fortune or upon faults committed by the enemy,
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  two things upon which a general must never count. Sometimes the plan of a
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  campaign, although based on sound principles of war, runs the risk of failing
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  at the outset, if opposed by an adversary who acts at first on the
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  defensive and then suddenly seizing the initiative, surprises by the skillfulness of his maneuvers.
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  Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Alick Council for
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  the campaign of seventeen ninety six under the command of Marshal Wormsir, from his
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  great numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated on the entire destruction of the French
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  army by cutting off its retreat. He founded his operations on the defensive attitude
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  of his adversary, who was posted on the line of the Audi Jay and
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  had to cover the siege of Mantua as well as Central and Lower Italy.
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  Wormsir, supposing the French army fixed in the neighborhood of Mantua, divided his
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  forces into three corps, which marched separately, intending to unite at that place.
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  Napoleon, having penetrated the design of the Austrian general, perceived the advantage
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  to be derived from striking the first blow against an army divided into three corps
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  with no communication between them. He hastened, therefore to raise the siege of
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  Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, and by this means became superior
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  to the imperialists, whose divisions he attacked and beat in detail. Thus,
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  worm Sir, who fancied he had only to march to certain victory, saw
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  himself compelled, after ten days campaign to retire with the remains of his army
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  into the Tyrol after a loss of twenty five thousand men in killed and wounded,
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  fifteen thousand prisoners, nine stand of colors, and seventy pieces of cannon.
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  Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe beforehand to a general the
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  line of conduct he shall pursue during the course of a campaign. Success must
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  often depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen, and it should be remembered likewise
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  that nothing cramps so much the efforts of genius as compelling the head of an
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  army to be governed by any will but his own. Maxim three. An
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  army which undertakes the conquest of a country has its two wings rested, either
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  upon neutral territories or upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of
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  mountains. It happens in some cases that only one wing is so supported,
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  and in others that both are exposed. In the first instant sighted viz.
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  Where both wings are protected, a general has only to protect his front from
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  being penetrated. In the second, where one wing only is supported, he
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  should rest upon the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are
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  exposed, he should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different
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  core under his command to depart from this, For if it be difficult to
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  contend with the disadvantage of having two flanks exposed, the inconvenience is doubled by
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  having four trebled if there be six. That is to say, if the
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  army is divided into two or three different core In the first instance, then
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  as above quoted, the line of operation may rest indifferently on the right or
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  on the left. In the second it should be directed toward the wing in
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  support. In the third it should be perpendicular to the center of the army's
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  line of march. But in all these cases it is necessary, at a
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  distance of every five or six days march to have a strong post or an
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  entrenched position upon the line of operation, in order to collect military stores and
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  provisions, to organize convoys, to form of it a center of movement,
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  and establish a point of defense to shorten the line of operation of the army.
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  Note these general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown or lost
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  sight of in the Middle Ages. The crusaders, in their incursions into Palestine,
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  appear to have had no object but to fight and to conquer. So
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  little pains did they take to profit by their victories. Hence, innumerable armies
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  perished in Syria without any other advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained
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  by superior numbers. It was by the neglect of these principles also that Charles
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  the Twelfth, abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden, threw
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  himself into the Ukraine and lost the greater part of his army by the fatigue
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  of a winter campaign in a barren country, destitute of resources. Defeated at
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  Pultua, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey after crossing the Napper,
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  with the remains of his army diminished to little more than one thousand men.
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  Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its true
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  principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid, and well executed.
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  He made success at all times conducive to future security, and established his line
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  of operation so as to prevent the possibility of any interruption in his communications with
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  Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in the art of war. Maxim
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  four. When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies
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  which have each their separate line of operation until they arrive at a point mixed
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  upon for their concentration. It should be laid down as a principle that the
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  union of these different courts should never take place near the enemy, because the
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  enemy, in uniting his forces, may not only prevent this junction, but
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  may beat the armies in detail. Note in the campaign of seventeen fifty seven,
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  Frederick marching to the conquest of Bohemia with two armies which had each their
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  separate line of operation, succeeded, notwithstanding in uniting them in sight of the
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  Duke of Lorraine, who covered Prague with the Imperial army. But his examples
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  should not be followed. The success of this march depended entirely on the enaction
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  of the Duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand men, did
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  nothing to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies. Maxim five. All
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  wars should be governed by certain principles. For every war should have a definite
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  object and be conducted according to the rules of art. A war should only
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  be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be will come. Note it
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  was a saying of martial Villers that when war is decided on, it is
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  necessary to have exact information of the number of troops the enemy can bring into
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  the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid plan of offensive
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  or defensive operation without an accurate knowledge of what you have to expect and fear.
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  When the first shot is fired, observes Martial Villers, no one can
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  calculate what will be the issue of the war. It is therefore of vast
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  importance to reflect maturely before we begin it. When, once, however,
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  this is decided, the Marshal observes that the boldest and most extended plans are
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  generally the wisest and the most successful. When we are determined upon war,
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  he adds, we should carry it on vigorously and without trifling maxim six.
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  At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a
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  matter for grave consideration. But when once the offensive has been assumed, must
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  be sustained to the last extremity. However skillful the maneuvers in a retreat,
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  it will always weaken the morale of an army, because, in losing the
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  chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides retreats always
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  cost more men and material than the most bloody engagements. With this difference that
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  in a battle, the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas
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  in a retreat the loss is on your side. Only note martial Saxe remarks
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  that no retreats are so favorable as those which are made before a languid and
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  unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues with vigor, the retreat soon degenerates into
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  a route. Upon this principle, it is a great error, says the
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  marshal, to adhere to the proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of
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  gold for a retreating enemy. No follow him up with spirit, and he
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  is destroyed. Maxim seven. An army should be ready every day, every
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  night, and at all times of the day and night, to oppose all
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  the resistance of which it is capable. With this view, the soldiers should
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  always be furnished completely with arms and ammunition. The infantry should never be without
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  its artillery, its cavalry, and its generals. And the different divisions of
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  the army should be constantly in a state to support, to be supported,
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  and to protect itself. The troops, whether halted or encamped or on the
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  march should be always in favorable positions, possessing the essentials required for a field
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  of battle. For example, the flanks should be well covered, and all
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  the artillery so placed as to have free range and to play with the greatest
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  advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have advanced
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  guards in flanking parties to examine well the country in front, to the right
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  and to the left, and always at such distance as to enable the main
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  body to deploy into position. Note the following maxims, taken from the memoirs
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  of Montecuculai, appear to me well suited to this place, and calculated to
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  form a useful commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding maxim one.
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  When war has been once decided on, the moment is passed for doubts
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  and scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the
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  evil which may ensue will not, that providence or our own wisdom may avert
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  it, or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may
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  prevent him from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer
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  the command on one individual. When the authority is divided, the opinions of
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  the commanders often vary, and the operations are deprived of that ensemble which is
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  the first essential to victory. Besides, when an enterprise is common to many
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  and not confined to a single person, it is conducted without vigor, and
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  less interest is attached to the result. After having strictly conformed to all the
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  rules of war, and satisfied ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual
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  success, we us then leave the issue in the hands of providence and repose
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  ourselves tranquility in the decision of a higher power. Let what will arrive.
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  It is the part of a general in chief to remain firm and constant in
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  his purposes. He must not allow himself to be elated by prosperity, nor
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  to be depressed by adversity. For in war, good and bad and fortune
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  succeed each other by turns form the abb and flow of military operations. Two.
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  When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of
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  the enemy is weak and consists of new levies or of troops enervated by long
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  in action, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle.
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  If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops,
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  a decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede
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  his progress by encamping advantageously and fortifying favorable passes. When armies are nearly equal
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  in force, it is desirable not to avoid a battle, but only to
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  attempt to fight one to advantage. For this purpose, cares should be taken
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  to encamp always in front of the enemy, to move when he moves,
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  and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds that lie upon his line of march.
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  To seize upon all the buildings and roads adjoining to his camp, and post
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  yourself advantageously in the places by which he must pass. It is always something
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  gained to make him lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retard
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  their progress in execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to
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  that of the enemy, and there is no possibility of maneuvering against him with
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  success, then the campaign must be abandoned and the troops must retire into the
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  fortresses. Three. The principal object of a general in chief in the moment
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  of battle should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true
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  that natural positions may be found to effect this object. But these positions,
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  being fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a general who
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  wishes to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who marches
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  to the attack. A general can therefore rely only on the proper arrangement of
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  his troops to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon the
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  front, or flanks or rear of his army. If one flank of an
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  army rests upon a river or an impassable ravine, the whole of the cavalry
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  may be posted with the other wing, in order to envelope the enemy more
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  easily by its superiority in numbers. If the enemy has his flanks supported by
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  woods, light cavalry or infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank or
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  in rear during the heat of the battle. If practicable, Also, an
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  attack should be made upon the baggage to add to his confusion. If you
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  desire to beat the enemies left with your right wing or his right with your
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  left wing, the wing with which you attack should be reinforced by the elite
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  of your army. At the same moment. The other wing should avoid battle,
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  and the attacking wing brought rapidly forward so as to overwhelm the enemy.
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  If the nature of the ground admits, he should be approached by stealth and
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  attacked before he is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable
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  in the enemy, and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder
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  in his movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him time to
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  recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into action and maneuver
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  so as to surprise and cut off his artillery and baggage. For the order
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  of march should always be subservient to the order of battle, which last should
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  be arranged beforehand. The march of an army is always well regulated, and
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  it is governed by the distance to be accomplished and by the time required for
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  its performance. The front of the column of march should be diminished or increased
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  according to the nature of the country, taking care that the artillery always proceeds
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  by the main road. When a river is to be passed, the artillery
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  should be placed in battery upon the bank opposite the point of crossing. It
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  is a great advantage when a river forms a sweep or angle, and when
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  a ford is to be found near the place where you wish to effect a
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  passage. As the construction of the bridge proceeds, infantry should be advanced to
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  cover the workmen by keeping up a fire on the opposite bank. But the
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  moment it is finished, a corps of infantry in cavalry and some field pieces
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  should be pushed across. The infantry should entrench itself immediately at the head of
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  the bridge, and it is prudent moreover to fortify on the same side of
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  the river in order to protect the bridge in case the enemy should venture an
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  offensive movement. The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trusty
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  guides and with a corps of pioneers, the first to point out the best
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  roads, the second to render these roads more practicable. If the army marches
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  in detachments, the commander of each detachment should be furnished with the name of
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  the place in riding where the whole are to be reassembled. The place should
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  be sufficiently removed from the enemy to prevent him from occupying it Before the junction
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  of all the detachments. To this end, it is of importance to keep
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  the name a secret. From the moment an army approaches the enemy, it
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  should march in the order in which it is intended to fight. If anything
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  is to be apprehended, precautions are necessary in proportion to the degree of the
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  danger. When a defile is to be passed, the troops should be halted
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  beyond the extremity until the whole army has quitted the defile. In order to
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  conceal the movements of an army, it is necessary to march by night through
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  woods and valleys, by the most retired roads, and out of reach of
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  all inhabited places. No fires should be allowed, and to favor the design
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  still more, the troops should move by verbal order. When the object of
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  the march is to carry a post or to relieve a place that is besieged,
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  the advanced guard should march within musket shot of the main body, because
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  then you are prepared for an immediate attack and ready to overthrow all before you.
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  When a march is made to surpass guarded by the enemy, it is
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  desirable to make a feint upon one point, while by a rapid movement you
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  bring your real attack to bear upon another. Sometimes success is obtained by pretending
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  to fall back upon the original line of march, and by a sudden countermarch,
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  seizing upon the pass before the enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some
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  generals have gained their point by maneuvering so as to deceive the enemy. While
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  a detachment under the cover of high grounds has surprised the passage by a stolen
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  march, the enemy being engaged in watching the movements of the main body,
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  the detachment has an opportunity of entrenching itself in its new position. Five.
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  An army regulates its mode of encampment according to the greater or less degree of
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  precaution when circumstances require. In a friendly country, the troops are divided to
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  afford better accommodation and supplies. But with the enemy in front, an army
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  should always encamp in order of battle. With this view, it is of
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  the highest importance to cover one part of the camp as far as practicable by
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  natural defenses, such as a river, a chain of rocks, or a
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  ravine. Care should be taken also that the camp is not commanded, and
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  that there is no obstacle to a free communication between the different cores, and
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  which can prevent the troops from mutually succoring each other. When an army occupies
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  a fixed camp, it is necessary to be well supplied with provisions and ammunition,
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  or at least that these should be within certain region easily obtained. To
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  ensure this, the line of communication must be well established, and care taken
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  not to leave an enemy's fortress in your rear. When an army is established
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  in winter quarters, its safety is best secured either by fortifying a camp,
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  for which purpose a spot should be selected near a large commercial town or a
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  river affording facility of transport, or by distributing it in close cantonments, so
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  that the troops should be near together and capable of affording each other mutual support.
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  The winter quarters of an army should be protected likewise by constructing small covered
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  works on all the lines of approach to the cantonments, and by posting advanced
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  guards of cavalry to observe the motions of the enemy. Six. A battle
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  is to be sought when there is reason to hope for victory, or when
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  an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting. Also when a besieged
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  place is to be relieved, or when you desire to prevent a reinforcement from
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  reaching the enemy. Battles are useful likewise when we wish to profit by a
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  favorable opportunity which offers to secure a certain advantage, such as seizing upon an
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  undefended point or pass, attacking the enemy when he has committed a fault,
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  or when some misunderstanding among his generals favors the undertaking. If an enemy declines
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  an engagement, he may be compelled to it, either by besieging a place
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  of importance or by falling upon him unawares, and when he cannot easily effect
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  his retreat, or after pretending to retire, by making a rapid countermarch attacking
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  him vigorously in forcing him to action. The different circumstances under which a battle
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  should be avoided or declined are when there is greater danger to be apprehended from
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  defeat than advantage to be derived from victory, when you are very inferior to
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  your adversary in numbers and are expecting reinforcements. Above all, when the enemy
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  is advantageously posted, or when he is contributing to his own ruin by some
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  inherent defect in his position, or by the errors and divisions of his generals.
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  To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously posted and have the
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  means of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected by
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  natural obstacles where these present themselves, or by having recourse when necessary to the
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  aid of art. The troops must be able to assist each other without confusion,
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  and care must be taken that the broken cords do not fall back upon
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  and throw the rest into disorder. Above all, the intervals between a different
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  or must be sufficiently small to prevent the enemy from penetrating between them, for
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  in that case you would be obliged to employ your reserves and run the risk
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  of being entirely overwhelmed. Sometimes victory is obtained by creating a diversion in the
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  middle of a battle, or even by depriving the soldier of all hope of
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  retreat and placing him in a situation where he is reduced to the necessity either
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  to conquer or die. At the commencement of a battle, if the ground
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  is level, you should advance to meet the enemy in order to inspire the
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  soldier with courage. But if you are well posted and your artillery advantageously placed.
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  Then wait for him with determination, remembering always to fight resolutely, to
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  succor opportunely those who require it, and never to bring your reserves into action
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  except in the last extremity, and even then to preserve some support behind which
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  the broken cor may rally. When it is necessary to attack with your whole
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  force. The battle should commence toward evening, because then, whatever be the
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  issue, night will arrive to separate the combatants before your troops are exhausted.
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  By this means, an opportunity is afforded of affecting an orderly retreat if the
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  result of the battle requires it. During an action, the general in chief
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  should occupy some spot whence he can, as far as possible, overlook his
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  whole army. He should be informed immediately of everything that passes in the different
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  divisions. He should be ready, in order to render success more complete,
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  to operate with fresh troops upon those points where the enemy is giving way,
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  and also to reinforce his own core wherever they are inclined to yield. When
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  the enemy is beaten, he must pursue him instantly, without giving him a
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  moment to rally. On the other hand, if he is himself defeated or
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  despairs a victory, he must retreat in the best possible order. Seven.
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  It shows great talent in a general to bring troops who are prepared for action
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  into collision with those who are not, For example, fresh troops against those
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  which wich are exhausted, brave and disciplined man against recruits. He must likewise
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  be ready always to fall with his army upon a week or detached corps,
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  to follow the track of the enemy and charge him among defile before he can
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  face about and get into position. Eight. A position is good when the
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  different corps are so placed as to be engaged with advantage and without any remaining
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  unemployed. If you are superior in cavalry, positions are to be taken in
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  plains and open ground, if in infantry, in an enclosed and covered country,
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  if inferior in numbers, in confined and narrow places, if superior in
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  a spacious and extensive field with a very inferior army, a difficult pass must
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  be selected to occupy and fortify. Nine. In order to obtain every possible
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  advantage from a diversion, we should ascertain first that the country in which it
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  is to be created is easily penetrated. A diversion should be made vigorously,
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  and on those points where it is calculated to do the greatest mischief to the
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  enemy. Ten to make war with success. The following principles should never be
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  departed from. To be superior to your enemy in numbers as well as in
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  morale. To fight battles in order to spread terror in the country. To
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  divide your army into as many corps as may be effected without risk, in
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  order to undertake several objects at the same time. To treat well those who
• 25:25
  yield, to ill treat those who resist. To secure your rear, and
• 25:30
  occupy and strengthen yourself at the outset in some post which shall serve as a
• 25:33
  central point for the support of your future movements. To guard against desertion.
• 25:40
  To make yourself master of the great rivers and principal passes, And to establish
• 25:44
  your line of communication by getting possession of the fortresses by laying siege to them,
• 25:48
  and of the open country by giving battle. For it is vain to
• 25:52
  expect that conquests are to be achieved without combats, although when a victory is
• 25:56
  won, they will be best maintained by uniting mild with valor maximate. A
• 26:03
  general in chief should ask himself frequently in the day, what should I do
• 26:07
  if the enemy's army appeared now in my front, or on my right or
• 26:11
  my left. If he have any difficulty in answering these questions, his position
• 26:15
  is bad, and he should seek to remedy it. Note in the campaign
• 26:22
  of seventeen fifty eight, the position of the Prussian army at hohen Kirk,
• 26:26
  being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all the heights,
• 26:30
  was eminently defective. Notwithstanding, Frederick, who saw his rear menace by the
• 26:34
  corps of Lawton, remained six days in his camp without seeking to correct his
• 26:38
  position. It would seem, indeed, that he was ignorant of his real
• 26:44
  danger for martial dawn, having maneuvered during the night in order to attack by
• 26:48
  daybreak, surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend themselves,
• 26:52
  and by this means surrounded them completely. Frederick succeeded, however, in
• 26:59
  effecting his retreat with regularity, but not without the loss of ten thousand men,
• 27:03
  many general officers, and almost all of his artillery. If Martial Dawn
• 27:08
  had followed up his victory with greater boldness, the King of Prussia would never
• 27:12
  have been able to rally his army on this occasion. Frederick's good fortune balanced
• 27:18
  his imprudence. Martial Saxe remarks that there is more talent than is dreamt of
• 27:23
  in bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good ones
• 27:27
  when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so much as this maneuver.
• 27:33
  He has counted upon something, all his arrangements have been founded upon it
• 27:37
  accordingly, and at the moment of attack it escapes him. I must repeat,
• 27:42
  says the Marshal, there is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as
• 27:47
  this, or leads him to commit so many errors. For it follows that
• 27:51
  if he does not change his arrangements, he is beaten, and if he
• 27:53
  does change them in presence of his adversary, he is equally undone. It
• 28:00
  seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of
• 28:03
  a battle upon such a principle would be more likely to lose than to gain
• 28:07
  by it, For if he had to deal with a skillful adversary and an
• 28:10
  alert tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous bad
• 28:15
  arrangements before he would be able to remedy them. Maxim nine, The strength
• 28:21
  of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the
• 28:25
  mass by the rapidity. A rapid march augments the morale of an army and
• 28:29
  increases its means of victory. Press On note. Rapidity, says Montecuculae,
• 28:37
  is of importance in concealing the movements of an army because it leaves no time
• 28:41
  to divulge the intention of its chief. It is therefore an advantage to attack
• 28:47
  the enemy unexpectedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise him and
• 28:51
  let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash. But if too great
• 28:55
  celerity exhausts your troops, while on the other hand, delay deprives you of
• 29:00
  the favorable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the disadvantage and choose between.
• 29:06
  Martial Villers observes that in war everything depends upon being able to deceive the
• 29:11
  enemy, and having once gained this point in never allowing him time to recover
• 29:15
  himself, Villers has united practice to precept his bold and rapid marches were almost
• 29:22
  always crowned with success. It was the opinion of Frederick that all wars should
• 29:26
  be short and rapid, because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates the
• 29:33
  state, and exhausts its resources. Maxim ten. When an army is inferior
• 29:38
  in number, inferior in cavalry and in artillery, it is essential to avoid
• 29:44
  a general action. The first efficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement,
• 29:48
  the want of artillery by the nature of the maneuvers, and the inferiority in
• 29:53
  cavalry by the choice of positions. In such circumstances, the morale of the
• 29:59
  soldier does much. Note the campaign of eighteen fourteen in France was skillfully executed
• 30:07
  upon these principles. Napoleon, with an army inferior in number, an army
• 30:11
  discouraged by the disastrous retreats of Moscow and of Leipzig, and still more by
• 30:15
  the presence of the enemy in the French territory, contrived notwithstanding, to supply
• 30:21
  his vast inequality of force by the rapidity and combination of his movements, by
• 30:26
  the success obtained a champouver Montmorrel, Montero and Rheims. He began to restore
• 30:32
  the morale of the French army. The numerous recruits of which it was composed
• 30:37
  had already acquired that steadiness of which the old regiments afforded them. An example,
• 30:41
  when the capture of Paris and the astonishing revolution it produced compelled Napoleon to
• 30:47
  lay down his arms. But this consequence resulted rather from the force of circumstances
• 30:52
  than from any absolute necessity. For Napoleon, by carrying his army to the
• 30:56
  other side of the lawyer, might easily have a junction with the armies of
• 31:00
  the Alps and Pyrenees, and have reappeared on the field of battle at the
• 31:04
  head of a hundred thousand men. Such a force would have amply sufficed to
• 31:08
  re establish the chances of war in his favor, more especially as the armies
• 31:14
  of the Allied sovereigns were obliged to maneuver upon the French territory, with all
• 31:18
  the strong places of Italy and France in their rear. Maxim eleven. To
• 31:23
  direct operations with lines far removed from each other and without communications is to commit
• 31:29
  a fault which always gives birth to a second. The detached column has only
• 31:33
  its orders for the first day. Its operations on the following day depend upon
• 31:38
  what may have happened to the main body. Thus this column either loses time
• 31:44
  upon emergency in waiting for orders, or it will act without them and at
• 31:48
  hazard. Let it therefore be held as a principle that an army should always
• 31:53
  keep its columns so united as to prevent the enemy from passing between them with
• 31:57
  impunity. Whenever for particular reasons, this principle is departed from the detached corps
• 32:05
  should be independent in their operations. They should move toward a point fixed upon
• 32:09
  for their future junction. They should advance without hesitating and without waiting for fresh
• 32:15
  orders, and every precaution should be taken to prevent an attack upon them.
• 32:20
  In detail, note the Austrian Army, commanded by Field Marshal Alvinzi, was
• 32:25
  divided into two corps, destined to act independently until they should accomplish their junction
• 32:31
  before Mantua. The first of these corps, consisting of forty five thousand men,
• 32:37
  was under the orders of Alvinzi. It was to debouch by monte Baldo
• 32:42
  upon the positions occupied by the French army on the Addijay. The second Corps,
• 32:47
  commanded by General Provera, was destined to act upon the lower Addi Jay
• 32:52
  and to raise the blockade of Mantua. Napoleon, informed of the enemy's movements,
• 32:58
  but not entirely comprehending his projects, confined himself to concentrating his masses and
• 33:02
  giving orders to the troops to hold themselves in readiness to maneuver. In the
• 33:07
  meantime, fresh information satisfied the General in chief of the French army that the
• 33:12
  corps, which had debouched by La Carana over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to
• 33:16
  form a junction with its cavalry and artillery, both which, having crossed the
• 33:21
  Audi Jay at Dolce, were directing their march upon the Plateau of Rivoli by
• 33:25
  the great road leading by Incanol. Napoleon immediately foresaw that by having possession of
• 33:31
  the plateau, he should be able to prevent this junction and obtain all the
• 33:36
  advantages of the initiative. He accordingly put his troops in motion, and at
• 33:40
  two o'clock in the morning occupied that important position, once master of the point
• 33:46
  fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian columns. Success followed all his dispositions,
• 33:52
  he repulsed every attack, made seven thousand prisoners, and took several standards
• 33:58
  in twelve pieces of cannon. At two o'clock in the afternoon, the battle
• 34:01
  of Rivoli was already gained when Napoleon, learning that General Provera had passed the
• 34:07
  Addi jay at Angiari and was directing his march upon Mantua, left to his
• 34:12
  generals the charge of following up the retreat of Alvinzi, and placed himself at
• 34:15
  the head of a division for the purpose of defeating the designs of Provera by
• 34:21
  a rapid march. He again succeeded in the initiatory movement and in preventing the
• 34:25
  garrison of Mantua from uniting its force with the relieving army. The corps entrusted
• 34:30
  with the blockade, eager to distinguish itself under the eyes of the conqueror of
• 34:35
  Rivoli, compelled the garrison to retire into the place, while the division of
• 34:38
  Victor, forgetting the fatigues of a forced march, rushed with impetuosity on the
• 34:44
  relieving army in front. At this moment, Assorti from the lines of Saint
• 34:47
  George took him in flank, while the corps of Augero, which had followed
• 34:52
  the forty two march of the Austrian general, attacked him in rear. Provera,
• 34:57
  surrounded on all sides, capitulated. The result of these two battles cost
• 35:01
  the Austrians three thousand men in killed and wounded, twenty two thousand prisoners,
• 35:07
  twenty four standards, and forty six pieces of cannon Maxim twelve. An army
• 35:14
  ought to have only one line of operation. This should be preserved with care
• 35:19
  and never abandoned. But in the last extremity note the line of communication of
• 35:24
  an army, says Montecuculae, must be certain and well established. For every
• 35:29
  army that acts from a distant base, and is not careful to keep this
• 35:32
  line perfectly open, marches upon a precipice, it moves to certain ruin,
• 35:37
  as may be seen by an infinity of examples. In fact, if the
• 35:43
  road by which provisions, ammunition, and reinforcements are to be brought up is
• 35:47
  not entirely secured, if the magazines, the forty three hospitals, the depots
• 35:52
  of arms, and the places of supply are not fixed and commodiously situated,
• 35:58
  not only the army cannot keep the yield, but it will be exposed to
• 36:00
  the greatest dangers. Underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore,
• 36:07
  underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore,
• 36:10
  underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore,
• 36:15
  underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore,
• 36:20
  underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore,
• 36:24
  underscore, underscore, underscore, underscore Maxim thirteen. The distance is permitted
• 36:31
  between core of an army upon the march must be governed by the localities,
• 36:36
  by circumstances, and by the object in view. Note when an army moves
• 36:42
  at a distance from the enemy, the columns may be disposed along the road
• 36:45
  so as to favor the artillery and baggage, but when it is marching into
• 36:51
  action, the different core must be formed in close columns. In order of
• 36:54
  battle. The generals must take care that the heads of the columns, which
• 36:59
  are to a tack together, do not outstep each other, and that in
• 37:02
  approaching the field of action, they preserve the relative intervals required for deployment.
• 37:07
  The marches that are made preparatory to a battle require, says Frederick, the
• 37:12
  greatest precaution. With this view, he recommends his generals to be particularly on
• 37:17
  their guard and to reconnoiter the ground at successive distances, in order to secure
• 37:22
  the initiative by occupying those positions most calculated to favor and attack on a retreat.
• 37:29
  It is the opinion of many generals that an army should concentrate its forces
• 37:32
  and march in close columns if it is still strong enough to resume the offensive,
• 37:37
  for by this means it is easy to form the line when a favorable
• 37:39
  opportunity presents itself, either for holding the enemy in check or for attacking him
• 37:45
  if he is not in a situation to accept battle. Such was Moreau's retreat
• 37:50
  after the passage of the Atta by the Austro Russian army. The French general,
• 37:54
  after having covered the evacuation of Milan, took up a position between the
• 38:00
  and the Tennaro. His camp rested upon Alexandria and Valencia, two capital fortresses,
• 38:06
  and had the advantage of covering the roads to Turin and Savona, by
• 38:09
  which he could effect his retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a junction
• 38:13
  with the Corps d Army of McDonald, who had been ordered to quit the
• 38:16
  Kingdom forty five of Naples and hasten his march into Tuscany. Forced to abandon
• 38:22
  his position in consequence of the insurrection in Piedmont and Tuscany. Moreau retired upon
• 38:27
  Osti, where he learned that his communication with the River of Genoa had just
• 38:30
  been cut off by the capture of Siva. After several ineffectual attempts to retake
• 38:36
  this place, he saw that his only safety depended upon throwing himself into the
• 38:40
  mountains. To effect this object, he directed the whole of his battering train
• 38:45
  and heavy baggage, by the call de Fenestrell, upon France. Then opening
• 38:50
  himself away over the Saint Bernard, he gained Loano with his light artillery and
• 38:53
  the small proportion of field equipment he had been able to preserve. By this
• 38:59
  skillful movement, he not only retained his communications with France, but was enabled
• 39:04
  to observe the motions of the army from Naples and to facilitate his junction with
• 39:07
  it by directing the whole of his force upon the points necessary for that purpose.
• 39:13
  MacDonald, in the meantime whose only chance of success depended on concentrating his
• 39:17
  little army, neglected this precaution and was beaten in three successive actions at the
• 39:22
  Trebia. By this retirement of his march, he rendered al Moreau's measures to
• 39:28
  unite the two armies in the plains of the pe useless, and his retreat
• 39:31
  after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other arrangements also
• 39:37
  which the former had made to come to his support. The inactivity of martial
• 39:42
  Suwaro, however, finally enabled the French general to accomplish his junction with the
• 39:46
  remains of the army from Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole force upon the
• 39:52
  Apennines and placed himself in a situation to defend the important positions of Liguria until
• 39:58
  the chances of war should afford him an opportunity of resuming the offensive. When
• 40:02
  after a decisive battle an army has lost its artillery and equipments, and is
• 40:07
  consequently no longer in a state to assume the offensive or even to arrest the
• 40:12
  pursuit of the enemy, it would seem most desirable to divide what remains into
• 40:16
  several corps and order them to march by separate and distant roots upon the base
• 40:21
  of operation, and throw themselves into the fortresses. This is the only means
• 40:25
  of safety for the enemy. Uncertain as to the precise direction taken by the
• 40:30
  vanquished army is ignorant in the first instance, which corps to pursue, And
• 40:35
  it is in this moment of indecision that a march is gained upon him.
• 40:38
  Besides the movements of a small body being so much easier than those of a
• 40:43
  larger one, these separate lines of march are all in favor of a retreating
• 40:47
  army. Maxim fourteen. Among mountains, a great number of positions are always
• 40:53
  to be found very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack.
• 40:59
  The character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the flanks
• 41:04
  or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative of abandoning
• 41:07
  his position without fighting, to take up another in the rear, or to
• 41:10
  descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain warfare, the assailant
• 41:15
  has always the disadvantage even an offensive warfare in the open field. The great
• 41:20
  secret consists in defensive combats and in obliging the enemy to attack. Note.
• 41:27
  During the campaign of seventeen ninety three in the Maritime Alps, the French army,
• 41:31
  under the orders of General Brunett, did all in its power to get
• 41:36
  possession of the camps at Rousse and at Forcea's by an attack in front.
• 41:39
  But these useless efforts served only to increase the courage of the Piedmontese and to
• 41:45
  destroy the elite of the grenadiers of the Republican army. The maneuvers by which
• 41:50
  Napoleon, without fighting, compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in seventeen ninety
• 41:55
  six suffice to establish the truth of these principles and to prove how much success
• 42:00
  in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on the courage
• 42:04
  of the soldier Maxim fifteen. The first consideration with a general who offers battle
• 42:10
  should be the glory and honor of his arms. The safety and preservation of
• 42:15
  his men is only the second. But it is in the enterprise and courage
• 42:19
  resulting from the former that the latter will most assuredly be found in a retreat.
• 42:23
  Besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often greater
• 42:28
  than in two battles. For this reason we should never despair, while brave
• 42:32
  men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means that
• 42:37
  we obtain victory and deserve to obtain it. Note In sixteen forty five,
• 42:43
  the French army, under the orders of the Prince of Conde, was on
• 42:46
  the march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that Count Mercy,
• 42:51
  who commanded the Bavarians, had foreseen this intention and had entrenched himself in
• 42:55
  a strong position which defended Nordlingen at the same time that it were Donaworth.
• 43:00
  Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy, Conde ordered the attack. The combat
• 43:07
  was terrible. All the infantry in the center and on the right, after
• 43:12
  being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed. In spite of the efforts of
• 43:15
  the cavalry and the reserve, which were likewise carried away with the fugitives,
• 43:21
  the battle was lost. Conde, in despair, having no longer either center
• 43:27
  or right to depend upon, collected the remnants of his battalions and directed his
• 43:31
  march to the left, where Turan was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated the
• 43:37
  ardor of the troops. They broke the right wing of the enemy, and
• 43:40
  Turin, by a change of front, returned to the attack upon his center.
• 43:45
  Night too favored the boldness of Conde. An entire corps of Bavarians,
• 43:51
  fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms, and the obstinacy of the
• 43:55
  French general in this struggle for victory was repaid by possession of the field of
• 44:00
  battle. Together with a great number of prisoners and almost all the enemies artillery,
• 44:06
  the Bavarian army beat a retreat, and the next day Nordlingen capitulated Maxim
• 44:12
  sixteen. It is an approved maxim in war never to do what the enemy
• 44:15
  wishes you to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it.
• 44:21
  A field of battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitered,
• 44:25
  should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time
• 44:29
  to fortify and entrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is never to attack
• 44:36
  a position in front which you can gain by turning. Note it was without
• 44:40
  due regard to this principle that Marshal Villeroy, on assuming the command of the
• 44:45
  army, of Italy during the campaign of seventeen o one, attacked with unwarrantable
• 44:50
  presumption Prince Eugene of Savoy in his entrenched position of Chiavey on the Oglio.
• 44:57
  The French generals Catenat, among the rest, considered the post unassailable, but
• 45:01
  Villeroy insisted, and the result of this otherwise unimportant battle was the loss of
• 45:06
  the elite of the French army. It would have been greater still, but
• 45:10
  for Catanat's exertions. It was by neglecting the same principle that the Prince of
• 45:15
  Conde, in the campaign of sixteen forty four failed in all his attacks upon
• 45:21
  the entrenched position of the Bavarian army. The Count Mercy, who commanded the
• 45:25
  latter, had drawn up his cavalry skillfully upon the plain resting upon Freiburg,
• 45:30
  while his infantry occupied the mountain. After many fruitless attempts, the Prince of
• 45:37
  Conde, seeing the impossibility of dislodging the enemy, began to menace his communications.
• 45:42
  But the moment Mercier perceived this, he broke up his camp and retired
• 45:45
  beyond the Black Mountains. Maxim seventeen, in a war of March and maneuver.
• 45:52
  If he would avoid a battle with a superior army, it is necessary
• 45:55
  to intrench every night and occupy a good defensive position. Those natural positions which
• 46:01
  are ordinarily met with are not sufficient to protect an army against superior numbers without
• 46:07
  recourse to art note. The campaign of the French and Spanish army commanded by
• 46:14
  the Duke of Berrick against the Portuguese in the year seventeen o six affords a
• 46:19
  good lesson on this subject. The two armies made almost the tour of Spain.
• 46:24
  They began the campaign near by the Haas, and after maneuvering across both
• 46:29
  Castilles, finished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The Duke of
• 46:34
  Berrick encamped his army eighty five times, and although the campaign passed without a
• 46:38
  general action, he took about ten thousand prisoners from the enemy. Marshal Turin
• 46:45
  also made a fine campaign of maneuver against the Count Montecuculai in sixteen seventy five.
• 46:51
  The Imperial Army, having made its arrangements to pass the Rhine at Strasbourg,
• 46:54
  Turin used all diligence and throwing a bridge over the river near the village
• 47:00
  of Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, he crossed with the French army and
• 47:05
  encamped close to the little town of Vilstet, which he occupied. This position
• 47:09
  covered the bridge of Strasbourg, so that by this maneuver Turin deprived the enemy
• 47:15
  of all approach to that city. Upon this, Montecucoalei made a movement with
• 47:20
  his whole army, threatening the bridge at Ottenheim, by which the French received
• 47:23
  their provisions from upper Alsos. As soon as Turin discovered the design of the
• 47:29
  enemy, he left a detachment at Vilstet and made a rapid march with his
• 47:32
  whole fifty fourth force upon the village of Altenheim. This intermediate position between the
• 47:38
  two bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave him the advantage of being
• 47:43
  able to succor either of these posts before the enemy had time to carry them.
• 47:47
  Montecucalei, seeing that any successful attack upon the bridges was not to be
• 47:52
  expected, resolved to pass the Rhine below Strasburg, and with this view,
• 47:55
  returned to his first position at Aufenburg. Marshal Turin, who followed all the
• 48:00
  movements of the Austrian army, brought back his army also to Vilstet in the
• 48:07
  meantime this attempt of the enemy. Having convinced the French general of the danger
• 48:10
  to which his bridge had exposed him, removed it nearer to that of Strasburg
• 48:15
  in order to diminish the extent of ground he had to defend. Montecuculae.
• 48:20
  Having commanded the magistrates of Strasburg to collect materials for a bridge, moved to
• 48:24
  Skertzime to receive them. But Tirin again defeated his projects by taking a position
• 48:30
  at Freistat, where he occupied the islands of the Rhine and immediately constructed a
• 48:34
  stockade. Thus it was that during the whole of this campaign Turin succeeded in
• 48:39
  gaining the initiative of the enemy and obliging him to follow his movements. He
• 48:45
  succeeded also by a rapid march in cutting off Montecuculae from the town of Aufenburg,
• 48:51
  whence he drew his supplies and would no doubt have prevented the Austrian general
• 48:54
  from effecting his junction with the Corps of Caprera, had not a cannon shot
• 48:59
  terminated this great man's life. Maxim eighteen. A general of ordinary talent occupying
• 49:06
  a bad position, and surprised by a superior force, seeks his safety in
• 49:09
  retreat. But a great captain supplies all deficiencies by his courage and marches boldly
• 49:15
  to meet the attack. By this means, he disconcerts his adversary, and
• 49:20
  if the latter shows any irresolution in his movements, a skillful leader, profiting
• 49:24
  by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at least employ the
• 49:29
  day in maneuvering at night, he intrenches himself or falls back to a better
• 49:32
  position. By this determined conduct fifty six, he maintains the honor of his
• 49:37
  arms, the first essential to all military superiority. Note. In sixteen fifty
• 49:45
  three, Martial Turin was surprised by the Prince of Conde in a position where
• 49:49
  his army was completely compromised. He had the power, indeed, by an
• 49:53
  immediate retreat, of covering himself by the psalm which he possessed, the means
• 49:59
  of crossing Purran, and whence he was distant only half a league. But
• 50:02
  fearing the influence of this retrograde movement on the morale of his army, Turan
• 50:07
  balanced all disadvantages by his courage and marched boldly to meet the enemy with very
• 50:13
  inferior forces. After marching a league, he found an advantageous position where he
• 50:17
  made every disposition for a battle. It was three o'clock in the afternoon,
• 50:22
  but the Spaniards, exhausted with fatigue, hesitated to attack him, and Turan,
• 50:28
  having covered himself with entrenchments during the night, the enemy no longer dared
• 50:31
  to risk a general action and broke up his camp Maxim nineteen. The transition
• 50:38
  from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations. Note
• 50:45
  By studying the first campaign of Napoleon in Italy, we can learn what genius
• 50:50
  and boldness may effect in passing with an army from the defensive to the offensive.
• 50:54
  The army of the Allies, commanded by General Bullieu, was provided with
• 50:59
  every means that could render it formidable. Its force amounted to eighty thousand men
• 51:05
  and two hundred pieces of cannon. The French army, on the contrary,
• 51:08
  could number scarcely thirty thousand men under arms and thirty pieces of cannon. For
• 51:15
  some time, there had been no issue of meat, and even the bread
• 51:17
  was irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill clothed, the cavalry wretchedly mounted.
• 51:24
  All the draft horses had perished from want, so that the service of the
• 51:29
  artillery was performed by mules. To remedy these evils, large disbursements were necessary,
• 51:35
  and such was the state of the finances that the fifty eighth government had
• 51:38
  only been able to furnish two thousand lewis in specie for the opening of the
• 51:43
  campaign. The French army could not possibly exist in this state. To advance
• 51:49
  or retreat was absolutely necessary. Aware of the advantage of surprising the enemy at
• 51:54
  the very outset of the campaign by some decisive blow, Napoleon prepared for it
• 51:59
  by re casting the morale of his army. In a proclamation full of energy.
• 52:04
  He reminded them that an ignoble death alone remained for them if they continued
• 52:07
  on the defensive. That they had nothing to expect from France, but everything
• 52:12
  to hope from victory. Abundance courts you in the fertile plains of Italy,
• 52:16
  said he, are you deficient soldiers in constancy or in courage? Profiting by
• 52:22
  the moment of enthusiasm which he had inspired, Napoleon concentrated his forces in order
• 52:28
  to fall with his whole weight on the different core of the enemy. Immediately
• 52:31
  afterward, the battles of Montanat, Melesimo and Mondovi added fresh confidence to the
• 52:37
  high opinion already entertained by the soldier for his chief, and that army,
• 52:42
  which only a few days ago was encamped amid barren rocks and consumed by famine,
• 52:46
  already aspired to the conquest of Italy. In one month after the opening
• 52:52
  of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated the war with the King of Sardinia and
• 52:57
  conquered the Milanese rich Kent comments soon dispelled from the recollection of the French soldier
• 53:02
  the misery and fatigue attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant administration of
• 53:07
  the resources of the country reorganized the material of the French army and created the
• 53:12
  means necessary for the attainment of future success Maxim twenty. It may be laid
• 53:19
  down as a principle that the line of operation should not be abandoned, but
• 53:22
  it is one of the most skillful maneuvers in war to know how to change
• 53:25
  it when circumstances authorize or render this necessary. An army which changes skillfully its
• 53:32
  line of operation deceives the enemy who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear,
• 53:37
  or upon what weak points it is assailable. Note Frederick sometimes changed his
• 53:44
  line of operation in the middle of a campaign, but he was enabled to
• 53:46
  do this because he was maneuvering at that time in the center of Germany,
• 53:51
  an abundant country capable of supplying all the wants of his army in case his
• 53:55
  communications with Prussia were intercepted. Martial Turin, in the campaign of seventeen forty
• 54:01
  six gave up his line of communication to the Allies in the same manner.
• 54:06
  But like Frederick, he was carrying on the war at this time in the
• 54:09
  center of Germany, and having fallen with his whole forces upon rain, he
• 54:14
  took the precaution of securing to himself a depot upon which to establish his base
• 54:17
  of operation. By a series of maneuvers marked alike by Audacity Ingenius, he
• 54:23
  subsequently compelled the Imperial Army to abandon its magazines and retire into Austria for winter
• 54:30
  quarters. But these are examples which, it appears to me, should only
• 54:34
  be imitated when we have taken full measure of the capacity of our adversary,
• 54:38
  and above all, when we see No. Sixty one reason to apprehend an
• 54:42
  insurrection in the country to which we transfer the theater of war Maxim Twenty one.
• 54:49
  When an army carries with it a battering train or large convoys of sick
• 54:52
  and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depots.
• 54:58
  Note it is a of all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed with
• 55:02
  woods and marshes, that it is of importance to observe this maxim. For
• 55:07
  the convoys and means of transport, being frequently embarrassed. In defile, an
• 55:12
  enemy, by maneuvering, may easily disperse the escorts, or make even a
• 55:15
  successful attack upon the whole army. When it is obliged from the nature of
• 55:20
  the country to march in an extended column Maxim Twenty two. The art of
• 55:25
  encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in order of battle
• 55:30
  in this position. To this end, the artillery should be advantageously placed,
• 55:36
  ground should be selected which is not commanded reliable to be turned, and as
• 55:39
  far as possible, the guns should cover and command the surrounding country. Note
• 55:46
  Frederick has remarked that in order to be assured that your camp is well placed,
• 55:51
  you should see if by making a small movement you can oblige the enemy
• 55:54
  to make a greater or if after having forced him to retrograde one march and
• 56:00
  compel him to fall back another. In defensive war, all camps should be
• 56:05
  entrenched in the front and wings of the position they occupy, and care should
• 56:08
  be taken that the rear is left perfectly open. If you are threatened with
• 56:13
  being turned, arrangements should be made beforehand for taking up a more distant position,
• 56:17
  and you should profit by any disorder in the enemy's line of march to
• 56:21
  make an attempt upon his artillery or baggage Maxim Twenty three. When you are
• 56:27
  occupying a position which the enemy threatens to surround, collect all your force immediately
• 56:32
  and menace him with an offensive movement. By this maneuver you will prevent him
• 56:37
  from detaching and annoying your flanks in case you should judge it necessary to retire.
• 56:43
  Note this was the maneuver practiced by General the Sakes in seventeen ninety eight
• 56:49
  near Ratstad. He made up for inferiority in numbers by audacity and maintained himself
• 56:54
  the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous attacks of the Archduke Charles
• 57:00
  at night. He effected his retreat in good order and took up a position
• 57:04
  in the rear. It was in accordance also with this principle in the same
• 57:08
  campaign that General Moreau gave battle at Biberack to secure his retreat by the passes
• 57:14
  of the Black Mountains. A few days after he fought at Schlingenn, with
• 57:19
  the same object. Placed in a good defensive position, he menaced the sixty
• 57:23
  four Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the offensive while his artillery and baggage
• 57:29
  were passing the Rhine by the bridge of Huningen, and he was making all
• 57:32
  the necessary arrangements for retiring behind that river himself. Here, however, I
• 57:37
  would observe that the execution of such offensive demonstrations should be deferred always till toward
• 57:44
  the evening, in order that you may not be compromised by engaging too early
• 57:47
  in a combat which you cannot long maintain. With success. Night and the
• 57:52
  uncertainty of the enemy after an affair of this kind will always favor your retreat
• 57:57
  if it is judged necessary. But with a view to mask the operation more
• 58:01
  effectually, fires should be lighted all along the lines to deceive the enemy and
• 58:06
  prevent him from discovering this retrograde movement. For in a retreat it is a
• 58:09
  great advantage to gain a march upon your adversary. Maxim twenty four. Never
• 58:16
  lose sight of this maxim that you should establish your cantonments at sixty five,
• 58:21
  the most distant and best protected point from the enemy, especially where a surprise
• 58:24
  is possible. By this means you will have time to unite all your forces
• 58:30
  before he can attack you. Note in the campaign of seventeen forty five,
• 58:36
  Martial Turin lost the Battle of Marienthal by neglecting this principle. For if instead
• 58:42
  of reassembling his divisions at Erbstausen, he had rallied his troops at Merchantame behind
• 58:46
  the tower, his army would have been much sooner reunited, and Count Mercy,
• 58:51
  in place of finding only three thousand men to fight at Erbstausen, of
• 58:54
  which he was well informed, would have had the whole French army to attack
• 58:59
  in a position covered by a river. Some one, having indiscreetly asked Viscount
• 59:04
  Turan how he had lost the Battle of Marienthal by my own fault, replied
• 59:08
  the Marshal, but added he when a man has committed no faults in war,
• 59:13
  he can only have been engaged in it but a short time maxim Twenty
• 59:17
  five. When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to
• 59:22
  retire over a bridge while the other has the circumference of the circle open,
• 59:27
  all the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general
• 59:30
  should show boldness, strike a decided blow, and maneuver upon the flank of
• 59:35
  his enemy. The victory is in his hands. Note This was the position
• 59:42
  of the French army at the famous Battle of Leipsig, which terminated the campaign
• 59:45
  of eighteen thirteen, so fatally for Napoleon, for the Battle of Hanau was
• 59:50
  of no consequence comparatively in the desperate situation of that army. It strikes me
• 59:57
  that in a situation like that of the French army pre vious to the Battle
• 1:00:00
  of Leipzig, a general should never calculate upon any of those lucky chances which
• 1:00:05
  may arise out of a return to the offensive, but that he should rather
• 1:00:07
  adopt every possible means to secure his retreat. With this view, he should
• 1:00:13
  immediately cover himself with good intrenchments to enable him to repel with inferior numbers the
• 1:00:19
  attack of the enemy while his own equipments are crossing the river. As fast
• 1:00:23
  as the troops reach the other side, they should occupy positions to protect the
• 1:00:28
  passage of the rear guard, and this last should be covered by attempt upont
• 1:00:31
  as soon as the army breaks up its camp. During the wars of the
• 1:00:36
  Revolution, too little regard was paid to intrenchments, and it is for this
• 1:00:39
  reason we have seen large armies dispersed after a single reverse, and a fate
• 1:00:44
  of nations compromised by the issue of one battle Maxim. Twenty six. It
• 1:00:51
  is contrary to all true principle to make corps which have no communication with each
• 1:00:54
  other acts separately against a central force whose communications are cut off. Note the
• 1:01:01
  Austrians lost the Battle of Hohenlinden by neglecting this principle. The Imperial Army,
• 1:01:07
  under the orders of the Archduke John, was divided into four columns, which
• 1:01:12
  had to march through an immense forest previous to their junction in the plain of
• 1:01:15
  Anzing, where they intended to surprise the French. But these different corps,
• 1:01:21
  having no direct communication, found themselves compelled to engage separately with an enemy who
• 1:01:25
  had taken the precaution of concentrating his masses, and who could move them with
• 1:01:30
  facility in a country with which he had been long previously acquainted. Thus,
• 1:01:35
  the Austrian army, enclosed in the defile of the forest with its whole train
• 1:01:38
  of artillery and baggage, was attacked in its flanks and rear, and the
• 1:01:43
  Archduke John was only enabled to rally his dispersed and shattered divisions under cover of
• 1:01:47
  the night. The trophies obtained by the French army on this day were immense.
• 1:01:53
  They consisted of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred pieces of cannon, several
• 1:01:59
  stand of colors, and all the baggage of the enemy. The Battle of
• 1:02:02
  Hohenlinden decided the fate of the campaign of eighteen hundred and Moreau's brilliant and well
• 1:02:07
  merited success placed him in the rank of the first general of the age Maxim
• 1:02:13
  Twenty seven. When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating
• 1:02:17
  columns should rally always sufficiently in the rear to prevent any interruption from the enemy.
• 1:02:23
  The greatest disaster that can happen is when the columns are attacked in detail
• 1:02:29
  and before their junction. Note. One great advantage which results from rallying your
• 1:02:35
  columns on a point far removed from the field of battle or from the position
• 1:02:38
  previously occupied, is that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean
• 1:02:44
  to take. If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself
• 1:02:49
  to see his detachments beaten in detail, especially if you have exerted all due
• 1:02:53
  diligence and have effected the junction of your troops in sufficient time to get between
• 1:02:58
  his columns and disperse them after the other. It was by a maneuver of
• 1:03:02
  this kind in the Campaign of Italy in seventeen ninety nine that General Maelas gained
• 1:03:07
  the Battle of Genola. General Championet commanded the French army and endeavored to cut
• 1:03:14
  off the communication of the Austrians with Turin by employing corps which maneuvered separately to
• 1:03:19
  get into their rear. Maelaws, who divined his project, made a retrograde
• 1:03:23
  march by which he persuaded his adversary he was in full retreat, although the
• 1:03:28
  real object of his movement was to concentrate his forces at the point fixed for
• 1:03:32
  the junction of the different attachments of the French army, and which he beat
• 1:03:36
  and dispersed one after another by his great superiority in numbers. The result of
• 1:03:42
  this maneuver, in which the Austrian general displayed vigor, decision and foresight,
• 1:03:47
  secured to him the peaceable possession of Piedmont. It was also by the neglect
• 1:03:52
  of this principle that General Bullieu, who commanded the Austro Sardinian army in the
• 1:03:57
  campaign of seventeen ninety six, lost the Battle of Millsimo after that of Montanat
• 1:04:02
  his object in endeavoring to rally his different core upon Millsimo was to cover the
• 1:04:08
  high roads of Turin and Milan. But Napoleon, aware of the advantages arising
• 1:04:13
  from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent success, attacked him before he could
• 1:04:16
  assemble his divisions, and by a series of skillful maneuvers, succeeded in separating
• 1:04:21
  the combined armies. They retired in the greatest disorder, the one by the
• 1:04:27
  road of Milan, the other by that of Turin Maxim twenty eight. No
• 1:04:32
  force should be detached on the eve of a battle because affairs may change during
• 1:04:38
  the night, either by the retreat of the enemy or by the arrival of
• 1:04:41
  large reinforcements, to enable him to resume the offensive and counteract your previous arrangements.
• 1:04:47
  Note in seventeen ninety six, the Army of the Sambran Meuse, commanded
• 1:04:53
  by General Jordan, effected a retreat which was rendered still more difficult by the
• 1:04:58
  loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the forces of
• 1:05:02
  the Archduke Charles were scattered, Jordan, in order to accomplish his retreat upon
• 1:05:06
  Frankfort, resolved to open himself away by Wurtzburg, where there were at that
• 1:05:12
  moment only two divisions of the Austrian army. This movement would have been attended
• 1:05:16
  with success if the French general, believing he had simply these two divisions to
• 1:05:20
  contend with, had not committed the error of separating himself from the Corps of
• 1:05:25
  Le Fevre, which he left at Schweinfort to cover the only direct communication of
• 1:05:30
  the army with its base of operation. The commission of this fault at the
• 1:05:33
  outset added to some slowness in the march of the French general secured the victory
• 1:05:39
  to the Archduke, who hastened to concentrate his forces. The arrival of the
• 1:05:44
  two divisions also of Cray and Wardeslebn, during the battle enabled him to oppose
• 1:05:48
  fifty thousand men to the French army, which scarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants.
• 1:05:55
  This last was consequently beaten and obliged to continue its retreat by the mountains of
• 1:06:00
  Folds, where the badness of the roads could be equaled only by the difficulty
• 1:06:03
  of the country. The division of le Fevre, amounting to fourteen thousand men,
• 1:06:09
  would in all probability have turned the scale in favor of Jordan, had
• 1:06:14
  the latter not unfortunately conceived that two divisions only were opposing his passage to Wurtzburg
• 1:06:19
  Maxim. Twenty nine. When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect
• 1:06:24
  your whole force, dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.
• 1:06:31
  Note I think it here desirable to observe that it is prudent before a
• 1:06:36
  battle to fix upon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction of
• 1:06:41
  the different detachments, for if from unforeseen circumstances these detachments should be prevented from
• 1:06:46
  joining before the action has commenced, they might be exposed in case a retrograde
• 1:06:51
  movement should be found necessary to the masses of the enemy. It is desirable
• 1:06:57
  also to keep the enemy in ignorance of these enforcements, in order to employ
• 1:07:01
  them with greater effect. A seasonable reinforcement, says Frederick, renders the success
• 1:07:06
  of a battle certain, because the enemy will always imagine it stronger than it
• 1:07:12
  really is and lose courage. Accordingly, maxim thirty, nothing is so rash
• 1:07:17
  or so contrary to principle as to make a flank march before an army in
• 1:07:23
  position, especially when this army occupies heights at the foot of which you are
• 1:07:27
  forced to defile. Note it was by a neglect of this principle that Frederick
• 1:07:31
  was beaten at Colin in the First Campaign of seventeen fifty seven. Notwithstanding prodigies
• 1:07:38
  of valor, the Prussians lost fifteen thousand men and a great portion of their
• 1:07:43
  artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did not exceed five thousand men.
• 1:07:47
  The consequence of this battle was more unfortunate still, since it obliged the King
• 1:07:51
  of Prussia to raise the siege of Prague and to evacuate Bohemia. It was
• 1:07:57
  also by making a flank march before the Ussian army that the French lost the
• 1:08:00
  disgraceful Battle of Rosbach. This imprudent movement was still more to be reprehended,
• 1:08:06
  because the Prince des Subes, who commanded the French army, was so negligent
• 1:08:12
  as to maneuver without either advanced guards or a flanking corps in presence of the
• 1:08:15
  enemy. The result was that his army, consisting of fifty thousand men,
• 1:08:21
  was beaten by six battalions and thirty squadrons. The French lost seven thousand men,
• 1:08:28
  twenty seven standards, and a great number of cannon. The Prussians had
• 1:08:32
  only three hundred men disabled. Thus, by having forgotten this principle that a
• 1:08:38
  flank march is never to be made before an enemy in line of battle,
• 1:08:42
  Frederick lost his army at Colin, and Subes at Rosbach lost both his army.
• 1:08:46
  In his honor Maxim thirty one, When you determined to risk a battle,
• 1:08:53
  reserve to yourself every possible chance of success, more particularly if you have
• 1:08:57
  to deal with an adversary of superior talents. For if you were beaten even
• 1:09:00
  in the midst of your magazines, and your communications were to the vanquished.
• 1:09:05
  Note we should make war, says martial Sachs, without leaving anything to hazard
• 1:09:12
  seventy six. And in this especially consists the talent of a general. But
• 1:09:16
  when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to
• 1:09:19
  profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves according to custom, with
• 1:09:25
  possession of the field. It was by neglecting to follow up the first success
• 1:09:30
  that the Austrian army, after gaining the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled
• 1:09:34
  on the following day to evacuate the whole of Italy. General Melas, observing
• 1:09:40
  the French and retreat, left the direction of the movements of his army to
• 1:09:43
  the chief of his staff and retired to Alexandria to repose from the fatigues of
• 1:09:47
  the day. Colonel Zach, equally, convinced with his general that the French
• 1:09:53
  army was completely broken and consisted only of fugitives, formed the divisions in column
• 1:09:58
  of Root. By this arrangement, the Imperial army prepared to enter upon its
• 1:10:02
  victorious march in a formation not less than three miles in depth. It was
• 1:10:08
  near four o'clock. When General the Sakes rejoined the French army with his division,
• 1:10:13
  his presence restored in some degree in equality between the contending forces. And
• 1:10:17
  yet Napoleon hesitated for a moment whether to resume the offensive or to make use
• 1:10:21
  of this corps to secure his retreat. The ardor of the troops to return
• 1:10:27
  to the charge decided his irresolution. He rode rapidly along the front of his
• 1:10:31
  divisions, and addressing the soldiers, we have retired far enough for today,
• 1:10:36
  said he. You know I always sleep upon the field of battle. The
• 1:10:41
  army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed to him a promise of victory. Napoleon
• 1:10:46
  resumed the offensive. The Austrian advance guard, panic struck at the sight of
• 1:10:51
  a formidable and unbroken body presenting itself suddenly at a point where a few moments
• 1:10:57
  before only fugitives were to be seen, went to the right about and carried
• 1:11:00
  disorder into the mass of its columns. Attacked immediately afterward with impetuosity in its
• 1:11:06
  front and flanks, the Austrian army was completely routed. Martial Dawn experienced nearly
• 1:11:14
  the same fate as General Melas at the Battle of Torgau. In the campaign
• 1:11:17
  of seventeen sixty, the position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had
• 1:11:24
  its left upon Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its
• 1:11:28
  front covered by a large sheet of water. Frederick proposed to turn its right
• 1:11:32
  in order to make an attack upon the rear. For this purpose he divided
• 1:11:36
  his army into two corps, the one under the orders of Zethen, with
• 1:11:41
  instructions to attack in front following the edge of the water, the other under
• 1:11:45
  his own immediate command, with which he set out to turn the right of
• 1:11:48
  the Austrians. But Martial Dawn, having had intimation of the movements of the
• 1:11:54
  enemy, changed his front by countermarching, and was thus enabled to repel the
• 1:11:58
  attacks of Frederick, whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps of the
• 1:12:01
  Prussian army had been acting without communication. Zethen in the meantime, hearing the
• 1:12:08
  fire, Recede, concluded that the king had been beaten, and commenced a
• 1:12:12
  movement by his left in order to rejoin him, but falling in with two
• 1:12:15
  battalions of the reserve. The Prussian general profited by this reinforcement to resume the
• 1:12:19
  offensive. Accordingly, he renewed the attack with vigor, got possession of the
• 1:12:25
  plateau of Siptits, and soon after of the whole field of battle. The
• 1:12:30
  sun had already set when the King of Prussia received the news of this unexpected
• 1:12:33
  good fortune. He returned in all haste, took advantage of the night to
• 1:12:39
  restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after the battle occupied Torgau.
• 1:12:44
  Marshal Dawn was receiving congratulations upon his victory when he heard that the Prussians
• 1:12:49
  had resumed the offensive. He immediately commanded a retreat, and at daybreak the
• 1:12:55
  Austrians repassed the Elba with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight thousand prison
• 1:13:00
  nurse, and forty five pieces of cannon. After the Battle of Marengo,
• 1:13:04
  General Melas, although in the midst of his fortresses and magazines, saw himself
• 1:13:09
  compelled to abandon everything in order to save the wreck of his army. General
• 1:13:15
  Mack capitulated after the Battle of Ulm, although in the center of his own
• 1:13:18
  country. The Prussians, in spite of their depots and reserves, were obliged
• 1:13:24
  after the Battle of Jena, and the French after that of waterloo to lay
• 1:13:28
  down their arms. Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune that results from
• 1:13:32
  the loss of a battle does not consist so much in the destruction of men
• 1:13:36
  and of material as in the discouragement which follows this disaster. The courage and
• 1:13:42
  confidence of the victor's augment in proportion as those of the vanquished, diminish,
• 1:13:45
  and whatever may be the resources of an army, it will be found that
• 1:13:49
  a retreat will degenerate rapidly into a route unless the general in chief shall succeed
• 1:13:55
  by combining boldness with skill, and perseverance with firmness, in restoring the rale
• 1:14:00
  of his army Maxim. Thirty two. The duty of an advanced guard does
• 1:14:04
  not consist in advancing or retiring, but in maneuvering. An advanced guard should
• 1:14:11
  be composed of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and
• 1:14:15
  by battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard should consist
• 1:14:20
  of picked troops and the general officers. Officers and men should be selected for
• 1:14:26
  their respective capabilities and knowledge. A court deficient in instruction is only an embarrassment
• 1:14:31
  to an advanced guard. Note it was the opinion of Frederick that an advanced
• 1:14:38
  guard should be composed of detachments of troops of all arms. The commanders should
• 1:14:43
  possess skill in the choice of ground, and he should take care to be
• 1:14:46
  instantly informed, by means of numerous patrols, of everything passing in the enemy's
• 1:14:51
  camp. In war, it is not the business of an advanced guard to
• 1:14:56
  fight, but to observe the enemy in order to cover the movement of the
• 1:15:00
  army. When in pursuit, the advanced guard should charge with vigor and cut
• 1:15:04
  off the baggage and insulated core of the retiring enemy. For this purpose it
• 1:15:10
  should be reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry of the army Maxim thirty three.
• 1:15:16
  It is contrary to the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of
• 1:15:20
  artillery to enter a defile unless you hold the other extremity. In case of
• 1:15:26
  retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost. They should be
• 1:15:30
  left in position under a sufficient escort until you are master of the opening.
• 1:15:36
  Note nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of baggage.
• 1:15:43
  In the campaign of seventeen ninety six, Napoleon abandoned his battering train under
• 1:15:47
  the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroying the carriages. By
• 1:15:53
  this sacrifice, he acquired a facility of maneuvering rapidly his little army, and
• 1:15:58
  obtained the initiative, as well as a general superiority over the numerous but divided
• 1:16:01
  forces of martial wormsir. In seventeen ninety nine, during his retreat in Italy,
• 1:16:08
  General Moreau, being compelled to maneuver among the mountains, preferred separating himself
• 1:16:13
  entirely from his reserve artillery, which he directed upon France by the call de
• 1:16:16
  Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his march with this part of his equipment. These
• 1:16:21
  are the examples we should follow. For if by a rapidity of march and
• 1:16:26
  a facility of concentration upon decisive points, the victory is gained, the material
• 1:16:30
  of an army is soon re established. But if, on the other hand,
• 1:16:35
  we are beaten and compelled to retreat, it will be difficult to save
• 1:16:40
  our equipments, and we may have reason to congratulate ourselves that we abandon them
• 1:16:44
  in time to prevent them from augmenting the trophies of the enemy maxim thirty four.
• 1:16:49
  It should be laid down as a principle never to leave intervals by which
• 1:16:54
  the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle, unless it be
• 1:16:58
  to draw him into a snare. Note. In the campaign of seventeen fifty
• 1:17:03
  seven, the Prince of Lorraine, who was covering Prague with the Austrian army,
• 1:17:08
  perceived the Prussian's threatening by a flank movement to turn his right. He
• 1:17:13
  immediately ordered a partial change of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing
• 1:17:17
  so as to form a right angle with the rest of the line. But
• 1:17:20
  this maneuver, being executed in presence of the enemy, was not effected without
• 1:17:26
  some disorder. The heads of the columns, having marched too quick, caused
• 1:17:30
  the rear to lengthen out, and when the line was formed to the right,
• 1:17:33
  a large interval appeared at the salient angle. Frederick, observing this error,
• 1:17:39
  hastened to take advantage of it. He directed his center corps, commanded
• 1:17:44
  by the Duke of Bevern, to throw itself into this opening, and by
• 1:17:47
  this maneuver decided the fate of the battle. The Prince of Lorraine returned to
• 1:17:53
  Prague beaten and pursued with the loss of sixteen thousand men and two hundred pieces
• 1:17:58
  of cannon. It should be observed at the same time that this operation of
• 1:18:02
  throwing a corps into the intervals made by an army in time of battle should
• 1:18:06
  never be attempted unless you are at least equal in force and have an opportunity
• 1:18:11
  of outflanking the enemy on the one side or the other. For it is
• 1:18:15
  then only you can hope to divide his army in the center and insulate the
• 1:18:17
  wings entirely. If you are inferior in number, you run the risk of
• 1:18:23
  being stopped by the reverses and overpowered by the enemy's wings, which may deploy
• 1:18:28
  upon your flanks and surround you. It was by this maneuver that the Duke
• 1:18:31
  of Barrick gained the Battle of Almanza. In the year seventeen o seven in
• 1:18:36
  Spain, the Anglo Portuguese army, under the command of Lord Galloway, came
• 1:18:42
  to invest eighty five Villena. Marshal Barrick, who commanded the French and Spanish
• 1:18:47
  army, quitted his camp at Montealiger and moved upon this town to raise the
• 1:18:51
  siege. At his approach, the English general, eager to fight a battle,
• 1:18:57
  advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza. The issue was long
• 1:19:00
  doubtful, the first line, commanded by the Duke of Populi, having been
• 1:19:05
  broken. The Chevalier D'asfeldt, who had charge of the second, drew up
• 1:19:10
  his masses with large intervals between them, and when the English, who were
• 1:19:14
  in pursuit of the first line, reached these reserves, he took advantage of
• 1:19:17
  their disorder to attack them in flank and defeated them entirely. Marshal Barrick,
• 1:19:24
  perceiving the success of this maneuver, threw open his front and deploying upon the
• 1:19:28
  enemy's flanks. While the reserves sustained the attack in front and the cavalry,
• 1:19:32
  maneuvered in their rear, obtained a complete victory. Lord Galloway, wounded and
• 1:19:38
  pursued, collected with difficulty the remains of his army, and took shelter with
• 1:19:43
  them in Tortosa Maxim Thirty five. Encampments of the same army should always be
• 1:19:48
  formed so as to protect each other. Note. At the Battle of Dresden
• 1:19:55
  in the campaign of eighteen thirteen, the camp of the Allies, although advantage
• 1:20:00
  justly placed upon the heights on the left bank of the Elba, was nevertheless
• 1:20:03
  extremely defective from being traversed longitudinally by a deep ravine which separated the left wing
• 1:20:10
  completely from the center and the right. This vicious arrangement did not escape the
• 1:20:15
  penetrating eye of Napoleon. He instantly directed the whole of his cavalry and two
• 1:20:19
  corps of infantry against the insulated wing, attacked it with superior numbers, overthrew
• 1:20:25
  it, and took ten thousand prisoners before it was possible to come to its
• 1:20:29
  support. Maxim thirty six. When the enemy's army is covered by a river
• 1:20:34
  upon which he holds several TETs de pont eighty seven, do not attack in
• 1:20:39
  front. This would divide your force and expose you to be turned. Approach
• 1:20:45
  the river in echelon of columns, in such a manner that the leading column
• 1:20:48
  shall be the only one the enemy can attack without offering you his flank.
• 1:20:54
  In the meantime, let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you
• 1:20:57
  have decided on the point of passage, Russia upon it and fling across your
• 1:21:00
  bridge. Observe that the point of passage should be always at a distance from
• 1:21:05
  the leading echelon in order to deceive the enemy. Note. If you occupy
• 1:21:12
  a town or a village on the bank of a river opposite to that held
• 1:21:15
  by the enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot the crossing point,
• 1:21:18
  because it is easier to cover your carriages and reserve artillery, as well
• 1:21:23
  as to mask the construction of your bridge in a town than in the open
• 1:21:27
  country. It is also a great advantage to pass a river opposite a village
• 1:21:31
  when the latter is only weakly occupied by the enemy, because as soon as
• 1:21:35
  the advanced guard reaches the eighty eight other side it carries this post makes a
• 1:21:41
  lodgment, and by throwing up a few defensive works, converts it easily into
• 1:21:45
  a teta pond. By this means, the rest of the army is enabled
• 1:21:48
  to effect the passage with facility maxim thirty seven. From the moment you are
• 1:21:56
  master of a position which commands the opposite bank, facilities are wired for effecting
• 1:22:00
  the passage of the river. Above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive
• 1:22:04
  to place upon an artillery in force. This advantage is diminished if the river
• 1:22:10
  is more than three hundred toises or six hundred yards in breadth. Because the
• 1:22:15
  distance being out of the range of grape, it is easy for the troops
• 1:22:18
  which defend the passage to line the bank and get under cover. Hence,
• 1:22:23
  it follows that if the grenadiers ordered to pass the river for the protection of
• 1:22:27
  the bridge should reach the other side, they would be destroyed by the fire
• 1:22:30
  of the enemy, because his batteries, placed at the distance of two hundred
• 1:22:34
  toises from the landing are capable of a most destructive effect although removed above five
• 1:22:40
  hundred toises from the batteries of the crossing force. Thus the advantage of the
• 1:22:45
  artillery would be exclusively his. For the same reason, the passage is impracticable
• 1:22:50
  unless you succeed in surprising the enemy and are protected by an intermediate island,
• 1:22:56
  or unless you are able to take advantage of an angle in the river to
• 1:22:59
  a establish a cross fire upon his works. In this case, the island
• 1:23:03
  or angle forms a natural tech to pont and gives the advantage in artillery to
• 1:23:09
  the attacking army. When a river is less than sixty toyses or one hundred
• 1:23:14
  and twenty yards in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side,
• 1:23:17
  the troops which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of your
• 1:23:21
  artillery, that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible for
• 1:23:26
  the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case, the
• 1:23:30
  most skillful generals, when they have discovered ninety the project of their adversary and
• 1:23:35
  brought their own army to the point of crossing, usually content themselves with opposing
• 1:23:41
  the passage of the bridge by forming a semicircle round its extremity, as round
• 1:23:45
  the opening of a defile, and removing to the distance of three or four
• 1:23:48
  hundred toyses from the fire of the opposite side. Note Frederick observes that the
• 1:23:56
  passage of great rivers in the presence of the enemy is one of the most
• 1:23:59
  delicate operations in war. Success on these occasions depends on secrecy, on the
• 1:24:04
  rapidity of the maneuvers, and the punctual execution of the orders given for the
• 1:24:09
  movements of each division. To pass such an obstacle in presence of an enemy
• 1:24:14
  and without his knowledge, it is necessary not only that the previous dispositions should
• 1:24:18
  be well conceived, but that they should be executed without confusion. In the
• 1:24:24
  campaign of seventeen o five, Prince Eugene of Savoy, wishing to come to
• 1:24:28
  the assistance of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a favorable point at which
• 1:24:32
  to force the passage of the Atta, defended at that time by the French
• 1:24:35
  army under the command of the Duc Devendome. After having selected an advantageous situation,
• 1:24:43
  Prince Eugene erected a battery of twenty pieces of cannon on a position which
• 1:24:46
  commanded the entire of the opposite bank, and covered his infantry by a line
• 1:24:50
  of entrenched parallels constructed on the slope of the declivity. They were working vigorously
• 1:24:56
  at the bridge when the Duc de Mondome appeared with his whole army. At
• 1:25:00
  first he seemed determined to oppose its construction, but after having examined the position
• 1:25:05
  of Prince Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable. He therefore placed his
• 1:25:11
  army out of reach of the Prince's batteries, resting both his wings upon the
• 1:25:15
  river, so as to form a bow of which the Atta was the cord.
• 1:25:19
  He then covered himself with entrenchments and abatties, and was thus enabled to
• 1:25:24
  charge the enemy's columns whenever they debouched from the bridge and to beat them in
• 1:25:28
  detail. Eugene, having reconnoitered the position of the French, considered the passage
• 1:25:33
  impossible. He therefore withdrew the bridge and broke up his camp during the night.
• 1:25:40
  It was by this maneuver also that in the campaign of eighteen o nine,
• 1:25:45
  the Archduke Charles compelled the French to reoccupy the Isle of Lobo after having
• 1:25:49
  debouched on the left bank of the Danube. The march of the Archduke Charles
• 1:25:55
  was wholly concentric. He menaced gross Aspurn with his right, Essling with his
• 1:26:00
  center, and Enzersdorff with his left. His army, with both wings resting
• 1:26:04
  on the Danube, formed a semicircle around Essling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke
• 1:26:11
  the center of the Austrians, but after having forced their first line, he
• 1:26:15
  found himself arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, the bridges upon the
• 1:26:19
  Danube had been destroyed and several of his corps, with their parks of artillery,
• 1:26:25
  were still on the right bank. This disappointment, joined to the favorable
• 1:26:29
  position of the Austrians, decided Napoleon to re enter the Isle of Lobo.
• 1:26:33
  Where he had previously constructed a line of field works, so as to give
• 1:26:38
  it all the advantages of a well entrenched camp Maxim. Thirty eight. It
• 1:26:43
  is difficult to prevent an enemy supplied with pontoons from crossing a river when the
• 1:26:48
  object of an army which defends the passage is to cover a siege. The
• 1:26:53
  moment the general has ascertained his inability to oppose the passage, he should take
• 1:26:58
  measures to arrive before the enemy at an intermediate position between the river he defends
• 1:27:02
  and the place he desires to cover. Note here we may observe that this
• 1:27:09
  intermediate position should be reconnoitered or rather well entrenched beforehand, for the enemy will
• 1:27:14
  be unable to make an offensive movement against the corps employed in the siege until
• 1:27:18
  he has beaten the army of observation, and the latter under cover of its
• 1:27:23
  camp may always await a favorable opportunity to attack him in flank or in rear.
• 1:27:29
  Besides, the army, which is once entrenched in this manner, has
• 1:27:31
  the advantage of being concentrated, while that of the enemy must act in detachments
• 1:27:36
  if he wishes to cover his bridge and watch the movements of the army of
• 1:27:40
  observation, so as to enable him to attack the besieging corps in its lines
• 1:27:45
  without being exposed to an attempt on his rear or being menaced with the loss
• 1:27:48
  of his bridge Maxim thirty nine. In the campaign of sixteen forty five,
• 1:27:55
  Turin was attacked with his army before Philipsburg by a very superior force. There
• 1:28:00
  was no bridge here over the rhine, but he took advantage of the ground
• 1:28:03
  between the river and the place to establish his camp. This should serve as
• 1:28:09
  a lesson to engineer officers, not merely in the construction of fortresses, but
• 1:28:13
  of tetes to pont a. Space should always be left between the fortress and
• 1:28:17
  the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged to throw
• 1:28:21
  itself into the place and thereby compromise its security. An army retiring upon Mayn's
• 1:28:28
  before a pursuing enemy is necessarily compromised for this reason, because it requires more
• 1:28:33
  than a day to pass the bridge, and because the lines of castle are
• 1:28:38
  too confined to admit an army to remain there without being blocked up. Two
• 1:28:42
  hundred toyses should have been left between that place and the Rhine. It is
• 1:28:46
  essential that all tetes de pont before great rivers should be constructed upon this principle,
• 1:28:51
  otherwise they will prove a very inefficient assistance to protect the passage of a
• 1:28:56
  retreating army. Tetes de pont, as laid down in our schools, are
• 1:29:00
  of use only for small rivers, the passage of which is comparatively short.
• 1:29:05
  Note Martial Sacks, in the campaign of seventeen forty one, having passed the
• 1:29:12
  Moldau in quest of a detached corps of fourteen thousand men, which was about
• 1:29:15
  to throw itself into Prague, left a thousand infantry upon that river, with
• 1:29:20
  orders to entrench themselves upon a height directly opposite the Tete de pont. By
• 1:29:26
  this precaution, the marshal secured his retreat and also the facility of repassing the
• 1:29:30
  bridge without disorder, by rallying his divisions between the entrenched height and the Tete
• 1:29:34
  de pont. Were these examples unknown to the generals of modern times, or
• 1:29:40
  are they disposed to think such precautions superfluous? Maxim forty fortresses are equally useful
• 1:29:47
  in offensive and defensive warfare. It is true they will not in themselves arrest
• 1:29:54
  an army, but they are an excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening,
• 1:29:58
  and annoying a victorious enemy. Note the brilliant success of the Allied armies
• 1:30:04
  in the campaign of eighteen fourteen has given to many military men a false idea
• 1:30:09
  of the real value of fortresses. The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and
• 1:30:15
  the Alps at this period were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong
• 1:30:18
  places that covered the frontiers of France without materially affecting the numerical superiority of the
• 1:30:25
  army which marched upon the capital. This army was in a condition, therefore,
• 1:30:30
  to act without the fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.
• 1:30:34
  But at no period of military history were the armies of Europe so combined before,
• 1:30:40
  or governed so entirely by one common mind in the attainment of a single
• 1:30:44
  object. Under these circumstances, the line of fortresses which surround France was rendered
• 1:30:49
  unavailable during the campaign. But it would be very imprudent therefore, to conclude
• 1:30:55
  that a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses may be passed with impunity, or that
• 1:31:00
  battles may be fought with these places in your rear without previously besieging or at
• 1:31:03
  least investing them with sufficient forces maxim forty one. There are only two ways
• 1:31:11
  of ensuring the success of a siege. The first to begin by beating the
• 1:31:15
  enemy's army employed to cover the place, forcing it out of the field,
• 1:31:19
  and throwing its remains beyond some great natural obstacle, such as a chain of
• 1:31:24
  mountains or large river. Having accomplished ninety eight this object, an army of
• 1:31:30
  observation should be placed behind the natural obstacle until the trenches are finished and the
• 1:31:34
  place taken. But if it be desired to take the place in presence of
• 1:31:39
  a relieving army without risking a battle, then the whole material and equipment for
• 1:31:44
  a siege are necessary to begin with, together with ammunition and provisions for the
• 1:31:47
  presumed period of its duration, and also lines of contravelation and circumvallation, aided
• 1:31:54
  by all the localities of heights, woods, marshes and inundations. Having no
• 1:31:59
  law longer occasion to keep up communications with your depots, it is now only
• 1:32:03
  requisite to hold and check the relieving army. For this purpose, an army
• 1:32:08
  of observation should be formed whose business it is never to lose sight of that
• 1:32:13
  of the enemy, and which, while it effectually bars all access to the
• 1:32:15
  place, has always time enough to arrive upon his flanks or rear in case
• 1:32:20
  he should attempt to steal a march. It is to be remembered too,
• 1:32:25
  that by ninety nine, profiting judiciously by the lines of contravelation, a portion
• 1:32:30
  of the besieging army will always be available in giving battle to the approaching enemy.
• 1:32:34
  Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged in
• 1:32:39
  presence of an enemy's army, it is necessary to cover the siege by lines
• 1:32:43
  of circumvallation. If the besieging force is of numerical strength enough, after leaving
• 1:32:47
  a corps before the place four times the amount of the garrison to cope with
• 1:32:51
  the relieving army, it may remove more than one day's march from the place,
• 1:32:56
  but if it be inferior in numbers, after providing for the sea each
• 1:33:00
  as above stated, it should remain only a short day's march from the spot,
• 1:33:03
  in order to fall back upon its lines if necessary, or received succor
• 1:33:09
  in case of attack. If the investing corps and army of observation are only
• 1:33:14
  equal when united to the relieving force. The besieging army should remain entire within
• 1:33:18
  or near its lines, and push the works and the siege with the greatest
• 1:33:23
  activity. Note when we undertake a siege, says Montecuculae, we should not
• 1:33:29
  seek to place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the
• 1:33:32
  point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs we have in view.
• 1:33:38
  This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berrick, sent to form
• 1:33:43
  the siege of Nice in seventeen o six. He determined to attack on the
• 1:33:46
  side of Montalban, contrary to the advice of Boban and even to the orders
• 1:33:50
  of the King. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began
• 1:33:56
  by securing his camp. This he did by constructing redoubts upon the heights that
• 1:34:00
  shut in the space between the var and the pale lawn, two rivers,
• 1:34:04
  which supported his flanks. By this means he protected himself against a surprise,
• 1:34:10
  for the Duke of Savoy, having the power of debouching suddenly by the called
• 1:34:14
  attenda, it was necessary that the marshal should be enabled to assemble his forces
• 1:34:18
  so as to move rapidly upon his adversary and fight him before he got into
• 1:34:23
  position. Otherwise, his inferiority in numbers would have obliged him to raise the
• 1:34:28
  siege. When Martial Sacks was besieging Brussels with only twenty eight thousand men opposed
• 1:34:33
  to a garrison of twelve thousand, he received intelligence that the Prince of Waldeck
• 1:34:38
  was assembling his forces to raise the siege. Not being strong enough to form
• 1:34:43
  an army of observation, the marshal reconnoitered a field of battle on the Little
• 1:34:47
  River Volume and made all the necessary dispositions for moving rapidly to the spot in
• 1:34:53
  case of the approach of the enemy. By this means, he was prepared
• 1:34:57
  to receive his adversary without discontinuing the operations of the siege. Maxim forty two
• 1:35:03
  Fuchiers says that we should never wait for the enemy in the lines of circumvallation,
• 1:35:09
  but we should go out and attack him. He is in error.
• 1:35:13
  There is no authority in war without exception, and it would be dangerous to
• 1:35:16
  proscribe the principle of awaiting the enemy within the lines of circumvallation. Note.
• 1:35:23
  During the Siege of Mons in sixteen ninety one, the Prince of Orange assembled
• 1:35:28
  his army and advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halley, making a demonstration
• 1:35:32
  to succor the place. Louis the fourteenth, who commanded the siege in person,
• 1:35:38
  called a council of war to deliberate on what was to be done in
• 1:35:41
  case the Prince of Orange approached. The opinion of Marshal Luxembourg was to remain
• 1:35:45
  within the lines of circumvallation, and that opinion prevailed. The Marshal laid it
• 1:35:50
  down as a principle that when the besieging army is not strong enough to defend
• 1:35:55
  the whole extent of circumvallation, it should quit the lines and advance to meet
• 1:36:00
  the enemy. But when it is strong enough to encamp in two lines around
• 1:36:02
  a place, that it is better to profit by a good entrenchment, more
• 1:36:06
  especially as by this means the siege is not interrupted. In sixteen fifty eight,
• 1:36:13
  Martial Turin was besieging Dunkirk. He had already opened the trenches when the
• 1:36:17
  Spanish army, under the orders of the Prince don Juan Conde and Daquancourt appeared
• 1:36:24
  in sight and took post upon the downs at a distance of a league from
• 1:36:27
  his lines. Turin had the superiority in numbers, and he determined to quit
• 1:36:32
  his entrenchments. He had other advantages. Also, The enemy was without artillery,
• 1:36:39
  and their superiority in cavalry was rendered useless by the unfavorable nature of the
• 1:36:44
  ground. It was therefore of great importance to beat the Spanish army before it
• 1:36:48
  had time to entrench itself and bring up its artillery. The victory gained by
• 1:36:54
  the French on this occasion justified all the combinations of martial Turin. When Marshal
• 1:37:00
  Barrick was laying siege to Philippsburg in seventeen thirty three, he had reason to
• 1:37:04
  apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would attack him with all the forces of the
• 1:37:09
  Empire before its termination. The Marshal, therefore, after having made his disposition
• 1:37:15
  of the troops intended for the siege, formed with the rest of his army
• 1:37:18
  a corps of observation to make head against Prince Eugene in case the latter should
• 1:37:23
  choose to attack him in his lines or attempt a diversion on the Moselle or
• 1:37:27
  Upper Rhine. Prince Eugene, having arrived in front of the besieging army.
• 1:37:32
  Some general officers were of opinion that it was better not to await the enemy
• 1:37:35
  in the lines, but to move forward and attack him. But Marshal Barrick,
• 1:37:41
  who agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg that an army which can occupy completely
• 1:37:45
  good entrenchments is not liable to be forced, persisted in remaining within his works.
• 1:37:51
  The result proved that this was also the opinion of Prince Eugene, for
• 1:37:56
  he did not dare to attack the entrenchments, which he would not have failed
• 1:37:59
  to do if he had any hopes of success. Maxim forty three. Those
• 1:38:04
  who prescribe lines of circumvallation and all the assistance which the science of the engineer
• 1:38:10
  can afford, deprive themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary which is never injurious, almost
• 1:38:15
  always useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted at the same time
• 1:38:20
  that the principles of field fortification require improvement. This important branch of the art
• 1:38:27
  of war has made no progress since the time of the ancients. It is
• 1:38:30
  even inferior at this day to what it was two thousand years ago. Engineer
• 1:38:35
  officers should be encouraged in bringing this branch of their art to perfection and in
• 1:38:40
  placing it upon a level with the rest. Note, if we are inferior
• 1:38:45
  in numbers, says martial Sacks, entrenchments are of no use, for the
• 1:38:49
  enemy will bring all his forces to bear upon particular points. If we are
• 1:38:55
  of equal strength, they are unnecessary. Also, if we are superior,
• 1:39:00
  we do not want them. Then why give ourselves the trouble to intrench.
• 1:39:04
  Notwithstanding this opinion of the inutility of entrenchments, martial Sacks often had recourse to
• 1:39:11
  them. In seventeen ninety seven, Generals Provera and Hohenzollern, having presented themselves
• 1:39:16
  before Mantua, where Marshal Wormster was shut up, for the purpose of raising
• 1:39:20
  the siege, they were stopped by the lines of contravelation of Saint George.
• 1:39:26
  This slight obstacle sufficed to afford Napoleon time to arrive from Rivoli and defeat their
• 1:39:30
  enterprise. It was in consequence of neglecting to entrench themselves that the French had
• 1:39:36
  been obliged to raise the siege in the preceding campaign maxim forty four. If
• 1:39:43
  circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend a fortified town which contains in
• 1:39:48
  hospital and magazines, at least every means should be employed to secure the citadel
• 1:39:53
  against a coup de main. Note. A few battalions dispersed about a town
• 1:40:00
  inspire no terror, but shut up in the more narrow outline of a citadel,
• 1:40:03
  they assume an imposing attitude. For this reason, it appears to me
• 1:40:08
  that such a precaution is always necessary, not only in fortresses, but wherever
• 1:40:13
  there are hospitals or depots of any kind. Where there is no citadel,
• 1:40:17
  some quarter of the town should be fixed upon most favorable for defense, and
• 1:40:21
  entrenched in such a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance possible maxim forty five.
• 1:40:29
  A fortified place can only protect the garrison and detain the enemy for a
• 1:40:32
  certain time. When this time has elapsed and the defenses of the place are
• 1:40:38
  destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All civilized nations are agreed
• 1:40:44
  on this point, and there never has been an argument, except with reference
• 1:40:46
  to the greater or less degree of defense which a governor is bound to make
• 1:40:50
  before he capitulates. At the same time, there are generals villars among the
• 1:40:57
  number who are of opinion that a governor should never surrender, but that in
• 1:41:00
  the last extremity he should blow up the fortifications and take advantage of the night
• 1:41:04
  to cut his way through the besieging army. Where he is unable to blow
• 1:41:09
  up the fortifications, he may always retire, they say, with his garrison
• 1:41:14
  and save the men. Officers who have adopted this line of conduct have often
• 1:41:18
  brought off three fourths of their garrison. Note. In seventeen o five,
• 1:41:25
  the French who were besieged in Hageneau by Count Thungeon found themselves incapable of sustaining
• 1:41:30
  an assault. Perry, the governor, who had already distinguished himself by a
• 1:41:35
  vigorous defense, despairing of being allowed to capitulate on any terms short of becoming
• 1:41:41
  prisoner of war, resolved to abandon the place and cut his way through the
• 1:41:44
  besiegers in order to conceal his intention more effectually, and while he deceived the
• 1:41:49
  enemy to sound at the same time the disposition of his officers. He assembled
• 1:41:54
  a council of war and declared his resolution to die in the breach. Then,
• 1:42:00
  under pretext of the extremity to which he was reduced, he commanded the
• 1:42:02
  whole garrison under arms, and, leaving only a few sharpshooters in the breach,
• 1:42:08
  gave the order to march and set out in silence under cover of the
• 1:42:12
  night from Hageneau. This audacious enterprise was crowned with success, and Perry reached
• 1:42:17
  Savern without having suffered the smallest loss. Two fine instances of defense in later
• 1:42:24
  times are those of Messina at Genoa and of Palafox at Saragassa. The first
• 1:42:30
  marched out with arms and baggage and all the honors of war, after rejecting
• 1:42:33
  every summons and defending himself until hunger alone compelled him to capitulate. The second
• 1:42:41
  only yielded after having buried his garrison amid the ruins of the city, which
• 1:42:45
  he defended from house to house until famine and death left him no alternative but
• 1:42:49
  to surrender. This siege, which was equally honorable to the French as to
• 1:42:54
  the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable in the history of war.
• 1:42:59
  In the course of it, Palafox displayed every possible resource, which courage and
• 1:43:02
  obstinacy can supply in the defense of a fortress. All real strength is founded
• 1:43:09
  in the mind, And on this account I am of opinion that we should
• 1:43:12
  be directed in the choice of a governor less by his genius than his personal
• 1:43:15
  character. His most essential qualities should be courage, perseverance, and soldier like
• 1:43:21
  devotedness. Above all, he should possess the talent not only of infusing courage
• 1:43:27
  into the garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance in the whole population
• 1:43:31
  where the latter is wanting. However, art may multiply the defenses of a
• 1:43:35
  place, the garrison will be compelled to capitulate after having sustained the first or
• 1:43:41
  at most the second assault maxim forty six. The keys of a fortress are
• 1:43:47
  well worth the retirement of the garrison when it is resolved to yield only on
• 1:43:50
  those conditions. On this principle, it is always wiser to grant an honorable
• 1:43:56
  capitulation to a garrison which has made a vigorous resistance than to risk an assault.
• 1:44:01
  Note Martial Villers has justly observed that no governor of a place should be
• 1:44:08
  permitted to excuse himself for surrendering on the ground of wishing to preserve the King's
• 1:44:12
  troops. Every garrison that displays courage will escape being prisoners of war. For
• 1:44:17
  there is no general who, however well assured of carrying a place by assault,
• 1:44:23
  will not prefer granting terms of capitulation rather than risk the loss of a
• 1:44:27
  thousand men in forcing determined troops to surrender Maxim forty seven. Infantry, cavalry
• 1:44:33
  and artillery are nothing without each other. Therefore they should always be so disposed
• 1:44:40
  in cantonments as to assist each other in case of surprise. Note a general
• 1:44:45
  says, Frederick should direct his whole attention to the tranquility of his cantonents,
• 1:44:50
  in order that the soldier may be relieved from all anxiety and repose insecurity from
• 1:44:56
  his fatigues. With this view, cares should be taken that the troops are
• 1:45:00
  able to form rapidly upon ground which has been previously reconnoitered, that the generals
• 1:45:04
  remain always with their divisions or brigades, and that the service is carried on
• 1:45:09
  throughout with exactness. Martial Sacks is of opinion that an army should not be
• 1:45:15
  in a hurry to quit its cantonents, but that it should wait till the
• 1:45:17
  enemy has exhausted himself with marching, and be ready to fall upon him with
• 1:45:21
  fresh troops when he is overcome with fatigue. I believe, however, that
• 1:45:27
  it would be dangerous to trust implicitly to this high authority, for there are
• 1:45:30
  many occasions where all the advantage lies in the initiative, more especially when the
• 1:45:34
  enemy has been compelled to extend his cantonents from scarcity of subsistence, and can
• 1:45:40
  be attacked before he has time to concentrate his forces maxim forty eight. The
• 1:45:45
  formation of infantry in line should be always in two ranks, because the length
• 1:45:50
  of the musket only admits of an effective fire. In this formation, the
• 1:45:56
  discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain, but frequently dangerous to the
• 1:46:00
  ranks in its front. In drawing up infantry in two ranks, there should
• 1:46:04
  be a supernumerary behind every fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be
• 1:46:10
  placed twenty five paces in rear of each flank. Note I am of opinion
• 1:46:16
  if circumstances require a line of infantry to resort to a square that too deep
• 1:46:21
  is too light a formation to resist the shock of cavalry. However, useless.
• 1:46:26
  The third rank may appear for the purpose of file firing. It is
• 1:46:30
  notwithstanding necessary in order to replace the men who fall in the ranks in front.
• 1:46:34
  Otherwise you would be obliged to close in the files, and by this
• 1:46:39
  means leave intervals between the companies which the cavalry would not fail to penetrate.
• 1:46:44
  It appears to me also that when infantry is formed in two ranks, the
• 1:46:48
  columns will be found to open out in marching to a flank. If it
• 1:46:53
  should be considered advantageous behind entrenchments to keep the infantry in two ranks, the
• 1:46:58
  third rank should be placed in reserve and brought forward to relieve the front rank
• 1:47:01
  when fatigued or when the fire is observed to slacken. I am induced to
• 1:47:06
  make these remarks because I have seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes the too deep
• 1:47:11
  formation for infantry as the best. The author supports his opinion by a variety
• 1:47:16
  of plausible reasons, but not sufficient, as it appears to me, to
• 1:47:20
  answer all the objections that may be offered to this practice. Maxim forty nine.
• 1:47:27
  The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is a bad
• 1:47:31
  one. And attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its power of action.
• 1:47:38
  It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy is destroyed. Even
• 1:47:43
  the infantry itself is compromised, for on the first movement of the cavalry it
• 1:47:47
  is left without support. The best mode of protecting cavalry is to cover its
• 1:47:53
  flank. Note this also was the opinion of Martial Sacks. The weakness of
• 1:48:00
  the above formation says he is sufficient in itself to intimidate the platoons of infantry,
• 1:48:04
  because they must be lost if the cavalry is beaten. The cavalry,
• 1:48:10
  also, which depends on the infantry for succor, is disconcerted. The moment
• 1:48:14
  of brisk forward movement carries them out of sight of their supports. Martial Turin
• 1:48:18
  and the generals of his time sometimes employed this order of formation, but that
• 1:48:24
  does not, in my opinion, justify a modern author for recommending it in
• 1:48:28
  an essay entitled consideration Sir Lark de la Gueerre. In fact, this formation
• 1:48:33
  has long been abandoned, and since the introduction of light artillery, it appears
• 1:48:39
  to me almost ridiculous to propose it. Maxim fifty charges of cavalry are equally
• 1:48:45
  useful at the beginning, the middle, and the end of a battle.
• 1:48:49
  They should be made always, if possible, on the flanks of the infantry,
• 1:48:54
  especially when the latter is engaged in front. Note the arched Charles,
• 1:49:00
  in speaking of cavalry, recommends that it should be brought in mass upon a
• 1:49:03
  decisive point, when the moment for employing it arrives, that is to say,
• 1:49:09
  when it can attack with a certainty of success. As the rapidity of
• 1:49:13
  its movement enables cavalry to act along the whole line in the same day,
• 1:49:16
  the general who commands it should keep it together as much as possible, and
• 1:49:20
  avoid dividing it into many detachments. When the nature of the ground admits of
• 1:49:26
  cavalry being employed on all points of the line, it is desirable to form
• 1:49:30
  it in column behind the infantry, and in a position whence it may be
• 1:49:33
  easily directed wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended to cover a position,
• 1:49:40
  it should be placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full speed any
• 1:49:43
  advance of troops coming to attack that position. If it is destined to cover
• 1:49:47
  the flank of the infantry, it should for the same reason be placed directly
• 1:49:53
  behind it. As the object of cavalry is purely offensive, it should be
• 1:49:58
  a rule to form it at such as since only from the point of collision,
• 1:50:00
  as to enable it to acquire its utmost impulse and arrive at the top
• 1:50:04
  of its speed into action. With respect to the cavalry reserve, this should
• 1:50:10
  only be employed at the end of a battle, either to render the success
• 1:50:13
  more decisive or to cover the retreat. Napoleon remarks that at the Battle of
• 1:50:18
  Waterloo, the cavalry of the Guard, which composed the reserve, was engaged
• 1:50:23
  against his orders. He complains of having been deprived from five o'clock of the
• 1:50:28
  use of this reserve, which, when well employed, had so often insured
• 1:50:32
  him the victory. Maxim fifty one. It is the business of cavalry to
• 1:50:39
  follow up the victory and to prevent the beaten enemy from rallying note victor or
• 1:50:45
  vanquished. It is of the greatest importance to have a body of cavalry in
• 1:50:48
  reserve, either to take advantage of victory or to secure a retreat. The
• 1:50:54
  most decisive battles lose half their value to the conqueror when the want of cavalry
• 1:50:59
  prevents him from following up his success and depriving the enemy of the power of
• 1:51:02
  rallying. When a retiring army is pursued, it is more especially upon the
• 1:51:09
  flanks that the weight of cavalry should fall, if you are strong enough in
• 1:51:12
  that arm to cut off his retreat Maxim. Fifty two. Artillery is more
• 1:51:17
  essential to cavalry than to infantry, because cavalry has no fire for its defense,
• 1:51:23
  but depends upon the saber. It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse
• 1:51:28
  has been had to horse artillery. Cavalry therefore, should never be without cannon,
• 1:51:33
  whether when attacking, rallying, or in position. Note horse artillery is
• 1:51:40
  an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time in introducing it into her armies,
• 1:51:45
  although in an imperfect degree. It was only in seventeen ninety two that
• 1:51:49
  this arm was adopted in France, where it was brought rapidly to its present
• 1:51:54
  perfection. The services of this arm during the wars of the Revolution were immense.
• 1:52:00
  It may be said to have changed, to a certain extent the character
• 1:52:02
  of tactics, because its facility of movement enables it to bear with rapidity on
• 1:52:08
  every point where artillery can be employed with success. Napoleon has remarked in his
• 1:52:13
  memoirs that a flanking battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely, is capable
• 1:52:17
  of deciding a victory in itself. To this we may add that, independent
• 1:52:23
  of the advantages which cavalry derives from horse artillery in securing its flanks and in
• 1:52:28
  opening the way for a successful charge by the destructiveness of its fire, it
• 1:52:32
  is desirable that these two arms should never be separated, but ready at all
• 1:52:36
  times to seize upon points where it may be necessary to employ cannon. On
• 1:52:42
  these occasions, the cavalry masks the march of the artillery, protects its establishment
• 1:52:46
  in position, and covers it from the attack of the enemy until it is
• 1:52:50
  ready to open its fire maxim fifty three. In march or in position,
• 1:52:57
  the greater part of the artillery should be with the visions of infantry and cavalry.
• 1:53:01
  The rest should be in reserve. Each gun should have with its three
• 1:53:05
  hundred rounds, without including the limber. This is about the complement for two
• 1:53:11
  battles. Note the better infantry is, the more important it is to support
• 1:53:16
  it by artillery with a view to its preservation. It is essential also that
• 1:53:23
  the batteries attached to divisions should march in the front, because this has a
• 1:53:27
  strong influence on the morale of the soldier. He attacks always with confidence when
• 1:53:31
  he sees the flanks of the column well covered with cannon. The artillery reserve
• 1:53:36
  should be kept for a decisive moment and then employed in full force, for
• 1:53:41
  it will be difficult for the enemy at such a time to presume to attack
• 1:53:45
  it. There is scarcely an instance of a battery of sixty pieces of cannon
• 1:53:49
  having been carried by a charge of infantry or cavalry, unless where it was
• 1:53:54
  entirely without support or in a position to be easily turned. Maxim fifty four.
• 1:54:00
  Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions and as far in
• 1:54:04
  front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible, without compromising the safety
• 1:54:10
  of the guns. Field. Batteries should command the whole country round from the
• 1:54:14
  level of the platform. They should on no account be massed on the right
• 1:54:18
  and left, but have free range in every direction. Note the battery of
• 1:54:25
  eighteen pieces of cannon which covered the center of the Russian army at the Battle
• 1:54:29
  of Lamasqua. Borodino may be cited as an example. Its position upon a
• 1:54:34
  circular height, which commanded the field in every direction, added so powerfully to
• 1:54:40
  its effect that its fire alone sufficed for a considerable time to paralyze the vigorous
• 1:54:45
  attack made by the French with their right. Although twice broken, the left
• 1:54:49
  of the Russian army closed to this battery as to a pivot, and twice
• 1:54:54
  recovered its former position. After repeated attacks conducted with a rare inter pidity,
• 1:55:00
  the battery was at length carried by the French, but not till they had
• 1:55:03
  lost the elite of their army, and with it the general's Collancourt and Montbrun.
• 1:55:09
  Its capture decided the retreat of the Russian left. I might advert likewise
• 1:55:14
  to another instance in the campaign of eighteen o nine, and to the terrible
• 1:55:17
  effect produced by the hundred pieces of cannon of the Guard which General Lorriston directed
• 1:55:21
  at the Battle of Wagram against the right of the Austrian army Maxim. Fifty
• 1:55:28
  five. A general should never put his army into cantonments when he has the
• 1:55:32
  means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus providing for the
• 1:55:36
  wants of the soldier. In the field. Note. One great advantage which
• 1:55:42
  results from having an army in camp is that it is easier to direct its
• 1:55:45
  spirit and maintain its discipline. There the soldier and cantonments abandons himself to repose.
• 1:55:53
  He ends by finding a pleasure in idleness and in fearing to return to
• 1:55:57
  the field. The reverse takes place in a camp. There, a feeling
• 1:56:01
  of enwi and a severe discipline make him anxious for the opening of the campaign,
• 1:56:06
  to interrupt the monotony of the service and relieve it with the chances and
• 1:56:10
  variety of war. Besides, an army in camp is much more secure from
• 1:56:15
  a surprise than in cantonments, the defect of which usually consists in their occupying
• 1:56:19
  too great an extent of ground. When an army is obliged to go into
• 1:56:25
  quarters, the Marquis de Fuquer recommends a camp to be selected in front of
• 1:56:29
  the line, where the troops can be frequently assembled, sometimes suddenly, in
• 1:56:32
  order to exercise their vigilance, or for the sole purpose of bringing the different
• 1:56:38
  core together Maxim Fifty six. A good general, a well organized system,
• 1:56:44
  good instructions, and severe discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make
• 1:56:49
  good troops independently of the cause for which they fight. At the same time,
• 1:56:55
  a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of national
• 1:56:59
  honor, and fanaticism will operate upon young soldiers with advantage. Note this remark
• 1:57:06
  appears to me less applicable to officers than to soldiers. For as war is
• 1:57:11
  not a state of things natural to man, it follows that those who maintain
• 1:57:15
  its cause must be governed by some strong excitement. Much enthusiasm and devotedness are
• 1:57:19
  required on the part of the troops. For the general who commands to induce
• 1:57:24
  an army to perform great actions in a war in which it takes no interest.
• 1:57:29
  This is sufficiently proved by the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired by
• 1:57:33
  the conduct of their chief Maxim fifty seven. When a nation is without establishments
• 1:57:40
  in a military system, it is very difficult to organize an army. Note
• 1:57:45
  this is an unanswerable truth, more particularly with reference to an army intended to
• 1:57:50
  act upon the system of modern war, and in which order, precision,
• 1:57:55
  and rapidity of movement are the principal essentials to success. Him fifty eight.
• 1:58:00
  The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is
• 1:58:08
  only the second hardship. Poverty and want are the best school for a soldier.
• 1:58:14
  Note valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran,
• 1:58:17
  but in the former it is more evanescent. It is only by habits of
• 1:58:21
  service, and after several campaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage which
• 1:58:28
  makes him support the fatigues and privations of war without a murmur. Experience by
• 1:58:32
  this time has instructed him to supply his own wants. He is satisfied with
• 1:58:38
  what he can procure, because he knows that success is only to be obtained
• 1:58:42
  by fortitude and perseverance. Well might Napoleon say that misery and want were the
• 1:58:46
  best school for a soldier, For as nothing could be compared with the total
• 1:58:50
  destitution of the army of the Alps when he assumed the command, so nothing
• 1:58:56
  could equal the brilliant success which he obtained with this army. In the first
• 1:59:00
  and pain in Italy, the conquerors of montanat Lodi Castiglione Bassano are Coal and
• 1:59:06
  Rivoli had beheld only a few months before, Whole battalions covered with rags and
• 1:59:12
  deserting for the want of subsistence Maxim. Fifty nine. There are five things
• 1:59:17
  the soldier should never be without his musket, his ammunition, his knapsack,
• 1:59:23
  his provisions for at least four days, and his entrenching tool. The knapsack
• 1:59:29
  may be reduced to the smallest size possible if it be thought proper, but
• 1:59:32
  the soldier should always have it with him. Note it is fortunate that Napoleon
• 1:59:39
  has recognized the advantage of giving to every soldier an entrenching tool. His authority
• 1:59:44
  is the best answer to the ridicule which has been thrown upon those who proposed
• 1:59:47
  it. An axe will be found to inconvenience the foot soldier as little as
• 1:59:53
  the sword he wears at his side, and it will be infinitely more useful.
• 1:59:57
  When axes are given out to companies or are carried by fatigued men during
• 2:00:00
  a campaign, they are soon lost. And it often happens when a camp
• 2:00:05
  is to be formed that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and building huts for
• 2:00:10
  the soldier. Whereas, by making the axe a part of every man's appointments,
• 2:00:14
  he is obliged to have it always with him, And whether the object
• 2:00:17
  be to entrench himself in a village or to erect huts in a camp.
• 2:00:21
  The commander of a corps will speedily see the advantage of this innovation. When
• 2:00:28
  once the axe has been generally adopted, we shall perhaps see the desirability of
• 2:00:32
  issuing pickaxes and shovels to particular companies, and also the benefit of more frequent
• 2:00:39
  entrenchments. It is more particularly during retreats that it is important to entrench when
• 2:00:44
  the army has reached a good position. For an entrenched camp not only furnishes
• 2:00:47
  the means of rallying troops which are pursued, but if it be fortified in
• 2:00:51
  such a manner as to render the issue of an attack doubtful to the enemy,
• 2:00:56
  it will not only sustain the morale of the soldier in the retreat,
• 2:01:00
  but afford the general in chief opportunities for resuming the offensive and profiting by the
• 2:01:04
  first false movement on the part of his adversary. It will be recollected how
• 2:01:10
  Frederick, in the campaign of seventeen sixty one, when surrounded by two Russian
• 2:01:15
  and Austrian armies whose united force was quadruple his own, saved his army by
• 2:01:19
  intrenching himself in the camp of Bunsowtz maxim sixty. Every means should be taken
• 2:01:27
  to attach the soldier to his colors. This is best accomplished by showing consideration
• 2:01:31
  and respect to the old soldier. His pay, likewise, should increase with
• 2:01:36
  his length of service. It is the height of injustice not to pay a
• 2:01:41
  veteran more than a recruit. Note. Some modern writers have recommended, on
• 2:01:46
  the other hand, to limit the period of service in order to bring the
• 2:01:50
  whole youth of a country successively under arms. By this means, they purposed
• 2:01:56
  to have the levies en mass already trained and capable of resisting successfully a war
• 2:02:00
  of invasion. But however advantageous at first sight such a military system may appear,
• 2:02:06
  I believe it will be found to have many objections. In the first
• 2:02:11
  place, the soldier, fatigued with the minuchie of discipline in a garrison will
• 2:02:15
  not feel much inclined to reenlist after he has received his discharge, more especially
• 2:02:19
  since having served the prescribed time, he will consider himself to have fulfilled all
• 2:02:25
  the duties of a citizen to his country. Returning to his friends, he
• 2:02:30
  will probably marry or establish himself in a trade. From that moment, his
• 2:02:34
  military spirit declines and he soon becomes ill adapted to the business of war.
• 2:02:40
  On the contrary, the soldier who serves long becomes attached to his regiment as
• 2:02:45
  to a new family. He submits to the yoke of discipline, accustoms himself
• 2:02:49
  to the privations his situation imposes, and ends by finding his condition agreeable.
• 2:02:56
  There are few officers that have seen service who have not discovered the difference between
• 2:03:00
  old and young soldiers, with reference to their power of supporting the fatigues of
• 2:03:03
  a long campaign, to the determined courage that characterizes the attack, or to
• 2:03:09
  the ease with which they rally after being broken. Montecuculay observes that it takes
• 2:03:15
  time to discipline an army, more to inure it to war, and still
• 2:03:17
  more to constitute veterans. For this reason, he recommends that great consideration should
• 2:03:24
  be shown to old soldiers, that they should be carefully provided for, and
• 2:03:28
  a large body of them kept always on foot. It seems to me,
• 2:03:32
  also, that it is not enough to increase the pay of the soldier according
• 2:03:35
  to his period of service, but that it is highly essential to confer on
• 2:03:40
  him some mark of distinction that shall secure to him privileges calculated to encourage him
• 2:03:44
  to grow gray under arms, and above all to do so with honor Maxim.
• 2:03:49
  Sixty one. It has not set speeches at the moment of battle that
• 2:03:54
  render soldiers brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets
• 2:04:00
  them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful, it is
• 2:04:04
  during the campaign to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct false reports, to
• 2:04:10
  keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to furnish materials and amusement
• 2:04:15
  for the bivouac. All printed orders of the day should keep in view these
• 2:04:18
  objects. Note the opinion of the General in chief energetically expressed, is notwithstanding,
• 2:04:27
  productive of great effect on the morale of the soldier. In seventeen o
• 2:04:31
  three, at the attack of Hornbeck, Martial Villers, seeing the troops advancing
• 2:04:36
  without spirit, threw himself at their head. What said he, is it
• 2:04:41
  expected that I, a marshal of France, should be the first to escalade
• 2:04:45
  when I order you to attack? These few words rekindled their ardor officers and
• 2:04:50
  soldiers rushed upon the works, and the town was taken almost without loss.
• 2:04:56
  We have retired far enough for today. You know, I always sleep upon
• 2:05:00
  the field of battle, said Napoleon, as he flew through the ranks at
• 2:05:02
  the moment of resuming the offensive at Marengo. These few words suffice to revive
• 2:05:09
  the courage of the soldiers and to make them forget the fatigues of the day,
• 2:05:13
  during which almost every man had been engaged Maxim. Sixty two. Tents
• 2:05:17
  are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs, because he
• 2:05:24
  sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the ground on which
• 2:05:28
  he lies. A few planks or a little straw shelter him from the wind.
• 2:05:33
  On the other hand, tents are necessary for the superior officers, who
• 2:05:38
  have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should therefore be issued to
• 2:05:43
  these, with directions to them never to sleep in a house. Tents are
• 2:05:46
  always objects of observation to the enemy's staff. They afford information in regard to
• 2:05:53
  your numbers and the ground you occupy. While an army bivouacing in two or
• 2:05:57
  three lines is only distinguishable from far by the smoke which mingles with the clouds,
• 2:06:02
  it is impossible to count the number of the fires. Note the acknowledged
• 2:06:09
  advantage of bivouacking is another reason for adding an entrenching tool to the equipment of
• 2:06:13
  the soldier, for with the assistance of the axe and shovel, he can
• 2:06:16
  hut himself without difficulty. I have seen huts erected with the branches of trees
• 2:06:23
  covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly sheltered from the cold and wet,
• 2:06:27
  even in the worst season Maxim. Sixty three. All information obtained from
• 2:06:32
  prisoners should be received with caution and estimated at its real value. A soldier
• 2:06:39
  seldom sees anything beyond his company, and an officer can afford intelligence of little
• 2:06:44
  more than the position and movements of the division to which his regiment belongs.
• 2:06:47
  On this account, the general of an army should never depend upon the information
• 2:06:51
  derived from prisoners, unless it agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards
• 2:06:57
  in reference to the position, etc. Of the enemy. Note Montecucoley wisely
• 2:07:03
  observes that prisoners should be interrogated separately in order to ascertain, by the agreement
• 2:07:09
  in their answers how far they may be endeavoring to mislead you. Generally speaking,
• 2:07:15
  the information required from officers who are prisoners should have reference to the strength
• 2:07:19
  and resources of the enemy, and sometimes to his localities and position. Frederick
• 2:07:25
  recommends that prisoners should be menaced with instant death if they are found attempting to
• 2:07:30
  deceive by false reports. Maxim. Sixty four. Nothing is so important in
• 2:07:35
  war as an undivided command. For this reason, when war is carried on
• 2:07:40
  against a single power, there should be only one army, acting upon one
• 2:07:44
  base, and conducted by one chief. Note, Success, says the Archduke
• 2:07:50
  Charles, is only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts directed upon a given point,
• 2:07:56
  sustained with constancy, and executed with decision. It rarely happens that any
• 2:08:01
  number of men who desire the same object are perfectly agreed as to the means
• 2:08:05
  of attaining it. And if the will of one individual is not allowed to
• 2:08:09
  predominate, there can be no ensemble in the execution of their operations. Neither
• 2:08:13
  will they attain the end proposed. It is useless to confirm this maxim by
• 2:08:18
  examples. History abounds in them. Prince Eugene and Marlborough would never have been
• 2:08:24
  so successful in the campaigns which they directed in concert. If a spirit of
• 2:08:28
  intrigue and difference of opinion had not constantly disorganized the armies opposed to them Maxim.
• 2:08:35
  Sixty five. The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions and councils
• 2:08:41
  of war will follow at all times. They will terminate in the adoption of
• 2:08:46
  the worst course, which in war is always the most timid, or,
• 2:08:50
  if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a general
• 2:08:54
  is determined courage. Note Prince Eugene used to say that councils of war are
• 2:09:01
  only useful when you want an excuse for attempting nothing. This was also the
• 2:09:07
  opinion of Villers. A general in chief should avoid, therefore, assembling a
• 2:09:11
  council on occasions of difficulty, and should confine himself to consulting separately his most
• 2:09:16
  experienced generals, in order to benefit by their advice, while he is governed
• 2:09:20
  at the same time in his decision by his own judgment. By this means,
• 2:09:26
  he becomes responsible, it is true, for the measures he pursues,
• 2:09:30
  but he has the advantage also of acting upon his own conviction, and of
• 2:09:33
  being certain that the secret of his operations will not be divulged, as is
• 2:09:37
  usually the case where it is discussed by a Council of War Maxim. Sixty
• 2:09:43
  six. In war, the general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It
• 2:09:48
  depends on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and resolution.
• 2:09:54
  Note, the officer who obeys whatever may be the nature or stent of his
• 2:10:00
  command will always stand excused for executing implicitly the orders which have been given to
• 2:10:05
  him. This is not the case with the general in chief, on whom
• 2:10:09
  the safety of the army and the success of the campaign depend occupied without intermission
• 2:10:15
  in the whole process of observation reflection, it is easy to conceive that he
• 2:10:20
  will acquire by degrees a solidity of judgment which will enable him to see things
• 2:10:24
  in a clearer and more enlarged point of view than his inferior generals. Martial
• 2:10:28
  Villers, in his campaigns, acted almost always in opposition to the advice of
• 2:10:33
  his generals, and he was almost always fortunate. So true it is that
• 2:10:39
  a general who feels confident in his talent for command must follow the dictates of
• 2:10:43
  his own genius if he wishes to achieve success Maxim. Sixty seven. To
• 2:10:50
  authorize generals or other officers to lay down their arms in virtue of a particular
• 2:10:54
  capitulation under any other circumstances than when they are composing. The garrison of a
• 2:10:58
  fortress affords a dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a
• 2:11:05
  nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even
• 2:11:09
  to the misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution. The more obstinate the
• 2:11:16
  resistance of an army, the greater the chances of assistance or of success.
• 2:11:20
  How many seeming impossibilities have been accomplished by men whose only resource was death.
• 2:11:26
  Note. In the campaign of seventeen fifty nine, Frederick directed General Fink with
• 2:11:33
  eighteen thousand men upon Maxim for the purpose of cutting off the Austrian army from
• 2:11:37
  the defile of Bohemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers, Fink capitulated after a
• 2:11:43
  sharp action, and fourteen thousand men laid down their arms. This conduct was
• 2:11:48
  the more disgraceful because General Winch, who commanded the cavalry, cut his way
• 2:11:54
  through the enemy. The whole blame of the surrender fell therefore upon Fink,
• 2:12:00
  who was tried afterward by a court martial and sentenced to be cashiered and imprisoned
• 2:12:03
  for two years. In the Campaign of Italy in seventeen ninety six, the
• 2:12:09
  Austrian general Provera capitulated with two thousand men in the Castle of Cassaria. Subsequently,
• 2:12:15
  at the Battle of La Favorite, the same general capitulated with a corps
• 2:12:18
  of six thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert to the shameful defection of
• 2:12:24
  General Mack in the capitulation of Home in eighteen o five, where thirty thousand
• 2:12:28
  Austrians laid down their arms. When we have seen during the wars of the
• 2:12:33
  Revolution, so many generals open themselves away by a vigorous effort through the enemy,
• 2:12:37
  supported only by a few battalions Maxim. Sixty eight. There is no
• 2:12:43
  security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any general. If
• 2:12:48
  officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field and to lay down their arms
• 2:12:52
  in virtue of conditions favorable to the contracting party, but contrary to the interests
• 2:12:56
  of the army at large. To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve
• 2:13:03
  their comrades in greater peril is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be
• 2:13:07
  proscribed, declared infamous and made punishable with death. All generals, officers,
• 2:13:13
  and soldiers who capitulate in battle to save their own lives should be decimated.
• 2:13:20
  He who gives the order and those who obey, are alike traitors and deserve
• 2:13:24
  capital punishment. Note soldiers who are almost always ignorant of the designs of their
• 2:13:31
  chief, cannot be responsible for his conduct. If he orders them to lay
• 2:13:35
  down their arms, they must do so, otherwise they fail in that law
• 2:13:41
  of discipline which is more essential to an army than thousands of men. It
• 2:13:45
  appears to me, therefore, under these circumstances, that the chiefs alone are
• 2:13:50
  responsible and liable to the punishment due to their cowardice. We have no example
• 2:13:56
  of soldiers being wanting in their duty in the most desperate situations where they are
• 2:14:00
  commanded by officers. Of approved resolution Maxim sixty nine. There is but one
• 2:14:07
  honorable mode of becoming prisoner of war, that is by being taken separately,
• 2:14:13
  by which is meant by being cut off entirely. And when we can no
• 2:14:16
  longer make use of our arms. In this case, there can be no
• 2:14:20
  conditions for honor can impose none. We yield to an irresistible necessity. Note
• 2:14:28
  there is always time enough to surrender prisoner of war. This should be deferred
• 2:14:33
  therefore till the last extremity. And here I may be permitted to cite an
• 2:14:37
  example of rare obstinacy in defense, which has been related to me by ocular
• 2:14:43
  witnesses. The captain of grenadiers, Dubrinel of the thirty seventh Regiment of the
• 2:14:48
  Line, having been sent on detachment with his company, was stopped on the
• 2:14:52
  march by a large party of Cossacks who surrounded him on every side. Dubrinel
• 2:14:58
  formed his little force into square and endeavored to gain the skirts of a wood.
• 2:15:01
  Within a few muskets shot of the spot where he had been attacked,
• 2:15:05
  and reached it with very little loss. But as soon as the grenadiers saw
• 2:15:09
  this refuge secured to them, they broke and fled, leaving their captain and
• 2:15:13
  a few brave men who were resolved not to abandon him at the mercy of
• 2:15:18
  the enemy. In the meantime, the fugitives who had rallied in the depth
• 2:15:22
  of the wood, ashamed of having forsaken their leader, came to the resolution
• 2:15:26
  of rescuing him from the enemy. If a prisoner or of carrying off his
• 2:15:30
  body if he had fallen. With this view, they formed once more upon
• 2:15:35
  the outskirts, and opening a passage with their bayonets through the cavalry, penetrated
• 2:15:39
  to their captain, who, notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending himself. Still.
• 2:15:45
  They immediately surrounded him and regained the wood with little loss. Such examples
• 2:15:50
  are not rare in the wars of the Revolution, and it were desirable to
• 2:15:54
  see them collected by some contemporary, that soldiers might learn how much is to
• 2:15:58
  be achieved in war by determined energy and sustained resolution maxim seventy. The conduct
• 2:16:05
  of a general in a conquered country is full of difficulties. If severe,
• 2:16:11
  he irritates and increases the number of his enemies. If lenient, he gives
• 2:16:16
  birth to expectations which only render the abuses and vexations inseparable from war. The
• 2:16:22
  more intolerable. A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice,
• 2:16:28
  and mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition or prevent it. Note.
• 2:16:33
  Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at the command of
• 2:16:37
  armies after having exercised the different functions of the magistracy. Thus, by a
• 2:16:43
  previous knowledge of administration, they were prepared to govern the conquered provinces with all
• 2:16:48
  that discretion which a newly acquired power, supported by arbitrary force demands. In
• 2:16:54
  the military institutions of modern times, the generals, instructed only in what can
• 2:17:00
  earns the operation of strategy and tactics, are obliged to intrust the civil departments
• 2:17:03
  of the war to inferior agents, who, without belonging to the army,
• 2:17:09
  render all those abuses and vexations inseparable from its operations. Still more intolerable.
• 2:17:16
  This observation, which I do little more than repeat, seems to me,
• 2:17:20
  notwithstanding deserving a particular attention, for if the leisure of general officers was directed
• 2:17:24
  in time of peace to the study of diplomacy, if they were employed in
• 2:17:28
  the different embassies which sovereigns sent to foreign courts, they would acquire a knowledge
• 2:17:33
  of the laws and of the government of these countries in which they may be
• 2:17:37
  called hereafter to carry on the war. They would learn also to distinguish those
• 2:17:41
  points of interest on which all treaties must be based, which have for their
• 2:17:46
  object the advantageous termination of a campaign by the aid of this information, they
• 2:17:50
  would obtain certain and positive results, since all the springs of action, as
• 2:17:56
  well as the machinery of war, would be in their hands. We have
• 2:18:00
  seen Prince Eugene and martial Villers, each fulfilling with equal ability the duties of
• 2:18:05
  a general and a negotiator. When an army which occupies a conquered province observes
• 2:18:11
  strict discipline, there are few examples of insurrection among the people, unless indeed
• 2:18:15
  resistance is provoked, as but too often happens by the exactions of inferior agents
• 2:18:20
  employed in the civil administration. It is to this point, therefore, that
• 2:18:26
  the general in chief should principally direct his attention in order that the contributions imposed
• 2:18:31
  by the wants of the army may be levied with impartiality, and above all,
• 2:18:35
  that they may be applied to their true object, instead of serving to
• 2:18:37
  enrich the collectors, as is ordinarily the case. Maxim. Seventy one.
• 2:18:45
  Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge acquired in the service
• 2:18:48
  of his country to deliver up her frontier and her towns to foreigners. This
• 2:18:54
  is a crime reprobated by every principle of religion, morality, and honor.
• 2:18:58
  Note, ambitious men who, listening only to their passions, armed natives of
• 2:19:05
  the same land against each other under the deceitful pretext of the public good are
• 2:19:09
  still more criminal. For, however arbitrary a government, the institutions which have
• 2:19:13
  been consolidated by time, are always preferable to civil war and to that anarchy
• 2:19:20
  which the latter is obliged to create for the justification of its crimes. To
• 2:19:24
  be faithful to his sovereign and to respect the established government are the first principles
• 2:19:30
  which ought to distinguish a soldier and a man of honor Maxim seventy two.
• 2:19:35
  A general in chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under cover
• 2:19:39
  of his sovereign or of a minister, when these are both distant from the
• 2:19:43
  scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill informed or wholly ignorant of
• 2:19:48
  the actual state of things. Hence, it follows that every general is culpable
• 2:19:54
  who undertakes the execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his
• 2:19:58
  duty to rep present his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan,
• 2:20:03
  in short, to give in his resignation rather than allow himself to be made
• 2:20:07
  the instrument of his army's ruin. Every general in chief who fights a battle
• 2:20:11
  in consequence of superior orders with the certainty of losing it is equally blameable.
• 2:20:18
  In this last mentioned case, the general ought to refuse obedience, because a
• 2:20:22
  blind obedience is due only to a military command given by a superior present on
• 2:20:26
  the spot at the moment of action. Being in possession of the real state
• 2:20:31
  of things. The superior has it then in his power to afford the necessary
• 2:20:35
  explanations to the person who executes his orders. But supposing a general in chief
• 2:20:41
  to receive positive order from his sovereign directing him to fight a battle with the
• 2:20:45
  further injunction to yield to his adversary and allow himself to be defeated, ought
• 2:20:50
  he to obey it. No, If the general should be able to comprehend
• 2:20:54
  the meaning or utility of such an order, he should execute it. Otherwise
• 2:21:00
  he should refuse to obey it. Note. In the campaign of sixteen ninety
• 2:21:05
  seven, Prince Eugene caused the courier to be intercepted who was bringing him orders
• 2:21:09
  from the Emperor, forbidding him to hazard a battle for which everything had been
• 2:21:13
  prepared, and which he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered therefore that he
• 2:21:20
  did his duty in evading the orders of his sovereign, and the victory of
• 2:21:22
  Zanta, in which the Turks lost about thirty thousand men and four thousand prisoners,
• 2:21:28
  rewarded his audacity. In the meantime, notwithstanding the immense advantages which accrued
• 2:21:33
  from this victory to the Imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced on his arrival at
• 2:21:39
  Vienna in seventeen ninety three. General Hoche, having received orders to move upon
• 2:21:45
  Treves with an army harassed by constant marches in a mountainous and difficult country,
• 2:21:50
  refused to obey. He observed with reason that in order to obtain possession of
• 2:21:54
  an unimportant fortress, they were exposing his army to inevitable ruin. He caused,
• 2:22:01
  therefore, his troops to return into winter quarters and prefer the preservation of
• 2:22:05
  his army, upon which the success of the future campaign depended to his own
• 2:22:09
  safety. Recalled to Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which he
• 2:22:15
  only quitted on the downfall of Robespierre. I dare not decide if such examples
• 2:22:20
  are to be imitated. But it seems to me highly desirable that a question
• 2:22:24
  so new and so important should be discussed by men who are capable of determining
• 2:22:28
  its merits maxim seventy three. The first qualification in a general in chief is
• 2:22:35
  a cool head, that is, a head which receives just impressions and estimates
• 2:22:39
  things and objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be
• 2:22:45
  elated by good news or depressed by bad. The impressions he receives, either
• 2:22:50
  successively or simultaneously in the course of the day, should be so classed as
• 2:22:54
  to take up only the exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy,
• 2:22:58
  since it is upon a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to
• 2:23:03
  different impressions that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends. Some men
• 2:23:07
  are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything through a highly colored medium.
• 2:23:13
  They raise up a picture in the mind on every slight occasion, and
• 2:23:16
  give to every trivial occurrence at dramatic interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent,
• 2:23:22
  or courage, or other good qualities such men may possess, Nature has
• 2:23:26
  not formed them for the command of armies, or the direction of great military
• 2:23:31
  operations. Note. The first quality in a general in chief, says Montecucolay,
• 2:23:37
  is a great knowledge of the art of war. This is not intuitive,
• 2:23:43
  but the result of experience. A man is not born a commander.
• 2:23:48
  He must become one. Not to be anxious, to be always cool,
• 2:23:52
  to avoid confusion in his commands, never to change countenance, to give his
• 2:23:56
  orders in the midst of battle with as much posier as if he were perfectly
• 2:24:01
  at ease. These are the proofs of valor in a general. To encourage
• 2:24:05
  the timid, to increase the number of the truly brave, to revive the
• 2:24:09
  drooping ardor of the troops in battle, To rally those who are broken,
• 2:24:13
  to bring back to the charge those who are repulsed, to find resources in
• 2:24:18
  difficulty and success even amid disaster. To be ready at a moment to devote
• 2:24:22
  himself if necessary for the welfare of the state. These are the actions which
• 2:24:28
  acquire for a general distinction and renown. To this enumeration may be added the
• 2:24:33
  talent of discriminating character, and of employing every man in the particular post which
• 2:24:37
  nature has qualified him to fill. My principal attention, said martial villers,
• 2:24:43
  was always directed to the study of the younger generals. Such a one I
• 2:24:48
  found, by the boldness of his character, fit to lead a column of
• 2:24:52
  attack, another from a disposition naturally cautious, but without being deficient in courage,
• 2:24:58
  more perfectly to be relied for the defense of a country. It is
• 2:25:01
  only by a just application of these personal qualities to their respective objects, that
• 2:25:07
  it is possible to command success in war Maxim seventy four. The leading qualifications
• 2:25:13
  which should distinguish an officer selected for the head of the staff are to know
• 2:25:18
  the country thoroughly, to be able to conduct a reconnaissance with skill, to
• 2:25:22
  superintend the transmission of orders promptly, to lay down the most complicated movements intelligibly,
• 2:25:28
  but in a few words, and with simplicity. Note. Formerly,
• 2:25:33
  the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the necessary preparations for
• 2:25:37
  carrying the plan of the campaign and the operations resolved on by the General in
• 2:25:43
  chief into effect. In a battle, they were only employed in directing movements
• 2:25:48
  and superintending their execution. But in the late wars the officers of the staff
• 2:25:54
  were frequently entrusted with the command of a column of attack or of large detachments,
• 2:25:58
  when the general in chief feared to disclose the secret of his plans by
• 2:26:01
  the transmission of orders or instructions. Great advantages have resulted from this innovation,
• 2:26:07
  although it was long resisted. By this means, the staff have been enabled
• 2:26:13
  to perfect their theory by practice, and they have acquired moreover the esteem of
• 2:26:18
  the soldiers and junior officers of the line, who are easily led to think
• 2:26:22
  lightly of their superiors, whom they do not see fighting in the ranks.
• 2:26:26
  The generals who have held the arduous situation of chief of the staff during the
• 2:26:30
  wars of the Revolution have almost always been employed in the different branches of the
• 2:26:35
  profession. Marshal Bertier, who filled so conspicuously this appointment to Napoleon, was
• 2:26:41
  distinguished by all the essentials of a general. He possessed calm and at the
• 2:26:46
  same time brilliant courage, excellent judgment and approved experience. He bore arms during
• 2:26:52
  half a century, made war in the four quarters of the globe, opened
• 2:26:56
  and terminated thirty two campaigns. In his youth he acquired, under the eye
• 2:27:01
  of his father, who was an engineer officer, the talent of tracing plans
• 2:27:05
  and finishing them with exactness, as well as the preliminary qualifications necessary to form
• 2:27:09
  a staff officer. Admitted by the Prince de Lambesque into his regiment of dragoons,
• 2:27:16
  he was taught the skillful management of his horse and his sword, accomplishments
• 2:27:20
  so important to a soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of Count Rochambeau,
• 2:27:26
  he made his first campaign in America, where he soon began to distinguish himself
• 2:27:30
  by his valor, activity and talents. Having at length attained superior rank in
• 2:27:35
  the staff corps formed by Martial de Segor, he visited the camps of the
• 2:27:39
  King of Prussia and discharged the duties of chief of the staff under the Baron
• 2:27:43
  de Bizenvil. During nineteen years consumed in sixteen campaigns. The history of Martial
• 2:27:50
  Bertier's life was little else but that of the wars of Napoleon, all the
• 2:27:54
  details of which he directed both in the cabinet and the field. A stranger
• 2:27:58
  to the intrigues politics, he labored with indefatigable activity, seized with promptitude and
• 2:28:03
  sagacity upon general views, and gave the necessary orders for attaining them with prudence,
• 2:28:09
  perspicuity and conceaseness, discreet, impenetrable, modest. He was just exact
• 2:28:16
  and even severe in everything that regarded the service. But he always set an
• 2:28:20
  example of vigilance and zeal in his own person, and knew how to maintain
• 2:28:24
  discipline and to cause his authority to be respected by every rank under his orders
• 2:28:30
  Maxim. Seventy five. A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles
• 2:28:35
  of each branch of the service. Since he is called upon to supply arms
• 2:28:39
  and ammunition to the different core of which it is composed. His correspondence with
• 2:28:45
  the commanding officers of artillery at the advanced posts should put him in possession of
• 2:28:50
  all the movements of the army, and the disposition and management of the great
• 2:28:54
  Park of Artillery should depend upon this information. Note. After having recognized the
• 2:29:00
  advantage of entrusting the supply of arms and ammunition for an army to a military
• 2:29:05
  body, it appears to me extraordinary that the same regulation does not extend to
• 2:29:09
  that of provisions and forage. Instead of leaving it in the hands of a
• 2:29:13
  separate administration, as is the practice at present, the civil establishments attached to
• 2:29:18
  armies are formed almost always at the commencement of a war, and composed of
• 2:29:22
  persons strangers to those laws of discipline which they are but too much inclined to
• 2:29:26
  disregard. These men are little esteemed by the military because they serve only to
• 2:29:33
  enrich themselves, without respect to the means. They consider only their private interest
• 2:29:37
  in a service whose glory they cannot share, although some portion of its success
• 2:29:43
  depends upon their zeal. The disorders and defalcations incident to these establishments would assuredly
• 2:29:48
  cease if they were confided to men who have been employed in the army,
• 2:29:52
  and who, in return for their labors, were permitted to partake with their
• 2:29:56
  fellow soldiers the triumph of their success Maxim seventy six. The qualities which distinguish
• 2:30:03
  a good general of advanced posts are to reconnoiter accurately, defile and fords of
• 2:30:09
  every description, To provide guides that may be depended upon, to interrogate the
• 2:30:13
  cure and postmaster, to establish rapidly a good understanding with the inhabitants, To
• 2:30:18
  send out spies, to intercept public and private letters, to translate and analyze
• 2:30:24
  their contents. In a word, to be able to answer every question of
• 2:30:28
  the General in chief when he arrives with the whole army. Note foraging parties,
• 2:30:33
  composed of small detachments, and which were usually entrusted to young officers,
• 2:30:39
  served formerly to make good officers of advanced posts, but now the army is
• 2:30:43
  supplied with provisions by regular contributions. It is only in a course of partisan
• 2:30:48
  warfare that the necessary experience can be acquired to fill these situations with success.
• 2:30:54
  A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent independent of the army.
• 2:31:00
  He receives neither pay nor provisions from it, and rarely succor, and is
• 2:31:03
  abandoned during the whole campaign to his own resources. An officer so circumstanced must
• 2:31:09
  unite address with courage and boldness, with discretion, if he wishes to collect
• 2:31:15
  plunder without measuring the strength of his little corps with superior forces, always harassed,
• 2:31:20
  always surrounded by dangers which it is his business to foresee and surmount,
• 2:31:24
  a leader of partisans acquires in a short time, and experience in the details
• 2:31:28
  of war rarely to be obtained by an officer of the line, because the
• 2:31:33
  latter is almost always under the guidance of superior authority, which directs the whole
• 2:31:37
  of his movements, while the talent and genius of the partisan are developed and
• 2:31:41
  sustained by a dependence on his own resources Maxim seventy seven. Generals in chief
• 2:31:48
  must be guided by their own experience or their genius tactics evolutions. The duties
• 2:31:54
  and knowledge of an engineer or artillery officer may be learned in treatises, but
• 2:32:00
  the science of strategy is only to be acquired by experience and by studying the
• 2:32:03
  campaigns of all the great captains. Gustavus, Adolphus, Turin, and Frederick,
• 2:32:09
  as well as Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar, have all acted upon the
• 2:32:15
  same principles. These have been to keep their forces united, to leave no
• 2:32:20
  weak part unguarded, to seize with rapidity on important points. Such are the
• 2:32:26
  principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiring terror at the reputation
• 2:32:30
  of your arms, will at once maintain fidelity. In secure subjection, note,
• 2:32:35
  a great captain can only be formed, says the Archduke Charles, by
• 2:32:41
  long experience and intense study. Neither is his own experience enough for whose life
• 2:32:46
  is there sufficiently fruitful of events to render his knowledge universal. It is therefore,
• 2:32:52
  by augmenting his information from the stock of others, by appreciating justly the
• 2:32:56
  discoveries of his predecessors, and by taking for his standard of parison those great
• 2:33:01
  military exploits in connection with their political results, in which the history of war
• 2:33:05
  abounds, that he can alone become a great commander Maxim seventy eight. Peruse
• 2:33:11
  again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Adolphus,
• 2:33:16
  Turin, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is
• 2:33:22
  the only means of becoming a great captain and of acquiring the secret of the
• 2:33:26
  art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study,
• 2:33:31
  and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of these
• 2:33:35
  great commanders. Note it is in order to facilitate this object that I have
• 2:33:41
  formed the present collection. It is, after reading, meditating upon the history
• 2:33:46
  of modern war, that I have endeavored to illustrate by examples, how the
• 2:33:50
  maxims of a great captain may be most successfully applied to this study, may
• 2:33:56
  the end I have had in view be accomplished