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004 - The Chinese intervention Part 2 · Korean War - Brief Histories

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  Speaker 1: Section four of the Korean War Brief Histories by various
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  Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. The Chinese
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  Speaker 1: Intervention point two three November nineteen fifty through twenty four
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  Speaker 1: January nineteen fifty one by Richard W. Stewart retreat from
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  Speaker 1: North Korea. After the defeat at chang Chong River, General
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  Speaker 1: Walker realized that it was necessary to withdraw his eighth
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  Speaker 1: Army from its positions before the Chinese could move around
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  Speaker 1: its still open right flight. He ordered an immediate retreat
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  Speaker 1: to create an enclave around Pyongyang. However, even as troops
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  Speaker 1: occupy their new positions, he realized that he lacked the
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  Speaker 1: forces to maintain a cohesive defensive line. Three of his
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  Speaker 1: ROK divisions, sixth, seventh, and eighth Infantry Divisions had disintegrated,
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  Speaker 1: The U S Second Infantry Division was in shambles, and
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  Speaker 1: all the other units had taken heavy losses in men, materiel,
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  Speaker 1: and morale. Faced with these problems, Walker decided to abandon Pyongyang.
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  Speaker 1: He needed time to regroup and refit his units. He
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  Speaker 1: ordered to withdraw the army to align along the Imjin River,
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  Speaker 1: about ninety five miles to the south, near the pre
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  Speaker 1: war border. He further ordered that all supplies that could
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  Speaker 1: not be moved or any installations that could be of
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  Speaker 1: use to the enemy be destroyed. Moving slowly down the
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  Speaker 1: few good roads in Korea, Eighth Army units began pulling
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  Speaker 1: back from their positions near Pyeongyang on two December and
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  Speaker 1: retreated over the course of three weeks to align along
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  Speaker 1: the Imjin River from Munsanni on the western coast to
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  Speaker 1: just south of the Huakchung Reservoir across the peninsula. Caught
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  Speaker 1: wrong footed by this quick withdrawal and needing time of
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  Speaker 1: their own to refit and resupply their troops, the Chinese
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  Speaker 1: did not immediately pursue. By twenty three December, the US
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  Speaker 1: first and ninth Corps and the ROK third and second
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  Speaker 1: course west to east were in place along the line.
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  Speaker 1: The ROK first Corps began to arrive after its evacuation
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  Speaker 1: from northeast Korea to be placed on the far right
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  Speaker 1: of the line, anchoring the line to the eastern coast.
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  Speaker 1: It was not a strong defensive position, but it had
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  Speaker 1: the advantage of leaving no flanks in the air. It
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  Speaker 1: also maintained u and control of Seoul in northeast Korea.
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  Speaker 1: With the consolidation of the first Marine Division at Hagauru Ri,
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  Speaker 1: along with the remnants of t F Faith, the situation
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  Speaker 1: in the Tenth Corps area was improved, but hardly reassuring.
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  Speaker 1: It was only one narrow road leading from Haguru Ri
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  Speaker 1: to the port of hung Nam, over fifty tough miles
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  Speaker 1: to the southeast. At hung Dam, Alman planned to establish
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  Speaker 1: a perimeter and began the slow process of withdrawal. Early
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  Speaker 1: in the process, he had ruled out a dunkirk situation
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  Speaker 1: where the men would be extracted while leaving their equipment
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  Speaker 1: and supplies behind. Such a blow to Allied pride and
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  Speaker 1: troop morale was too grievous to contemplate. The challenge was
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  Speaker 1: first to safely withdraw the marine and army units from
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  Speaker 1: the chosen reservoir area down to hung Nam, then to
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  Speaker 1: establish a strong defensive perimeter, and finally to begin shrinking
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  Speaker 1: that perimeter under enemy pressure while loading up all the
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  Speaker 1: supplies and equipment possible. It would be a race between
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  Speaker 1: the Chinese forces and US tactical and logistical skills. The
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  Speaker 1: first challenge, withdrawing the marine and army units from Hunguru
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  Speaker 1: re to hung Nam. Intact was potentially the most dangerous.
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  Speaker 1: If the Chinese in the area could cut the road
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  Speaker 1: between hungarru Re and hung Nam with a strong enough force,
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  Speaker 1: the entire First Marine Division could be lost. Such a
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  Speaker 1: disaster would seriously undercut the entire Yun position in Korea.
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  Speaker 1: The effect on the American public would be tremendous. Their
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  Speaker 1: failure to rescue t f McLean faith fresh in their minds,
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  Speaker 1: the Marine and Tenth Core staffs began working together to
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  Speaker 1: coordinate their movements in fires to prevent any chance of
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  Speaker 1: a recurrence of such a tragedy. Their planning, coupled with
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  Speaker 1: massive American firepower and air power, and the sheer persistence
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  Speaker 1: encourage of the Marines and soldiers at hand, would turn
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  Speaker 1: the tide and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
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  Speaker 1: The First Marine Division plan was relatively clear and straightforward,
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  Speaker 1: although it still difficult to execute. The division, with its
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  Speaker 1: attached army units, would move all its men and equipment
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  Speaker 1: down the road to hung Nam, while combat units would
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  Speaker 1: systematically take and clear the ridge lines dominating the road.
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  Speaker 1: There was to be no repetition of the Kunnuri Gauntlet
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  Speaker 1: of the Second Infantry Division combat power would clear the ridges,
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  Speaker 1: while air support and artillery would destroy any roadblocks or
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  Speaker 1: major concentration of Chinese forces. Meanwhile, tenth Corps would send
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  Speaker 1: a special task force from the relatively fresh third Infantry
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  Speaker 1: Division code named Task Force Dog about thirty miles north
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  Speaker 1: up the road from hung Nam through ham Hung to
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  Speaker 1: just south of the fun Chillen Pass near koto Ri.
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  Speaker 1: Task Force Dog, with its powerful attached artillery units, would
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  Speaker 1: keep the road south of the pass open all the
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  Speaker 1: way to the port. Leading the way south some eight
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  Speaker 1: miles to Kotoie on six December, were the seventh Marines
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  Speaker 1: and the ad hoc Army Battalion formed from the remnants
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  Speaker 1: of Task Force Faith McLain. With artillery support carefully planned
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  Speaker 1: and around the clock air cover, the force quickly met
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  Speaker 1: and overcame enemy resistance at various strong points. The rest followed,
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  Speaker 1: and a marine rear guard was out of Hagarui by
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  Speaker 1: mid morning of the following day. During the fight south
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  Speaker 1: to Kotoie, some one hundred and three Marines lost their lives,
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  Speaker 1: with almost five hundred wounded. Once at Kotoree, the Marine
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  Speaker 1: and Army force faced a major obstacle. A sixteen foot
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  Speaker 1: gap in the road near the Hunchalin Pass. A steep
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  Speaker 1: chasm prevented any hope of bypassing the gap. The staff
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  Speaker 1: of tenth Corps coordinated an air drop on seven December
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  Speaker 1: of eight two and one quarter ton treadway bridge sections
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  Speaker 1: to cross the gap. In a series of air operations,
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  Speaker 1: all eight sections were dropped by parachute near the pass,
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  Speaker 1: with one falling inside Chining lines and another damaged in
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  Speaker 1: the drop. However, the remaining sections bridged the gap, and
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  Speaker 1: despite some tense moments when trucks almost slid off the
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  Speaker 1: narrow bridge, the way was clear. Followed by hundreds of
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  Speaker 1: fleeing Korean refugees, the marine and army forces made their
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  Speaker 1: way south against continuing Chinese flank attacks. Finally, early in
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  Speaker 1: the morning of ten December, the first link up occurred
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  Speaker 1: between the lead elements of the Northern Force and Task
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  Speaker 1: Force Dog. Over the next two days, the rest of
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  Speaker 1: the marine and Army elements withdrew through the covering elements
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  Speaker 1: of t F Dog to safety and hung Nam. Again,
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  Speaker 1: the withdrawal came at a price. The Chinese managed to
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  Speaker 1: cut the road near Sudong, about ten miles south of
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  Speaker 1: Kottori laid on ten December, but a composite marine force
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  Speaker 1: led by two army officers beat back the enemy. In
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  Speaker 1: the process, one of the leaders of the force, Army
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  Speaker 1: lace Lieutenant Colonel John Yu d Page, was killed in
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  Speaker 1: action and later received the Medal of Honor posthumously. Despite
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  Speaker 1: the attacks of two Chinese armies, the withdrawal from the
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  Speaker 1: chosen area of over eleven thousand marines and one thousand
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  Speaker 1: soldiers was successful. On eighth December, Regarthur ordered tenth Courts
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  Speaker 1: to evacuate through the port of hung Nam and redeployed
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  Speaker 1: to South Korea as part of eighth Army. Given the
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  Speaker 1: size of the force in the near presence of the Chinese,
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  Speaker 1: the withdrawal had to be a carefully orchestrated event, setting
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  Speaker 1: up a special evacuation control Group. Ahman directed battle weary
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  Speaker 1: first Marine Division to be evacuate at first from nine
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  Speaker 1: through fifteen December, was followed by the rok first Corps
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  Speaker 1: from fifteen to seventeen December, the seventh Infantry Division from
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  Speaker 1: eighteen through twenty one December, and the third Infantry Division
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  Speaker 1: from twenty one to twenty four December. All this occurred
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  Speaker 1: while coordinating shipping with the Navy's Task Force ninety, uploading
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  Speaker 1: thousands of tons of supplies, and maintaining a secure perimeter.
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  Speaker 1: The withdrawal from hung Nam was accomplished successfully despite all
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  Speaker 1: the potential dangers. The tenth Corps arranged for the withdrawal
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  Speaker 1: of over one hundred and five thousand troops, eighteen thousand,
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  Speaker 1: four hundred and twenty two vehicles, three hundred and fifty
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  Speaker 1: thousand tons of bulk cargo, and as a bonus, some
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  Speaker 1: ninety eight thousand, one hundred refugees. Naval gunfire support assisted
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  Speaker 1: in pulling off the maneuver with minimal enemy interference. The
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  Speaker 1: Navan Army worked together as well to coordinate a massive
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  Speaker 1: demolitions plan to destroy any cargo too bulky or dangerous
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  Speaker 1: like frozen dynamite to move along with the docks and
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  Speaker 1: port facilities, The tenth Corps outloaded all its elements on
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  Speaker 1: a strict timetable and move them by sea to Ulsan,
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  Speaker 1: just north of Pusan and South Korea, for refitting and
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  Speaker 1: redeployment to the front to help Eighth Army hold the line.
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  Speaker 1: The last soldiers from the third Infantry Division embarked on
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  Speaker 1: their landing craft to the waiting ships on Christmas Eve
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  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty. As they left, the docks erupted behind them
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  Speaker 1: in a series of huge explosions. The attempt to reunify
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  Speaker 1: Korea by force was over. Ridgeway takes command. General Walker
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  Speaker 1: was an indirect casualty of the Chinese attacks. On the
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  Speaker 1: morning of twenty three December, With the redeployment of eighth
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  Speaker 1: Army to new lines in the south complete and the
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  Speaker 1: first elements of the evacuated tenth Corps on the way,
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  Speaker 1: the eighth Army commander left Soul by jeep on an
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  Speaker 1: inspection trip ten miles north of the capitol. His vehicles
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  Speaker 1: zoomed north past several US trucks halted on the opposite
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  Speaker 1: side of the road. Only a Korean truck driver pulled
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  Speaker 1: out of his lane heading south and tried to bypass
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  Speaker 1: the trucks. In doing so, he pulled into the northbound
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  Speaker 1: lane and collided it with Walker's jeep. The commander was
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  Speaker 1: knocked unconscious and later pronounced dead from multiple head injuries.
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  Speaker 1: The man selected to replace General Walker as eighth Army
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  Speaker 1: commander was Lieutenant General Matthew b Ridgeway. At the time,
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  Speaker 1: Ridgeway was serving on the Army staff in the Pentagon
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  Speaker 1: as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration. A
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  Speaker 1: famed airborne commander from World War II, Ridgeway was knowledgeable
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  Speaker 1: about conditions in Korea and the Far East and had
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  Speaker 1: a strong and dynamic personality. He would need both for
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  Speaker 1: the task ahead. His success in turning Eighth Armies morale
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  Speaker 1: around using little more than a magnetic personality in bold
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  Speaker 1: leadership is still a model for the Army, showing how
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  Speaker 1: the power of leadership can dramatically change a situation. Ridgway
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  Speaker 1: landed in Tokyo on Christmas Day nineteen fifty to discuss
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  Speaker 1: the situation with MacArthur. The latter assured the new commander
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  Speaker 1: of his full support to direct Eighth Army operations as
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  Speaker 1: he saw fit. Ridgway was encouraged to retire to successive
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  Speaker 1: defensive positions as currently under way and hold soil as
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  Speaker 1: long as he could, but not if it meant that
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  Speaker 1: Eighth Army would be isolated in an enclave around the city.
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  Speaker 1: In a foreshadowing of his aggressive nature, Ridgway asked specifically
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  Speaker 1: that if he found the combat situation to my liking,
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  Speaker 1: whether MacArthur would have any objection to my attacking, MacArthur answered,
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  Speaker 1: Eighth Army is yours, mad do what you think best.
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  Speaker 1: General Ridgeway knew that one of his first jobs was
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  Speaker 1: to restore the Eighth Army soldier's confidence in themselves. To
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  Speaker 1: accomplish this, he had to be aggressive despite the hard
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  Speaker 1: knocks of November and December, and find other leaders in
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  Speaker 1: Eighth Army who were not defeatist or defensive oriented. In practice,
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  Speaker 1: he proved quick to reward commanders who shared his sentiments
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  Speaker 1: and just as quick to relieve those officers at any
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  Speaker 1: level who did not. During one of his first briefings
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  Speaker 1: in Korea at First Corps, Ridgeway sat through an extensive
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  Speaker 1: discussion of various defensive plans and contingencies. At the end,
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  Speaker 1: he asked the startled staff where their attack plans were.
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  Speaker 1: The Corgi III operations officer responded that he had no
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  Speaker 1: such plans. Within days, First Corps had a new operations officer.
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  Speaker 1: The message went out. Ridgeway was interested in taking the
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  Speaker 1: offensive to aid In this perception. He also established a
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  Speaker 1: plan to rotate out those division commanders who had been
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  Speaker 1: in action for six difficult months and replaced them with
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  Speaker 1: fresh leaders. Who would be more interested in attack and
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  Speaker 1: less in retreat. In addition, he sent out guidance commanders
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  Speaker 1: at all levels to spend more time at the front
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  Speaker 1: lines and lessen their command posts in the rear. The
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  Speaker 1: men had to see their commanders if they were to
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  Speaker 1: have confidence that they had not been forgotten. All these
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  Speaker 1: positive leadership steps would have a dramatic effect almost from
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  Speaker 1: the first Eighth Army was in Korea to stay. Ridgeway,
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  Speaker 1: despite his aggressive intent, was also enough of a realist
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  Speaker 1: to know that the Chinese were still capable of launching
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  Speaker 1: major attacks. He also knew that his Eighth Army still
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  Speaker 1: needed time to refit and reorganize. Thus he immediately began
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  Speaker 1: planning to strengthen the defensive lines around Seoul while bringing
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  Speaker 1: up tenth Corps as quickly as possible to strengthen the
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  Speaker 1: wan Ju sector in the center of the line. Alma's
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  Speaker 1: tenth Corps was no longer independent, but would be just
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  Speaker 1: another corps of the Eighth Army, tied into a new
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  Speaker 1: defensive line that stretched unbroken from one side of the
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  Speaker 1: peninsula to the other. Before Ridgeway's changes could be instituted, however,
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  Speaker 1: the Chinese attacked again Beginning on twenty sixth December, the
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  Speaker 1: CCF struck hard at Yun units on the western approaches
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  Speaker 1: to Seoul. Supporting attacks occurred as well in the central
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  Speaker 1: and eastern parts of the line. The Chinese hit the
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  Speaker 1: Rok units hard, and again several units broke. Two out
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  Speaker 1: of three regiments of the Rok second Division fled the battlefield,
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  Speaker 1: leaving their valiant seventeenth Regiment to fight alone and hold
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  Speaker 1: its position for hours. Despite heavy losses, Richway reluctantly ordered
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  Speaker 1: a general but orterly withdrawal, with units instructed to maintain
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  Speaker 1: contact with the enemy during their retreat rather than simply
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  Speaker 1: giving up real estate without inflicting losses on the enemy. Initially,
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  Speaker 1: Eighth Army pulled back thirty miles to a defensive line
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  Speaker 1: along the Han River to protect Seoul. By two January,
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  Speaker 1: both First and ninth Corps had successful will he concluded
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  Speaker 1: the new withdrawal, and with extensive firepower at their command,
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  Speaker 1: their chances of holding the city were good. However, there
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  Speaker 1: was a distinct danger that the two corps could be
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  Speaker 1: outflanked to the east and forced to defend Seoul with
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  Speaker 1: their backs to the sea ridgeway. Unwilling to risk the
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  Speaker 1: loss or isolation of so much of his combat power,
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  Speaker 1: reluctantly ordered the retreat of both corps to line sea
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  Speaker 1: just south of the Han for the third time in
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  Speaker 1: the war so far, Seoul was to change hands, followed
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  Speaker 1: by hordes of refugees hauling their loved ones or a
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  Speaker 1: few personal treasures on their backs or on ox carts.
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  Speaker 1: First and ninth Corps began withdrawing from Seoul on three January.
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  Speaker 1: The loss of the capitol was again a bitter pill
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  Speaker 1: for everyone to swallow. The cold froze refugee and soldier
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  Speaker 1: alike as the long UN columns snaked southward again as
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  Speaker 1: the Han River began to freeze solid, refugees braved the
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  Speaker 1: treacherous ice to reach the temporary safety of UN lines. However,
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  Speaker 1: the freezing of the river threatened the entire Yun position,
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  Speaker 1: since the same ice that held refugees could hold Chinese
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  Speaker 1: infantry and tent on heading off the American withdrawal before
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  Speaker 1: such attacks could occur. However, the movement south was completed.
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  Speaker 1: On the whole, the Allies accomplished the evacuation of Soul
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  Speaker 1: with minimal casualties. However, one of the units, the attached
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  Speaker 1: twenty seventh Commonwealth Brigade had been forced into hand to
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  Speaker 1: hand combat to rescue one of its cutoff battalions and
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  Speaker 1: had suffered heavy casualties. Finally, in the morning of four January,
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  Speaker 1: despite the continuing stream of desperate refugees, Eighth Army engineers
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  Speaker 1: blew the three pontoon bridges and the main railway bridge
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  Speaker 1: over the Han to prevent their use by the pursuing Chinese.
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  Speaker 1: The withdrawal to Laan Sea was complete. However, even as
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  Speaker 1: units were moving into position on this defensive line, plans
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  Speaker 1: were being executed to withdraw some thirty five miles farther
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  Speaker 1: south to Line D, running from yeong Tik in the
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  Speaker 1: west southwestward toward wan Ju to Juan Pohri. The freezing
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  Speaker 1: of the Han River limited the defensive capabilities of Yuan
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  Speaker 1: troops scattered along Line C. In addition, the ROK third
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  Speaker 1: Corps in Central Korea had virtually collapsed. Only the ROK
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  Speaker 1: seventh Division was in a position to help stabilize the line.
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  Speaker 1: The ROK second Division was down to less than a regiment.
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  Speaker 1: The ROK fifth and eighth Divisions were in complete retreat
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  Speaker 1: toward Wanju to the east. The ROK second Corps third
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  Speaker 1: Division was also withdrawing to the south. As a result,
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  Speaker 1: Ridgeway ordered the U S. Tenth Corps, still recovering from
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  Speaker 1: m s its near disaster in northeast Korea, to move
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  Speaker 1: up and take responsibility for some thirty five miles in
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  Speaker 1: the center of Line C. Alman was to have control
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  Speaker 1: of the U S Second and seventh Infantry Divisions in
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  Speaker 1: whatever remnants that he could gather of the r O
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  Speaker 1: K second, fifth, and eighth divisions to the right of
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  Speaker 1: tenth Corps, the r O K Third and first Corps
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  Speaker 1: would extend Line SEED to the eastern coast. However, the
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  Speaker 1: staying power of this new defensive line was problematic. Ridgeway
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  Speaker 1: assessed the situation and after the withdrawal from Seoul was completed,
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  Speaker 1: ordered the entire Eighth Army to withdraw again to Line D,
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  Speaker 1: which was somewhat redrawn to run straight east from juan
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  Speaker 1: Ju to sam Chuck instead of northeastward to Juan Poleri.
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  Speaker 1: Beginning on five January, all five corps of Eighth Army
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  Speaker 1: pulled back to this line. Despite its losses. The Eighth
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  Speaker 1: Army situation was thus much improved from the last days
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  Speaker 1: of November with better coordination between units and fewer open flanks.
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  Speaker 1: The enemy attacks, however, were not over. The rejuvenated NKPA
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  Speaker 1: opened a two corps assault on tenth Corps positions near
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  Speaker 1: Wanju in the center of line D On seven January.
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  Speaker 1: The NKPE Fifth Corps hit the second Division at Wanju
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  Speaker 1: with two divisions in a frontal attack, while a third
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  Speaker 1: division attacked from the northwest against the adjacent ROK eighth Division.
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  Speaker 1: They were assisted by one of the divisions of the
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  Speaker 1: NKPA Second Corps, which also launched attacks against the neighboring
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  Speaker 1: ROK third Corps to the east. The North Koreans managed
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  Speaker 1: to force the second Division out of Juanhau by the
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  Speaker 1: evening of seventh January, and all counter attacks failed to
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  Speaker 1: take the city. The North Koreans success at Wanju and
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  Speaker 1: the dangerous penetration of the ro K third Corps by
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  Speaker 1: the nkpa's Second Corps threatened to unhinge the entire UN line. However,
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  Speaker 1: the harsh winter weather and logistical challenges, coupled with newly
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  Speaker 1: aggressive patrolling by UN soldiers, began to take their toll
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  Speaker 1: on the attacker's momentum, the defensive line was re established
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  Speaker 1: just south of Wan jew cutting off the weekend NKPA
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  Speaker 1: divisions that had penetrated the line. The first Marine Division
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  Speaker 1: was sent up from a reserve to conduct a systematic
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  Speaker 1: anti guerrilla campaign against the scattered forces, and in three
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  Speaker 1: weeks managed to destroy virtually one entire NKPA division. By
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  Speaker 1: the end of January, a new defensive line had been
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  Speaker 1: established from the Han River, running just south of Wanjeu
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  Speaker 1: to Sam Chuck on the eastern coast. While Tenth Corps
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  Speaker 1: was dealing with a potentially disastrous penetration in the center,
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  Speaker 1: First and Ninth Corps were busy stabilizing their bozsiis in
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  Speaker 1: instituting a series of aggressive reconnaissance and forced patrols to
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  Speaker 1: their front. General Ridgeway, dismayed by the continuing poor showing
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  Speaker 1: of his battle weary units, demanded that unit commanders lead
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  Speaker 1: the way in restoring an aggressive spirit to help rebuild
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  Speaker 1: the still shaking morale of the Eighth Army. He ordered
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: First Corps to plan a major reconnaissance and force in
• 22:25
  Speaker 1: its sector to test the measure of Chinese resistance. Operation
• 22:29
  Speaker 1: Wolfhound used troops from the U S twenty fifth Infantry Division,
• 22:34
  Speaker 1: especially the twenty seventh Infantry Regiment, the Wolfhounds from which
• 22:38
  Speaker 1: the operation drew its name, the U. S Third Infantry Division,
• 22:43
  Speaker 1: and the ROK first Division. Major General Frank W. Shrimp Milburn,
• 22:48
  Speaker 1: commander of First Corps, directed it along the Osan Sewan
• 22:53
  Speaker 1: axis twelve to twenty miles to the north, supported by
• 22:57
  Speaker 1: artillery and tanks. The reconnaissance began again on fifteen January.
• 23:02
  Speaker 1: The Third Infantry Division units involved were quickly immobilized by
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: enemy defensive positions, but the rest of the forces met
• 23:09
  Speaker 1: little opposition until near Suwan. Their Chinese troops forced the
• 23:14
  Speaker 1: Wolfhound units to turn back just south of their objective,
• 23:18
  Speaker 1: but they were able to established an advanced corep outpost
• 23:22
  Speaker 1: line along the Chinwi River south of Osan by late
• 23:27
  Speaker 1: on sixteen January, while inflicting some one thousan three hundred
• 23:31
  Speaker 1: and eighty enemy casualties at the cost of three killed
• 23:35
  Speaker 1: and seven wounded of their own. More important, they had
• 23:38
  Speaker 1: showed both the Chinese and themselves that the Eighth Army
• 23:42
  Speaker 1: continued to have an offensive spirit. Almost immediately, two other
• 23:46
  Speaker 1: reconnaissance in force sallied out from Yuan lines, another from
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: first Corps and a one day action in the Ninth
• 23:53
  Speaker 1: Corps Sector, both on twenty second January. The reconnaissance in
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: the ninth Core sector insisted of a tank heavy formation
• 24:02
  Speaker 1: called Task Force Johnson after its commander, Colonel Johnson. The
• 24:07
  Speaker 1: immediate results of both operations were small, but the ground
• 24:11
  Speaker 1: was being laid for a return to the offensive by
• 24:14
  Speaker 1: the entire eighth Army in the near future. Analysis, the
• 24:19
  Speaker 1: period from early November nineteen fifty to late January nineteen
• 24:23
  Speaker 1: fifty one was in many ways the most heartbreaking of
• 24:27
  Speaker 1: the Korean War. During the previous summer, the North Korean
• 24:30
  Speaker 1: attack had been a total surprise, and the disastrous retreat
• 24:34
  Speaker 1: to the Pusan perimeter was painful in the extreme. However,
• 24:39
  Speaker 1: the series of defeats could be explained by the necessarily
• 24:42
  Speaker 1: haphazard and slow reinforcement of the outnumbered US and South
• 24:47
  Speaker 1: Korean forces. Moreover, these defeats were followed by the elation
• 24:52
  Speaker 1: as the Inchon landings reversed the situation and the UN
• 24:55
  Speaker 1: forces seemed on the verge not just of victory in
• 24:58
  Speaker 1: South Korea, but of total victory, including the liberation of
• 25:02
  Speaker 1: North Korea and the reunification of the Peninsula. All these
• 25:06
  Speaker 1: dreams were swept away by the massive intervention of the
• 25:10
  Speaker 1: Chinese army in late November nineteen fifty. There would be
• 25:14
  Speaker 1: no homecoming victory parade by Christmas. The initial warning attacks
• 25:19
  Speaker 1: and diplomatic hints by the Chinese were ignored by the
• 25:23
  Speaker 1: over confident for Eastern Command under General MacArthur. MacArthur's failure
• 25:28
  Speaker 1: to comprehend the reality of the situation led the entire
• 25:31
  Speaker 1: United Nations Army to near disaster at the chung Chong
• 25:35
  Speaker 1: River and the Chosin Reservoir. Only the grit and determination
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: of the individual American soldiers and marines as they fought
• 25:44
  Speaker 1: the three major enemies of cold, fear, and isolation held
• 25:48
  Speaker 1: the Yuan line together during the retreats from North Korea.
• 25:52
  Speaker 1: Once tied together into a coherent defensive line under new
• 25:56
  Speaker 1: and dynamic leadership, the same soldiers and marines showed their
• 26:00
  Speaker 1: determination to continue the fight. Hard battles lay ahead, but
• 26:05
  Speaker 1: the period of headlong retreats from an attacking unsuspected foe
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: was finally over. Further readings Appleman roy E, East of
• 26:17
  Speaker 1: Chosen Entrapman and Breakout in Korea nineteen fifty College Station,
• 26:22
  Speaker 1: Texas A and M University Press, nineteen eighty seven. Appleman
• 26:28
  Speaker 1: Roye Escaping the Trap, The U. S. Army, Tenth Corps
• 26:32
  Speaker 1: and Northeast Korea, nineteen fifty. College Station, Texas A and
• 26:37
  Speaker 1: M University Press, nineteen ninety. Appleman Roye South to the Noktang,
• 26:43
  Speaker 1: North to the Yalu June through November nineteen fifty. US
• 26:48
  Speaker 1: Army in Korea, Washington, U. S. Army Center of Military History,
• 26:53
  Speaker 1: nineteen sixty one. Blair Clay, The Forgotten War America and Korea,
• 26:59
  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty through nineteen fifty three, New York Doubleday, nineteen
• 27:04
  Speaker 1: eighty seven. Marshal S. L A. The River and the Gauntlet,
• 27:09
  Speaker 1: November nineteen fifty. The Defeat of Eighth Army, Nashville, Tennessee
• 27:14
  Speaker 1: Battery Press, nineteen eighty seven. Mossman, Billissi, EBB and Flow,
• 27:20
  Speaker 1: November nineteen fifty through July nineteen fifty one. U. S.
• 27:24
  Speaker 1: Army in Korea, Washington, d C. U S. Army Center
• 27:28
  Speaker 1: of Military History, nineteen ninety. Stanton Shelby America's tenth Legion,
• 27:35
  Speaker 1: Tenth Corps in Korea, nineteen fifty, Novato, California, Presidio Press,
• 27:42
  Speaker 1: nineteen eighty nine, end of Section four,