Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Greg Abel‘s First Berkshire Shareholder Letter
Transcript
- 0:00You know, for like 60 years, the financial world has had this,
- 0:04this almost sacred annual tradition.
- 0:07Absolutely. The shareholder letter.
- 0:08Right. Every winter this letter would
- 0:11arrive, and it was written by a man who honestly felt less like
- 0:15a Wall Street Titan and more like a, I don't know, a wise
- 0:18grandfather sitting across from you at the kitchen table.
- 0:21Yeah, exactly. He talked about baseball.
- 0:23He talked about Cinderella's at the ball, maybe throwing a
- 0:26metaphor about building cathedrals.
- 0:29It was just comforting. You read it and you felt like
- 0:31you understood the madness of the markets just a little bit
- 0:34better. It was an absolute anchor for
- 0:35millions of investors. I mean, you weren't just reading
- 0:38a corporate filing, right? You were absorbing A literal
- 0:42master class in behavioral psychology and and capital
- 0:44allocation. But.
- 0:45The thing is, this year that grandfatherly voice is gone.
- 0:49For the very first time in six decades, Warren Buffett did not
- 0:53write the Berkshire Hathaway annual shareholder letter.
- 0:56Yeah, it's a huge shift. It really is.
- 0:58Instead, the new CEO, Greg Abel just dropped this dense 18 page
- 1:03document that is sending absolute shock waves through
- 1:06Wall Street. And that is basically our
- 1:09mission for today's Deep Dive. Right, we really need to decode
- 1:12this transition. Exactly.
- 1:14We're unpacking Abel's brand new letter, plus this breaking CNBC
- 1:17interview he literally just gave to try and figure out what the
- 1:21person sitting on the biggest pile of cash in corporate
- 1:23history is warning us about the current market.
- 1:26And just to set the stage for you, when we say the biggest
- 1:29pile of cash, we are talking about $373.3 billion in cash and
- 1:35treasury holdings at the close of 2025.
- 1:37Mind blowing. It is over a third of the entire
- 1:40company's value is just. It's just sitting there
- 1:43completely idle. Just a staggering number, but
- 1:45hey, before we break down that massive mountain of cash, a
- 1:48really quick bit of housekeeping.
- 1:49Yeah, before jumping into the castle is cash a quick reminder
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- 2:19may be subject to revisions or differing interpretations.
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- 2:29conduct your own due diligence before making investment
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- 2:41Don't forget to like this video. Much appreciated.
- 2:44OK, let's unpack this. We have Greg Abel walking into
- 2:46the CEO office and the very first thing he has to deal with
- 2:49is this unprecedented $373.3 billion.
- 2:54And he referred to it in his letter very specifically as dry
- 2:57powder, saying his job is to keep capital deployment
- 3:01intentional and deliberate. Which, you know, is a very
- 3:04deliberate choice of words in itself.
- 3:06It signals to you, the listener, that he doesn't view this cash
- 3:10as a burden that's just burning a hole in his pocket.
- 3:13Right, he's not itching to spend.
- 3:14Exactly. He views it as ammunition that
- 3:17is being meticulously conserved for a highly specific set of
- 3:21conditions. But here's where it gets really
- 3:23interesting to me. For six straight quarters, we're
- 3:27talking. Going all the way back to the
- 3:28spring of 2024, Berkshire had not repurchased a single share
- 3:34of its own stock. Not one.
- 3:35Not a single one. But then breaking news hits.
- 3:38CNBC Cable filed a 10K, waited a 48 hour cooling off period
- 3:43through Monday and Tuesday, and then just commenced buying back
- 3:46shares on a Wednesday morning. Yeah, and and before we analyze
- 3:49why he did it, let's quickly explain the mechanics of that
- 3:52cooling off period, just for context.
- 3:53Good idea. So when a company releases its
- 3:56annual report, the 10K executives possess all the
- 4:00inside numbers before the public actually does so.
- 4:03The SEC requires this cooling off period, usually around 48
- 4:06hours, before insiders or the company itself can buy stock.
- 4:10Basically making sure the public has time to digest the new info.
- 4:14Precisely, it prevents anyone from trading on an unfair
- 4:17advantage. OK, so the clock expires and
- 4:20Abel immediately jumps in. Now Abel explained they have 3
- 4:23buckets for their cash, right? Deploying it into existing
- 4:26businesses, acquiring whole companies and then share
- 4:28repurchases. But wait, hold on, I have to
- 4:30push back here. Buying back shares after 18
- 4:33months of doing literally nothing right when the broader
- 4:37market is flirting with all time highs.
- 4:39I mean, to a skeptic, that might just look like a new CEO trying
- 4:42to artificially prop up the stock price on his first day to
- 4:46look good for Wall Street. How is that conservative?
- 4:48It's a really great question. And it all comes down to how
- 4:51they actually calculate value, because Abel went on CNBC and
- 4:54explicitly stated that he consulted with Warren on this.
- 4:57The policy hasn't changed an inch.
- 4:59Oh, really? Yeah.
- 5:00They only execute buybacks when the intrinsic value of the
- 5:04company, calculated on a very conservative basis, exceeds the
- 5:08current market price. He's looking at the actual cash
- 5:11generated by their railroads, their energy grids, their
- 5:14insurance floats, and determining what those cash
- 5:17flows are objectively worth. OK, so if we use an analogy for
- 5:20you listening, think of a stock buyback like slicing a pizza.
- 5:24If Abel uses the company's cash to buy back and retire shares,
- 5:28he's permanently removing slices from the table.
- 5:30Exactly. So you, as a remain shareholder,
- 5:34suddenly own a slightly larger percentage of the whole pie and
- 5:38a larger claim on the company's future profits without having to
- 5:41do a single thing. That's spot on.
- 5:43And by doing this immediately after taking the reins, Abel is
- 5:46communicating structural stability.
- 5:48He is showing that the intrinsic value finally dipped below their
- 5:51conservative threshold. So, you know, he pulled the
- 5:53trigger, but noticeably, he refused to give the public a
- 5:56ballpark figure on how well they actually bought.
- 5:59Right, I saw that. Why keep that a secret?
- 6:02Well, because Berkshire has never disclosed the amount,
- 6:05timing or computation of their buybacks in advance, Abel
- 6:09announced they had recommenced simply out of respect for the
- 6:12owners during a leadership change.
- 6:14He wanted you to know the engine is still running, but he
- 6:17absolutely refuses to let Wall Street Front run his trades.
- 6:21That cautious capital deployment makes a whole lot more sense
- 6:24when you actually look inside the business is able just
- 6:26inherited. Oh, definitely.
- 6:27Because while the cash pile looks impregnable, the castle
- 6:31itself has some foundational cracks, and Abel is addressing
- 6:35them in a radically different way that we are used to seeing.
- 6:38It is a profound stylistic shift.
- 6:40I mean, the previous era was defined by this folksy trust.
- 6:43Yeah. The operating philosophy was
- 6:45essentially, you know, by great companies install great managers
- 6:50and then step entirely out of their way.
- 6:52Public criticism of a subsidiary by headquarters was incredibly
- 6:56rare. Yeah, the contrast here is just
- 6:58jarring. It feels a bit like a new
- 7:00stepdad coming into the house and immediately grounding the
- 7:02kids. That's a good way to put it.
- 7:04Right, like Buffett was the cool grandfather who trusted you to
- 7:08do your homework, but Abel is pulling out his red pen and
- 7:11auditing your report card. Because this 18 page letter does
- 7:16not read like a fireside chat. It reads like a precise, highly
- 7:20organized CEO document. And he really did not sugarcoat
- 7:25the financial hits. No, he laid them out very
- 7:27clearly. Fourth quarter operating profit
- 7:30actually fell 29%, down to $10.2 billion.
- 7:34Wow. And crucially, insurance
- 7:36underwriting profits, which have historically been the great
- 7:39engine generating cash for Berkshire, plummeted 54% in that
- 7:43same quarter. Wait, let's explain why that
- 7:45happened. Why did insurance suddenly
- 7:47crater like that? Well, insurance isn't just about
- 7:48collecting premiums, right? It's the business of accurately
- 7:51pricing future disasters, right? And when you have an environment
- 7:54with unprecedented climate catastrophes, combined with
- 7:57severe inflation driving up the cost of auto parts, labor, home
- 8:01repairs, all of that, those profit margins get completely
- 8:05obliterated. Because the models were
- 8:06outdated. Exactly.
- 8:07The models they used to price policies a year ago suddenly
- 8:10didn't cover the real world cost of claims today.
- 8:13And then there was a whole Kraft Heinz situation.
- 8:16They took a $4.5 billion write down on the value of their
- 8:21stake, and a January filing even suggests they might sell all
- 8:26three $125 million of their remaining Kraft Heinz shares.
- 8:29Yeah, that's massive. For the listener who might only
- 8:32hear the term write down on the Evening News, what does that
- 8:35actually mean mechanically for a company's balance sheet?
- 8:38So a write down is essentially an accounting reality check.
- 8:41You buy an asset or a stake in a company thinking it will
- 8:44generate a certain amount of cash over its lifetime, but then
- 8:47the macroeconomic environment changes.
- 8:50Things get worse. Right.
- 8:51And when you realize that asset will never produce the cash you
- 8:54originally projected, you are legally required to adjust your
- 8:57balance sheet downward to reflect reality.
- 9:00They essentially took a $4.5 billion haircut on paper.
- 9:04Which makes total sense when you look at why Kraft Heinz is
- 9:07struggling right now. Consumer Packaged Goods are
- 9:10hitting this massive pricing Powerwall.
- 9:12Absolutely. For years, these legacy brands
- 9:14just relied on consumer loyalty to steadily raise prices, but
- 9:18inflation has just exhausted the average shopper.
- 9:21We've reached a point where people are no longer willing to
- 9:23pay a premium for name brand ketchup or macaroni.
- 9:26You know they are trading down to store brands.
- 9:29And Abel taking this right down shows he doesn't have any
- 9:32sentimental attachment to legacy brands that have lost their
- 9:35edge. Exactly.
- 9:37But what really shocked Wall Street wasn't just the math,
- 9:39right? It was the public call outs.
- 9:42Abel wrote that the performance gap between BNSF Railroad, which
- 9:46is one of their crown jewels, and its rivals, is quote too
- 9:50wide. That is a fascinating call out
- 9:52because it highlights a really deep operational divergent.
- 9:55Over the last decade, rival railroads adopted an aggressive
- 9:58model called Precision Scheduled Railroading, or PSR.
- 10:02OK. What does that entail exactly?
- 10:03It's basically a ruthless efficiency model.
- 10:06It focuses on running trains on fixed, relentless schedules,
- 10:09minimizing idle time and rail yards, and drastic cutting staff
- 10:13and locomotives. It boosts short term profit
- 10:15margins incredibly well. But under Buffett, Berkshire
- 10:19resisted PSR because they felt it severely degraded customer
- 10:22service, overworked employees and just ruined long term
- 10:26resilience. But now Abel's looking at the
- 10:28spreadsheet and saying, you know, holding the moral high
- 10:30ground is great, but we are bleeding efficiency compared to
- 10:34everyone. Else yeah, the numbers don't
- 10:35lie. And he didn't stop at the
- 10:37railroad. He pointed directly at Shaw
- 10:39Industries, their flooring business, and blame
- 10:42self-inflicted difficulties for damaging quality and service.
- 10:46He wrote that each business is accountable to its CEO who is
- 10:49expected to pursue operational excellence relentlessly.
- 10:54I mean Dan Hanson, who overseas about 6 billion at Neuberger
- 10:58Berman literally called those fighting words.
- 11:00They really are. This transition from Buffett to
- 11:03Able proves this universal business truth.
- 11:05Founders and visionaries build empires using trust and grand
- 11:08narratives that successors must maintain those empires using
- 11:12audits and operational discipline.
- 11:14That makes a lot of sense. Abel is showing his true
- 11:16character here. He isn't hiding the 10.2 billion
- 11:20profit drop. He is walking through every
- 11:23single door in that conglomerate and demanding accountability.
- 11:27He is proving that he won't let nostalgia protect an
- 11:31underperforming manager. It's ruthless, but perhaps
- 11:34exactly what a sprawling conglomerate needs to survive
- 11:37its founder now. Whether he's refusing to accept
- 11:40inefficiency internally or refusing to bow to peer pressure
- 11:44externally, Abel is displaying an incredible immunity to what
- 11:47other people think. And we see this play out in two
- 11:51major external battles mentioned in the letter.
- 11:53The first one stems from a cryptic warning he pledged that
- 11:56Berkshire will avoid businesses that, quote, undermine the
- 11:59fabric of society or could jeopardize Berkshire's
- 12:01reputation. And noticeably, he didn't name a
- 12:03single sector when he said that. No names, no explanations, but
- 12:07CFRA analyst Kathy Seifert immediately speculated this
- 12:10could be a direct reference to artificial intelligence.
- 12:12Which is huge. Think about how wild that is.
- 12:15Every major institutional investor is at the Cinderella
- 12:19ball dancing to the AI music right now, and Berkshire is
- 12:22refusing to even enter the room. So is that a stroke of
- 12:25contrarian genius? Or is it just the classic
- 12:28Berkshire blind spot repeating itself, like when they initially
- 12:31missed out on the tech boom in the 90s because they didn't
- 12:33understand it? It's a tension you really have
- 12:36to respect. On one hand, missing out on
- 12:39massive growth sectors obviously hurts your returns.
- 12:42On the other hand, holding 373 billion and deliberately
- 12:47sidestepping the hottest sector on the planet sends a clear
- 12:50signal about how they view reputational risk.
- 12:53Interesting. Yeah?
- 12:54If an AI tool you invest in hallucinates and causes severe
- 12:57harm, or if it disrupts industries in a way that draws
- 13:00intense regulatory backlash, that damages the parent company.
- 13:04And let's not forget that even the CEO of Open AI has publicly
- 13:07suggested the current AI market is experiencing bubble dynamics.
- 13:11Even the insiders. Right.
- 13:13Abel seems perfectly willing to absorb the criticism of being a
- 13:16dinosaur if it means protecting the company's 60 year
- 13:19foundation. And that leads directly to how
- 13:21he handles actual tangible threats to that foundation.
- 13:26Let's look at Pacificorp. This is Berkshire's western
- 13:29utility company and they are currently facing up to $48
- 13:33billion in wildfire liability claims from communities in the
- 13:37Pacific Northwest. To really understand this, you
- 13:39need to grasp a legal concept that utilities face called
- 13:43inverse condemnation. OK, in some states, if utility
- 13:47equipment is found to have sparked a fire, the utility is
- 13:50held strictly liable for the damages, regardless of whether
- 13:53they were actually negligent or followed all safety protocols.
- 13:56Wait, so if your wire fell you pay correct?
- 13:59If the previous administration were handling this, you might
- 14:02expect very careful diplomatic language, you know, perhaps
- 14:05looking for a quiet settlement to just make the headline go
- 14:07away. But Abel chose a remarkably
- 14:10combative path. He wrote that Pacificorp is not
- 14:13an insurer of last resort and should not be treated as a deep
- 14:16pocket by litigants. He vowed to fight unjust claims
- 14:20relentlessly in court. Which is basically a complete
- 14:22declaration of war. He's refusing to just write a
- 14:26check to appease Wall Street's desire for clean quarterly
- 14:29earnings. And Speaking of quarterly
- 14:31earnings, he actually doubled down on this independent streak
- 14:34by buildly canceling Berkshire's quarterly earnings calls
- 14:37altogether. That was a.
- 14:38Shock. In today's market, the 90 day
- 14:41rhythm is almost a religion. Wall Street builds complex
- 14:45financial models around those calls.
- 14:47Management teams contort their entire businesses just to hit a
- 14:5190 day target. And Abel just dismantled that
- 14:53treadmill. He essentially stated that a
- 14:55company built for the next century simply cannot be managed
- 14:58on a 90 day startwatch. Quarterly commentary encourages
- 15:02short term thinking and it completely misaligns with their
- 15:05objective of buying and holding for decades.
- 15:07OK, let's pull all these philosophical threads together
- 15:10because all of Abel's actions, hoarding the 373 billion,
- 15:14demanding internal operational excellence, ghosting the AI
- 15:17bubble, fighting massive legal battles instead of settling,
- 15:20canceling the quarterly calls, they all culminate in one
- 15:23reality about the broader stock market right now.
- 15:26Yeah, they do. And it looks exactly like the
- 15:281999 playbook. The macroeconomic parallels are
- 15:31genuinely striking. If you look at the broad
- 15:33valuation metrics, the dashboard is flashing red.
- 15:37This is exactly why tracking tools like the Buffett Indicator
- 15:40app are so relevant for you right now.
- 15:43For those who aren't familiar, the Buffett Indicator is a
- 15:46simple but really powerful ratio.
- 15:49You take the total market value of all publicly traded stocks
- 15:53and divide it by the national GDP right?
- 15:56It tells you if the stock market is outpacing the actual physical
- 16:00economy, and right now it is sitting at an astronomical 218%.
- 16:06To put that in perspective, anything over 150% is
- 16:08historically considered significantly overvalued.
- 16:12But it's not just that one metric validating Abel's
- 16:14caution. If you look at the Schiller PE
- 16:17ratio, it's telling the exact same story.
- 16:19Let's pause and explain why the Schiller PE is a better alarm
- 16:22bell than just a regular price to earnings ratio.
- 16:24Sure. So a standard PE ratio just
- 16:27looks at a company's stock price compared to its profits over the
- 16:29last 12 months. The problem is 12 months can be
- 16:32a total fluke. Right, like a weird anomaly.
- 16:34Exactly. You might have a temporary
- 16:37economic boom or a one time corporate tax break that makes
- 16:40profits look artificially amazing.
- 16:43Robert Shiller, who is a Nobel laureate, designed his ratio to
- 16:46average out corporate earnings over the last 10 years.
- 16:49And, crucially, he adjusts those numbers for inflation.
- 16:53OK, that makes sense. It strips away the short term
- 16:55noise and shows you the true underlying valuation across an
- 16:58entire business cycle. And historically, the average
- 17:01for the Shiller PE is around 17. Today, it stands at 40.
- 17:06It's more than double the historical norm.
- 17:08And this is where the history lesson really matters for you
- 17:10listening right now. Back in 1999, Buffett looked at
- 17:14similar metrics and warned of a lost decade in market returns.
- 17:17He outright refused to chase overpriced tech stocks.
- 17:20And he caught a lot of Flack for it.
- 17:22He was called out of touch, people said the game had passed
- 17:24him by, and then the.com bubble burst, the market crashed, and
- 17:28he was ultimately proven right. Abel is running that exact same
- 17:32playbook through his actions today.
- 17:34So for regular investors, people who don't have 373 billion
- 17:39sitting in a corporate treasury but who do get a monthly
- 17:42paycheck, how should they react to these specific warning signs?
- 17:45This is where you have to look at what the smartest capital in
- 17:48the world is doing and more importantly, what it is not
- 17:51doing. Abel isn't confused by this
- 17:54market. He is waiting it out.
- 17:56There's a brilliant philosophy from the late Charlie Munger
- 17:59that applies perfectly here. The wise ones bet heavily when
- 18:02the world offers them a great opportunity, and the rest of the
- 18:05time they do nothing. Doing nothing is arguably the
- 18:08hardest psychological challenge in investing, especially when
- 18:11your neighbor is getting rich on paper, buying mean stocks or AI
- 18:14startups. It takes immense discipline, but
- 18:16you as an individual investor actually have a distinct
- 18:19advantage over a massive conglomerate.
- 18:21Your recurring income, your monthly paycheck is your version
- 18:25of that 373 billion. I love that.
- 18:28Every dollar you save today, rather than throwing it into an
- 18:31overvalued market at a FOMO, becomes your own dry powder.
- 18:35You are stockpiling ammunition for when the market inevitably
- 18:38reprices. Because history shows us,
- 18:40without what exception, that corrections happen and
- 18:43opportunities always reappear. You just need the capital ready
- 18:46to deploy when they do. Your paycheck is your dry
- 18:49powder. That's fantastic.
- 18:51So to recap this monumental transition, the folksy
- 18:55storytelling era of Warren Buffett is officially over.
- 18:58It has been replaced by Greg Abel's highly precise,
- 19:01aggressively disciplined and honestly, sometimes combative
- 19:04leadership style. He's bringing audits to the
- 19:07railroads and war to the utility litigants.
- 19:09Yeah, the tone has definitely changed.
- 19:11But the core principles of Berkshire Hathaway, the
- 19:13patience, the demand for tangible intrinsic value, and
- 19:16the willingness to hold unprecedented amounts of dry
- 19:19powder when the market is dancing on the edge of a bubble,
- 19:22those are continuing in perpetuity.
- 19:24The walls of the castle are intact.
- 19:26Abel made it abundantly clear that the culture of conservative
- 19:28valuation remains, even if the tone of the shareholder letters
- 19:32has dramatically shifted. But, and here's where I want to
- 19:34leave you with a final undressed puzzle piece from our sources
- 19:37today, something to really Mull over.
- 19:41Todd Combs, who was one of Bercher's top 2 investment
- 19:44managers, just left the company to become the CEO of AGP Morgan
- 19:49Consumer Business, and Berkshire has not named a new chief
- 19:53investment officer to replace him.
- 19:55Instead, Greg Abel wrote in this new letter that the
- 19:58responsibility for equity investment ultimately resides
- 20:01with him. Which honestly raises A
- 20:04profoundly important question for the long term future of the
- 20:06company, right? Because let's look at Abel's
- 20:09resume. Greg Abel's a master of
- 20:11operations. He ran Berkshire's energy
- 20:13division brilliantly. He knows how to lay pipelines
- 20:16and optimize power grids, but he has never made a living as a
- 20:19stock picker. He's an operator, not an equity
- 20:21guy. Yeah, completely different skill
- 20:23sets. It reminds me a bit of when Tim
- 20:25Cook took over Apple from Steve Jobs.
- 20:28Tim Cook is a legendary supply chain operator, but he wasn't
- 20:31the product visionary Jobs was. Apple thrived anyway because the
- 20:35ecosystem was already built. That is a really great
- 20:37comparison. But Apple's ecosystem is
- 20:40software and hardware. Berkshire's ecosystem is
- 20:43allocating capital. Exactly.
- 20:46So the thought to ponder is this, when the market finally
- 20:49does crash and those 1999 level indicators finally reset, will
- 20:55Greg Abel be able to spot the next Apple sized equity winner?
- 20:59Or is the absence of a dedicated world class stock picker at the
- 21:02helm a major gap that the market simply hasn't priced in yet?
- 21:06It is the ultimate test of his tenure.
- 21:08When the dust settles and the generational bargains appear,
- 21:10who actually has the vision to pull the trigger?
- 21:13That's. Going to be fascinating to watch
- 21:14unfold. Thank you so much for joining us
- 21:16in this deep dive into a truly historic moment in financial
- 21:19history. A quick reminder to hit the like
- 21:21button on this video and be sure to subscribe to our sister
- 21:23channel at Deep Values to keep exploring the philosophies that
- 21:26drive the world's greatest investors.
- 21:28Until next time, keep your dry powder ready and we'll see you
- 21:31on the next deep dive.