Latest / Supreme Cases from 1803-2018 / 22 - Supreme Cases from 1803-2018 by United States Supreme Court
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- 0:01Speaker 1: Section twenty two of a collection of Supreme Court opinions
- 0:05Speaker 1: by the United States Supreme Court. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:11Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:15Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. New
- 0:22Speaker 1: York Times Company v. Sullivan three seventy six US two
- 0:27Speaker 1: fifty four, decided March ninth, nineteen sixty four, Part two.
- 0:36Speaker 1: Please note this is a reading of the opinion of
- 0:39Speaker 1: the Court only. This reading does not include the syllabus
- 0:44Speaker 1: or any concurring or dissenting opinions. Fre ease of listening.
- 0:48Speaker 1: This reading omits legal citations found within the text of
- 0:53Speaker 1: the Court's opinion. Mister Justice Braun, in his concurring opinion
- 1:02Speaker 1: in Whitney v. California two seventy four US three fifty seven,
- 1:07Speaker 1: gave the principle its classic formulation. Those who won our
- 1:15Speaker 1: independence believed that public discussion is a political duty, and
- 1:20Speaker 1: that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
- 1:26Speaker 1: They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject,
- 1:31Speaker 1: but they knew that order cannot be secured merely through
- 1:35Speaker 1: fear of punishment for its infraction. That it is hazardous
- 1:40Speaker 1: to discourage thought, hope, and imagination, that fear breeds repression,
- 1:46Speaker 1: that repression breeds hate, that hate MENACE's stable government. That
- 1:52Speaker 1: the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
- 1:55Speaker 1: freely supposed grievances and proposed remedy, and that the fitting
- 2:01Speaker 1: remedy for evil counsels is good ones believing in the
- 2:06Speaker 1: power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed
- 2:11Speaker 1: silence coursed by law the argument of force in its
- 2:15Speaker 1: worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
- 2:22Speaker 1: amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should
- 2:27Speaker 1: be guaranteed end. Thus, we consider this case against the
- 2:34Speaker 1: background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
- 2:39Speaker 1: debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open,
- 2:45Speaker 1: and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
- 2:50Speaker 1: unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. The present advertisement,
- 2:59Speaker 1: as an expression of grievance and protests on one of
- 3:03Speaker 1: the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly
- 3:07Speaker 1: to qualify for the constitutional protection. The question is whether
- 3:12Speaker 1: it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of
- 3:16Speaker 1: its factual statements, and by its alleged defamation of respondent
- 3:23Speaker 1: authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment. Guarantees have consistently refused
- 3:30Speaker 1: to recognize an exception for any test of truth, whether
- 3:35Speaker 1: administered by judges, juries or administrative officials, and especially one
- 3:41Speaker 1: that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker.
- 3:46Speaker 1: The constitutional protection does not turn upon quote the truth, popularity,
- 3:53Speaker 1: or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.
- 4:01Speaker 1: As Madison said, quote, some degree of abuse is inseparable
- 4:06Speaker 1: from the proper use of everything. And in no instance
- 4:10Speaker 1: is this more true than in that of the press
- 4:13Speaker 1: end quote. In can't well versed Connecticut. Three ten US
- 4:19Speaker 1: two ninety six three ten, the Court declared, quote, in
- 4:24Speaker 1: the realm of religious faith and in that of political belief,
- 4:29Speaker 1: sharp differences arise in both fields. The tenets of one
- 4:34Speaker 1: man may seem the rankest heir to his neighbor to
- 4:38Speaker 1: persuade others to his own point of view. The pleader,
- 4:42Speaker 1: as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification
- 4:46Speaker 1: of men who have been or are prominent in church
- 4:50Speaker 1: or state, and even to false statement. But the people
- 4:54Speaker 1: of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that,
- 4:58Speaker 1: in spite of the probab ability of excesses and abuses,
- 5:03Speaker 1: these liberties are in the long view, essential to enlightened
- 5:07Speaker 1: opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens
- 5:11Speaker 1: of a democracy. End quote. That erroneous statement is inevitable
- 5:18Speaker 1: in free debate, and that it must be protected if
- 5:21Speaker 1: the freedom of expression are to have the quote breathing space.
- 5:27Speaker 1: End quote that they quote need to survive. End quote.
- 5:33Speaker 1: Was also recognized by the Court of Appeals for the
- 5:37Speaker 1: District of Columbia Circuit in Sweeney versus Patterson, seventy six
- 5:42Speaker 1: U S. Judge Edgerton spoke for a unanimous court which
- 5:47Speaker 1: affirmed the dismissal of a congressman's libel suit based upon
- 5:51Speaker 1: a newspaper article charging him with anti Semitism. In opposing
- 5:56Speaker 1: a judicial appointment, he said, quote, cases which impose liability
- 6:03Speaker 1: for erroneous reports of the political conduct of officials reflect
- 6:08Speaker 1: the obsolete doctrine that the government must not criticize their governors.
- 6:15Speaker 1: The interest of the public here outweighs the interest of
- 6:18Speaker 1: appellent or any other individual. The protection of the public
- 6:22Speaker 1: requires not merely discussion but information, political conduct, and views
- 6:29Speaker 1: which some respectable people approve and others condemn are constantly
- 6:34Speaker 1: imputed to Congressmen. Heirs of fact, particularly in regard to
- 6:39Speaker 1: the man's mental states and processes, are inevitable. Whatever is
- 6:44Speaker 1: added to the field of libel is taken from the
- 6:47Speaker 1: field of free debate. End footnote. See also Mill on
- 6:55Speaker 1: liberty Oxford Blackwell, nineteen forty seven at forty seven. Quote
- 7:01Speaker 1: to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate
- 7:07Speaker 1: the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion.
- 7:12Speaker 1: All this, even to the most aggravated degree, is so
- 7:16Speaker 1: continually done in perfect good faith by persons who are
- 7:20Speaker 1: not considered and in many other respects may not deserve
- 7:24Speaker 1: to be considered ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible,
- 7:30Speaker 1: on adequate grounds conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable.
- 7:38Speaker 1: And still less could law presume to interfere with this
- 7:42Speaker 1: kind of controversial misconduct. End quote and a footnote. Injury
- 7:50Speaker 1: to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech
- 7:55Speaker 1: that would otherwise be free than does factual air. Where
- 8:00Speaker 1: judicial officials are involved. This Court has held that concern
- 8:05Speaker 1: for dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify
- 8:09Speaker 1: the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge
- 8:14Speaker 1: or his decision. This is true even though the utterance
- 8:19Speaker 1: contains quote half truths end quote end quote misinformation end quote.
- 8:27Speaker 1: Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by
- 8:31Speaker 1: a clear and present danger of the obstruction of justice.
- 8:36Speaker 1: If judges are to be treated as quote men of
- 8:40Speaker 1: fortitude able to thrive in a hearty climate end quote,
- 8:45Speaker 1: surely the same must be true of other government officials,
- 8:49Speaker 1: such as elected city commissioners. Footnote. The climate in which
- 8:57Speaker 1: public officials operate, especially during a political campaign, has been
- 9:02Speaker 1: described by one commentator in the following terms. Quote charges
- 9:07Speaker 1: of gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies,
- 9:13Speaker 1: and the like usually have filled the air, and hints
- 9:17Speaker 1: of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent
- 9:23Speaker 1: end and footnote. Criticism of their official conduct does not
- 9:31Speaker 1: lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism
- 9:37Speaker 1: and hence diminishes their official reputations. If neither factual air
- 9:44Speaker 1: nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from
- 9:50Speaker 1: criticisms of official conduct. The combination of the two elements
- 9:55Speaker 1: is no less inadequate. This is the lesson to be
- 9:59Speaker 1: drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of
- 10:03Speaker 1: seventeen ninety eight one stat. Five ninety six, which first
- 10:09Speaker 1: crystallized the national awareness of the central meaning of the
- 10:13Speaker 1: First Amendment. That statute made it a crime punishable by
- 10:18Speaker 1: a five thousand dollars fine and five years in prison
- 10:24Speaker 1: if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish any false, scandalous,
- 10:29Speaker 1: and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the
- 10:34Speaker 1: United States, or either House of the Congress or the President,
- 10:39Speaker 1: with intent to defame, or to bring them, or either
- 10:43Speaker 1: of them into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them,
- 10:49Speaker 1: or either of any of them, the hatred of the
- 10:52Speaker 1: good people of the United States. End. The Act allowed
- 10:59Speaker 1: the defendant to the defense of truth, and provided that
- 11:02Speaker 1: the jury were to be judges both of the law
- 11:05Speaker 1: and the facts. Despite these qualifications, the Act was vigorously
- 11:11Speaker 1: condemned as unconstitutional in an attack joined in by Jefferson
- 11:16Speaker 1: and Madison in the famous Virginia Resolutions of seventeen ninety eight.
- 11:22Speaker 1: The General Assembly of Virginia resolved that it doth particularly
- 11:29Speaker 1: protest against the palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution
- 11:34Speaker 1: in the too late cases of the Alien and Sedition
- 11:38Speaker 1: Acts passed at the last Session of Congress. The Sedition
- 11:43Speaker 1: Act exercises a power not delegated by the Constitution, but
- 11:48Speaker 1: on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of
- 11:53Speaker 1: the amendments. There too, a power which, more than any other,
- 11:57Speaker 1: ought to produce universal allow because it is leveled against
- 12:02Speaker 1: the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and
- 12:07Speaker 1: of free communication among the people thereon, which has ever
- 12:11Speaker 1: been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other
- 12:16Speaker 1: right end quote. Madison prepared the report in support of
- 12:23Speaker 1: the protest. His premise was that the Constitution created a
- 12:28Speaker 1: form of government under which quote the people, not the government,
- 12:33Speaker 1: possessed the absolute sovereignty end quote. The structure of the
- 12:38Speaker 1: government dispersed power and reflection of the people's distrust of
- 12:43Speaker 1: concentrated power and of power itself at all levels. This
- 12:48Speaker 1: form of government was quote altogether different end quote from
- 12:54Speaker 1: the British form under which the crown was sovereign and
- 12:57Speaker 1: the people were subjects. Quote is it not natural and
- 13:02Speaker 1: necessary under such different circumstances? End quote, He asked, quote
- 13:08Speaker 1: that a different degree of freedom in the use of
- 13:11Speaker 1: the press should be contemplated. End quote. Earlier, in a
- 13:17Speaker 1: debate in the House of Representatives, Madison had said, quote,
- 13:22Speaker 1: if we advert to the nature of Republican government, we
- 13:27Speaker 1: shall find that the sensorial power is in the people
- 13:30Speaker 1: over the government, and not in the government over the people.
- 13:36Speaker 1: End quote. Of the exercise of that power by the
- 13:41Speaker 1: press is report said quote. In every state, probably in
- 13:46Speaker 1: the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing
- 13:50Speaker 1: the merits and measures of public men of every description
- 13:54Speaker 1: which has not been confined to the strict limits of
- 13:58Speaker 1: the common law. On this footing, the freedom of the
- 14:02Speaker 1: press has stood. On this foundation, it yet stands end
- 14:08Speaker 1: the right of free public discussion of the stewardship of
- 14:12Speaker 1: public officials was, thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle
- 14:17Speaker 1: of the American form of government. Footnote. The report on
- 14:23Speaker 1: the Virginia Resolutions further stated, quote, it is manifestly impossible
- 14:29Speaker 1: to punish the intent to bring those who administer the
- 14:33Speaker 1: government into disrepute or contempt without striking at the right
- 14:38Speaker 1: of freely discussing public characters and measures, which again is
- 14:42Speaker 1: equivalent to a protection of those who administer the government,
- 14:47Speaker 1: if they should, at any time deserve the contempt or
- 14:50Speaker 1: hatred of the people against being exposed to it by
- 14:54Speaker 1: free animadversions on their characters and conduct. Nor can can
- 15:00Speaker 1: it be a doubt that a government thus entrenched in
- 15:03Speaker 1: penal statutes against the just and natural effects of a
- 15:08Speaker 1: culpable administration, will easily evade the responsibility which is essential
- 15:14Speaker 1: to a faithful discharge of its duty. Let it be
- 15:17Speaker 1: recollected lastly, that the right of electing the members of
- 15:21Speaker 1: the government constitutes, more particularly the essence of a free
- 15:26Speaker 1: and responsible government. Value and efficiency of this right depends
- 15:31Speaker 1: on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of
- 15:35Speaker 1: the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently,
- 15:41Speaker 1: of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the
- 15:45Speaker 1: candidates respectively. And footnote. Although the Sedition Act was never
- 15:55Speaker 1: tested in this court, footnote, the Act expired by its
- 16:00Speaker 1: terms in eighteen hundred and one, and footnote the attack
- 16:05Speaker 1: upon its validity has carried the day in the Court
- 16:08Speaker 1: of history, fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by
- 16:14Speaker 1: Act of Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Calhoun,
- 16:19Speaker 1: reporting to the Senate on February fourth, eighteen thirty six,
- 16:24Speaker 1: assumed that its invalidity was a matter quote which no
- 16:28Speaker 1: one now doubts. End quote. Jefferson, as President, pardoned those
- 16:35Speaker 1: who had been convicted and sentenced under the Act and
- 16:38Speaker 1: remitted their finds, stating quote, I discharged every person under
- 16:44Speaker 1: punishment or prosecution under the Sedition Law because I considered
- 16:49Speaker 1: and now considered that law to be a nullity, as
- 16:53Speaker 1: absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us
- 16:57Speaker 1: to fall down and worship a golden image. End. The
- 17:03Speaker 1: invalidity of the Act has also been assumed by justices
- 17:08Speaker 1: of this Court. These views reflect a broad consensus that
- 17:13Speaker 1: the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism
- 17:18Speaker 1: of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.
- 17:24Speaker 1: There is no force in respondence argument that the constitutional
- 17:28Speaker 1: limitations implicit in the history of the Sedition Act applied
- 17:33Speaker 1: only to Congress and not to the state. It is
- 17:37Speaker 1: true that the First Amendment was originally addressed only to
- 17:41Speaker 1: action by the federal government, and that Jefferson, for one,
- 17:45Speaker 1: while denying the power of Congress quote to control the
- 17:50Speaker 1: freedom of the press end recognized such a power in
- 17:55Speaker 1: the States, but this distinction was eliminated with the adoption
- 18:00Speaker 1: of the Fourteenth Amendment and the application to the States
- 18:04Speaker 1: of the First Amendments restrictions. What a state may not
- 18:09Speaker 1: constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is
- 18:13Speaker 1: likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.
- 18:19Speaker 1: The fear of damage awards under a rule such as
- 18:22Speaker 1: that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly
- 18:26Speaker 1: more inhabiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute. Alabama,
- 18:33Speaker 1: for example, has a criminal libel law which subjects to
- 18:37Speaker 1: prosecution quote any person who speaks, writes, or prints of,
- 18:41Speaker 1: and concerning another any accusation falsely and maliciously importing the
- 18:47Speaker 1: commission by such person of a felony or any other
- 18:51Speaker 1: indictable offense involving moral turptitude end, and which allows as
- 18:58Speaker 1: punishment upon conviction a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars
- 19:03Speaker 1: and a prison sentence of six months. Presumably, a person
- 19:08Speaker 1: charged with violation of this statute enjoys ordinary criminal law safeguard,
- 19:13Speaker 1: such as the requirements of an indictment and of proof
- 19:17Speaker 1: beyond a reasonable doubt. These safeguards are not available to
- 19:22Speaker 1: the defendant in a civil action. The judgment awarded in
- 19:26Speaker 1: this case, without the need of any proof of actual
- 19:30Speaker 1: pecuniary loss, was one thousand times greater than the maximum
- 19:35Speaker 1: fine provided by the Alabama Criminal Statute and one hundred
- 19:40Speaker 1: times greater than that provided by the Sedition Act. And
- 19:45Speaker 1: since there is no double jeopardy limitation applicable to civil
- 19:50Speaker 1: law suits, this is not the only judgment that may
- 19:53Speaker 1: be awarded against petitioners for the same publication. Footnote. The
- 20:00Speaker 1: Time states that four other libel suits based on the
- 20:04Speaker 1: advertisement have been filed against it by others who have
- 20:07Speaker 1: served as Montgomery City commissioners and by the Governor of Alabama,
- 20:13Speaker 1: that another five hundred thousand dollars verdict has been awarded
- 20:17Speaker 1: in the only one of those cases that has yet
- 20:21Speaker 1: gone to trial, and that the damage is sought in
- 20:24Speaker 1: the other three total two million dollars, and footnote whether
- 20:32Speaker 1: or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments.
- 20:36Speaker 1: The pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who
- 20:40Speaker 1: would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in
- 20:45Speaker 1: which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive plainly. The Alabama
- 20:50Speaker 1: law of civil libel is quote, a form of regulation
- 20:55Speaker 1: that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those
- 21:00Speaker 1: that attend reliance upon the criminal law. End the state
- 21:07Speaker 1: rule of law is not saved by its allowance of
- 21:10Speaker 1: the defense of truth. A defense for erroneous statements honestly
- 21:15Speaker 1: made is no less essential here than was the requirement
- 21:19Speaker 1: of proof of guilty knowledge, which in Smith v. California,
- 21:25Speaker 1: we held indispensable to a valid conviction of a bookseller
- 21:30Speaker 1: for possessing obscene writings for sale. We said, quote, for
- 21:36Speaker 1: if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents,
- 21:41Speaker 1: he will tend to restrict the books he sells to
- 21:44Speaker 1: those he has inspected, and thus the state will have
- 21:48Speaker 1: imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as
- 21:53Speaker 1: well as obscene literature, and the bookseller's burden would become
- 21:59Speaker 1: the public's burden, for by restricting him, the public's access
- 22:04Speaker 1: to reading matter would be restricted. His timidity in the
- 22:08Speaker 1: face of his absolute criminal liability thus would tend to
- 22:13Speaker 1: restrict the public's access to forms of the printed word
- 22:17Speaker 1: which the state could not constitutionally suppress directly the bookseller.
- 22:23Speaker 1: Self censorship compelled by the state would be a censorship
- 22:27Speaker 1: affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered.
- 22:34Speaker 1: Through it, the distribution of all books, both obscene and
- 22:39Speaker 1: not obscene would be impeded, and a rule compelling the
- 22:47Speaker 1: critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all
- 22:51Speaker 1: his factual assertions, and to do so on pain of
- 22:56Speaker 1: liable judgments, virtually unlimited in amount, leads to a comparable
- 23:02Speaker 1: quote self censorship and quote allowance of the defense of
- 23:07Speaker 1: truth with the burden of proving it on the defendant
- 23:12Speaker 1: does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Footnote.
- 23:19Speaker 1: Even a false statement may be deemed to make a
- 23:22Speaker 1: valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about quote
- 23:27Speaker 1: the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by
- 23:33Speaker 1: its collision with air. End quote and footnote. Even quotes
- 23:40Speaker 1: accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the
- 23:45Speaker 1: difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was
- 23:51Speaker 1: true in all its factual. Particulars under such a rule
- 23:56Speaker 1: would be critics of official conduct may be deterred from
- 24:00Speaker 1: voicing their criticism even though it is believed to be true,
- 24:04Speaker 1: and even though it is in fact true, because of
- 24:08Speaker 1: doubt whether it can be proved in courte or fear
- 24:11Speaker 1: of the expense of having to do so, they tend
- 24:15Speaker 1: to make only statements which quote steer far wider of
- 24:20Speaker 1: the unlawful zone end quote. The rule thus dampens the
- 24:24Speaker 1: vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is
- 24:30Speaker 1: inconsistent with the First and fourteenth Amendments. The Constitutional Guarantees require,
- 24:37Speaker 1: we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official
- 24:41Speaker 1: from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
- 24:47Speaker 1: official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
- 24:52Speaker 1: with quote actual malice end quote, that is, with knowledge
- 24:58Speaker 1: that it was false, or with reckless disregard of whether
- 25:02Speaker 1: it was false or not. An oft cited statement of
- 25:07Speaker 1: a like rule, which has been adopted by a number
- 25:10Speaker 1: of state courts, is found in the Kansas case of
- 25:15Speaker 1: Coleman versus McClelland, seventy eight Kansas seven eleven, ninety eight,
- 25:21Speaker 1: Page two eighty one, nineteen hundred and eight, the state
- 25:26Speaker 1: Attorney General, a candidate for re election, and a member
- 25:30Speaker 1: of the commission charged with the management and control of
- 25:34Speaker 1: the state school fund, sued a newspaper publisher for alleged
- 25:38Speaker 1: libel in an article purporting to state facts relating to
- 25:42Speaker 1: his official conduct in connection with a school fund transaction.
- 25:47Speaker 1: The defendant pleaded privilege, and the trial judge, over the
- 25:51Speaker 1: plaintiff's objection, instructed the jury that quote, where an article
- 25:58Speaker 1: is published and circulated among voters for the sole purpose
- 26:02Speaker 1: of giving what the defendant believes to be truthful information
- 26:06Speaker 1: concerning a candidate for public office, and for the purpose
- 26:11Speaker 1: of enabling such voters to cast their ballot more intelligently,
- 26:16Speaker 1: and the whole thing is done in good faith and
- 26:19Speaker 1: without malice, the article is privileged, although the principal matters
- 26:24Speaker 1: contained in the article may be untrue in fact and
- 26:28Speaker 1: derogatory to the character of the plaintiff, and in such
- 26:33Speaker 1: a case, the burden is on the plaintiff to show
- 26:36Speaker 1: actual malice in the publication of the article. In answer
- 26:43Speaker 1: to a special question, the jury found that the plaintiff
- 26:46Speaker 1: had not proved actual malice, and a general verdict was
- 26:50Speaker 1: returned for the defendant on appeal the Supreme Court of Kansas,
- 26:56Speaker 1: in an opinion of Justice Birch, reasoned as follows, it
- 27:03Speaker 1: is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss
- 27:07Speaker 1: the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The
- 27:13Speaker 1: importance to the state and to society of such discussions
- 27:17Speaker 1: is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great
- 27:21Speaker 1: that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons
- 27:26Speaker 1: whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the
- 27:31Speaker 1: reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare. Although
- 27:36Speaker 1: at times such injury may be great, the public benefit
- 27:42Speaker 1: from publicity is so great and the chance of injury
- 27:46Speaker 1: to private character so small, that such discussion must be privileged.
- 27:51Speaker 1: And the Court thus sustained the trial court's instruction as
- 27:58Speaker 1: a correct statement of the law, saying quote. In such
- 28:03Speaker 1: a case, the occasion gives rise to a privilege qualified
- 28:07Speaker 1: to this extent. Anyone claiming to be defamed by the
- 28:11Speaker 1: communication must show actual malice or go remediless. This privilege
- 28:18Speaker 1: extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters
- 28:22Speaker 1: of public concern. Public men and candidates for office end quote.
- 28:31Speaker 1: Such a privilege of criticism of official conduct is appropriately
- 28:36Speaker 1: analogous to the protection afforded a public official when he
- 28:41Speaker 1: is sued for libel by a private citizen. Footnote. The
- 28:47Speaker 1: privilege immunizing honest misstatements of fact is often referred to
- 28:53Speaker 1: as a quote conditional end quote privilege to distinguish it
- 28:58Speaker 1: from the quote absolute end quote privilege recognized in judicial, legislative, administrative,
- 29:07Speaker 1: and executive proceedings and footnote. In bar v Matio, this
- 29:16Speaker 1: court held the utterance of a federal official to be
- 29:19Speaker 1: absolutely privileged if made quote within the outer perimeter end
- 29:25Speaker 1: quote of his duties. The States accord the same immunity
- 29:30Speaker 1: to statements of their highest officers, although some differentiate their
- 29:35Speaker 1: lesser officials and qualify the privilege they enjoy, but all
- 29:41Speaker 1: hold that all officials are protected unless actual malice can
- 29:46Speaker 1: be proved. The reason for the official privilege is said
- 29:50Speaker 1: to be that the threat of damage suits would otherwise
- 29:54Speaker 1: quote inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies
- 30:00Speaker 1: of government end and quote dampen the ardor of all
- 30:07Speaker 1: but the most resolute or the most irresponsible in the
- 30:11Speaker 1: unflinching discharge of their duties. End quote. Analogous consideration support
- 30:18Speaker 1: the privilege. For the citizen critic of government, it is
- 30:23Speaker 1: as much his duty to criticize as it is the
- 30:27Speaker 1: official's duty to administer. As Madison said, quote, the censorial
- 30:35Speaker 1: power is in the people over the government, and not
- 30:38Speaker 1: in the government over the people. End quote. It would
- 30:43Speaker 1: give public servants an unjustified preference over the public they
- 30:48Speaker 1: serve if critics of official conduct did not have a
- 30:52Speaker 1: fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves.
- 30:58Speaker 1: We conclude that such a privilege is required by the
- 31:01Speaker 1: First and fourteenth Amendments. Se three. We hold today that
- 31:09Speaker 1: the Constitution delimits a state's power to award damages for
- 31:13Speaker 1: libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of
- 31:18Speaker 1: their official conduct. Since this is such an action, the
- 31:23Speaker 1: rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable. While Alabama
- 31:29Speaker 1: law apparently requires proof of actual malice for an award
- 31:34Speaker 1: of punitive damages, where general damages are concerned, malice is
- 31:40Speaker 1: quote presumed end quote. Such a presumption is inconsistent with
- 31:46Speaker 1: the federal rule. Quote. The power to create presumptions is
- 31:51Speaker 1: not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions. End quote quote.
- 31:58Speaker 1: The showing of malice required for the forfeiture of the
- 32:02Speaker 1: privilege is not presumed, but is a matter for proof
- 32:06Speaker 1: by the plaintiff. End quote footnote. We have no occasion
- 32:12Speaker 1: here to determine how far down into the lower ranks
- 32:16Speaker 1: of government employees the quote public official end quote designation
- 32:22Speaker 1: would extend for the purpose of this rule, or otherwise
- 32:25Speaker 1: to specify categories of persons who would or would not
- 32:30Speaker 1: be included. Nor need we here determine the boundaries of
- 32:34Speaker 1: the quote official conduct in quote concept. It is enough
- 32:40Speaker 1: for the present case that respondent's position as an elected
- 32:44Speaker 1: city commissioner clearly made him a public official, and that
- 32:48Speaker 1: the allegations in the advertisement concerned what was allegedly is
- 32:52Speaker 1: official conduct as commissioner in charge of the police department.
- 32:58Speaker 1: As to the statement's alleging the assaulting of doctor King
- 33:02Speaker 1: and the bombing of his home, it is a material
- 33:04Speaker 1: that they might not be considered to involve respondent's official
- 33:08Speaker 1: conduct if he himself had been accused of perpetrating the
- 33:12Speaker 1: assaulting and the bombing. Respondent does not claim that the
- 33:17Speaker 1: statements charged him personally with these acts. His contention is
- 33:22Speaker 1: that the advertisement connects him with them only in his
- 33:26Speaker 1: official capacity as the commissioner supervising the police, on the
- 33:31Speaker 1: theory that the police might be equated with the quote
- 33:36Speaker 1: they end quote who did the bombing and the assault. Thus,
- 33:42Speaker 1: if these allegations can be read as referring to respondent
- 33:46Speaker 1: at all, they must be read as describing his performance
- 33:50Speaker 1: of his official duties and footnote footnote. Thus, the trial
- 33:58Speaker 1: judge here instructed jury that mere negligence or carelessness is
- 34:04Speaker 1: not evidence of actual malice or malice. In fact, it
- 34:08Speaker 1: does not justify an award of exemplary or punitive damages
- 34:13Speaker 1: in an action for libel. The court refused, however, to
- 34:19Speaker 1: give the following instruction, which had been requested by The Times. Quote.
- 34:25Speaker 1: I charge you that punitive damages, as the name indicates,
- 34:29Speaker 1: are designed to punish the defendant, the New York Times Company,
- 34:34Speaker 1: a corporation, and the other defendants in this case. And
- 34:38Speaker 1: I further charge you that such punitive damages may be
- 34:42Speaker 1: awarded only in the event that you, the jury, are
- 34:46Speaker 1: convinced by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the
- 34:50Speaker 1: defendant was motivated by personal ill will. That is, actual
- 34:55Speaker 1: intent to do the plaintiff harm, or that the defendant
- 34:59Speaker 1: was guilty of of gross negligence and recklessness and not
- 35:03Speaker 1: of just ordinary negligence or carelessness in publishing the matter
- 35:09Speaker 1: complained of, so as to indicate a wanton disregard to
- 35:14Speaker 1: plaintiff's rights. The trial court's err in failing to require
- 35:21Speaker 1: any finding of actual malice for an award of general
- 35:24Speaker 1: damages makes it unnecessary for us to consider the sufficiency
- 35:29Speaker 1: under the Federal standard of the instructions regarding actual malice
- 35:34Speaker 1: that were given as to punitive damages and footnote. Since
- 35:41Speaker 1: the trial judge did not instruct a jury to differentiate
- 35:45Speaker 1: between general and punitive damages, it may be that the
- 35:49Speaker 1: verdict was wholly in a word of one or the other,
- 35:53Speaker 1: but it is impossible to know in view of the
- 35:56Speaker 1: general verdict returned. Because of this uncertainty, the judgment must
- 36:01Speaker 1: be reversed and the case remanded. Since respondent may seek
- 36:08Speaker 1: a new trial, we deem that considerations of effective judicial
- 36:13Speaker 1: administration require us to review the evidence in the present
- 36:17Speaker 1: record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment
- 36:22Speaker 1: for a respondent. This court's duty is not limited to
- 36:27Speaker 1: the elaboration of constitutional principles, we must also, in proper cases,
- 36:32Speaker 1: review the evidence to make certain that those principles have
- 36:36Speaker 1: been constitutionally applied. This is such a case, particularly since
- 36:42Speaker 1: the question is one of alleged trespass across quote the
- 36:47Speaker 1: line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately
- 36:54Speaker 1: be regulated end. In cases where the line must be
- 36:59Speaker 1: drun on, the rule is that we quote examined for
- 37:03Speaker 1: our selves the statements in issue and the circumstances under
- 37:08Speaker 1: which they were made, to see whether they are of
- 37:11Speaker 1: a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as
- 37:15Speaker 1: adopted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
- 37:19Speaker 1: protect end quote. We must quote make an independent examination
- 37:26Speaker 1: of the whole record end quote, so as to assure
- 37:30Speaker 1: ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion
- 37:36Speaker 1: on the field of free expression. Footnote. The Seventh Amendment
- 37:43Speaker 1: does not, as responding contends, preclude such an examination by
- 37:48Speaker 1: this court that amendment providing that quote, no fact tried
- 37:54Speaker 1: by a jury shall be otherwise re examined in any
- 37:58Speaker 1: court of the United States. Then, according to the rules
- 38:01Speaker 1: of the common law end is applicable to state cases
- 38:07Speaker 1: coming here, but its ban on re examination of facts
- 38:12Speaker 1: does not preclude us from determining whether governing rules of
- 38:16Speaker 1: federal law have been properly applied to the facts. Quote.
- 38:21Speaker 1: This Court will review the finding of facts by a
- 38:25Speaker 1: state court where a conclusion of law as to a
- 38:28Speaker 1: federal right and a finding a fact are so intermingled
- 38:33Speaker 1: as to make it necessary in order to pass upon
- 38:36Speaker 1: the federal question to analyze the facts and footnote. Applying
- 38:45Speaker 1: these standards, we consider that the proof presented to show
- 38:48Speaker 1: actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands,
- 38:55Speaker 1: and hints that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment
- 38:59Speaker 1: for respondent under the proper rule of law. The case
- 39:04Speaker 1: of the individual petitioners requires little discussion. Even assuming that
- 39:09Speaker 1: they could constitutionally be found to have authorized the use
- 39:13Speaker 1: of their names on the advertisement, there is no evidence
- 39:17Speaker 1: whatever that they were aware of any erroneous statements or
- 39:21Speaker 1: were in any way reckless in that regard. The judgment
- 39:25Speaker 1: against them is thus without constitutional support. As to the Times,
- 39:32Speaker 1: we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a
- 39:36Speaker 1: finding of actual malice. The statement by the Times secretary
- 39:41Speaker 1: that apart from the padlocking allegation he thought the advertisement
- 39:46Speaker 1: was quote substantially correct endo affords no constitutional warrant for
- 39:52Speaker 1: the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusion that it was a quote
- 39:57Speaker 1: cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement, from which
- 40:02Speaker 1: the jury could not have but been impressed with the
- 40:06Speaker 1: bad faith of the Times and its maliciousness inferable therefrom
- 40:13Speaker 1: end quote. The statement does not indicate malice at the
- 40:18Speaker 1: time of the publication, even if the advertisement was not
- 40:22Speaker 1: quote substantially correct end quote. Although the respondent's own proof
- 40:29Speaker 1: tend to show that it was. That opinion was at
- 40:32Speaker 1: least a reasonable one, and there was no evidence to
- 40:35Speaker 1: impeach the witness's good faith in holding it. The Times
- 40:40Speaker 1: of failure to retract upon Respondent's demand, although it later
- 40:44Speaker 1: retracted upon the demand of Governor Patterson, is likewise not
- 40:50Speaker 1: adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes. Whether or not
- 40:55Speaker 1: a failure to retract may ever constitute such evidence, there
- 41:00Speaker 1: are two reasons why it does not hear. First, the
- 41:04Speaker 1: letter written by The Times reflected a reasonable doubt on
- 41:08Speaker 1: its part as to whether the advertisement could reasonably be
- 41:12Speaker 1: taken to refer to respondent at all. Second, it was
- 41:16Speaker 1: not a final refusal, since it asked for an explanation
- 41:21Speaker 1: on this point, a request that Respondent chose to ignore.
- 41:26Speaker 1: Nor does the retraction upon the demand of the governor
- 41:30Speaker 1: supply the necessary proof. It may be doubted that a
- 41:34Speaker 1: failure to retract, which is not itself evidence of malice,
- 41:39Speaker 1: can retroactively become such by virtue of a retraction subsequently
- 41:44Speaker 1: made to another party. But in any event, that did
- 41:49Speaker 1: not happen here, since the explanation given by The Times
- 41:52Speaker 1: a secretary for the distinction drawn between respondent and the
- 41:57Speaker 1: Governor was a reasonable one, the good faith of which
- 42:01Speaker 1: was not impeached. Finally, there is evidence that The Times
- 42:06Speaker 1: published the advertisement without checking its accuracy against the news
- 42:10Speaker 1: stories of the Times his own files. The mere presence
- 42:14Speaker 1: of the stories in the files does not, of course,
- 42:17Speaker 1: establish that the Times quote knew end quote the advertisement
- 42:22Speaker 1: was fouse, since the state of mind required for actual
- 42:26Speaker 1: malice would have to be brought home to the persons
- 42:29Speaker 1: in the Times's organization having responsibility for the publication of
- 42:35Speaker 1: the advertisement. With respect to the failure of those persons
- 42:40Speaker 1: who make the check, the record shows that they relied
- 42:43Speaker 1: upon their knowledge of the good reputation of many of
- 42:47Speaker 1: those whose names were listed as sponsors of the advertisement,
- 42:52Speaker 1: and upon the letter from a Philip Randolph, known to
- 42:56Speaker 1: them as a responsible individual, certifying that the use of
- 43:00Speaker 1: the names was authorized, there was testimony that the person's
- 43:06Speaker 1: handling the advertisement saw nothing in it that would render
- 43:09Speaker 1: it unacceptable under the times as policy of rejecting advertisements
- 43:15Speaker 1: containing quote attacks of a personal character end quote. Their
- 43:21Speaker 1: failure to reject it on this ground was not unreasonable.
- 43:26Speaker 1: We think that the evidence against The Times supports at
- 43:30Speaker 1: most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements,
- 43:35Speaker 1: and is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is
- 43:40Speaker 1: required for a finding of actual malice. We also think
- 43:45Speaker 1: the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect, it was
- 43:51Speaker 1: incapable of supporting the juries finding that the alleged liable
- 43:56Speaker 1: statements were made quote of and concerning end respondent. Respondent
- 44:04Speaker 1: relies on the words of the advertisement and the testimony
- 44:08Speaker 1: of six witnesses to establish a connection between it and himself. Thus,
- 44:14Speaker 1: in his brief to this court, he states quote the
- 44:17Speaker 1: reference to respondent as police commissioner is clear from the
- 44:22Speaker 1: ad In addition, the jury heard the testimony of a
- 44:26Speaker 1: newspaper editor, a real estate and insurance man, the sales
- 44:31Speaker 1: manager of a men's clothing store, a food equipment man,
- 44:35Speaker 1: a service station operator, and the operator of a truck
- 44:40Speaker 1: line for whom Respondent had formerly worked. Each of these
- 44:44Speaker 1: witnesses stated that he associated the statements with respondent end quote.
- 44:51Speaker 1: There was no reference to respondent in the advertisement, either
- 44:55Speaker 1: by name or official position. A number of the allegedly
- 45:00Speaker 1: libelist statements, the charges that the dining hall was padlocked
- 45:04Speaker 1: and that doctor King's home was bombed, his person assaulted,
- 45:08Speaker 1: and a perjury prosecution instituted against him, did not even
- 45:13Speaker 1: concern the police. Despite the ingenuity of the arguments which
- 45:17Speaker 1: would attach his significance to the word quote they end,
- 45:24Speaker 1: it is clained that these statements could not reasonably be
- 45:28Speaker 1: read as accusing respondent of personal involvement in the acts
- 45:32Speaker 1: in question. The statement upon which Respondent principally relies as
- 45:38Speaker 1: referring to him are the two allegations that did concern
- 45:42Speaker 1: the police or police functions. That quote, truckloads of police
- 45:48Speaker 1: ringed the Alabama State College campus ended after the demonstration
- 45:54Speaker 1: on the state capital steps, and that doctor King had
- 45:58Speaker 1: been quote arrested seven times end quote. These statements were
- 46:04Speaker 1: false only in that the police had been quote deployed
- 46:08Speaker 1: near end quote the campus, but had not actually quote
- 46:13Speaker 1: ringed end quote it and had not gone there in
- 46:17Speaker 1: connection with the state capital demonstration, and in that doctor
- 46:21Speaker 1: King had been arrested only four times. The ruling that
- 46:25Speaker 1: these discrepancies between what was true and what was asserted
- 46:29Speaker 1: were sufficient to injure Respondent's reputation may itself raise constitutional problems,
- 46:36Speaker 1: but we need not consider them here. Although the statements
- 46:41Speaker 1: may be taken as referring to the police, they did not,
- 46:44Speaker 1: on their faith, make even an oblique reference to Respondent
- 46:48Speaker 1: as an individual. Support for asserted reference must therefore be
- 46:54Speaker 1: sought in the testimony of respondents witnesses, But none of
- 46:58Speaker 1: them suggested any basis for the belief that Responded himself
- 47:02Speaker 1: was attacked in the advertisement, beyond the bare fact that
- 47:06Speaker 1: he was in overall charge of the police department and
- 47:10Speaker 1: thus boro official responsibility for police conduct. To the extent
- 47:16Speaker 1: that some of the witnesses thought Respondent to have been
- 47:19Speaker 1: charged with ordering or approving the conduct, or otherwise being
- 47:24Speaker 1: personally involved in it. They based this notion not on
- 47:28Speaker 1: any statements in the advertisement, and not on any evidence
- 47:33Speaker 1: that he had in fact been so involved, but solely
- 47:37Speaker 1: on the unsupported assumption that, because of his official position,
- 47:42Speaker 1: he must have been. This reliance on the bare fact
- 47:46Speaker 1: of respondent's official position was made explicit by the Supreme
- 47:51Speaker 1: Court of Alabama. That court, in holding that the trial
- 47:55Speaker 1: court quote did not err in overruling the demurror of
- 48:00Speaker 1: the Times in the aspect of the libelous matter was
- 48:04Speaker 1: not of and concerning the plaintiff end based its ruling
- 48:09Speaker 1: on the proposition that quote, we think it common knowledge
- 48:14Speaker 1: that the average person knows that municipal agents such as
- 48:18Speaker 1: police and firemen and others, are under the control and
- 48:22Speaker 1: direction of the city governing body, and more particularly under
- 48:27Speaker 1: the direction and control of a single commissioner. In measuring
- 48:31Speaker 1: the performance or deficiencies of such groups, praise or criticism
- 48:37Speaker 1: is usually attached to the official incomplete control of the body.
- 48:42Speaker 1: End quote. This proposition has disquieting implications for criticism of
- 48:50Speaker 1: governmental conduct. For good reason. Quote. No courte of last
- 48:56Speaker 1: resort in this country has ever held, or even suggests did,
- 49:00Speaker 1: that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in
- 49:05Speaker 1: the American system of jurisprudence end quote. The present proposition
- 49:13Speaker 1: would sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criticism of government, however
- 49:19Speaker 1: impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism
- 49:24Speaker 1: and hence potential libel of the officials of whom the
- 49:28Speaker 1: government is composed. There is no legal alchemy by which
- 49:33Speaker 1: a state may thus create the cause of action that
- 49:37Speaker 1: would otherwise be denied for a publication which has Respondent
- 49:41Speaker 1: himself said of the advertisement quote reflects not only on me,
- 49:47Speaker 1: but on the other commissioners and the community. End reason.
- 49:53Speaker 1: As it does the possibility that a good faith critic
- 49:57Speaker 1: of government will be penalized for or his criticism. The
- 50:02Speaker 1: proposition relied on by the Alabama Court strikes at the
- 50:06Speaker 1: very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression footnote.
- 50:15Speaker 1: Insofar as the proposition means only that the statements about
- 50:19Speaker 1: police conduct libeled respondent by implicitly criticizing his ability to
- 50:25Speaker 1: run the police department, recovery is also precluded in this
- 50:31Speaker 1: case by the doctrine of fair comment. Since the Fourteenth
- 50:35Speaker 1: Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements
- 50:42Speaker 1: of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment
- 50:47Speaker 1: must be afforded for honest expression of opinion based upon
- 50:51Speaker 1: privileged as well as true statements of fact. Both defenses
- 50:56Speaker 1: are of course defeasible if the public official proves actual malice,
- 51:03Speaker 1: as was not done here and footnote. We hold that
- 51:10Speaker 1: such a proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish
- 51:15Speaker 1: that an otherwise impersonal attack on government operations was a
- 51:20Speaker 1: liable of any official responsible for those operations. Since it
- 51:25Speaker 1: was relied on exclusively here and there was no other
- 51:29Speaker 1: evidence to connect the statements with respondent, the evidence was
- 51:34Speaker 1: constitutionally insufficient to support a finding that the statements referred
- 51:39Speaker 1: to respondent. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama
- 51:44Speaker 1: is reversed and the case is remanded to that court
- 51:48Speaker 1: for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and
- 51:54Speaker 1: remanded end of Section twenty two y