Latest / The Philosophy Insights Collection / 02 Part 1 - What Pragmatism Means - Pragmatism - William James
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- 0:00Lecture two what pragmatism means. Some years ago, being with a camping party
- 0:07in the mountains, I returned from a solitary ramble to find every one engaged
- 0:12in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel,
- 0:18A live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree trunk,
- 0:23while over against the other trees opposite side. A human being was imagined to
- 0:28stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly
- 0:35round the tree. But no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel knows
- 0:39as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and
- 0:45the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant
- 0:49metaphysical problem now is this, does the man go round the squirrel or not?
- 0:57He goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on
- 1:00the tree. But does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure
- 1:07of the wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. Every one had taken signs
- 1:11and was obstinate, and the numbers on both signs were even each side when
- 1:18I appeared. Therefore, appealed to me to make it a majority. Mindful
- 1:23of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction, you must make a
- 1:27distinction, I immediately sought and found one. As follows. Which party is
- 1:34right, I said, depends on what you practically mean by going round the
- 1:40squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east,
- 1:44then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north
- 1:48of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies
- 1:53these successive positions. But if, on the contrary, you mean being first
- 1:57in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him,
- 2:01then on his left, and finally front again, it is quite as
- 2:06obvious that the man fails to go round him, for by the compensating movements
- 2:10the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time,
- 2:15and his back turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no
- 2:21occasion for any further dispute. You are both right and both wrong, according
- 2:27as you conceive the verb to go round in one practical fashion or the other.
- 2:32Although one or two of the Hotter disputants called my speech a shuffling evasion,
- 2:38saying they wanted no quibbling or scholastic hair splitting, but meant just plain
- 2:42honest English round The majority seemed to think that the distinction had assuaged the dispute.
- 2:50I tell this trivial anecdote because it is a peculiarly simple example of what
- 2:54I wish now to speak of as the pragmatic method. The pragmatic method is
- 3:00primarily a method of settling metaphysical dispute that otherwise might be interminable. Is the
- 3:07world one or many? Fated or free? Material or spiritual? Here are
- 3:15notions, either of which may or may not hold good of the world,
- 3:19and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is
- 3:25to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference
- 3:34would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true.
- 3:39If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically
- 3:46the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious,
- 3:52we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from
- 3:55one side or the others being right. A glance at the history of the
- 4:00idea will show you still better what pragmatism means. The term is derived from
- 4:06the same Greek word pi row alpha gammamu alpha, meaning action, from which
- 4:14our words practice and practical come. It was first introduced into philosophy by mister
- 4:21Charles Perce in eighteen hundred and seventy eight in an article entitled how to make
- 4:29our Ideas Clear in the Popular Science Monthly for January of that year. Footnote
- 4:35translated in the Review Philosophy for January eighteen hundred seventy nine, volume seven.
- 4:44Mister Piers, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action,
- 4:48said that to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it
- 4:54is fitted to produce. That conduct is for us its soul significant, and
- 5:00the tangible fact at the root of all our thought distinctions, however subtle,
- 5:06is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything
- 5:11but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of
- 5:17an object, then we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind
- 5:23the object may involve, What sensations we are to expect from it, and
- 5:29what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or
- 5:35remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object,
- 5:41so far as that conception has positive significance at all. This is the principle
- 5:47of purse, the principle of pragmatism. It lay entirely unnoticed by anyone for
- 5:55twenty years until I, in an address before Professor Howinson's Philosophy Union at the
- 6:00University of California, brought it forward again and made a special application of it
- 6:05to religion. By that date eighteen hundred and ninety eight, the time seemed
- 6:12ripe for its reception. The word pragmatism spread, and at present it fairly
- 6:17spots the pages of philosophic journals. On all hands. We find the pragmatic
- 6:24movement spoken of, sometimes with respect, sometimes with contumely, seldom with clear
- 6:30understanding. It is evident that the term applies itself conveniently to a number of
- 6:35tendencies that hitherto have lacked a collective name, and that it has come to
- 6:42stay. To take in the importance of Percy's principle, one must get accustomed
- 6:47to applying it to concrete cases. I found a few years ago that Ostwald,
- 6:53the illustrious Leipzig chemist, had been making perfectly distinct use of the principle
- 6:59of pragmaty in his lectures on the philosophy of science, though he had not
- 7:03called it by that name. All realities influence our practice, he wrote me,
- 7:11and that influence is their meaning for us. I am accustomed to put
- 7:15questions to my classes in this way, in what respects would the world be
- 7:19different if this alternative or that were true. If I can find nothing that
- 7:26would become different, then the alternative has no sense. That is, their
- 7:31rival views mean practically the same thing, and meaning other than practical, there
- 7:38is for us none. Ostwald, in a published lecture, gives this example
- 7:44of what he means. Chemists have long wrangled over the inner constitution of certain
- 7:49bodies called toutomeros. Their properties seemed equally consistent with the notion that an instable
- 7:58hydrogen atom of us inside of them, or that they are instable mixtures of
- 8:03two bodies. Controversy raged, but never was decided. It would never have
- 8:09begun, says Ostwald, if the combatants had asked themselves what particular experimental fact
- 8:16could have been made different by one or the other view being correct, for
- 8:22it would then have appeared that no difference of fact could possibly ensue, and
- 8:28the quarrel was as unreal as if theorizing in primitive times about the raising of
- 8:33dough by yeast, one party should have invoked a brownie, while another insisted
- 8:39in elf as the true cause of the phenomenon footnote theory und praxis, zeit
- 8:46shift dis uster reichichan echeneur on the Architect and Foreighness, nineteen hundred and five,
- 8:54Number four, Volume six. I find a still more radical pragmatism than
- 9:01Ostwald's in an address by Professor W. S. Franklin. I think that
- 9:05the sicklest notion of physics, even if a student gets it, is that
- 9:11it is the science of masses, molecules, and the ether. And I
- 9:16think that the healthiest notion, even if a student does not wholly get it,
- 9:20is that physics is the science of the ways of taking hold of bodies
- 9:26and pushing them science January Tewod, nineteen hundred and three. It is astonishing
- 9:33to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the moment you subject him to
- 9:39this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can be no difference anywhere
- 9:46that doesn't make a difference elsewhere, no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express
- 9:52itself in a difference in concrete fact, and in conduct consequence upon that fact
- 9:58imposed on somebody, some how, somewhere and some when. The whole function
- 10:03of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to
- 10:07you and me a definite instance of our life, if this world formula or
- 10:13that world formula be the true one. There is absolutely nothing new in the
- 10:20pragmatic method. Socrates was an adept at it, Aristotle used it methodically.
- 10:26Locke, Berkeley, and Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means.
- 10:31Shadworth Hodgen keeps insisting that realities are only what they are known as. But
- 10:39these forerunners of pragmatism used it in fragments. They were preluders. Only not
- 10:46until in our time has it generalized itself, become conscious of our universal mission,
- 10:52pretended to a conquering destiny. I believe in that destiny, and I
- 10:58hope I may aim by inspiring you with my belief pragmatism represent a perfectly familiar
- 11:05attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude. But it represents it as it seems
- 11:13to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than
- 11:18it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns it back resolutely and once for
- 11:24all, upon a lot of invertate habits. Dear to professional philosophers. He
- 11:31turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori
- 11:39reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins.
- 11:46He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards
- 11:56power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up.
- 12:05It means the open air and possibilities of nature as against dogma, artificiality,
- 12:11and the pretense of finality in truth. At the same time, it
- 12:16does not stand for any special results. It is a method only, but
- 12:22the general triumph of that method would mean an enormous change in what I have
- 12:28called in my last lecture the temperament of philosophy. Teachers of the ultra rationalistic
- 12:33type would be frozen out, much as the quartier type is frozen out in
- 12:39republics, as the ultramontane type of priest is frozen out in Protestant lands.
- 12:46Science and metaphysics would come much nearer together, would in fact work absolutely hand
- 12:52in hand. Metaphysics has usually followed a very primitive kind of quest. You
- 12:58know how men have always hankered after unlawful magic, and you know what a
- 13:03great part in magic words have always played. If you have his name or
- 13:09the formula of incantation that binds him, you can control the spirit, genie,
- 13:16afrite, or whatever the power may be. Solomon knew the names of
- 13:20all the spirits, and having their names, he held them subject to his
- 13:24will. So the universe has always appeared to the natural mind as a kind
- 13:30of enigma which the key must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or
- 13:35power bringing word or name. That word names the universe's principle, And to
- 13:43possess it is, after a fashion, to possess the universe itself, God,
- 13:50matter, reason, the absolute energy. Are so many solving names you
- 13:58can rest when you have them. You are at the end of your metaphysical
- 14:01quest. But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any
- 14:07such word as closing your quest. You must bring out of each word its
- 14:13practical cache value, set it at work within the stream of your experience.
- 14:20It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program for more
- 14:24work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities
- 14:31may be changed. Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which
- 14:39we can rest. We don't lie back upon them. We move forward,
- 14:46and on occasion make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all our
- 14:54theories, limbers them up, and sets each one at work. Being not
- 15:00thing essentially new, It hormonizes with many ancient philosophic tendencies. It agrees with
- 15:07nominalism, for instance in always appealing to particulars, with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical
- 15:15aspects, with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions, and
- 15:22metaphysical abstractions. All these, you see, are anti intellectualist tendencies against rationalism
- 15:31as a pretension and a method. Pragmatism is fully armed and militant, but
- 15:37at the outset at least it stands for no particular results. It has no
- 15:43dogmas and no doctrines save its method. As the young Italian pragmatist Papinas well
- 15:50said, it lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in
- 15:54a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find
- 16:00a man writing on an atheistic volume. In the next, someone on his
- 16:07knees praying for faith and strength. In a third, a chemist investigating our
- 16:11body's properties. In a fourth, a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated.
- 16:18In a fifth, the impossibility of metaphysics is being shown. But they
- 16:23all own the corridor, and all must pause through it if they want a
- 16:30practical way of getting into or out of their respective rooms. No particular results
- 16:36then, so far, but only an attitude of orientation is what the pragmatic
- 16:41method means, the attitude of looking away from first things principles, categories,
- 16:48supposed necessities, and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.
- 16:57So much for the pragmatic method. You may say that I have been
- 17:02praising it rather than explaining it to you, But I shall presently explain it
- 17:06abundantly enough by showing how it works on some familiar problems. Meanwhile, the
- 17:11word pragmatism has come to be used in a still wider sense, as meaning
- 17:15also a certain theory of truth. I mean to give a whole lecture to
- 17:21the statement of that theory, after first paving the way. So I can
- 17:25be very brief now, But brevity is hard to follow. So I ask
- 17:29for your redoubled attention for a quarter of an hour. If much remains obscure,
- 17:34I hope to make it clearer in the later lectures. One of the
- 17:38most successfully cultivated branches of philosophy in our time is what is called inductive logic,
- 17:47the study of the condition under which our sciences have evolved. Writers on
- 17:52this subject have begun to show a singular unanimity as to what the laws of
- 17:57nature and elements of fact mean when formulated by mathematicians, physicists, and chemists.
- 18:06When the first mathematical, logical and natural uniformities the first laws were discovered,
- 18:12men were so carried away by the clearness, beauty, and simplification that
- 18:18resulted that they believed themselves to have deciphered authentically the eternal thoughts of the Almighty
- 18:26his mind. Also thundered and reverberated in syllogisms. He also thought in conic
- 18:33sections, squares and roots and rages, and geometrized like Euclid. He made
- 18:40velocity increase proportionally to the time in falling bodies. He made the law of
- 18:45the science for light to obey when refracted. He established the classes orders,
- 18:52families and genera, or plants and animals, and fixed the distances between them,
- 19:00thought the archetypes of all things, and devised their variations. And when
- 19:04we rediscover any one of these his wondrous institutions, we seize his mind in
- 19:11its very literal intention. But as the sciences have developed further, the notion
- 19:18has gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations.
- 19:26The laws themselves, moreover, have grown so numerous that there is no
- 19:30counting them, and so many rival formulations are proposed in all the branches of
- 19:37science that investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a
- 19:42transcript of reality, but that any one of them may, from some point
- 19:48of view, be useful. Their great use is to summarize old facts and
- 19:53to lead to new ones. They are only a man made language are conceptual
- 20:00shorthand, as someone calls them, in which we write our reports of nature,
- 20:06and languages, as is well known, tolerate much choice of expression and
- 20:11many dialects. Thus, human arbitrariness has driven divine necessity from scientific logic.
- 20:18If I mention the names of Sigwart, mach Ostwald, Pearson, Milhard,
- 20:25poincreduham Raisin, those of you who are students will easily identify the tendency I
- 20:30speak of, and will think of additional names. Writing now on the front
- 20:37of this wave of scientific logic, misters Schiller and Dewey appear with their pragmatistic
- 20:41account of what truth everywhere signifies. Everywhere these teachers say, truth in our
- 20:49ideas and believes means the same thing that it means in science, it means.
- 20:56They say nothing but this that idea, which themselves are but parts of
- 21:03our experience, become true just in so far as they help us to get
- 21:07into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, to summarize them and get
- 21:15about among them by conceptual shortcuts, instead of following the interminable succession of particular
- 21:22phenomena, Any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part or our
- 21:29experience, to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying,
- 21:37saving labor is true for just so much, true in so far forth
- 21:44true instrumentally. This is the instrumental view of truth taught so successfully at Chicago,
- 21:52the view that truth in our ideas means their power to work, promulgated
- 21:56so brilliantly at Oxford. Mister Dewey, Schiller and their allies in reaching this
- 22:03general conception of all truths have only followed the example of geologists, biologists,
- 22:11and philologists. In the establishment of these other sciences. The successful stroke was
- 22:17always to take some simple process, actually observable in operation as denudation by weather,
- 22:25say, or variation from parental type, or change of dialect by incorporation
- 22:30of new words and pronunciations, and then to generalize it, making it apply
- 22:36to all times and produce great results by summating its effects through the ages.
- 22:44The observable process which Schiller and Dewey particularly singled out for generalization is the familiar
- 22:51one by which any individual settles into new opinions. The process here is always
- 22:57the same. The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but it
- 23:03meets a new experience that puts them to strain. Somebody contradicts them, or
- 23:08in a reflective moment, he discovers that they contradict each other, or he
- 23:12hears of facts with which they are incompatible, or desires arise in him which
- 23:19they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward trouble, to which his
- 23:25mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape
- 23:30by modifying his previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as
- 23:36he can, for in this matter of belief, we are all extreme conservatives.
- 23:41So he tries to change first this opinion and then that, for they
- 23:45receeast change very variously, until at last some new idea comes up which he
- 23:52can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter,
- 23:59idea that mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them into one
- 24:04another, most felicitously and expediently. This new idea is then adopted as the
- 24:11true one. It preserves the older stock of truths with a minimum of modification,
- 24:18stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that
- 24:22in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible an outry explanation violating all our
- 24:30preconceptions. Would never pause for a true account of a novelty. We should
- 24:36scratch around industriously till we found something less eccentric. The most violent revolutions in
- 24:42an individual's beliefs leave the most of its old orders standing. Time and space,
- 24:49cause and effect, nature and history, and one's owned biography remain untouched.
- 24:57New truth is always a go between a smoother over of transitions. It
- 25:03marries old opinion to new facts, so as ever to show a minimum of
- 25:08jolt a maximum of continuity. We hold the theory true just in proportion to
- 25:15its success in solving this problem of maxima and minima. But success in solving
- 25:22this problem is eminently a matter of approximation. We say this theory solves it
- 25:27on the whole more satisfactorily than that theory, but that means more satisfactorily to
- 25:34ourselves, and individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently to a certain degree.
- 25:42Therefore, everything here is plastic. The point I now urge you to
- 25:48observe particularly is the part played by the older truths. Failure to take account
- 25:55of it is the source of much of the unjust criticism level against pragmatism.
- 26:02Their influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to them is the first principle. In
- 26:08most cases, it is the only principle, for by far, the most
- 26:12usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make for a serious rearrangement
- 26:18of our preconceptions is to ignore them altogether, or to abuse those who bear
- 26:25witness for them. You doubtless wish examples of this process of truth's growth,
- 26:30and the only trouble is their superabundance. The simplest case of new truth is,
- 26:36of course, the mere numerical addition of new kinds of facts, or
- 26:41a new single facts of all kinds to our experience, an addition that involves
- 26:47no alteration in the old beliefs. Day follows day and its content are simply
- 26:52added. The new contents themselves are not true. They simply come, and
- 26:57are is what we say about them. And when we say that they have
- 27:03come, truth is satisfied by the plain additive formula. But often the day's
- 27:08contents oblige a rearrangement. If I should now utter piercing shrieks and act like
- 27:15a maniac on this platform. It would make many of you revise your ideas
- 27:21as to the probable worth of my philosophy. Radium came the other day as
- 27:26part of the day's content and seemed for a moment to contradict our ideas of
- 27:30the whole order of nature, that order having come to be identified with what
- 27:37is called the conservation of energy. The mere sight of radium paying heat away
- 27:42indefinitely out of its own pocket seemed to violate that conservation. What to think
- 27:51if the radiations from it were nothing but an escape of unsuspected potential energy pre
- 27:57existent inside of the atoms, the principle of conservation would be saved the discovery
- 28:04of helium as the radiation's outcome opened away. To this belief, so Ramsay's
- 28:12view is generally held to be true because although it extends our old ideas of
- 28:18energy, it causes a minimum of alteration in their nature. End of Lecture
- 28:26two, Part one