Latest / Bloomberg Law / Twenty Years Since The Enron Collapse
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- 0:02Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law. Some complicated international law issues here.
- 0:07Speaker 1: What kind of docket is Chief Justice Roberts facing interviews
- 0:11Speaker 1: with prominent attorneys and Bloomberg legal experts. Joining me is
- 0:15Speaker 1: Bloomberg New Supreme Court reporter Greg Store, Neil Devon's a
- 0:18Speaker 1: professor at William and Mary Law School, and analysis of
- 0:21Speaker 1: important legal issues cases in headlocks. This essentially the fifth
- 0:25Speaker 1: circuit haunting he has presided over a so called hot
- 0:29Speaker 1: bench at the Supreme Court. Bloomberg Law with June Grosso
- 0:32Speaker 1: from Bloomberg Radio. Welcome to Bloomberg Law on Bloomberg Radio.
- 0:40Speaker 1: I'm Joe Shorts living for Joan Grosso. This month marked
- 0:44Speaker 1: twenty years since one of the greatest financial collapses in history,
- 0:47Speaker 1: Energy Trading a giant and Ron filed for bankruptcy on
- 0:51Speaker 1: December second, two thousand one, becoming a symbol of corporate
- 0:54Speaker 1: fraud and accounting malpractice. We're going to take you through
- 0:58Speaker 1: the events that led Enron's downfall and talk about the
- 1:02Speaker 1: players involved and what the world has learned since. To begin,
- 1:06Speaker 1: I spoke with ed Her as a professor with the
- 1:08Speaker 1: Economics department at the University of Houston. Ed served as
- 1:11Speaker 1: a consultant to the Justice Department's Enron Task Force. He
- 1:15Speaker 1: talked about the rise of Enron and when suspicions about
- 1:18Speaker 1: their behavior began. Did Enron revolutionize the trading of of
- 1:24Speaker 1: natural gas and electricity? I mean fortune said that they
- 1:27Speaker 1: were the most innovative company for six years running up
- 1:30Speaker 1: to two the year two thousand. Well, they the innovations
- 1:35Speaker 1: they brought to natural gas occurred in the UH nineteen
- 1:40Speaker 1: nineties early nineties. UM. When I came to Houston, one
- 1:46Speaker 1: could buy and sell natural gas and there might be
- 1:49Speaker 1: a delta of cents or even fifty cents between the
- 1:52Speaker 1: bid and the ask. By the time Enron had brought
- 1:56Speaker 1: standardization of contracts of of aquidity in a trading platform
- 2:01Speaker 1: to natural gas, the margins and had had shrunken dramatically
- 2:08Speaker 1: to lessen a penny a contract. And they did this
- 2:11Speaker 1: with electricity. UH, they did this with weather derivatives, heating
- 2:15Speaker 1: days and cooling days. And as everyone in finance knows
- 2:20Speaker 1: that if we have more liquidity and more transparency in
- 2:24Speaker 1: the market, the margins began to shrink. So for Enron
- 2:29Speaker 1: to report ever increasing profits, they would have to trade
- 2:34Speaker 1: ever increasing numbers of contracts for example, and this was
- 2:39Speaker 1: something that that everyone knew could not be sustained. So
- 2:43Speaker 1: Enron's approach was to go look for other markets to
- 2:46Speaker 1: apply this innovation too. They tried with paper companies, They
- 2:51Speaker 1: tried with hydroelectric power in Bolivia. They tried this with
- 2:57Speaker 1: water companies in Brazil. They tried this with power plants
- 3:01Speaker 1: in India, and in each market they found they were
- 3:04Speaker 1: unable to apply the in Ron recipe and create profits.
- 3:10Speaker 1: The challenge was in they had changed their mode of
- 3:15Speaker 1: accounting to mark to market and they began to book
- 3:18Speaker 1: profits on contracts that the we're maybe ten years into
- 3:23Speaker 1: the future. They were they were going to book them
- 3:25Speaker 1: into that financial reporting period. And Ron brought innovation to
- 3:30Speaker 1: the market, but as they tried to extend this to
- 3:33Speaker 1: other markets, they failed and talked to us about the
- 3:37Speaker 1: connection here to the Valhalla scandal. In the late eighties,
- 3:44Speaker 1: and Ron announced a one time fifty million dollar after
- 3:49Speaker 1: tax loss due to a couple of rogue traders up
- 3:54Speaker 1: in New Jersey, New York UH their Valhalla office. UH.
- 3:59Speaker 1: They laid off fifteen hundred workers at the time. My
- 4:03Speaker 1: landlord was a senior vice president who had pushed the
- 4:05Speaker 1: Majabi pipeline project through for en Ron. You know, an
- 4:09Speaker 1: old hard asset guy in the trading circles in Houston
- 4:14Speaker 1: at the time, it was known that that one trader
- 4:17Speaker 1: in particular had taken a big hit. If you if
- 4:21Speaker 1: you just do some back of the envelope math like
- 4:24Speaker 1: we did at the restaurant that night, hundred workers, a
- 4:28Speaker 1: hundred thousand dollars ahead, hundred fifty million a year, one
- 4:31Speaker 1: point five billion over ten years. That was the math
- 4:35Speaker 1: I bet two beers. In two thousand three, the Houston
- 4:39Speaker 1: Chronicle reported that the Valhalla scandal had cost in Ron
- 4:43Speaker 1: about eight hundred and seventy million dollars after tax um
- 4:48Speaker 1: or one point five billion pretexts. So, you know, there
- 4:51Speaker 1: was a history of obfuscation, the history of of covering
- 4:55Speaker 1: up what was really going on. As you look at
- 4:58Speaker 1: how they became the darling of the energy world, how
- 5:02Speaker 1: would you describe that the management team had a cultish
- 5:07Speaker 1: type of environment. Uh and Rod would go to the
- 5:12Speaker 1: big business schools and outdid the Wall Street banks and um.
- 5:16Speaker 1: This of course was during the tech bubble of the
- 5:19Speaker 1: late nineties, and they would outbid the tech companies and
- 5:23Speaker 1: they thought that they had really assembled a team of
- 5:27Speaker 1: the smartest guys in the room, and uh once they
- 5:30Speaker 1: were assembled, they certainly didn't want to to say that
- 5:33Speaker 1: there was a problem that the CEO didn't have any
- 5:36Speaker 1: clothes on. The diligent exercise of end of quarter into
- 5:42Speaker 1: financial uh period transactions that they pursued, you know, really
- 5:50Speaker 1: painted a facade of a company that was growing. But
- 5:54Speaker 1: all of the transactions that they were reporting again dark
- 5:57Speaker 1: fiber water plants in Brazil, um power plants in India,
- 6:04Speaker 1: the the old style utility type earnings were certainly there,
- 6:11Speaker 1: but but not the mega growth. There's no question that
- 6:14Speaker 1: were really brilliant people working at Enron. The problem was
- 6:18Speaker 1: that they had perfected gas trading and electricity trading to
- 6:24Speaker 1: a level that they couldn't generate the profits they used
- 6:27Speaker 1: to do, and as they looked to go further into
- 6:29Speaker 1: different markets, they were flummoxed by the fact that they
- 6:34Speaker 1: they were not successful at hers Lecturer, Department of Economics,
- 6:39Speaker 1: College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the University
- 6:42Speaker 1: of Houston. Appreciate taking time and joining us on Bloomberg Law.
- 6:45Speaker 1: Thank you, Joe. When did the dominoes fall for Enron?
- 6:50Speaker 1: Leslie Caldwell is just the person to ask. She's a
- 6:53Speaker 1: partner with the law firm Latham and Watkins. She was
- 6:56Speaker 1: formerly an Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of
- 7:00Speaker 1: the Justice Department, and she let a team of investigators
- 7:03Speaker 1: and prosecutors in the Department's Enron Task Force. She talked
- 7:07Speaker 1: to me about how Enron's transgressions were uncovered. When we
- 7:11Speaker 1: all hear about Enron and and and it's spectacular collapse,
- 7:16Speaker 1: and how it happened in such a really a short
- 7:18Speaker 1: period of time. From a prosecutor investigators standpoint, this this
- 7:24Speaker 1: essentially this house of card that collapsed. Did that make
- 7:28Speaker 1: it easier to investigate or harder? I wouldn't say it
- 7:32Speaker 1: made it either. It made it more imperative to investigate, because,
- 7:36Speaker 1: as you said, it was a spectacular collapse. Months before
- 7:39Speaker 1: it declared bankruptcy, Enron had been ranked Fortune number seven
- 7:43Speaker 1: in US corporations and suddenly it was gone. So that
- 7:47Speaker 1: suggested some kind of wrongdoing that really made it critical
- 7:52Speaker 1: that there'll be a prompt and thorough investigation. We'll take
- 7:56Speaker 1: us to the early days. What were the first few weeks, Like,
- 7:59Speaker 1: what were you doing? So? And Ron was a very large,
- 8:03Speaker 1: sprawling corporation with a lot of different business lines and
- 8:06Speaker 1: a lot of different interests, and so I guess for
- 8:08Speaker 1: the first couple of weeks, our main goal was to
- 8:10Speaker 1: assemble a team of the right size and kind of
- 8:14Speaker 1: learn the company, understand the company, understand these very complicated
- 8:17Speaker 1: business lines that the company was in. And to get there,
- 8:20Speaker 1: the FBI assigned actually hand picked agents from around the
- 8:26Speaker 1: country who had experience in some of these very sophisticated
- 8:29Speaker 1: financial products and Ron was using, like derivatives and and
- 8:32Speaker 1: other products. So there were a bunch of FBI agents
- 8:35Speaker 1: who had experience that's a little unusual for an FBI agent,
- 8:38Speaker 1: for example, former investment bankers, former securities traders, former derivatives traders.
- 8:45Speaker 1: And then we also were putting together a team of
- 8:48Speaker 1: prosecutors from around the country with with significant experience in
- 8:53Speaker 1: significant cases, which was important because could it was clear
- 8:56Speaker 1: that this is going to be not only complicated, but
- 8:58Speaker 1: very high profile. So we wanted to make sure we
- 9:01Speaker 1: had the right team when this assignment came to you
- 9:04Speaker 1: in two thousand two. In the beginning, you know of
- 9:08Speaker 1: an investigation, you often think you know what you have.
- 9:10Speaker 1: Many times you think you know what you have, and
- 9:12Speaker 1: then when would you end up with is very different.
- 9:14Speaker 1: I guess I'm curious is when you look at the
- 9:17Speaker 1: you know what you when you were handed this in
- 9:19Speaker 1: two thousand two and what you ended up with, how
- 9:21Speaker 1: how different a picture was that. It was the kind
- 9:25Speaker 1: of thing that when we started, all we really knew
- 9:30Speaker 1: other than learning about Enron's business, was that this very
- 9:34Speaker 1: large and powerful and influential and well regarded company was
- 9:38Speaker 1: very very important and well regarded and connected senior executives
- 9:43Speaker 1: had literally collapsed, apparently overnight, and there have been some
- 9:47Speaker 1: murmurings in the press about potential shenanigans involving some off
- 9:52Speaker 1: books entities, but we really didn't know. I mean, there
- 9:55Speaker 1: are a lot of reasons why a business can collapse
- 9:57Speaker 1: besides criminal activity, and we were concerned that the haste
- 10:02Speaker 1: with and the degree to which Enron collapse suggested that
- 10:05Speaker 1: there must be some kind of wrongdoing, but we really
- 10:07Speaker 1: didn't know. Um. One thing we didn't know until we
- 10:12Speaker 1: really rolled up our sleeves and got into it was
- 10:15Speaker 1: just how much the kind of unfortunately corrupt leadership culture
- 10:20Speaker 1: and messages UH infected so many different corners of the company.
- 10:25Speaker 1: And that was what we took a bit of time
- 10:28Speaker 1: to unravel over the next couple of years, take us
- 10:30Speaker 1: deeper than you're not getting cooperations from key players. The
- 10:33Speaker 1: Board of Directors has prepared a report. What happened next, Well,
- 10:37Speaker 1: we kind of looked through the report that the board
- 10:39Speaker 1: had prepared and figured out different potential lines of inquiry,
- 10:42Speaker 1: assigned different teams to those different lines. So one group
- 10:46Speaker 1: would be in charge of um looking into the broadband business,
- 10:49Speaker 1: one group would be in charge of looking into other
- 10:52Speaker 1: aspects of the company, and then they would all kind
- 10:55Speaker 1: of work and we would coordinate. And my role was
- 10:58Speaker 1: to make sure everyone was doing what they were supposed
- 11:00Speaker 1: to be doing and that things were moving forward, and
- 11:02Speaker 1: that we were all coordinating in terms of understanding what
- 11:04Speaker 1: each group was finding and making adjustments accordingly. So we started,
- 11:10Speaker 1: We looked at a lot of documents, We interviewed people,
- 11:13Speaker 1: We educated ourselves about the business models, and I say
- 11:17Speaker 1: models because there were very several different business models in play.
- 11:20Speaker 1: We looked at third parties who may have been culpable
- 11:24Speaker 1: in some fashion in supporting Enron's fraud or leading to
- 11:28Speaker 1: its collapse. And so it was really we had a
- 11:31Speaker 1: bunch of different work streams going at the same time,
- 11:34Speaker 1: when did you have an AHA moment? As you were
- 11:36Speaker 1: doing your investigation. At the very beginning, there was a
- 11:42Speaker 1: massive document destruction across the board at Arthur Anderson involving
- 11:47Speaker 1: members of the Enron team in different different geographies. That
- 11:51Speaker 1: was of immediate interest. UM. We were very interested right
- 11:54Speaker 1: off the bat in some special purpose entities that were
- 11:57Speaker 1: being used by the company to move under performing or
- 12:01Speaker 1: negative assets off their books so they could continue to
- 12:04Speaker 1: report favorable financial results. We saw some specific transactions UM
- 12:10Speaker 1: that looked very suspicious that we focused more deeply on.
- 12:14Speaker 1: We were able to get a conviction in the Anderson case.
- 12:16Speaker 1: We then we're able to bring charges against three British
- 12:19Speaker 1: bankers and begin extradition proceedings involving them. And around that
- 12:24Speaker 1: same time, which would have been about July of two
- 12:26Speaker 1: thousand two, we got the first significant cooperating Enron insider
- 12:31Speaker 1: witness who has with somebody who was kind of a
- 12:35Speaker 1: right hand man to the chief financial officer, Andy fast Out,
- 12:40Speaker 1: his sort of principal deputy right hand man, decided to
- 12:44Speaker 1: cooperate with us, and that helped tremendously in advancing our
- 12:47Speaker 1: understanding of internal discussions and who knew what when at Enron,
- 12:53Speaker 1: and that was tremendously helpful. And from then, which was
- 12:56Speaker 1: as I said about July of two thousand two, there
- 12:59Speaker 1: was a fairly quick momentum change and additional people started
- 13:04Speaker 1: cooperating UM and providing information and the case the case
- 13:09Speaker 1: started moving, as you know, in the way we wanted
- 13:12Speaker 1: it to more quickly, Sarbanes Oxley. You know it came
- 13:16Speaker 1: as a result of this. Did this make the world
- 13:18Speaker 1: safer from situations like Cameron? I think the collapse of
- 13:23Speaker 1: Enron and the sort of the associated shock of that
- 13:26Speaker 1: collapse and the magnitude of that collapse did actually get
- 13:29Speaker 1: people's attention and it made a difference. Obviously, it helps
- 13:31Speaker 1: spawn Sarbanes Oxley, which I think has been useful. But
- 13:35Speaker 1: I think more importantly, the fact that there was a
- 13:38Speaker 1: company that had corruption at the highest levels and in
- 13:41Speaker 1: the c suite, which is something frankly you very rarely see,
- 13:46Speaker 1: was really appalling and shocking and has led to an
- 13:49Speaker 1: entire new outlook in corporate America and globally about the
- 13:53Speaker 1: importance of culture and tone at the top and compliance
- 13:58Speaker 1: controls and integrity UM, all of which I think has
- 14:02Speaker 1: been a net plus for for the for the economy. Um,
- 14:07Speaker 1: I'm not going to say that Enron changed the world,
- 14:09Speaker 1: but it was certainly a wake up call for the
- 14:11Speaker 1: need for companies to take compliance much more seriously and
- 14:15Speaker 1: focus much more on the top messages coming from their
- 14:17Speaker 1: top people. Leslie Caldwell, partner with the law firm Latham
- 14:21Speaker 1: and Watkins. We appreciate you taking time and joining us
- 14:23Speaker 1: today on Bloomberg Law. Thank you my pleasure. That's it
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- 14:45Speaker 1: night at ten pm Wall Street Time. The show is
- 14:48Speaker 1: produced by Eric Mallow for Bloomberg Radio. I'm Joe Shortsley.
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